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Abstract 
This thesis comprises an examination of choice of law rules in property. The study is 
principally concerned with the Scottish rules of international private law, but these, in 
turn, rely heavily upon, and in many respects are indistinguishable from, the 
equivalent English rules. Indeed, they seem in places to be mutually dependent. 
An examination is conducted of choice of law methodology, including in particular, 
an analysis of the configuration of choice of law rules. Consideration is given to the 
role of the connecting factor, and to the definition thereof, in its spatial, temporal and 
dimensional contexts. Throughout the thesis, a contrast is drawn between the 
jurisdiction-selecting approach of Scottish and English international private law, and 
the rule-selecting techniques which are employed in the United States of America. 
Central to the thesis is an examination of the role and definition of the connecting 
factor in the particular context of choice of law rules in property. The study traces the 
development of the lex Situs rule, and its application to dealings with immoveable 
property, corporeal moveable property and incorporeal moveable property, as well as 
the special case of dealings with `cultural property'. Arguments in favour of, and 
against, the lex Situs rule, in these various contexts, are considered, and special 
attention is paid to instances of latent and patent avoidance of the lex situs rule. 
In order to integrate the methodology analysis with the detailed study of choice of law 
in property, two alternative Models of suggested choice of law rules in property are 
presented for consideration; Model 1 is intended to be a draft international instrument, 
whereas Model 2, the more moderate proposal, is intended only as a draft national 
measure. The Models seek to embody the author's desire to inject a greater degree of 
flexibility into choice of law rules in property, and to attempt to formulate even- 
handed solutions to the complex problems (of space, time and policy) which arise in 
this area of the conflict of laws. 
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Choice of Law Methodology 
The structure of conflict rules 
Choice of law rules are typically expressed in the form of an abstract proposition that 
a given matter is `governed' by the `law' of a particular country. Falconbridge has 
described the structure of a choice of law rule thus, "The subject of a conflict rule is a 
legal question arising from a factual situation, and the conflict rule indicates the local 
element in the factual situation which is important as regards that legal question. This 
local element constitutes the connecting factor, that is, the element which connects the 
factual situation with a particular country and thus indicates that the law of that 
country is the proper law governing the legal question; that is, the law which should 
be applied to the factual situation for the purpose of affording a definitive answer to 
the legal question. " 1 
It is not intended to examine in detail applications of the art of characterisation (that 
is, whether or not a particular issue in dispute may be subsumed within the abstract 
proposition specified in the conflict rule). 2 It is, however, intended to analyse the 
Falconbridge, J D, `Conflict of Laws' (1954), 2°d edition, p69; Falconbridge, J D, `Conflict Rule and 
Characterisation of Question' (1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 103,264. 
2 The literature on characterisation (or classification) is immense (e. g. Beckett, W E, `The Question of 
Classification in P. I. L. ' (1934) XV B. Y. B. I. L. 46; Bland, A J, `Classification Re-classified' (1957) 6 
I. C. L. Q. 10; Dine, J M, `Choice of Law by Characterisation' 1983 J. R. 73; Ehrenzweig, A E, 
`Characterisation in the Conflict of Laws: An Unwelcome Addition to American Doctrine' (1961); 
Forsyth, C, `Characterisation Revisited' (1998) 114 L. Q. R. 141; Lipstein, K, `International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 5- Characterization' (1999); Morse, J, 
`Characterisation: Shadow or Substance' (1949) 49 Col. L. R. 1027; Overton, E E, `Analysis in 
Conflict of Laws: The Problem of Classification' (1951) 21 Tennessee Law Rev. 600; Pound, R, 
`Classification of Law' (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 933; Robertson, A H, `Characterisation in the Conflict 
of Laws' (1940); and Unger, J, `The Place of Classification in P. I. L. ' (1937) 19 Bell Yard 3. ) The 
complexities of the subject are familiar to conflicts scholars: "... classification is not unique to the 
2 
formulation and purpose of the `local element' which links the `legal question arising 
from a factual situation' with the lex causae. 
The role of the connecting factor in choice of law methodology 
The unique quality of choice of law rules is the fact that, in contrast with internal or 
domestic law rules, they indicate merely the legal system which is to supply3 the 
substantive relief or remedy sought in the particular case. 4 Choice of law rules, per se, 
are not generally concerned with the substantive outcome of disputes. Instead of 
directing the forum to a particular substantive provision (i. e. to a "decisional norm"), 5 
the choice of law technique which is applied by jurisdiction-selection systems merely 
directs the forum's attention to a certain legal system. 6 The forum should identify the 
system of law from which a substantive solution to a particular issue is to be supplied, 
"... by identifying within the circumstances of the case an element which seems to link 
those circumstances most strongly with a particular legal system. "7 The forum is then 
expected to extract from within that legal system's body of rules, the decisional norm 
which that legal system considers should be applied to the issue presented. The choice 
problem of conflict of laws, though the problem is of greater importance in that field than in any other 
field. " (Overton, ibid., p602). Morris explained that, "Even if, by some miracle, all countries in the 
world adopted the same formulation of the same conflict rules, it would still not follow that the same 
case would be decided in the same way irrespective of the country in which it was litigated. This is 
because, lying hidden beneath the identical formulation of the conflict rules, there would still remain 
differences of view as to the categories which these rules were intended to cover. " (Morris, JHC, 
`Falconbridge's Contribution to the Conflict of Laws' (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 610,618) The 
indefatigable puzzle and appeal of the subject is plain from the words of Professor Cheshire, who 
stated, in 1947, that, "I have modified my views on the baffling problem of classification, probably not 
for the last time. ", and subsequently, in 1952, that, "The problem of classification has lost its terrors so 
far as I am concerned ... 
[a] happy, though probably transient, state of mind. " ('Private International 
Law', Preface, 3'a edition and 4`s editions) 
3 Except, that is, in cases where renvoi operates. 
° Rabe] noted that this unique quality resides in the localizing element which "... prescribes the 
legislative domain in which the question should be 'localized'. " (Rabel, E, 'The Conflict of Laws: A 
Comparative Study - Volume 1' (1958), p47/8; Falconbridge (1954), ibid., p52. 
5 Rosenberg, M, `The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules' (1981) 81 Col. L. R. 946, at p948. 
6 Cf. Baxter, I F, `Recognition of Status in Family Law' (1961) 39 Canadian Bar Review 301, at 
pp341/2: "Rules for choice of law ... are reduction mechanisms ... enabling the courts of the 
forum to 
localize a problem to one system. " 
Anton, A E, `Private International Law' (1990), 2 °d edition, p72. 
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of law problem is deemed to have been solved just as soon as the applicable law has 
been designated by the mechanical allocation or jurisdiction-selecting process. 
Exceptionally, if the forum were to consider that the rule thus extracted would defeat 
a `just' outcome, 8 then rather than ratifying the perceived injustice, the forum may 
resort to certain escape devices (e. g. public policy). 9 
The pivotal element in any choice of law rule is the connecting factor, or localising 
agent. Vischer has defined this determinant as "... the element forming one of the 
facts of the case which is selected in order to attach a question of law to a legal 
system ... the link between the relationship or the legal issue defined in the conflict 
rule and a legal system. "10 The facts which are localised by the connecting factor 
constitute the `matter connected', and the connecting factor, in turn, signifies the 
proximity which exists between the matter connected and the lex causae. If, as 
Savigny believed, the purpose of choice of law rules is "To discover for every legal 
relation (case) that legal territory to which, in its proper nature, it belongs or is 
8 According, that is, to the forum's conception of justice. 
9 Rosenberg considers that devices such as public policy are "... escape devices that superficially 
preserve the integrity of the actual choice-of-law system, but actually riddle it with subterfuge. " (ibid., 
p948) Only in exceptional circumstances will the result to which the putative lex causae leads be taken 
into account: "If the result to which application of the designated law leads is repugnant to the 
concepts of justice and morality of the forum or hurts strong policies underlying the forum law, the 
foreign rules which would produce such an effect can be set aside as violating the international 'ordre 
public' of the forum country. Thus, regard is being paid to the substantive rule of the foreign law, but 
only by way of exception at the end of the allocation process. " (Sauveplanne, J G, `New Trends in the 
Doctrine of P. I. L and their Impact on Court Practice' (1982) lI Receuil des Cours 13, at p24) In a 
colourful depiction of the traditional approach, Sauveplanne has drawn an analogy with the seventeenth 
century Italian painter, Luca Giordano's allegorical depiction of justice: "..., contrary to customary 
representations, she is not blindfolded but her feet rest on an ostrich and it is well known that this bird 
has the habit of putting his head into the sand ... when the problem of conflict of law arises, the ostrich 
raises his head and looks around with a view to choosing the most closely connected legal system. As 
soon as he has discovered this system he bends his neck over the territory where that system governs 
and puts his head into the sand, so that he is unable to see what happens when the rules of law from 
that system are being applied. Only when the result is so shocking that the cry of `ordre public' is 
raised with such force that it reaches his ears, he raises his head out of the sand and looks 
around. "(ibid., pp24/25) 
10 Vischer, F, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 4- Connecting 
Factors' (1999), p3. 
4 
subject (in which it has its seat)", " determination of the connecting factor should, in 
theory, signify the law of the country to which the `legal relation' in question 
`belongs'. 12 
Designation of a connecting factor amounts, in effect, to a policy decision on the part 
of the lexfori, insofar as the connecting factor constitutes a "signpost to the relevant 
legal system. " 13 As Professor Anton has explained, where different connecting factors 
would point towards different legal systems, "... the choice of one rather than the 
other is likely to be dictated by the desire to give effect not only to the policies of the 
conflicts system of the forum, but to those of the branch of the internal law into which 
the question falls. " 14 
In seeking to resolve a choice of law problem, it is necessary to answer two questions, 
first, what is the connecting factor designated by a particular choice of law rule of the 
lex fori, and secondly, according to which system of law should that factor be 
defined? '5 
1 Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p89, paragraph 360. 
12 Savigny, ibid., p89, para 360. As per note 3, supra, however, determination of the connecting factor 
will not necessarily determine the lex causae, since the legal system indicated by the connecting factor 
may operate the doctrine of renvoi. 
13 Anton, ibid., p72. Cf. Vischer, ibid., p3, "The choice of the connecting factor ... always involves a 
policy decision, perhaps the most important one in conflict of laws. " 
14 Anton, ibid., p72. Dine has suggested that a choice of law problem should, in fact, be characterised 
"... in the light of the reason for applying a particular connecting factor to a particular type of 
problem. " (i. e. instead of weighing the merits of competing substantive laws - as interest-analysis 
theorists would recommend - the forum should weigh the merits of the competing (abstract) connecting 
factors) (Dine, ibid., p77) Dine submits, at p91, that "... a comparison of the classification and 
evaluation of the possible connecting factors ... would be valuable", since "the root of the problem ... [is] why are we, applying a particular law to the question? " (ibid., p100) It is submitted, however, that 
the weighing of abstract connecting factors would merely result in the forum being torn by loyalty to 
different policies enshrined within its various choice of law rules. 
15 Cf. Graveson, R H, `Private International Law' (1974), 7`s edition, p68. 
5 
Defining the connecting factor - spatial definition 
The range of factual scenarios, or legal relationships, which, for purposes of choice of 
law, may require to be connected with a legal system, is incalculable. 16 Similarly, the 
number of potential connecting factors is, in theory, infinite. " To instil a degree of 
pragmatism and control into the choice of law process, legal categories have been 
defined in relation to which choice of law rules have been formulated. The legal 
categories and corresponding choice of law rules are relatively broad, and the number 
of connecting factors, relatively few. '8 
Where a connecting factor is `factual' (e. g. ordinary, and possibly habitual, 
residence), the definition or interpretation thereof should not present particular 
difficulties. 19 Where, on the other hand, the factor is `legal' (e. g. domicile'20 locus 
delicti, 21 locus contractus, 22 locus actus, or locus rei sitae23), difficulties of definition 
and interpretation may be anticipated. 
16 Consider Cohn's observation that "... the difficulties facing private international law are so 
complicated and so extensive that it is completely impossible to draft general rules ... in anticipation of 
conflicts. " (Cohn, G, `Existenzialiasms und Rechtsmissenschaft' (1955), p119, per Neuheus P H, 
'Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws' (1963) 28 Law and Contemporary Problems 
795, p800) 
17 Lipstein, ibid., p3. Cf. Reese, WLM, "Restatement of Law Second, Conflict of Laws" (1971) 
(hereinafter `the Second Restatement'), paragraph 6, comment c: "[A] statement of precise rules in 
many areas of choice of law is made even more difficult by the great variety of situations and of 
issues. " 
18 According to Vischer, "Normally the same connecting factor is adopted for several legal questions 
falling within the same legal category or legal concept. " (ibid., p3) 
19 Consider, however, Von Mehren & Trautman's remark that, "To the extent that the term 'contact 
point' has ... physical connotations, it is not particularly felicitous ... What is involved is not 
necessarily a physical connection or a 'point' in any relevant sense. " (Von Mehren, A T, and 
Trautman, D T, `The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws' (1965), 
1103) 
2° Bell v. Kennedy (1868) 6 M. (HL) 69; Udny v. Udny (1869) 7 M. (HL) 89. And arguably the 
definition of `habitual residence' has become as rule-laden (though with less certain rules) as that of 
domicile. 
2t Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co (1904) 7 F. 65. 
22 Benaim v. Debono [1924] A. C. 514; Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 Q. B. 327. 
23 See Chapter Four, infra - 'Defining the `Situs". 
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In principle, a connecting factor should be defined by the lex fori, 24 since conflict of 
laws rules comprise part of the internal law of the forum25 (e. g. if a Scots forum, 
applying Scots conflict rules, considers that succession to moveable property is 
governed by the lex domicilii of the deceased, `domicile' should be determined 
according to the lex fori26). The reason for this is clear: as Overton has explained, "We 
cannot ... refer to the law of any state or nation until we 
have agreed upon the contact 
point. We can not [sic] use the contact definition of the state whose law will ultimately 
control because until we define the contact point we do not know whose law will 
ultimately control 9927 In the same way, however, that an enlightened lexfori approach 
should regulate the characterisation process, 28 so too, it is submitted, the forum should 
adopt an enlightened approach to the definition and interpretation of connecting 
factors. 29 (e. g. If the forum considers that certain property, say, a fixture, is situated in 
state X, but state X considers that the property is, in fact, situated in state Y, it may be 
appropriate for the forum to defer to the view of state X). 
Defining the connecting factor - temporal definition30 
Difficulties of definition and interpretation of a connecting factor may arise, not only 
on the spatial plane, but also on the temporal one. An important distinction exists 
24 An exception to this rule pertains in relation to nationality (Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1975] 1 All 
E. R. 538), and possibly in relation to situs (See Chapter Four, infra - `Defining the `Situs"). 25 Unger, ibid., p4; Lipstein, ibid., p4; and Vischer, ibid., p21. Hence, the designation `International 
Private Law' is more accurate than `Private International Law', for choice of law rules comprise part 
of the Private Law, not International Law. 
26 Re Annesley [ 1926] Ch. 692. 
27 Overton, ibid., p608. 
28 See Chapter Nine, infra - `The Contract/Conveyance Borderland'. 29 Cf. Vischer, ibid., p21: "The interpretation of a connecting factor should always take into account 
the purpose of the conflict rule; it should serve to co-ordinate the national conflict rules with the rules 
of other states using the same connecting factor ... 
A broader autonomous interpretation seems 
indicated. " 
30 See Chapter Four, infra - `Defining the `Situs". 
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between static, or constant, connecting factors, and dynamic, or variable, factors. 
31 
Many connecting factors comprise one or more elements which may be altered by the 
will of the parties in question (e. g. domicile, 32 or the situs of moveable property). If 
the relevant connecting factor is variable, there may emerge a `conflit mobile dans le 
temps', 33 and the lex foci will be required to determine the precise moment at which 
the law designated by the connecting factor is to be ascertained. 
Temporal conflicts may arise from a change in the connecting factor itself (e. g. where 
A loses his domicile of origin in state X, and acquires a domicile of choice in state Y), 
or from a change in the substantive law designated by the connecting factor (e. g. 
where the rules of succession applicable in state Y are altered between the date of A's 
acquisition of a domicile of choice in Y, and the date of A's death, with or without 
retrospective effect). 
When considering conflits mobiles, it is necessary also to distinguish between the 
relevant date on which a connecting factor should be determined, and the period of 
time which appertains to the finding of facts incidental to that determination (e. g. the 
forum may determine that the propositus was domiciled in state X on his or her date 
of death, but the factual investigation necessary to support such a conclusion may 
range over the entire life of the propositus and, potentially, that of his or her parents). 
31 "[A connecting factor] may be of such nature that it necessarily refers to a particular moment and 
none other, so that further definition can be dispensed with, or it may refer to conditions which extend 
over a period of time so that a definition of the relevant moment is required. " (Mann, F A, `The Time 
Element in the Conflict of Laws' (1954) 31 B. Y. I. L. 217,221) Cf. Webb, PRH, and Brown, DJL, 
`Casebook on the Conflict of Laws' (1960), p54. 
32 Noting, however, that it is the combination of intention and residence ('animo et facto') which is 
significant. Consider Dr Crawford's explanation: "Acquisition of a domicile of choice involves a 
chap e of both residence and intention ... Retention of a domicile of choice involves retention of either 
residence or intention ... Abandonment of a domicile of choice involves a chap e of both residence and 
intention. " (Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p78, paragraph 6.08) 
S 
The formulation of connecting factors 
Connecting factors may be personal34 or territorial, 35 voluntary36 or involuntary. 37 
More interesting perhaps, is the formulation of connecting factors. The factors 
referred to thus far (i. e. locus domicilii, locus rei sitae, locus actus, locus contractus, 
locus solutionis, locus celebrationis, locus delicti, and place of incorporation) may be 
termed `single-contact' connecting factors, referring specifically, and exclusively, to 
one legal system. 38 Single-contact connecting factors expressly curtail the range of 
facts which is deemed relevant to a determination of the lex causae. This has invited 
criticism since, "Where, as in choice of law cases, the problem is essentially complex, 
the rules developed must contain variables to permit some degree of accommodation 
to these complexities whose precise nature cannot be anticipated. , 39 
33 See generally Mann, ibid., and Kahn-Freund, 0, `General Principles of Private International Law' 
(1980), p252 et seq. 
34 E. g. Nationality or domicile: "... the relevant element is the social connection of an individual with a 
legal system. " (Vischer, ibid., p7). Vischer also cites, as an example of a personal connecting factor, 
adherence to a particular religious community (e. g. The Sinha Peerage Claim [1946] 1 All E. R. 348; 
Lendrum v. Chakravarti 1929 S. L. T. 96; and MacDougall v. Chitnavis 1937 S. C. 39). 
35 E. g. locus rei sitae; locus actus; locus contractus; locus solutionis; locus celebrationis; locus delicti; 
locus concursus (the state in which bankruptcy proceedings are opened); and place of incorporation. 
36 E. g. locus actus; locus contractus; locus celebrationis; domicile of choice; and more broadly, any 
permitted exercise of party autonomy. 
37 E. g. locus delicti; nationality; domicile of origin; and derivative or dependent domiciles. 
38 Cf. Von Mehren & Trautman, ibid., at p103: "Conventional thought calls for identification of 
'contact points', that is, of the factual elements of a transaction that connect it with various 
jurisdictions ... 
From among these various contact points, traditional thought calls for the selection of 
the primarily significant contact point. " ; and Kay: "The traditional approach focuses on the location 
of a single conceptual event, generally the state in which the rights asserted by the claimant vested. " 
(Kay, H H, `Testing the Modern Critics Against Moffatt Hancock's Choice of Law Theories' (1985) 73 
Cal. L. Rev. 525,526) 
39 Cavers, D F, 'A Critique of the Choice-of-law Process' (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173, p194. Cf. 
Vischer, ibid., p19: "The single contact approach has been criticized for exaggerating the importance 
of the contact chosen, especially in case the legal relationship to which the connecting factor refers 
englobes a wider range of legal issues. " This is especially true in cases where an incidental or 
preliminary question which arises in the course of the principal action is referred to the lex causae 
pertaining to the primary question: reliance is placed upon an incidental, single-contact connecting 
factor 
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Sometimes, choice of law rules incorporate what may be termed 'multiple', 40 or 
`cumulative', 41 connecting factors, the effect of which is to impose a stricter rule of 
choice of law than would pertain in terms of a single-contact connecting factor. 42 
In contrast with multiple factors, a more liberal approach to choice of law is apparent 
from the application of rules of `alternative connection', in terms of which, 
satisfaction of any one of a range of factors will validate the transaction or other act in 
question. 3 `Alternative connection' connecting factors exude a preference for a 
particular substantive result (e. g. in favorem contractual, or testamentary, validity). 
Rather than achieving a certain substantive result by means of an entirely open-ended 
connecting factor (e. g. the law which upholds the formal validity of the contract or 
will), the desired result is secured by operation of a rule of delimited optional 
reference. 44 
Further latitude exists in the freedom, in any conflict of laws case which arises in a 
Scottish or English forum, for parties to refrain from pleading or proving the relevant 
40 E. g. In terms of section 46(2)(a)(i) of the Family Law Act 1986, recognition, in Scotland, of an 
overseas divorce etc., obtained otherwise than by means of proceedings, depends, inter alia, upon each 
party to the marriage being domiciled in the country in which it was obtained, at the relevant date. 
41 E. g. The common law rule (preserved for use, in certain cases, by section 13 of the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995), of double actionability in delict, according to 
which an act must be actionable as a delict according to the lex loci delicti, and by the lex fori (See 
Crawford, ibid., p288, paragraph 13.13) 
42 Cf. Vischer, ibid., at p20: "In the final analysis, the strictest law prevails. " 
43 E. g. Article 9(1) and (2) of the Rome Convention, regarding the formal validity of a contract; and 
section 1(1) of the Wills Act 1963, concerning the formal validity of a will: compliance with any one of 
the lex loci actus, the lex domicilii (at date of execution, or date of the testator's death), the testator's 
residence (at date of execution, or date of the testator's death), or the testator's nationality (at date of 
execution, or date of the testator's death), will suffice to make the will formally valid. (Crawford, ibid., 
p364, paragraph 17.22) It is submitted that the theories variously applied to determine the essential 
validity of a marriage, namely, the traditional theory (which is itself a `cumulative' connecting factor, 
applied distributively, according to which each party must have capacity to marry according to his or 
her ante-nuptial domicile), and the intended matrimonial domicile theory (in terms of which each party 
must have capacity to marry according to the intended matrimonial domicile), do not constitute an 
`alternative connection' connecting factor, but rather amount to rival rules of choice of law. 
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foreign law, and thereby to induce (albeit indirectly) reference to the lex foci. This 
procedural quirk may be exploited so as to reduce what is a multiple, or cumulative, 
connecting factor, to a single-contact connecting factor, 45 and to consign a single- 
contact connecting factor to oblivion. Furthermore, in certain single-contact instances 
(notably the `personal' connecting factors), the rules of onus of proof may favour one 
party over the other (e. g. the rules of domicile acquisition, which stand against 
change). 
It is submitted that what are commonly termed `proper law' rules of choice of law 
constitute a hybrid of single and multiple contact connecting factors. Proper law 
connecting factors are generally only ascertainable ex posteriori. 46 On the face of it, 
the `proper law' epithet points only to one connecting factor, typically, to the law with 
which the transaction (or right) in question is most closely connected. 47 In order to 
ascertain what that law is, however, account must be taken of connections which 
exist, first, between the transaction (or right) in question and the putative lex causae, 
and secondly, between that transaction (or right) and other systems of law. 48 In short, 
44 Vischer has suggested that choice of law rules of this nature are "... partly conflict rules and partly 
international substantive rules. By favouring a certain result they attempt to eliminate the blind 
reference to a foreign law inherent in bilateral conflict rules. " (ibid., p19) 
45 Whilst a Scots forum would have judicial knowledge, in an appropriate case, say, of the choice of 
law rule of double actionability (e. g. where the case fell within section 13 of the Private International 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995), if neither party were to plead or prove the foreign lex loci 
delicti, the content of that law would be presumed to be the same as the Scots lex fori. Technically, the 
cumulative connecting factor would still apply, but, in practice, it would amount to no more than a 
single-contact connecting factor. 
46 Although they must exist ab initio: The Armar [1981] 1 All E. R. 498. Consider Crawford, ibid., 
p253, at paragraph 12.34: "... the proper law was held to attach ... at the time the contract was made, 
even though it might not be visible and might require to be discovered. " But see further Plender, R, and 
Wilderspin, M, `The European Contracts Convention: The Rome Convention on the Choice of Law for 
Contracts' (2°d ed. ) (2001), paragraph 5-05 (suggesting that a contract - at common law - could be 
regarded as governed by its proper law objectively ascertained, until the event occurred or option was 
exercised to `fix' the governing law; and to similar effect under the Convention (paragraph 5-06). 
47 E. g. Article 4(1) of the Rome Convention: "... the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country with which it is most closely connected. " 
48 E. g. Article 3 of the Rome Convention, where the law chosen by the parties has not been expressed, 
but rather has been "... demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. "; and Article 4(5): "... the presumptions in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 shall be 
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a `single-contact' connecting factor disguises what transpires to be a `multiple- 
contact' reference. It is submitted, therefore, that `proper law' rules constitute 
`complex' or `aggregate' connecting factors. In contrast with `multiple' or 
`cumulative' contact connecting factors, it is suggested that `complex' or `aggregate' 
factors necessitate a qualitative, rather than a purely quantitative, evaluation of 
contacts. 49 
If the choice of law rule in question should take the form of a presumptive proper 
law, 50 generally it will be necessary, in order for the presumption to operate, that the 
`primary' connecting factor (i. e. the factor in favour of which the presumption 
operates)51 should be buttressed by subsidiary connections. Otherwise, the 
presumption will likely be rebutted. 52 
Recent trends in the formulation of connecting factors 
Since the 1970s, there has been a change53 in American conflict of laws theory and 
practice. The modern tendency in choice of law is to "... suppress the choice of 
connecting factors by the lawmaker and to replace it by a choice of connecting factor 
disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected 
with another country. " Cf. Vischer, ibid., p14, "A legal relationship can be localized by taking into 
account a variety of circumstances without giving beforehand preference to any specific contact. The 
goal is to identify ex post the law with which the relationship or legal transaction has the closest and 
most real connection. " 
49 See note 121, infra. 
50 E. g. Article 4(2), (3) and (4) of the Rome Convention. 
51 E. g. The habitual residence of the characteristic performer (Article 4(2), Rome Convention); the Situs 
of immoveable property (Article 4(3), Rome Convention); or the carrier's principal place of business 
(being also the country of loading or discharge, or the principal place of business of the consignor) 
(Article 4(4), Rome Convention). 
52 E. g. The corrective mechanism contained in Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention. Cf. Vischer, ibid., 
at p19, "In a system of grouping of contacts, the main connecting factor is relevant only if it is 
reinforced by other contacts pointing to the same law. "; and Lagarde, P, `International Encyclopaedia 
of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 11- Public Policy' (1994), p3. 
53 Described by some as a `revolution'. (E. g. Jeunger, F K, `Amercian and European Conflicts Law' 
(1982) Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 117,132; Trautman, D T, 'The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another 
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in each case ad hoc by the decision maker. , 54 This `softening' process represents, in 
the U. S. A. at least, the "dominant characteristic of the contemporary development of 
private international law. "55 The process has occurred against the backdrop of the 
rule-selection regime, and has entailed the replacement of `hard' connecting factors 
(i. e. traditional, single-contact factors), with `soft' ones (i. e. complex, or aggregate, 
connecting factors). The softening phenomenon, which has been dubbed "legal 
impressionism", 56 also comprises the rejection of strict, inflexible rules and "... the 
adoption of principles which owing to their generality and indistinctness leave as 
much as possible to the decision of the individual case. "57 
Arguably, the germ of the softening process was inherent in Savigny's doctrine of the 
`sedes obligationes. '58 The sedes principle, the purpose of which was to localize the 
Insight' (1986) 99 Harv. L. R. 1101; and Vitta, E, 'The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts 
Revolution"' (1982) 30 Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 1) 
54 Kahn-Freund, ibid., p260. 
ss Kahn-Freund, ibid., p260. Cf. The remarks of Vitta: "Such a softening process characterises all of 
the American theories. European scholars might then profit from the perspectives afforded by 
American proposals and experiences. " (ibid., p8); and Kegel: "Altogether it seems to be a sign of the 
times to soften up strict forms. " (Kegel, G, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 
111, Chapter 3- Fundamental Approaches' (1986), p63) 
56 Loussouarn, `Course General de droit international prive' (1973) II Receuil des Cours 271,338 (per 
Kahn-Freund, ibid., p264). 
57 Kahn-Freund, ibid., p261. Kahn-Freund argued that the advent of more flexible concepts was a 
necessary reaction to the growth of, and changing techniques employed in, international trade: "All 
attempts to cope with the problems of international commercial law with the help of 'hard' concepts ... 
foundered on the facts of life. " (ibid., p262) He considered that the basis of this methodological 
metamorphosis was a "plea of necessity. "(ibid., p274) Cf. Kegel, who opined that, "The hostility of the 
[American] innovators to 'rules' and their inclination towards decisions ad hoc, based on far-reaching 
considerations of legal policy, has its origin in realism. " (ibid., p65) The perceived inadequacy of 
`hard' rules prompted Kahn-Freund to argue that, "It is useless simply to lament the sacrifice of 
predictability upon the altar of 'equity' ... or to 
deny such tendencies as 'nihilism'. " (ibid., p261) Cf. 
Ehrenzweig, A A, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws', (1962) p548. 
58 Consider, for example, Audit's observation that, "... the 'Bealian' rules of the Ist Restatement and 
the Continental (or 'Savignian') rules rested on quite different bases. The latter are founded on much 
the same analysis that was developed in the United States to depart from the former. The approach 
incorporated in the 2nd Restatement is thus more likely to close the gap between American and 
European solutions or bring them closer together than they were under the Ist Restatement (or would 
have been had the Restatement been faithfully applied). " (Audit, B, 'A Continental Lawyer Looks at 
Contemporary American Choice-of-Law Principles' (1979) 27 Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 589, p590) 
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seats of particular obligations, 59 enhanced the power of the decision-maker. More 
conspicuously, the softening process both triggered, and resulted from, the 
substitution in the United States of the Second6° for the First61 Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws. While `hard' connecting factors, amounting to "... crystallisations of a 
policy to find the system of law with which a type of issue has its closest link"62 were 
the hallmark of the First Restatement, 63 the Second Restatement embodied the 
widespread preference for `soft' connecting factors. 64 
The choice of law process: 'rules' v. 'approach'? 
Related to the question whether it is preferable to employ `hard' as opposed to `soft' 
connecting factors, is the question whether it is better to construct a framework of 
choice of law rules65 (exemplified by the technique of jurisdiction-selection), or to 
cultivate a fluid approach66 to choice of law (exemplified by the technique of rule- 
selection). The choice between application of mechanical rules, and implementation 
of a flexible approach, rests ultimately upon whether it is deemed preferable to 
employ precise rules which may prove inappropriate, or inadequate, in a particular 
59 Savigny considered that, "... the whole problem comes to be - To discover for every legal relation 
(case) that legal territory to which, in its proper nature, it belongs or is subject (in which it has its 
seat). " (Savigny, ibid., p89, paragraph 360) Later, Savigny suggested that the proper enquiry should be, 
"Where is the true seat of each obligation; at what place is its home? " (ibid., p148, paragraph 369) 
60 (1971), Reporter Willis Reese. 
61 (1934), Reporter Joseph Beale. 
62 Kahn-Freund, ibid., p263. 
63 E. g. Paragraph 257: "Whether a conveyance of a chattel which is in due form and is made by a party 
who has capacity to convey it is in other respects valid, it determined by the law of the state where the 
chattel is at the time of the conveyance. " 
64 Note 81 et seq., infra. 
65 "By 'rule' is meant a phenomenon found in most areas of the law, namely a formula which once 
applied will lead the court to a conclusion. To be sure, there will inevitably be questions as to the 
proper scope of the rule, including questions as to how the words that comprise the rule should be 
defined. But once it has been decided what a rule means and how it should be applied, a conclusion 
will be reached through the rule's application. " (Reese, WLM, 'General Course on Private 
International Law' (1976) II Receuil des Cours 2, at p44) 
66 "By 'approach' is meant a system whose application will not of itself lead to a conclusion since it 
does no more than state what factor or factors should be considered in arriving at a conclusion. " 
(Reese, (1976), ibid., at p44) 
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case, 67 or to adopt a discretionary approach which may engender greater difficulty in 
its general application. 68 
Traditionally, choice of law rules (classically formulated), were few in number, 69 and 
all embracing in character (e. g. the rule that all questions concerning the cross-border 
transfer of property should be governed by the lex situs). It is said that rules of this 
type foster certainty and predictability, and thereby facilitate the judicial task. 
Reliance upon strict rules, however, places a heavy onus on the effective operation of 
the characterisation process. This is less true of discretionary approaches to choice of 
law, which seek only to identify the law with which a particular matter is most closely 
connected. In the recent case of Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v. Five Star 
Trading LLC, 70 Mance, I. J. adverted to the sometimes-artificial constraints of the 
characterisation process, warning that, "... the conflict of laws does not depend like a 
game or even an election upon the application of rigid rules, but upon a search for 
appropriate principles to meet particular situations. "71 The contest between `rigid 
rules' and `appropriate principles' mirrors that which pertains between `hard' and 
`soft' connecting factors. 72 
67 Von Mehren & Trautman, for example, wrote of the "troublesome" matter of "... individualization of 
the rule to fit the facts of particular cases. " (ibid., p104) This, of course, is true of all rules. 
68 Cf. Carter, P B, `Rejection of Foreign Law: Some P. I. L Inhibitions' (1984) 55 B. Y. B. I. L. 111,112. 
69 Consider Dr Crawford's comment that, "... the remark has been made to me that it [international 
private law] could all be written down on the back of an envelope. " (Crawford, E B, `What Happened 
to Indyka? ', p176, in Gamble, AJ (ed. ), `Obligations in Context' (1990)) 
70 [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344. 
71 Ibid., p1356. As Binchy has advised, however, "... ordinary life, let alone the legal process, would 
become unmanageable if we were to avoid the categorisation process. " (Binchy, W, `Irish Conflicts of 
Law' (1988), p28) Cf. Von Mehren & Trautman, ibid., at p437: "The use of abstractions and categories 
are necessary to render manageable the infinite detail of immediate experience ... appropriate use of 
abstraction economizes on time and energy. " Characterisation, however, must necessarily involve 
some loose ends; these, it has been suggested, rest more easily with a choice of law approach, than 
with a system of strict choice of law rules. 
72 See generally Kegel, G, `Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the 
American Reformers' (1979) 27 Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 615. 
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In favour of 'rigid rules' - jurisdiction-selection 
As has already been indicated, 73 legal systems which adhere to jurisdiction-selection 
methodology74 allocate factual situations or legal relationships to systems of law (the 
lex causae), "... by means of pre-established connecting factors without taking into 
account the concrete circumstances of the case. "75 
Jurisdiction-selection mandates that the forum adopt a mechanical approach to choice 
of law: "The judge's attention is diverted from the problems of policy posed by the 
facts and the alternative solutions suggested by the dispositive rules to the remote and 
taxonomic issue of assigning the dispositive rules to some general rubric of law. "76 
The methodology relies heavily upon rote application by the forum of connecting 
factors, particularly factors which do not necessitate evaluation or appraisal by the 
forum of competing contacts. The technique has been condemned by American 
73 Note 6, supra. 
74 Consider Carter's remark that jurisdiction-selection is a "fundamental assumption of orthodox 
private international law. " Carter suggests that the technique "... remains firmly embedded in English 
grivate international law doctrine. " (ibid., p112) 
5 Sauveplanne, ibid., p34. Cavers argued that, within the context of the allocation method, "... 
considerations [of justice and social expediency] are still harnessed to the old task of devising (or 
justifying) rules for selecting the appropriate jurisdiction whose law should govern a given case. " 
(Cavers (1933), ibid., p178) Cf. Currie's description of jurisdiction-selection: "When a conflict-of-laws 
case comes before a court, the court is not supposed to adjudicate it - that is, to bring its intelligence to 
bear upon the reason and policy and history of the laws in question, and their application to the facts 
at hand, so as to do justice to the parties under law. [The judge] is supposed to feed the data into the 
machine, using certain standard procedures, and to write down as his decision the result that comes 
out of the machine. He is not supposed to question the wisdom, or soundness, or justice of the result, 
nor to think, or even talk in terms of competing policies. "(Currie, B, `Selected Essays on the Conflict of 
Laws' (1963), p138/9); Kegel, G, `The Crisis of Conflict of Laws' (1961) II Receuil des Cours 95, 
p177; and Cavers, "... a courtfaithful to the conventional approach will turn in search of a conflicts of 
law rule to determine the jurisdiction whose law should govern the question at issue. The conflicts rule 
indicates in which jurisdiction the appropriate law may be found. Assuming the law offered to be from 
that jurisdiction, the court will proceed with the case, employing that law as a rule of decision. Not 
until its admission for that purpose does the content of that law become material. " (Cavers (1933), 
ibid., p178) 
76 Hancock, M, `Three Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem: the Classificatory, the Functional 
and the Result-Selective', P367. (In 'XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Laws - Essays in 
Honour of Nessel E Yntema') (1961) 
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scholars, as "metaphysical in concept, mechanistic in operation and myopic as to 
consequences. "77 
In favour of 'appropriate principles' - rule-selection 
The theme that unites `modern' theories about choice of law methodology, is censure 
of the mechanical application of pre-determined connecting factors. Traditional 
methodology has been portrayed as an example of "... robot-like machinery, 
operating at random, producing spurious results, without bothering about their 
soundness and disregarding social realities. , 78 In contrast, rule-selecting theorists 
replace choice of law rules with a choice of a law process. 79 
Rule-selection adherents consider that regard should be paid to the particular nuances 
of individual cases and to the policies of interested states. Otherwise, it is contended, 
the routine application of hard rules may lead to a result which furthers the interests of 
no particular state, and which, in addition, may infringe the interests of more than 
one. 80 This belief has resulted in the expansion of rule-selecting techniques, the most 
favoured of which is interest analysis. Interest analysis will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven, infra, but it suffices to note that, for reasons there outlined, it is not 
77 Rosenberg., ibid., p948. 
'a Vitta, ibid., p7. Cf. Cavers' verdict that, "The court ... is engaging in a 
blindfold test. The court must 
blind itself to the content of the law to which its rule or principle of selection points and to the result 
which that law may work in the case before it. The conflicts rule having pointed out the jurisdiction in 
which the appropriate law may be found, judicial scrutiny of that law, except for the purpose of its 
application, is henceforth proscribed. " (Cavers (1933), p180); and De Nova's finding that the 
'blindfold test' operates as if the reference were to "... closed boxes, only the chosen to be opened and 
scrutinised for its contents after the choice has been made on the basis of external factors. " De Nova 
alternatively compared the jurisdiction-selecting approach to a coin which, "... when inserted in the 
doctrinal slot machine, produces the appropriate jurisdiction, provided the coin fits the slot. " (De 
Nova, R, `Glancing at the Content of Substantive Rules Under the Jurisdiction-Selecting Approach' 
(1977) 41 Law and Contemporary Problems 1, p5) Such portrayals amount to a 'caricature' of the 
traditional method, viewed invariably through the 'distortions of American spectacles'. (Van Hecke, G, 
(1969) Receuil des Cours 329,399, per Vitta, ibid., p7) 
79 Kegel (1986), ibid., p43. 
80 Reese, WLM, 'Major Areas of Choice of Law' (1964) 1 Receuil des Cours 315,330. 
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considered that the theory would favourably, or usefully, be imported into Scots or 
English choice of law methodology. Whilst it may be argued that interest analysis 
epitomizes a `soft' approach to choice of law, the theory is concerned less with the 
formulation of connecting factors, than with the interests and policies underlying rules 
of substantive law. Of greater relevance to a consideration of connecting factors, is 
the localising agent utilised in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, namely, 
the `most significant relationship' test (hereinafter, `the MSR test'). 
The Second Restatement81 adopts as the basic criterion for choice of law, the law of 
the state with which the issue82 in question has the most significant relationship. 83 
Within the Second Restatement, one can discern qualities reminiscent of the objective 
theory of the proper law of a contract, 84 and of the `centre of gravity' and `grouping of 
contacts' theories developed in the U. S. A., first in relation to choice of law in 
contract, and later, choice of law in tort. According to the latter of these theories, the 85 
SI The Second Restatement has been described by Morris as, "... the most impressive, comprehensive 
and valuable work on the conflict of laws that has ever been produced in any country, in any language, 
at any time. " (Morris, JHC, `Law and Reason Triumphant - or - How Not to Review a Restatement' 
(1973) 21 Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 322,330) According to Kegel, "[it] represents a compromise 
between traditional conflicts law and modern American doctrines. " (1986, ibid., p62) 
82 The MSR test is issue-oriented, proceeding on an issue-by-issue basis. (Shapira, A, `The Interest 
Approach to Choice of Law' (1970), p210) Shapira has suggested that, "this growing quest for 
particularization in the choice-of-law process introduces into traditional conflicts thinking a fresh, 
progressive element, which is perhaps of a more radical significance than is ordinarily perceived. " 
(ibid., p211) 
83 Proceeding from the MSR basis, it is explained that, "Those chapters in the Restatement ... which 
are concerned with choice of law state the rules which the courts have evolved in accommodation of 
the factors listed in [paragraph 6](2). " (paragraph 6, comment c) 
84 E. g. The Assunzione [1954] P. 150; and Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., The Al 
Wahab [1983] 2 All E. R. 884. 
85 E. g. Auten v. Auten 308 N. Y. 155,124 N. E. 2d 99 (1954); Babcock v. Jackson 12 N. Y. 2d 473,191 
N. E. 2d 279 (1963) (per Shapira, ibid., p209). Decisions such as these prompted Reese's remark that, 
"... the conflict. of laws is in a state of flux. This is particularly true of that most difficult area of the 
subject ... choice of 
law 
... 
This surely is a time for soul-searching and re-evaluation. " (Reese, WLM, 
'Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second' (1963) 28 Law and Contemporary Problems 679, at 
p679) 
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jurisdiction "most intimately connected with the outcome of [the] particular litigation 
will be accorded control over the legal issues implicated in the controversy. , 86 
It was surmised by the drafters of the Second Restatement that, in course of time, 
fixed rules would be proved wrong or inadequate. In the reformers' learned view, 
what was required was that, "... in each case, all of the policies must be considered 
and a choice of law rule developed that will give effect to what are the most important 
policies for the precise purpose at hand. "87 Accordingly, the Restatement stipulates 
that the MSR criterion should be ascertained in accordance with the principles listed 
in paragraph six of the Restatement, viz.: - 
`°(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of 
its own state on choice of law; 
(2) Where there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the 
applicable rule of law include: - 
(a) needs of the interstate and international systems; 88 
(b) relevant policies of the forum; 89 
86 Auten v. Auten, ibid., per Fuld, J. 
87 Reese (1963), ibid., p698 
88 Professor Reese, Reporter for the Second Restatement, outlined how "Choice of law rules ... should 
seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse ... 
Adoption of the same choice of law rules by many states will further the needs of the interstate and 
international systems. " (paragraph 6, comment c) 
89 A strong sense of interest analysis is introduced in this factor, viz.: "if the purposes sought to be 
achieved by a local statute or common law rule would be furthered by its application to out-of-state 
facts, this is a weighty reason why such application should be made. " (paragraph 6, comment b) 
Consider, in contrast, paragraph 9, which states that, "A court may not apply the local law of its own 
state to determine a particular issue unless such application of this law would be reasonable in the 
light of the relationship of the state and of other states to the person, thing or occurrence involved. " It 
is interesting to note that the revised Restatement was written from the perspective of a neutral forum 
having no interest of its own to protect. (Reese (1963), ibid., p692) As Kegel has noted, however, only 
rarely in a conflicts case is the forum entirely neutral. (1986, ibid., p62) 
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(c) relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the delimitation of the particular issue; 90 
(d) protection of justified expectations; 9' 
(e) basic policies underlying the particular field of law; 92 
(0 certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; 93 and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. v994 
Professor Reese reported that the paragraph 6(2) factors were not intended to be 
exclusive. 95 Furthermore, he advised that, "Varying weight will be given to a 
particular factor, or to a group of factors, in different areas of choice of law.,, 96 This 
is inevitable, for even a brief consideration of the paragraph 6(2) principles will 
demonstrate how certain factors will, on occasion, pull the court in different 
directions97 (e. g. ease in determining the applicable law (paragraph 6(2)(g)), does not 
sit comfortably with the principle of paying due consideration to the policies of other 
interested states (paragraph 6(2)(c)). 
90 This factor intensifies the interest-analysis character of the Restatement, requiring not only that the 
forum should ascertain the policies and interests of a particular state, but also that it should weigh the 
respective strengths of those policies and interests. 
91 This factor disregards the fact that such expectations as exist generally pertain to substantive result, 
not choice of law. (paragraph 6, comment d) 
92 The same objections may be made in respect of this factor, as may be levied against interest analysis 
generally. See Chapter Seven, infra - `Cracks in the Monolith - Particular Instances'. 3 Significantly, Professor Reese expressed the view that, "... it is often more important that good rules 
be developed than that predictability and uniformity of result should be assured through continued 
adherence to existing rules. " (paragraph 6, comment f) This statement possibly captures the primary 
divergence between rule-selection and jurisdiction-selection supporters. 
94 Akin to the sentiments expressed in note 89, supra, the Reporter advised that, "This policy should not 
be over-emphasised, since it is obviously of greater importance that choice of law rules lead to 
desirable results. " (paragraph 6, comment g) 
95 Thus, says Kegel, "... the elasticity of the basis is increased. " (1986, ibid., p59) Significantly, 
however, as Kegel has noted, "... these unspecified factors are not mentioned again as the Restatement 
unfolds. " (ibid. ) 
96 Reese, paragraph 6, comment (c). Cf. paragraph 222, comment b: "The factors listed in paragraph 
6(2) vary somewhat in importance from field to field. " 
97 Professor Reese acknowledged that, "... any choice of law rule, like any other common law rule, 
represents an accommodation of conflicting values. " (comment (c)) Cf. Kegel (1986), ibid., p59. 
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The MSR test applies to the full spectrum of choice of law issues. Its application to 
property matters98 is expressed in paragraph 222, viz.: "The interests of the parties in 
a thing are determined, depending upon the circumstances, either by the `law' or the 
`local law' of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the thing and the parties under the principles stated in para 
6. »99 
As regards the transfer of interests in immoveable property, it is considered that, "... 
the factors listed in para 6(2) lead to the application of the law that would be applied 
by the courts of the situs. "100 Professor Reese's commentary regarding the transfer of 
interests in moveable property is less prescriptive. 101 Instead of the `quasi- 
presumption' in favour of the lex loci rei sitae, it is merely provided that, "In 
determining the state of the applicable law, greater weight will usually be given to the 
location of the chattel ... at the time of the conveyance than to any other contact. 
"102 
In situations where the situs is transient or fortuitous, the premise that the situs will be 
98 From the wording of paragraph 222, comment b, it appears that this rule is intended to apply to 
moveable and to immoveable property. 
99 It is stated in paragraph 222, comment a, that, "[The] principle is applicable to all things, to all 
interests in things and to all issues involving things. " 
100 Paragraph 222, comment b. On account of the general wording of paragraph 6, however, this can 
constitute no more than a presumption in favour of the lex situs. 
101 The introductory note to paragraph 244, which may be rebutted in the exceptional case, recognises 
that, "A state is unlikely to have the same interest in a chattel within its territory as it has in land 
situated there. " (Reese, 1971, p65) Cf. paragraph 244, comment f, and paragraph 251, comment g. 
Note also paragraph 244, comment c: "The principles stated in paragraph 6 underlie all rules of choice 
of law and are used in evaluating the significance of a relationship with respect to the particular issue, 
of the potentially interested states to the parties, the chattel and the conveyance. " 
102 Paragraph 244, comment f. Later in this commentary, the Reporter indicates that, "In determining 
the state of most significant relationship and thus of the applicable law, the forum will consider other 
contacts in addition to the location of the chattel ... Thus, the forum will consider the domicile, 
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. Also where it is understood that 
a chattel will be moved to a more or less permanent location following the conveyance ... the place of 
its intended destination. " 
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given greater weight, is displaced, 103 as is also the case where the transfer in question 
concerns aggregate moveables. 104 
To some extent, the perceived value of the flexibility of the MSR approach has been 
undermined by Professor Reese's declaration that, "I believe that one ultimate goal, 
be it ever so distant, should be the development of hard-and-fast rules of choice of 
law. I believe that in many instances these rules should be directed, at least initially, 
at a particular issue. "105 The hope, it seems, was that from broad guidelines, narrow 
rules would ensue. The remark conveys an impression that choice of law `rules' are, 
in fact, caught in a cycle: hard-won, `hard' rules may gradually be diluted until such 
time as application of the exception(s) is more frequent than application of the rule 
itself. As a result, the rule and exception(s) evolve into a softer `proper law' approach, 
from which, in time, inchoate, and ultimately, refined rules develop. '06 
In 1982, Professor Reese defended the approach of the Second Restatement, asserting 
that, "American choice of law is not as unruly and chaotic as is generally 
103 The Reporter stated that, "The importance of a chattel's location at the time of the conveyance ... 
depends upon the intended permanence of this location ... when it is understood that the chattel will 
be 
kept only temporarily in the state where it was located at the time of the conveyance ... 
it is more likely 
that, with respect to the particular issue, some other state will have the most significant relationship to 
the parties, the chattel and the conveyance and be the state of the applicable law. " (paragraph 244, 
comment f) Cf. paragraph 251 (concerning security interests in chattels), comment e: "... when it is 
understood that the chattel will be kept only temporarily in the state where it was located at the time 
the security interest attached ... 
it is more likely that, with respect to the particular issue, some other 
state will have the most significant relationship to the parties, the chattel and the security interests and 
be the state of applicable law. " E. g. Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & 
Feldman Fine Arts Inc 717 F. Supp. 1374,917 F. 2d. 278. 
104 , If 
... the chattels composing the group are scattered more or 
less evenly throughout a number of 
states, the forum will give predominant weight to other contacts [i. e. other than location] in 
determining the state of the applicable law. " (paragraph 244, comment f) 
105 Reese (1976), ibid., p180; Cheshire & North, `Private International Law' 13th edition, p29. This 
endorses Reese's previously expressed wish that, "What is needed ... is a 
large number of relatively 
narrow rules that will be applicable only in precisely defined situations. " (Reese (1963), ibid., 681. Cf. 
Shapira, ibid., p211) 
106 E. g. The development of Scottish and English rules of choice of law in delict. 
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supposed. " 107 It is submitted that the truth of the Reporter's statement is supported by 
an examination of the operation of the MSR test in the case of Autocephalous Greek 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc. 108 The case 
concerned a claim by the Republic of Cyprus, and its Church, against the purchaser of 
four stolen Byzantine mosaics, for recovery of possession thereof. One of two choice 
of law issues which arose109 concerned the law applicable to determine the validity of 
the transfer of title to the mosaics, to the defendant. The matter was litigated in an 
American forum, and the question for the U. S. District Court (Indianapolis Division) 
was whether the law of Indiana, ' 10 or the law of Switzerland, should apply. 
Supporting the application of Swiss law was the fact that when the purchaser took 
possession and control of the mosaics, they were situated in Switzerland. In contrast, 
application of the law of Indiana was supported by the following facts: the purchaser, 
Peg Goldberg, was a citizen of Indiana; the defendant corporation had its principal 
place of business in Indiana; the purchase of the mosaics was effected principally 
through the efforts of an Indiana art dealer; the purchase was financed by a loan from 
an Indiana bank; several Indiana residents were entitled to profits realised upon the 
eventual re-sale of the mosaics by Goldberg; the original re-sale agreement provided 
that the law of Indiana would govern any disputes; and, finally, the mosaics were 
situated in Indiana at the time of the action. "' 
107 Reese, WLM, `American Choice of Law' (1982) 30 Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 135,146. Consider, for 
example, Kegel, who suggested that the Restatement does no more than "... define the task of conflicts 
law, which is to determine the law which justice requires to be applied. " (Kegel, 1986, ibid., p63) 
108 717 F. Supp. 1374,917 F. 2d. 278. 
109 The second choice of law issue concerned the operation of rules of prescription and limitation of 
actions (in respect of which, see Chapter Twelve, infra - `The `Situs' Rule - For and Against'). 
10 Including its choice of law rules (per Bauer, CJ., at 917 F. 2d 278, paragraph 286). 
"' 717 F. Supp. 1374, paragraphs 3 and 1394, per Noland J. Cf. 917 F. 2d 278, per Bauer, CJ., at 
paragraph 287. 
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Having weighed these various factors, the District Court concluded that "... because 
the place where the mosaics were purchased, Switzerland, has an insignificant 
relationship to this suit, 112 and because Indiana has greater contacts and a more 
significant relationship to this suit, 113 the substantive law of the state of Indiana 
should apply to this case. "114 According to the law of Indiana, Goldberg obtained no 
title to, or right to possession of, the stolen items, 115 and accordingly, was unable to 
pass any right of ownership to subsequent purchasers. ' 16 As a result, possession of the 
mosaics was awarded to the plaintiff. The defendant's appeal was refused by the U. S. 
Court of Appeals, Bauer, CJ. affirming Noland, J. 's application of the law of 
Indiana. ' 17 
It is important to note that the plaintiff's suit was an action in replevin, that is, "An 
action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully taken or detained by the 
defendant. "' 18 Strictly, Indiana law was applied on the basis of the choice of law rule 
in tort, not the rule of property. The relief sought, however, was clearly proprietary: 
as Noland, J., explained, "Under Indiana law, replevin is the proper legal theory for 
the recovery of personal property ... the issue necessarily 
decided in a replevin action 
112 Noland, J. advised that, "Switzerland's lack of significant contacts is also highlighted by the fact 
that the mosaics never entered the Swiss stream of commerce. The mosaics were on Swiss soil no more 
than four days, during which time they remained in the free port area of Geneva airport. The mosaics 
never passed through Swiss customs ... The 
Swiss bank merely served as a conduit to pass the funds 
from Merchants in Indianapolis to Goldberg ... most of the negotiations 
for the sale occurred in The 
Netherlands, not Switzerland. Any contacts Switzerland may have had to the transaction at the heart of 
this suit were fortuitous and transitory. Switzerland has no significant interest in the application of its 
law to this suit ... Switzerland 
'bears little connection' to this suit; its contacts to this case are 
insignificant. " (ibid., paragraph 1394) 
113 "Indiana's contacts to this suit are more significant than those of any other jurisdiction ... 
Indiana 
has a significant interest in the application of its law to this transaction ... the 
Court concludes that 
Indiana has the most significant contacts to this suit. " (ibid., paragraph 1394, per Noland, J. ) 
114 Ibid., Summary of Decision. 
15 Ibid., paragraphs 1398/9. 
116 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
1" 917 F. 2d 278. Bauer, CJ., explained, at paragraph 286, that "... we find Judge Noland's analysis 
under Indiana law to be free of error, and we affirm his conclusion that Indiana law applies. " 
118 Garner, B A, (ed. ), `Black's Law Dictionary', 7`s Deluxe edition (1999). 
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is the right to present possession. "' 19 It is submitted, therefore, that application of the 
MSR test in this instance may correctly be used as a precedent for cases which, 
strictly, may be characterised as proprietary. Interestingly, on appeal, Bauer, CJ. 
remarked that "We note Goldberg claims error in Judge Noland's decision similarly 
to look to tort principles, and expends a great deal of effort arguing conflict of laws 
principles used in actions involving the transfer of chattels, which is apparently how 
this action would be characterized under Swiss law. As to the application of Indiana 
law and principles, Goldberg's argument entirely misses the mark. " 120 The end result, 
justifying an award of possession in favour of the plaintiffs, was that the contact 
between the mosaics, the parties and the Swiss situs, was not deemed to be more 
significant than the overall contacts which existed between the mosaics, the parties 
and the law of Indiana. 
Although operation of the MSR test may be relatively straightforward in cases such as 
the Cypriot mosaics, it is suggested that it would be less easily applied in cases where 
the various contacts were more evenly distributed between, or among, two or more 
states. In such a scenario, the forum would be called upon to make, not only a 
quantitative decision (that is, concerning the number of contacts between the 
circumstances and a particular state), but also a qualitative one (i. e. concerning the 
intensity of connection evinced by the contact(s) in question). 121 The forum would 
then be required to evaluate the significance of each contact, and to determine in 
which state the (qualitative) preponderance of contacts lay. To the extent that the 
Second Restatement does not specify any presumptions as to what may be the most 
119 Ibid., paragraphs 1395/6. 
120 917 F2d. 278, paragraph 286. 
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significant contact (e. g. territorial, as opposed to personal, contacts), or prescribe a 
hierarchy of contacts, ultimately, the balancing exercise and choice of law decision 
would fall to the discretion of the court. 122 
The bottom line: certainty v. flexibility 
It has been observed that "... the struggle between legal certainty and equity is as old 
as the law itself. 99123 Furthermore, in a conflict of laws context, "... the conflict 
between legal certainty and justice (equity) will never come to an end', 
124 since, as 
Neuheus has suggested, one or other of these "twin objectives" will inevitably 
underpin the prevailing choice of law methodology, in different jurisdictions and from 
time to time. 
A sense of the struggle between the desiderata of certainty and flexibility may be 
gleaned from a cursory review of the American experience. The rules of the First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws were "simple, relatively few in number, and 
dogmatic. They [were] consistent with the vested rights theory and they [gave] little 
indication of the fluidity and of the complexities and uncertainties of the subject. 11125 
The rationale of the First Restatement was simply that "... it is in the nature of men to 
121 To some extent, of course, the two types of decision are related, since a gathering of contacts 
between a set of circumstances and a particular state will, inevitably, increase the significance of that 
connection. 
122 Commentators have suggested various means by which qualitative judgments might be made. E. g. 
Leflar's better law approach. Leflar advocated that American courts should seek to resolve choice of 
law issues by reference to five 'choice-influencing considerations'. In no particular order of priority, 
the factors were: (a) Predictability of result; (b) Maintenance of interstate and international order; (c) 
Simplification of the judicial task; (d) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (e) 
Application of the better rule of law. (Leflar, R A, 'American Conflict of Laws' (1986) 4th edition, 
p277-279). With the exception of (e), these largely mirror the factors listed in the Second Restatement 
Second. Factors (d) and (e) promote forum-preference. Factor (e) is questionable since it "... confuses 
the issue of the reform of the substantive law of one country with that of choosing the most appropriate 
law to govern a dispute with links with two or more countries. " (Cheshire and North, ibid., p30) 
123 Neuheus, ibid., at p795. 
124 Neuheus, ibid., p796. 
125 Reese (1963), ibid., p680; and Kegel (1986), ibid., p58. 
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seek certainty and simplicity in the law. They will wish to regulate a field by a few 
simple rules if rules of this nature can be devised to handle adequately the problems 
involved. "126 By 1952, however, discontent with the dogmas of certainty and 
simplicity was evident, and by 1971, the MSR formulation was determinative. In the 
course of fewer than forty years, the choice of law pendulum had swung from a 
streamlined system of strict rules, to an approach which advocated evaluation of all 
relevant interests and policies. 127 
Proclamation of a `new era' in American conflicts thinking stirred doubts and 
concerns in Europe, not only regarding the wisdom of jurisdiction-selection, but also 
regarding the value of choice of law `rules', per se. Freedom of movement of persons, 
goods and services has made Europe as much of a conflicts paradise as the U. S. A., 
and prudence would suggest that the American experience should be embraced as an 
aid to, but not necessarily a model for, Europe. 128 
Choice of law certainty (in the sense of predictability) is a virtue, insofar as it aids the 
protection of cross-border social, commercial, and economic relationships. 129 Clear, 
unequivocal rules of law (whether choice of law, or domestic) promote certainty, to 
the extent that they assist parties in regulating their own behaviour, and in assessing 
the significance of the conduct of others. Whilst choice of law rules which incorporate 
' Reese (1963), ibid., p680. 
127 It is interesting to note Kegel's perspicacious remark that, "... it is ... easier to go without legal 
certainty in the Law School than in the practice of laws. " (1986, ibid., p66) 
128 Consider generally Jeunger, ibid. Jeunger has expressed the hope that, "Perhaps our [U. S. ] 
experience can help you [continental systems] save it [`continental' I. P. L. ] from becoming a conflicts 
hell. " (ibid., p 132) Jeunger has admitted that, "... [the] conflicts revolution has made ours [the U. S. ] an 
untidy law. However, it seems ... that in most of our cases justice was done. If the end is clear but the 
means are not, fumbling may be the best policy. " (ibid., p132) In view of their conflicts revolution, the 
Americans are now able to offer "an emporium of hard-won empirical lessons. " (ibid., p132) 
129 Consider Cavers' remark that, "... in many instances ... the consequences of the application of either law are not as important as the predictability of its application. " (Cavers (1933), ibid., p198) 
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single-contact connecting factors epitomize the desired transparency, 130 they do not, it 
is submitted, accommodate the special (possibly unique) facts and circumstances of 
particular cases. At the other extreme, the softening process is acceptable only to the 
extent that it does not deprive the choice of law framework of its character "... as a 
body of legal norms. s131 As Vitta has indicated, choice of laws rules should be more 
than mere "suggestions". 132 It would be wrong to adopt a choice of law approach 
comprising of no more than "... a set of elastic formulae which can be manipulated to 
produce almost any result desired. "133 It is submitted that, from the perspective of 
certainty and predictability, choice of law rules are preferable to a choice of law 
approach. It is further submitted that certainty and predictability are better protected 
by jurisdiction-selection, than by rule-selection. Whilst jurisdiction-selection is 
piloted by the operation of choice of law rules, rule-selection relies too heavily on the 
exercise of judicial discretion. In rule-selection, for instance, the following matters 
would be subject to judicial discretion: identification of the policy(ies) underlying a 
particular rule of law; determination of whether those policy(ies) or interest(s) is/are 
advanced by application of the rule to the dispute in question; ascertainment of the 
intended ambit of the rule's operation; and appraisal of the merits or demerits of 
applying competing rules. 134 It is contended that such an approach leaves too much to 
the whim of the forum. 
130 Save, of course, for the inescapable difficulties concerning the definition and interpretation of 
connecting factors, in the spatial, temporal and dimensional (i. e. inclusive or exclusive of renvoi) 
contexts. 
131 Vitta, ibid., p14. 
132 Vitta, ibid., p14. 
133 Hancock (1961), ibid., p379. Yntema considered the chief vice of an abstract theory to be the fact 
that, "... because the symbols used are too remote from reality to represent it, they force those whose 
thoughts are limited to these symbols finally to regard them as reality and to believe that by employing 
them in the process of formal logic 'correct' results may be obtained. " (Yntema, H, (1928) 37 Yale LJ 
468,477, per Hancock (1961), ibid., p379) 
134 Cf. Cavers' view that, "The suggested [interest analysis] approach would preclude the attainment of 
either certainty or uniformity in the conflict of laws because under it the decision of a case involving a 
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Whilst it is contended that certainty and predictability are better protected by a 
combination of jurisdiction-selection methodology and choice of law rules, it is 
nevertheless submitted that the rules themselves should admit some flexibility. The 
requisite flexibility, it is suggested, should emanate from within the rules. In short, 
flexibility should derive from the connecting factor. 
The adoption of `soft' rather than `hard' connecting factors would offer flexibility, but 
without disavowing the tenets of the classical method. It is submitted that a more 
equitable result may be secured, especially in atypical or exceptional cases, 135 by 
reference, not to `single-contact' connecting factors, but to `complex' or `aggregate' 
factors, which themselves contain a flexible corrective. 136 Flexibility should emanate 
not from an open-ended exercise of judicial discretion, but rather, from the actual 
configuration of connecting factors. 137 
Where the apposite connecting factor is a single-contact factor (e. g. the lex sites), it is 
submitted that, "... it cannot be maintained that real legal certainty is the certainty 
that justice will prevail. "138 Rules incorporating `complex' or `aggregate' connecting 
factors come closer, it is submitted, to providing the `certainty of justice': while such 
choice of law would depend on the content of the conflicting laws and the relative desirability of their 
application in light of the facts in controversy in litigation. " (Cavers, 1933, ibid., p197) 
135 i. e. Cases which derive from special or unique circumstances such as would justify the rebuttal of a 
general presumption in favour of a certain connecting factor, or which would trigger displacement of a 
general rule in favour of that factor. 
136 Consider, for example, the model of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (hereinafter the Rome Convention'), and the structure of sections 11 and 12 of 
the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
137 Cf. "It then appears preferable to continue to submit cases with a foreign element to the law 
indicated by a specific connecting factor ... However, if such a factor does not work, then a way out 
may be found by including in the conflict rule an alternative, more flexible factor. " (Vitta, ibid., p16) 
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factors would not enable parties to predict the substantive results of disputes, they 
would nevertheless allow them to map out the process by which the choice of law 
decision would be reached. 
Conclusion 
In 1963, Professor Reese indicated that "Choice of law, even now, is not ripe for 
restatement in the sense that it is rarely possible to state hard and fast rules with the 
reasonable assurance based on precedent and the resources of human reasoning and 
imagination that these rules will work well in all situations to which they literally can 
be applied. "139 This predicament pertains still. Scottish and English choice of law 
rules of property have tended to over-simplify the problem; choice of law subtleties 
have been disregarded and problems which, in fact, are diverse and complex, have 
been subsumed within a broad and blunt rule. '4° 
One objective of a new `restatement' should be to strike a finer balance between 
certainty and flexibility, to honour the tradition of jurisdiction-selecting rules, but, 
simultaneously, to respect the uniqueness of individual cases. 141 In accompanying the 
present author in this pursuit, the reader is respectfully invited to hold to words 
penned by Sir Francis Bacon, 142 viz.: 
138 Neuheus, ibid., p796. There is a danger that traditional, single-contact connecting factors elevate the 
importance of certainty to an unwarrantable level, forsaking, as they do, consideration of other relevant 
factors. In such an event, it is submitted that the price of certainty is too high. Cf. note 94, supra. 
139 Reese (1963), ibid., p681. 
140 Chapters Eight ('The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property') and Eleven ('The Assignation of 
Incorporeal Moveable Property'), infra. 
141 Cf. Neuheus, ibid., p799. The Second Restatement itself was intended to be "... a compromise 
between ad hoc decisions and rules. While refraining from providing rigid rules it seeks to establish 
g4uidelines for reaching decisions. " (Kegel, 1986, ibid., p58) 
2 Sir Francis Bacon, (1561) - (1626). 
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"If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content 
to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties. "143 
143 'The Advancement of Learning' (1605). (per Ratcliffe, S (ed. ), `The Little Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations' (1994), p51) 
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Chapter Two 
The Land Taboo 
In the closing decades of the twentieth century, Scots and English rules of choice of 
law were subjected to substantial re-modelling. In the United Kingdom, whilst the 
underlying theory and processes of the subject have remained largely unchanged 
(archetypally, characterisation of the cause of action, identification of the lex causae, 
proof and application thereof, and, where appropriate, limitation of that law), in 
several branches of the subject significant changes have been wrought regarding the 
connecting factors to be applied. 
In choice of law in delict, for example, the rule of double actionability now bears little 
more than historical interest. ' In contract, the cherished2 common law rules for 
identifying the proper law of the contract and determining its ambit have, for the most 
part, 3 been rendered superfluous by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. In 
consistorial matters, the Family Law Act 1986, bolstering and replacing the 
provisions of the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, has, for 
the time being, curbed the arguably undesirable permissiveness heralded by the House 
of Lords in Indyka v. Indyka. 4 The 1986 Act, in its turn, has been emasculated by 
' Section 10 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. Noting, of course, 
the saving provisions of section 13 in relation to defamation claims. 
2 E. g. Nussbaum, 'Principles of Private International Law' (1943), p168 (per Morris, JHC, `The 
Proper Law of a Tort' (1951) 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881, at p881). 
3 Save as regards contracts concluded prior to the statutory commencement date of 1 April 1991, and 
in respect of the express exclusions enumerated in Article 1(2) of the Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, and in areas where Rome's provisions are not comprehensive 
(e. g. Articles 10 and 11), or where they permit discretion (e. g. Article 4(5)). 
4 [196911 A. C. 33. 
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`Brussels 11', 5 which, among Contracting States, operates (since 1 March 2001) so as 
to regulate jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters. 6 This is an example of the new order in the new century; a 
century which seems destined to endure an excess of legal regulation and to witness 
many more examples of legal overlap and conflict than hitherto anticipated - not only 
`traditional' conflict of laws problems, but also problems between and within 
Conventions. 7 
Likewise, changes have been wrought in respect of the connecting factors designated 
by the conflict rules concerning married persons, 8 children, 9 trusts, 1° insolvency" and 
procedure. 12 
It is with mixed feelings that one reflects upon the words penned by Cheshire in the 
Preface to the first edition of his principal work, viz:, "[Private International Law] ... 
is not overloaded with detailed rules; it has been only lightly touched by the 
paralysing hand of the Parliamentary draftsman; it is perhaps the one considerable 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of Both 
Spouses. (29 May 2000) 
6 See also the European Communities (Matrimonial Jurisdiction and Judgments) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2001(S. S. I. 2001/36) and Act of Sederunt (Ordinary Cause Rules) Amendment (European 
Matrimonial and Parental Responsibility Jurisdiction and Judgments) 2001 (S. S. I. 2001/144). For 
equivalent provisions in England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, see S. I. 2001/310 and S. I. 
2001/660. 
7 E. g. Brussels II, Article 37. 
8 Part II, Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1995. 
9 Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985; Council Regulation EC No. 1347/2000. Consider also the 
1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation 
in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, which is currently 
the subject of consultation in Scotland (Scottish Executive Justice Department Consultation Paper, 
December 2000), and the European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matters of Parental Responsibility (OJ [20011 C332 
E/269). 
10 Recognition of Trusts Act 1987. 
11 Council Regulation EC No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (29 May 2000). 
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department in which the formation of a coherent body of law is in course of 
process. " 13 It is the aim of the present author neither to extol, nor to condemn, the 
trend towards statutory intervention in international private law; rather, the intention 
is merely to observe the changing mien of our conflict rules, and to consider the 
metamorphosis which occurs as choice of law rules develop so as better to respond to 
the needs of society, and more effectively to contend with the demands and challenges 
of technology, Europeanisation and globalisation. 
It is against this background that we turn to consider a rule which has triumphantly 
withstood this climate of change and which, today, remains largely the same, and as 
apparently invincible, as it was in the early years of the twentieth century, and before. 
Certainly as regards the transfer of immoveable property, generally as regards the 
inter vivos transfer of corporeal moveable property and frequently in the case of the 
inter vivos transfer of incorporeal moveable property, the lex Situs (as defined in each 
case 14) has long been considered to be the apposite connecting factor. Indeed, such is 
the status of the lex situs, at least in relation to immoveable property, that 
commentators now speak, from varying perspectives of resignation, frustration and 
pride, of the `land taboo'. Moffatt Hancock explained the nature of this quasi-sacred 
rule, viz: "'The land taboo' - what an excellent phrase to describe the curious 
doctrine, so popular with English and American commentators, that every 
conceivable question affecting the transfer of title to land must invariably be 
12 Section 4 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1984; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1348/2000 on the Service in the Member States of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (29 May 2000) (OJ [2000] L160/37). 
B Private International Law, 1935, Preface; Private International Law, 13`s edition, pviii. 
14 See Chapter Four, infra - `Defining the `Situs". 
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determined by the domestic law of the situs. "15 Whilst the expression `land taboo' has 
been strongly associated with Hancock (Andreas Lowenfeld later explained that, "I 
had supposed that Hancock invented the phrase, which he uses frequently, here and 
elsewhere"), 16 the term did not, in fact, originate with him. Commending the label, 
however, Hancock attributed it to the unnamed author of a 1938 note entitled `Choice 
of Law for Land Transactions'. 17 
The `unequivocal' certainty of, and support for, the situs axiom is, for many 
commentators, a source of some pride. Joseph Beale declared in 1907 that "The law of 
the situs governs title to land. No more generally accepted doctrine, or one more 
clearly based upon principle and reason, exists in the whole body of the law. "18 It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that, in 1934, when the First Restatement of the Conflict 
of Laws (hereinafter `the First Restatement') was published, under the supervision of 
its Chief Reporter, Joseph Beale, it should reinforce the `incontrovertible' control of 
the lex situs: "Following Professor Beale's mechanical and territorially oriented 
approach, the Restatement referred all questions regarding real property to the law of 
the situs. As with the earlier English cases, the Restatement made little attempt to 
justify' the situs rule ... the situs rule must have seemed self-evident. "19 
Beale was merely following the pattern already established by preceding American 
jurists, particularly Joseph Story. As Alden has remarked, the situs rule has 
15 Hancock, M, `Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws: the 
Disadvantages of Disingenuousness' 1967 (20) Stanford L Rev 1. 
16 Lowenfeld, A F, `Book Review: Revolt against Intellectual Tyranny' 1985-6 (38) Stanford L. Rev. 
1411,1418. 
17 1938 (28) Colum. L. Rev 1949,1051; Lowenfeld, A F, ibid. 
'8 Beale, J H, `Equitable Interests in Foreign Property' 20 Harv. L. Rev. (1906-07) 382. 
19 Alden, R, `Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts' 1987 (65) Texas L. R. 585,589. 
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persevered in the United States for more than one hundred and fifty years. 2° Whilst 
Joseph Story is generally considered to be the father of American conflict rules, 
Hancock has observed that Story was not alone in promoting the situs rule. Hancock, 
taking a pragmatic view, explains that, " ... since choice-of-law questions are 
relatively rare in litigation, judges and lawyers have little experience in dealing with 
them and are inclined to accept as gospel the views of the text writers, especially 
when the latter are in agreement. Since the time of Story, American text writers have 
(with rare exceptions) unanimously supported the land taboo in all its ramifications. 
Garnishing it with superficial, abstract arguments, they have contrived to make it 
appear to be one of the fundamental principles of American conflict of laws. 9921 
`Contrived' is indeed the appropriate word to describe their conduct, for Hancock 
goes on to remark that several commentators and judges have propped up the rule 
with `vague sophistries 22: "Thoughtfully considered, these attempts to justify the situs 
formula are reminiscent of the medieval canonists' attempt to justify the prohibition of 
marriage within seven degrees of kinship. , 23 This quasi-religious adherence to the 
situs rule, coupled with the relative infrequency with which international property 
disputes are reported, 24 has resulted in the rule becoming entrenched, for reasons 
which include simple respect for the length of its tenure; in law, as in life, old age is 
20 Alden, ibid., p585. 
2t Hancock, ibid., p8. 
22 Hancock, ibid., plO. 
23 `All manner of fanciful analogies, however, could be found for the choice of this holy number. Were 
there not seven days of the week, and seven ages of the world, seven gifts of the spirit and seven deadly 
sins. ' - Pollock & Maitland, `History of England before the Time of Edward I' (1899) (2°d edition), 
388 (per Hancock, ibid., pl0). 
Which, some might claim, is due (at least in part) to the situs rule itself. Consider however 
Graveson's remarks, "It is impossible to state dogmatically that one theory governs to the exclusion of 
all others since most English decisions have not been based on a direct conflict between the leges situs, 
actus and domicilii or any two of them. The effect of the reasons for decision in favour of the lex Situs 
... is accordingly 
diminished. While, therefore, a preponderance of authority exists in favour of the lex 
situs, it does not justify rejection of the lex actus as a possible alternative (whatever theoretical defects 
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worthy of respect. 25 Even today, in America as in the United Kingdom, the situs rule 
enjoys unrivalled potency as a conflict rule, having survived the philosophical volte- 
face inflicted upon most American choice of law rules by the Second Restatement. 
Walter Cook first articulated the `self-evidence' of the situs rule in 1939, declaring 
that the rule "... is accepted by nearly all Anglo-American writers as more or less 
self-evident. "26 Three years later, he endorsed his earlier remarks, explaining that, "It 
is not the purpose of the present paper to attack the principle as unsound or in any 
way irrational, but quite the contrary: it will be accepted as in origin based upon 
principles of obvious social convenience. "27 Also observing this irrefutable quality of 
the situs rule, and even identifying an unspoken "anxious fear" of applying non-situs 
law, Brainerd Currie noted that "People ... are 
[not] readily separated from their faith 
in sonorous and seemingly self-evident formulas. Perhaps the argument is suspected 
of being a tour de force, which silences a less articulate opponent without really 
disproving his case. "28 This imputed `self-evidence' of the situs rule, that is, the 
presupposed interest of the lex Situs in any and every dispute involving land (and 
indeed other property), is proclaimed, not out of recognition for or acknowledgement 
of the legitimate concerns of the lex Situs, but rather as an absolute denial of the 
potential interest of any other legal system in the resolution of the dispute in hand. 
that alternative may possess). " (Graveson, R H, `Conflict of Laws Private International Law', 7's 
edition (1974), p463) 
ZS See also Alden, ibid., p586/7. 
26 Cook, W W, `Immovables and the Law of the Ditus' (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1246,1246/7. 
27 Cook, W W, `The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws' (1942), p253. 
28 Currie, B, `Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees' (1954) 21 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 620, 
631/2. 
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This latter notion is supported by Weintraub who christened the situs rule, "... this 
most monolithic of all choice-of-law rules. "29 Commentators have remarked that "... 
there is no denying ... that the situs rule is dominant ... It muddies innumerable 
opinions... Land is something rather sacrosanct. And `title' has a derivative magic ... 
which no one has dared challenge ... Thus it is taboo to allow a 
law other than the 
law of the land to control questions involving that land ... title must certainly 
be left 
inviolate. "30 
That this approach was evident in America and in England even in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century is clear from the case law. In 1869, in America, in the case of 
McGoon v. Scales31 Mr Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, referred to 
the situs principle, stating that: `It is a principle too firmly established to admit of 
dispute at this day, that to the law of the state in which the land is situated must we 
look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect 
and construction of conveyances. Applications of the broad principle are easy to find. 
... It would 
be affectation to multiply instances, for the general principle is well 
known and thoroughly established. "32 So also, in England, as early as 1873, in Freke 
v. Carbery 33 Lord Selborne stated "a point upon which I need no authority", namely, 
that "The territory and soil of England ... is governed 
by all statutes which are in 
force in England. This leasehold property ... is part of the territory and soil of 
England, and the fact that the testator had a chattel interest in it, and not a freehold 
29 Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of Situs as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis' (1966) 52 
Cornell L. Q. 1,2. See also Scoles and Weintraub, `Cases and Materials on Conflict of Law' (1972), 
p573; Hay P (ed) `Property Law and Legal Education; the Situs Rule in European and American 
Conflicts Law - Comparative Notes' (1988), p109. 
30 Schott & Rembar, `Choice of Law for Land Transactions' (1938) 38 Columbia L. Rev. 1049, 
1050/1. 
31 (1869) 9 Wall. 23,27 (U. S. ). 
32 See also Goodrich, H F, `Two States and Real Estate' (1941) 89 Uni. of Pen. L. R. 417,418. 
33 (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 641. 
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interest, makes it in no way whatever less so. s34 For the purpose of the present 
discussion, however, it is interesting to note that Clarence Smith later remarked that 
"Lord Selborne's pronouncement in 1873 was not a restatement of existing law - at 
least as commonly understood - but a radical innovation. s35 But such was the 
universally accepted mastery of the situs rule, that this `innovation' went 
unchallenged; 36 unchallenged, perhaps, for certain legitimate reasons, both theoretical 
and practical. For example, Cheatham stated in 1960 that "On some matters certainty 
is the first requisite and other elements may be subordinated to it. It is so as to the 
title to land. s37 So too, Ernst Rabel has commented that, "The quasi unanimity in this 
field is easily understandable, since here sheer territorialism is assumed in the most 
modern systems ... an old and unchallenged tradition has resulted in a universal 
principle, natural in view of the physical and economic integration of the property in 
the territory and affording the easiest available certainty to the state of the situation, 
to all interested parties, and to prospective successors and creditors. , 38 Admittedly, 
Rabel's view cannot reasonably be denied in respect of what might be termed the 
fundamental aspects of a transfer of immoveable property (e. g. the essential validity 
of the transfer). As regards transfers of moveable property, however, and likewise as 
regards certain incidents of transactions concerning immoveable property (e. g. 
capacity to transfer), it is submitted that there may exist alternative, more suitable, yet 
hitherto obscured, connecting factors. The scheme of the First Restatement, framed in 
the years before 1934 and subjecting all matters concerning the transfer of chattels to 
34 Ibid. 
35 Clarence Smith, J A, `Classification by Site in Conflict of Laws' (1963) 26 M. L. R 16,19. 
36 E. g. Gardner, J C, `The Decreasing Influence of the Lex Situs' (1934) 46 J. R. 244. 
37 Cheatham, E E, `Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws' (1960) 99 I Hague Receuil 237,314. 
38 Rabel, E, `The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study', Volume IV (1958), pp31/2. 
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the control of the situs at the time of the conveyance, 39 is not necessarily one that 
should rigidly and unthinkingly be adhered to at the beginning of the twenty first 
century. 
The trouble with the taboo is that, although there is promulgated an impression of a 
rule widely recognized and enforced, that impression is betrayed by expose of the 
stratagems which courts sometimes employ to circumvent the rule's strict application. 
As Hancock has explained, "Despite its overwhelming support in the literature, ... 
some sensitive American judges have recoiled from the harsher applications of this 
drastic formula, often invoking one device or another to avoid it. "40 More recently, 
instances of American judicial indulgence in evasive tactics have prompted Weintraub 
to suggest that "... an increasing number of recent cases ... are displacing the most 
hallowed of all the traditional choice-of-law rules - that applying the law of the situs 
to determine interests in real property. "41 Regrettably, however, it seems that 
displacement is not manifesting itself in the form of a clear exception to, or 
modification of, the situs principle, but rather, that it has entered surreptitiously, under 
cover of various guises (e. g. manipulative characterisation), leaving courts and 
commentators free still to proclaim their enduring allegiance to the situs monolith. 
Hay, showing more candour, has more recently concluded that, "The approach to 
immoveables in the conflict of law may no longer be monolithic, but it is confused. "42 
39 Viz.: capacity to convey chattel (paragraph 255); formalities of conveyance (paragraph 256); 
substantial validity of conveyance (paragraph 257); and the nature of interest created by the 
conveyance (paragraph 258). See also Carnahan, C W, `Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts' 
(1958), p348. 
40 Hancock, ibid., ppl, 3 and 7, giving the example, albeit from the realm of succession, of In re Estate 
of Barrie 338 U. S. 815 (1949), where four dissenting judges took a stance against application of the 
Iowa lex situs. Nevertheless, a five-judge majority cleaved to the traditional choice of law formula. See 
Chapter Seven, infra - `Cracks in the Monolith - Particular Instances'. 41 Weintraub, R J, `Commentary on the conflict of laws' (1986), pvii. 
40 
As far as the position in Scotland and England is concerned, one might ponder the 
words of Peter Carter, namely, "In this sphere of law, somewhat ironically and 
uncharacteristically, the rules of private international law can be, and largely are, 
relatively simple. "43 Whilst one might endorse Carter's sentiment that a more difficult 
(yet profitable) challenge would be "the formulation of a sophisticated and acceptable 
pattern of uniform internal or domestic law"44, it is submitted that Carter's verdict 
concerning our property rules would be more accurate if it pronounced, not that our 
rules are `relatively simple', rather that they are `deceptively simple'. ' 
In America, Weintraub has acknowledged the tenacity of the situs `myth': "Courts 
that have cast off territorial rules in other substantive areas are only now beginning 
to do the same when determining interests in realty. "46 The task now at hand in 
respect of Scottish (and English) conflict rules, is to consider the extent of the `myth' 
in our own system. In view, however, of the (apparent) unparalleled loyalty to the 
situs rule, when now daring to formulate and recommend an alternative connecting 
factor, it is necessary, first, that any purported defects in the situs rule be set forth, and 
that any alleged instances of defection from the existing rule be disclosed. It is 
intended, therefore, to survey the cracks in the situs monolith. 
42 Hay (1988), ibid., p121. 
43 Carter, P, `International Sales of Works of Art' (in Lalive, P, ed. ) (1988), p330. 
44 Ibid. 
as For difficulties of definition and interpretation, for example, see Chapter Four, infra - `Defining the 
`Situs". 
46 Weintraub, R J, `The Conflict of Laws Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal Reasoning' (1986) 65 Texas 
L. R. 215,229/230. 
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Chapter Three 
The Distinction between Moveable and Immoveable Property 
The law of property "consists of all the rules conferring, defining and regulating legal 
rights vested in individuals over material and immaterial things, rights of ownership, 
possession, use, alienation and disposal. It is a large and important subject of law 
because of the great number, importance, utility and value of the kinds of objects of 
property recognised, and of the number and variety of the kinds of legal rights which 
may be exercised in relation thereto. "' In short, the law of property is concerned with 
the creation, acquisition, disposal, transmission and extinction of rights in, and over, 
particular objects of property. 
Where questions of international private law arise in conjunction with a standard 
property issue, the nature of the particular transaction and the precise description of 
the property rights involved can become rather clouded. 2 As Pierre Lalive has 
explained, "... in order to differentiate the rights created, transferred or destroyed by 
a transaction, it is a natural step for a court to examine the things over which these 
rights give a power ... The fact that some objects can 
be transported from one country 
to another increases the frequency of conflict of laws and the difficulty of finding a 
' Walker, D M, `The Scottish Legal System' (2001), p224. 
2 Consider Robertson's view that, "The characterisation of property probably represents the most 
difficult problem in the whole field of characterisation. " (Robertson, A H, `Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws' (1940), pI90) Robertson's general approach to the problem has been criticised by 
Cook, viz.: "Robertson frequently forgets ... that 
he is dealing with the characterisation of 'interests in 
land' and so characterises the land rather than the legal interest as the immoveable (e. g. p196). " 
(Cook, W W, `The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws' (1942), p288) Cook notes, with 
some despondency, that "... of course judges often talk the same way. " (ibid. ) Consider too Walker, 
"Note that the word 'property' may mean either the legal rights of property of owning, holding, using 
and disposing of a thing, or the thing itself over which legal rights subsist. The former is the more 
correct legal meaning of the word. " (Walker, ibid., p224, note 79) 
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suitable connecting or localizing element. "3 In international property disputes, it is 
necessary to distinguish the constituent elements of the problem, first, to determine 
the character of the property affected and, secondly (stemming from that 
characterisation), to ascertain the conflict rules appropriate to the situation at hand. As 
Story explained, "... every nation, having authority to prescribe rules for the 
disposition and arrangement of all the property within its own territory, may impress 
upon it any character which it shall choose, and no other nation can impugn or vary 
that character. ,4 Almost immediately, of course, the difficulties inherent in the 
characterisation process become apparent: how can one determine the specific nature 
of the property affected until the apposite conflict rule has been identified? The 
scenario gives rise to a circulus inextricabilis, for how is it possible to ascertain the 
apposite conflict rule before characterising the property as moveable or immoveable? 
Intrinsic to the process of determining the character of the property concerned is the 
division of property into certain categories, according to its nature. Division 
`according to nature', however, may be a flawed criterion. In Ross v. Ross's Trustees, 
Lord Meadowbank outlined how the trustees of the late General Ross were forced to 
maintain, without the aid of any legal decision, that there is a division in nature itself 
of all rights into moveable and immoveable. His Lordship concluded that, "There is 
no solid foundation for this argument; for, first, there is no natural division into 
moveable and immoveable, even in things ... There is nothing absurd in reducing all 
these things to a classification; but it is in vain to contend that classification is 
3 Lalive, P A, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study' (1955), p5. 
4 Story, `Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws', p654, paragraph 447. Moreover, the character 
impressed may be chameleon; see note 31 et seq, infra. 
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pointed out by nature itself.: 5 The domestic law of Scotland has traditionally drawn 
a distinction between heritable and moveable property. 6 Whilst heritable property 
basically comprises land and buildings, heritable rights need not necessarily constitute 
land; on the other hand, whilst moveable property usually consists of objects which 
are themselves physically moveable, rights associated with land may, "for certain 
purposes be held to be moveable. "7 Professor Walker makes clear the position, 
namely that, "This is not a distinction drawn entirely on logical grounds, but stems 
from the dualism of rules of succession on death whereby for reasons explicable only 
by legal history some property (heritable property) descended to the person 
designated by the law as heir, and some (moveable property) descended to the 
persons designated by the law as next-of-kin. "8 In England, the customary 
demarcation between "proprietary interests in things" is the "historical and technical 
distinction" between realty and personalty. 9 
5 Ross v. Ross' Trustees July 4 1809 F. C., at p380. Cf. Macdonald v. Macdonald 1932 S. C. (H. L. ) 79, 
per Lord Tomlin, at p85, "Where a foreign asset is immoveable by nature or in the contemplation of 
the lex rei sitae. a claim to render it subject to the legitim of Scots law is really a claim that it should 
devolve contrary to the lex rei sitae and cannot be supported consistently with the principles of private 
international law. " (Emphasis added). 
6 Bell, Commentaries, II. V. 1.1., "The distinction between heritable and moveable property is one of the 
most important in practical jurisprudence. "; and Stair, Institutions, II. 1.2.: "The distinction of moveable 
and heritable is very necessary to be here known, as being the common materials of real rights, and 
having a general use, in the constitution and transmission of rights amongst the living, and from the 
dead. " 
7 Anton, A E, `Private International Law' (1990), p597. E. g. Section 117 of the Titles to Land 
Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 (heritable securities are deemed to be moveable in a creditor's 
succession). 
8 Walker, ibid., p224. 
9 Dicey and Morris, `The Conflict of Laws' (13`h ed., 2000), p918, paragraph 22-004. Consider 
Chatfield v. Berchtoldt L. R. 7 Ch. 192 where, in the words of Clarence Smith, "the court shares the 
ignominy of having 'inadvertently' referred to realty and personalty when it 'meant to say' 
immoveables and moveables. " (Clarence Smith, J A, 'Classification by Site in Conflict of Laws' (1963) 
26 M. L. R. 16,20). Commenting upon the different characterisations of moveable/immoveable property 
and personalty/realty, Falconbridge has remarked that, these are "... not only substantially divergent ... 
but are also, so to speak, distinctions in different planes, one being a distinction between different kinds 
of things, the other being a distinction between different kinds of interests in things. " (Falconbridge, J 
D, `Essays on the Conflict of Laws' (1947), p434) Cf. Von Mehren & Trautman, who state that the 
realty/personalty characterisation, "... is said to go not to the physical nature of the thing, but to 
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In contrast to the domestic classifications, the distinction which is preferred in both 
Scots and English conflict of laws is that between moveable and immoveable 
property. 1° It has been suggested that the conflict categories of moveable and 
immoveable were first articulated in Jarman on Wills. " An exposition of the 
difference between the distinction drawn in the conflict of laws and that which 
pertains in the domestic sphere has been furnished by Lord Tomlin in the Scottish 
House of Lords case of Macdonald v. Macdonald, 12 viz.: "The Scots law distinguishes 
between property which is heritable and property which is moveable and except to 
this extent does not any more than English law recognise for internal purposes the 
antithesis between moveables and immoveables. But each system, when brought into 
interests in things. " (Von Mehren, A T, and Trautman, D T, `The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases 
and Materials on Conflict of Laws' (1965), p194) 
10 Although it would appear that errors (which, one hopes, are semantic rather than substantive) 
occasionally occur e. g. Downie v. Downie's Trustees (1866) 4 M. 1067, per Lord President McNeill, 
"The principle has been recognised and settled that the character of the subject, whether heritable or 
moveable, depends on the law of the country where it is placed. That being ascertained, the right of 
participation in it [i. e. legal rights] must be regulated by the law of this country, in which it is to be 
distributed. " (p1070). Lord Deas echoed the nomenclature employed by the Lord President, viz.: "... it 
is an Australian deed, and must be dealt with, not according to our law, but according to the foreign 
law, so far as regards the question whether the contents are heritable or moveable. " (p1071). 
(Emphasis added) Consider, however, Moss' Trustees v. Moss 1916 2 S. L. T. 31. In this case, Lady 
Moss' contention was that 'foreign law was wrongly appealed to for the determination of the question 
whether the subject was heritable or personal, the real question being whether it was moveable or 
immoveable. " (p34) Lord Hunter's response to this assertion was surprising, namely, "According to 
Scots law, subjects are considered as real or heritable on the one hand, and personal or moveable on 
the other. It is unnecessary to introduce the word 'immoveable' ... Personally, I am quite unable either 
to understand or to follow the course of reasoning by which 1 am supposed, by manipulation of words 
strange to Scots jurisprudence, to be entitled to reach a result contrary to a series of decisions which 
are binding upon me. " (p34) Lord Hunter referred to the dictum of Lord President McNeill in Downie 
v. Downie's Trustees, and to that of Lord Glenlee in Newlands v. Chalmers' Trustees (1832) 11 S. 65, 
viz.: "It is the law of the country where the subject is situated that must regulate the character of the 
subject as heritable or moveable. " (Emphasis added) In the case of In re Hoyles, Row v. Jagg [1911] 
1 Ch. 179, Cozens-Hardy M. R. and Farwell, I. J. suggested, at p183, that the division of property into 
moveable and immoveable property was only operative where English courts had to determine rights as 
between an English domiciliary and a foreign domiciliary, and doubted its expediency when the 
potential leges causae derived from the common law. This suggestion, however, was subsequently 
rejected: Morris concluded that, "The suggestion of Farwell LI.... that our courts only adopt the 
distinction between movables and immovables when the conflict is between English law and the law of 
some civil law country and not when the conflict is between English law and another common law 
country, looks plausible, but is (it is submitted) unsound. At any rate, it has not been followed: 
Macdonald v. Macdonald; Re Cutliffe. " (Morris, JHC, `Cases on Private International Law', 4`h ed. 
(1968), p325) 
"A footnote to p4 of the 151 edition (1884) (per Clarence Smith, ibid., p17). 
12 1932 S. C. (H. L. ) 79. 
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contact with a foreign system does, in accordance with the principles of what is called 
private international law, recognise the antithesis... "' 3 
It is perhaps on account of the inconsistent, sometimes illogical, nature of our 
traditional, domestic distinction between moveable and heritable property that the 
conflict of laws distinction between moveables and immoveables has been widely 
recognised as more universal and more cogent in its application, being based 
essentially on physical criteria. 14 For this reason, the moveable/immoveable 
distinction is considered to be capable of application in situations involving even the 
most eclectic systems of law. 15 In the case of Re Hoyles, it was stated that in order "... 
to arrive at a common basis on which to determine questions between the inhabitants 
of two countries living under different systems of jurisprudence, our courts recognise 
and act upon a division otherwise unknown to our law into moveable and 
13 Ibid., p84. Cf Robertson: "The method of characterisation in the conflict of laws, then, must be 
something indigenous to the conflict of laws, and neither the same as that of the internal law, nor as 
that of the potentially applicable foreign law. " (Robertson, ibid., p223) 
14 Re Hoyles [1911] 1 Ch. 179; Re Berchtold [1923] 1 Ch. 192. Consider Falconbridge, who refers to 
the "relatively simple classification of tangible things according to their physical nature, 
corresponding with the natural distinction. " (1947, ibid., p433) Von Mehren & Trautman suggest that 
"Perhaps as a consequence of thinking in terms of physical power it is said to be desirable to use the 
physical characterisation for conflicts purposes. " (ibid., p194) Robertson, exhorting characterisation 
by the lex situs, asks rhetorically, "What criterion could be better than the objective test of fact? ... 
By 
adopting the objective test of the de facto nature of the property, the conflict of laws may avoid an 
excessive addiction to fictions and provide a simple and sure criterion for one problem of 
characterisation. " (1940, ibid., pp205,211). This is subject to the caveat, however, that "This rule will 
apply most appropriately to the cases of interests in land, but not necessarily to de facto moveables. " 
(ibid., p206). Robertson accepts, for instance, that the character of intangible property as moveable or 
immoveable can only be ascertained de iure, and not de facto. (ibid., p212). Cf. Erskine, Institutes, 
11.2. L: "Incorporeal things did not admit of being handled, but consisted in jure, and so were more 
properly rights than subjects. " 
15 Consider, however, Clarence Smith, who poses the question, "If the law of the site must be asked to 
put the property in question into one or the other of these categories [moveable or immoveable], what 
if it has no knowledge of such categories, either internationally or internally? " (ibid., p25) In such a 
case, it is submitted that the forum rei sitae, if willing to adopt, ex comitate, the `international' division 
of property (according, at least, to Scottish and English rules of international private law), should 
classify the property in question purely according to the object's physiognomy. 
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immoveable. "16 Accordingly, a distinction accepted in other legal systems has 
successfully been received into Scottish and English jurisprudence. '? 
The adoption of this internationally recognised distinction underlines the 
cosmopolitan character of the subject, 18 and the benefits of an enlightened approach. 
The distinction enables a court (whose ultimate aim is to ascertain, and thereafter to 
apply, the appropriate lex causae) to engage in the characterisation process, adopting 
a less insular approach than its own domestic characterisation would otherwise 
permit. This, in itself, is laudable, even if it should later be discovered that the line of 
demarcation between moveable property and immoveable property is not drawn alike 
by every system of law, and that differences in characterisation may, in any event, 
arise (e. g. the character of fixtures and fittings). 
Although the dictum of Farwell LT. in Re Hoyles might mistakenly be understood to 
imply that all systems of law have now reached consensus as to the proper 
characterisation of property (which "... despite their use of the same words, is far 
from being true"), 19 it nevertheless seems prudent that the Scots system of 
international private law should adopt, for use in its international dealings, 
" 16 Re Hoyles [ 1911 ]1 Ch. 179, per Farwell LJ., p 185. 
'7 Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p307, paragraph 14.01; and Cheshire 
and North, `Private International Law' (13"' ed., 2000), p923. 
18 Cf. Re Bonacina [ 1912] 2 Ch. 394. 
19 Clarence Smith, ibid., p17. Consider also Clarence Smith, "... it is assumed that apart from a few 
local quirks there is universal agreement on the meaning of moveable and immoveable. " (ibid., p22) 
Consider, however, Kahn Freund's warning (albeit in a different context) of the dangers inherent in the 
hidden homonym: "The hidden homonym is one of the most fruitful roots of misunderstanding in 
private international law. The builders of the Tower of Babel must be assumed to have realised that 
they did not understand one another's speech. We are now dealing with situations in which people are 
struck by the Curse of Babel and do not know it. "(Kahn Freund, 0, `General Problems of Private 
International Law' (1980), Ch. X. iii) Consider too the remarks of Gambaro, viz.: "... it is not important 
that a European Civil Code institutes a uniform law of property, and certainly not of real property. But 
it is necessary that lawyers come up with a reasonably homogeneous language with which to discuss 
property problems ... a grammar of property 
law. " (Gambaro, A, `Perspectives on the Codification of 
the Law of Property: An Overview' 1997 (5) European Review of Private Law 497,500) 
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terminology which is untarnished by its domestic prejudices or preconceptions. It is 
generally accepted that the benefits of an internationally employed distinction are 
self-evident, although an element of dissensus does still persist. Minority opinion has 
been articulated to the effect that the difficulty in finding a coherent explanation for 
preferring one pair of categories (i. e. moveable and immoveable) over another (i. e. 
moveable and heritable, or personalty and realty) is basically due to the distinction 
itself being irrational: "The different treatment given to realty in some countries and 
to moveable property in others is a relic in both cases of the feudal importance of 
land, for apart from feudalism, there is no difference in kind between property which 
can be moved and property which cannot. "20 Now, in view of the increasing 
awareness of intellectual property rights, and the burgeoning exploitation thereof, the 
traditional belief that land has far greater commercial value than other items of 
property cannot necessarily be upheld. 21 In spite of this, however, "with or without an 
explanation, the authority for the categories being moveable and immoveable is now 
conclusive. "22 
Property accordingly falls into two categories, moveable and immoveable, according 
to what is "roughly speaking, a natural division. " 23 The object of the distinction is to 
secure a harmony of decision by "abandoning the internal classifications of interests 
20 Clarence Smith, ibid., p17. Cf. Savigny who, in 1869, remarked that, "On impartial consideration, it 
must be admitted that the great changes in respect of property and commerce which have taken place 
in modern times, tend to the abandonment of that sharp distinction [between moveable and 
immoveable property]. " (Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p93) Savigny 
further explained that "German writers have in modern times ever been more and more inclined to give 
up the strict separation between immoveable and other estates ... 
The English writers, on the contrary, 
with the Americans ... adhere to the 
distinction with great tenacity and the French writers appear to 
take the same side. " (ibid., p94) 
21 Consider Troller's remarks that, "Since, as a rule, the purpose of an intangible is to be exploited and 
used as far as possible throughout the world, its creation opens up a potentially unlimited international 
economic area. " (Troller, K, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Ch. 22 - 
Industrial and Intellectual Property' (1994), p7) 
22 Clarence Smith, ibid., p17. 
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in property, which may be artificial and idiosyncratic, for a classification of those 
interests which is more likely to command international acceptance. "24 Academic 
favour naturally rests upon a distinction which is more obvious and realistic than are 
our native domestic categories of heritable or real, and moveable or personal, since 
the international private law distinction rests not on rights (e. g. qua heir, or qua next- 
of-kin), but rather on actual things. Walter Cook, taking the opposite stance, once 
declared that "... the law, unlike engineering, deals with rights and not with things. "25 
This observation stemmed from the rather strained view that "... nothing is really 
immoveable, even relatively to the earth, except empty space, which is not a thing, but 
an absence of things. , 26 
It is submitted that, in the international context, it would be inappropriate for the 
distinction between different types of property to be based upon rights: this would be 
to beg the very question in issue, since the underlying premise of international rules of 
property is the fact that the definition and regulation of rights in and over property 
may be governed by one of a number of possible legal systems and not exclusively by 
the lex situs. 27 To characterise an object of property as moveable or immoveable 
according to the rights possibly attaching to it would be inappropriate since it may 
subsequently be discovered that those rights do not, in fact, exist in the eyes of the 
legal system which is ultimately to regulate the treatment of that item of property. 
23 Lalive (1955), ibid., p7, and bearing in mind the remarks made at note 5 above. 
24 Anton, A E, 'Private International Law' (1967) p386. (This section would appear to have been 
omitted from the 2°d edition. ) 
25 Cook (1942), ibid., p301. 
26 Cook (1942), ibid., p304. Cf. Clarence Smith's opinion that, "the annexation of things to a position is 
artificial, because no thing is physically so annexed to a position that it cannot by the exertion of 
adequate effort be detached from it. " (ibid., p28) 
27 Consider Falconbridge's explanation that, "Persons may have interests in things. In other words the 
things may be the subject of interests. These interests are of course themselves intangible legal 
concepts which may be various in kind and variously classified in different systems of law. " ((1947) 
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That said, it is conceded that the "so-called physical criterion"28 cannot comprise the 
only touchstone in every case, since certain objects of property may be inherently 
"ambiguous in their nature. "29 
In reality, the question whether the subject-matter of ownership is physically 
moveable or immoveable generally presents no difficulty. A more complex problem 
does, however, arise in those cases where a right over what is physically moveable is 
regarded by a particular legal system as being a right over an immoveable e. g. 
fixtures, title deeds etc. It is always open to a legal system to determine that "a thing 
in its nature moveable shall, for some or for all legal purposes, be subject to the rules 
generally applicable to immoveables"30 and vice versa. Accordingly, no legal system 
is bound absolutely by the restraints of physical criteria. 
In 1907, the difficulties concerning the characterisation of fixtures ("tangible property 
whose status as realty or personalty is indeterminate")31 were highlighted by 
ibid., p433) Further, "It is ... important that things and interests in things be not confused. " (ibid., 
p436) 
28 Lalive (1955), ibid., p12. 
29 E. g. Fixtures, a prefabricated house, or an exhibition tent. Cf. Hellendall, "The definition and 
characterisation of things as moveables or immoveables must be kept distinct from notions of daily 
language. " (Hellendall, F, 'The Characterization of Proprietary Rights to Tangible Moveables in the 
Conflict of Laws' (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 374,384). Robertson makes the point that, "... 
jurisprudentially speaking, all property is both moveable and intangible. 'Property', in its strict sense, 
means a legal relationship, or 'bundle of rights' and not the physical object with which the relationship 
is concerned, or over which those rights exist. The relationship, or rights, clearly must be intangible. " 
(Robertson, ibid., p192). Consider Story (cited with approval by Farwell, U. in In re Hoyles), who 
advised that, "the question ... is not so much what are, or ought to be, deemed ex sua natura, 
moveables or not, as what are deemed so by the law of the place where they are situated. " (Story, J., 
'Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws', p654, s. 447) 
30 Dicey & Morris, 'The Conflict of Laws', (13th ed., 2000), p917, paragraph 22-002. 31 Bingham, J W, 'Some Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures' (1907) 7 Colombia L. Rev. 1,4. 
Story had previously noted the problem: "... moveables may become annexed to immoveables, either 
by incorporation or as incidents, and then they take the character of the latter. Such are the common 
cases of fixtures of personal property ... whether for use or ornament ... Among the class of immoveables are also ranked ... 
heritable bonds by the Scottish law, and ground rents, and other rents 
charged on land. " (Story, ibid., p557) Bingham depicted various disputes which might arise concerning 
fixtures, including, inter alia, disputes between (a) the chattel claimant and the owner of land to which 
the chattel has been annexed without the chattel claimant's consent or fault; (b) the chattel owner who 
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Bingham. Falconbridge has proposed that courts should adopt what may be termed a 
purposive approach to the characterisation of fixtures, namely, "... regard should be 
had, not so much to the characterisation of things annexed to land or connected with 
land as moveables or immoveables in themselves, as to the question whether social 
convenience or practical expediency requires that they should be treated as falling 
within the rules of law applicable to the land. 02 This approach is, nevertheless, 
limited, insofar as the same author further states that, "if [chattels] are susceptible of 
being severed from the land, they may, on severance, resume their character of 
moveables, and, if they are taken to another country, may be dealt with under the law 
of their new situs, without regard to the fact that under the law of their former situs 
they may still be regarded as so closely connected with the land that they should be 
subject to the law of the former situs. "33 Falconbridge was, in effect, suggesting a 
proper law approach to the characterisation of property, where the circumstances are 
such (i. e. where a closer connection exists between the object and the `first' situs, than 
with the `subsequent' situs), as to justify an exception to the norm of characterisation 
by the lex Situs. Beale had previously remarked, "Suppose ... the owner of land 
carried his house key into another state; would it be regarded as having a situs in that 
has annexed his chattel to another's land, without that other's consent, and the landowner; (c) the 
chattel claimant who has annexed his chattel to land while in adverse possession, and the owner of a 
better title to the land who has recovered possession; (d) the transferor of land and the transferee; and 
(e) the mortgagor of land and the mortgagee. (Bingham, ibid., p20 et seq. ) Other types of problem 
might also arise (e. g. the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference has asked, "Do the benefits and 
income derived from a particular estate, for example, immoveable property situate in country A, accrue 
to that estate, or does the law applicable to them depend on their character as immoveable or 
moveable property? This question is not devoid of practical importance ... 
Immoveable property may 
well yield sizeable amounts of income. " ('Actes et Documents de la Seizieme Session, Tome 11' - Droz, 
G, `Commentary on Succession Questionnaire', p21) 
32Falconbridge (1947), ibid., p442- 
33 Falconbridge (1947), ibid., p442. (Emphasis added) (i. e. if the situs of a constructively annexed 
moveable object [e. g. title deeds to a house, or a house key] should change, that object will thereafter 
fall under the control of the new lex situs, which could, of course, entail absurd consequences. ) Cf. 
Prott, L V, `Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage' (1989) 
217 II Receuil ý des Cours 215,241, viz.: "If detached elements are found in another country and 
classified as moveables to be dealt with according to the law of the place where they are currently 
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state? It is pretty clear that it would not. 34 He justified this conclusion not by relying 
on a rule of closer connection (as did Falconbridge), but by maintaining that the key, 
by virtue of a legal fiction, is permanently situated on the land (i. e. in the `first' situs); 
when the owner (or, indeed, any other party) takes it to another jurisdiction, it is 
necessarily in transit until returned again to its putative permanent position. 35 This 
appears to rely on a rather tenuous distinction between physical, and legal, situation. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that only physical criteria are 
important in determining the secondary distinction between tangible or corporeal, and 
intangible or incorporeal, property. This secondary characterisation cuts across the 
principal division of property into moveable and immoveable objects. Items of 
incorporeal immoveable property (e. g. leases, servitudes, titles of honour), although 
located, the protection of the state of origin will not follow them and the dismemberment will be 
established. " 
34 Beale, J H, `The Situs of Things' (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 256. 
35 Beale, ibid., p262. Cf. Cook: "If by 'situated' is meant merely 'physically situated' clearly the second 
state ... need pay no attention to what the 
first state has previously said about the `moveable' or 
'immoveable' character of the object concerned: the object is now in the second state, and the latter's 
power or jurisdiction is ... complete ... 
The way out for those using the conventional confused 
terminology is to say that the object is still 'legally situated', or `by operation of law' has a 'situs' in 
some state in which it once was, even though it is now physically situated within the borders of a 
second state. " (Cook, W W, `Immoveables and the Law of the Situs' (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1246, 
1254). Cf. A case concerning the removal, in 1955, by the Contessa Maria Lucheschi, of a cycle of 
Tiepolo frescoes from the walls of her Venetian Grand Canal Palazzo. The Contessa sold the denuded 
Palazzo to one Luigi Franchin, and, simultaneously, she sold the frescoes (now valued at approximately 
$600,000) to a Milanese collector for $10,000. In a subsequent tri-partite dispute, the Italian court 
employed (in practice, if not in name), the physical/legal situs distinction, taking the view that "the 
parts are indivisible from the whole, meaning that the frescoes were 'automatically transferred' with 
the palazzo. It is of little importance that at the moment of sale the frescoes were not there `since the 
material factor of the separation did not make the tie less binding. "' (Bronson, C G, International 
Foundation for Art Research Journal 1998, Vol. 1, No. 3, p10) Since the problem was internal to Italy, 
this seems to have been a satisfactory solution, but one wonders what would have been the result if, 
say, the frescoes had been sold to a Swiss collector and immediately annexed to the walls of his Alpine 
schloß. It is submitted that Falconbridge's approach is more appealing than Beale's since it relies less 
heavily upon a legal fiction. 
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less common perhaps than objects of incorporeal moveable property (e. g. goodwill, 
trademarks, debts etc. ), do nevertheless exist 36 
It has been suggested37 that a more logical characterisation of property would, in fact, 
be between: - 
(1) Corporeal or tangible things (which may be either moveable or 
immoveable); and 
(2) Incorporeal or intangible things. 38 
According to the authors of Dicey and Morris, however, "common practice" (at least 
for the purposes of the conflict of laws) classifies all things as being moveable or 
immoveable, and includes within the category of moveable objects, corporeal and 
36 Contrast the view of Falconbridge, who says that, "The terms immoveable and moveable cannot be 
applied in any real sense to intangible interests in things as distinguished from tangible things ... " 
(1947, ibid., p434) 
37 For example, by Falconbridge: "Intangible things, having no actual Situs, cannot property be 
described as being either moveable or immoveable, so that things should be classified as being (1) 
tangible things - which may be either (a) moveable or (b) immoveable, and (2) intangible things. " 
(1947, ibid., p435) 
38 Consider the approach of the Institutional writers, including, Bell (Commentaries, II. V. 1.1. ): 
"According to the division of the Roman law, things were corporeal or incorporeal; the former 
comprehending such property as is perceptible to sense, the latter such as consists in legal right 
merely. This is a division consistent with nature, and which ought not to be discarded ... 
Things 
corporeal are distinguished in law as heritable or moveable, rst By their own nature and description; 
secondly. By their connection with other things; thirdly. By the destination towards such connection. "; 
Bell (Commentaries, rights of an incorporeal nature partake of the character of 
heritable or moveable, either, 1. By their nature; 2. By connection; or, 3. By destination. " Erskine 
(Institutes, 1I. 2.1. ), in a section headed `Of heritable and moveable rights' commences, "By the Roman 
law, things or subjects were divided into corporeal and incorporeal. " The air of simplicity suggested 
by the corporeal/incorporeal distinction may be deceiving: Cook has warned that, "At first sight these 
words [tangible and intangible] seem largely self-explanatory, but we soon find ourselves lost in a 
verbal fog when we attempt to follow the actual use of these terms by judges and writers. " (1942, ibid., 
p284) Cf. Cheshire, "An unfortunate practice ... 
has grown up by which moveables are distinguished ... 
into tangible things and intangible things. This is a linguistic solecism, for it is a little difficult to 
conceive of a moveable thing that cannot be touched. Loose and inaccurate terminology ... causes no 
serious harm, provided that it does not lead to false analogies and obscurity of thought. This is just 
what the expression 'intangible things' has done. " (Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law', 3`d ed. 
(1947), p550) 
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incorporeal objects, and even ascribes to the latter an artificial situs "in order to bring 
them within the scope of rules of law expressed in terms of situs. "39 
The distinction between moveable property and immoveable property is not merely a 
matter of fact; rather, the forum must engage in a process of legal characterisation of 
the property in question. 40 The choice of what law governs the characterisation 
process is relatively restricted insofar as the characterisation of property is concerned. 
The choice is whether the court should resort to the lexfori or to the lex sites in order 
to ascertain the nature of the property transferred. "Prevailing legal opinion rightly 
adopts the second solution. s41 In Ross v. Ross's Trustees, 42 Lord Meadowbank 
pondered, "By the law of what country, the nature of a property, the character of 
which was disputed, should be determined; ... [it] must be decided by the law of the 
country where the subject itself is situated ... the question, what forms a personal 
estate, is altogether different from the question, to whom does the personal estate 
39 Dicey & Morris, ibid., p920, paragraph 22-010. See Chapter Eleven, infra - `The Assignation of 
Incorporeal Moveable Property'. It should be noted that there has been a call to abandon the distinction 
between moveable and immoveable property as far as `cultural property' is concerned, on the basis that 
"cultural property ought not to be accorded greater or lesser protection depending on whether it is an 
integral part of a whole or has been detached from it, or on whether it is qualified as moveable or 
immoveable property. " (Reichelt, G, `International Protection of Cultural Property' (1985), Uniform 
Law Review 43,99; and Prott, ibid., p241) Reichelt and Prott are concerned less with the 
characterisation of particular types of property than with the formulation of a bespoke, flexible, choice 
of law rule concerning cultural property. Consider too in this regard Merryman's proposal for the 
additional sub-categories of `culturally moveable' (cultural objects which can be "moved abroad 
without significant danger to the objects themselves or to their contexts and without harm to their 
culture of origin") and `culturally immoveable' ("objects, whose exports would result in significant 
cultural loss" To determine whether an article is culturally immoveable, the author suggests that three 
factors should be considered, namely, (a) whether the culture/belief system from which the object came 
is still alive; (b) whether the object was made to be used in religious or ceremonial ways; and (c) 
whether the object would be used by the state of origin in the manner so intended. ) (Merryman, J H, `A 
Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects' 3, at p17, in Briat, M and Freedberg, J A, ed. 
`International Sales of Works of Art, Volume 5: Legal Aspects of International Trade in Art' (1996)) 
The answers to these three questions would be highly subjective and the factors, it is suggested, would 
very likely prove unworkable. 
40 Lalive (1955), ibid., p14. 
41 Lalive (1955), ibid., p15; Downie v. Downie (1866) 4 M. 1067,1070; and Monteith v. Monteith 
(1882) 19 Sc. L. R. 740,742. Although it might be argued, as in other areas, that characterisation by the 
lex Situs incurs the difficulties inherent in any process of characterisation by the lex causae. 
42 July 4 1809 F. C. 
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devolve; the question, whether the subject be personal or not ought to be decided by 
the lex rei sitae. s43 As Clarence Smith has written, "It used to be accepted - and still 
is accepted in the textbooks - as axiomatic that the law of the site of the property in 
question at the time in question should classify that property for all purposes of 
private international law. "44 If there is a conflict between the lex Situs and the lexfori 
as to whether an object of property is moveable or immoveable, it is well settled that 
the lex Situs at the relevant moment (i. e. at the time when ownership is alleged to have 
passed, or at the time pertinent to which the dispute has arisen) must determine the 
characterisation. 45 Of course, no real difficulty of characterisation emerges if the 
43 Ibid., p389. 
44 Clarence Smith, ibid., p23. However, a rather significant rider follows this axiom, namely, 
"Robertson more soberly (p191) says that only the law of the site 'can effectively determine' how the 
property is to be classified ... With all respect, even this is pure 
fantasy: moveable property may well, 
at the time for decision, be outside the country where it was at the relevant date and even immoveable 
property may have been sold and the proceeds removed. " (ibid., p23) Consider too Savigny, ibid., at 
p 134: "... the position in space of moveables may be so indeterminate and fluctuating as entirely to 
preclude any definite knowledge of this position, as well as of the territory in which the local law 
subsists. " 
as Macdonald v. Macdonald 1932 S. C. (H. L. ) 79, per Lord Tomlin, at p84: "The English view is that 
the law of the asset's situation must determine whether it is moveable or immoveable ... 
In this respect 
the Scots law does not appear to differ. " In re Berchtold, Berchtold v. Capron [1923] 1 Ch. 193, per 
Russell, J., at p199: "It is further conceded that whether particular property is a moveable or an 
immoveable is decided according to the lex situs. " In re Cutliffe's Will Trusts, Brewer v. Cutliffe [1940] 
1 Ch. 565, per Morton, J., at p571: "I start with this rule which is, 1 think, well established that the 
question whether particular property is a moveable or an immoveable is decided according to the lex 
situs. " Morris has remarked that the decision in Cutliffe would "appear to be perfectly correct. " 
(Morris, JHC, 'Cases on Private International Law', 4`s ed. (1968), p325). Cf. Collier, who has 
advised that, "... for our courts to classify [property] in a manner opposed to that of the lex situs would 
often be a waste of time, as there may be little our courts could to do enforce their ideas and 
solutions. " (Collier, J G, `Conflict of Laws' (2001), p243) See also Hellendall (1941), ibid., p386/7. 
Contra Robertson, who has noted (as regards intangible property at least) that the criterion of situs may 
result in the court's assuming that which is yet to be proved, "... to refer to that situs in order to 
discover the nature of the property when it is in dispute is to assume the point in issue. " (ibid., pp191, 
193). Similarly, Kaye has indicated that, "Whether lex Situs should be resorted to in order to determine 
the nature of property as being immoveable in the context of Article 16(1) [Brussels Convention] is 
debatable 
... the meaning of connecting or 
jurisdictional factors and of concepts contained therein is 
principally to be ascertained according to the interpretation they bear under English law itself as lex 
fori, since ... it would 
beg the question to adopt the meaning of a foreign law, before that law were 
found to be applicable or its courts to be competent. " (Kaye, P, `Civil Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments' (1987), p895) Kaye admits, however, that if the lexfori, instead of the lex situs, 
were to characterise the property, there would be a risk of jurisdictional conflict in the event that the lex 
fori considered the property to be moveable and the lex situs considered it to be immoveable. Cf. 
Schlosser Report (1978), p121, paragraph 168(c): "If an action relating to immoveable property is 
brought in a particular State and the question whether the action is concerned with a right in rem 
within the meaning of Article 16(1) arises, the answer can hardly be derived from any law other than 
that of the situs. " Consider too Rabel's statement that "The traditional principle that the lex Situs 
55 
different characterisations of the lexfori and the lex Situs would, in any event, lead to 
the same choice of law rule being invoked in the particular case. Alternatively, when 
the property would be classified in an identical manner by all possible laws "there is 
no necessity for ascertaining which law is applicable for this would be a purely 
academical pursuit. "46 In the event, however, that a different conflict rule pertains for 
each kind of property, characterisation is clearly a pivotal stage in the resolution of 
the case. 47 
The only law which can effectively determine whether property should be treated as 
moveable or immoveable is the law of the country which has immediate control of the 
property, that is to say (at least if the property is corporeal), the law of the country 
where it is situated. 4 Dicey and Morris state quite starkly that "The law of the country 
where a thing is situate (the lex situs) determines whether (1) the thing itself is to be 
considered an immoveable or a moveable; or (2) any right, obligation or document 
connected with the thing is to be considered an interest in an immoveable or a 
moveable. "49 If the subject matter, whether of ownership, possession or of some lesser 
proprietorial right, is regarded as being immoveable by one system of law, but as 
moveable by another, then Scots law, English law and most other foreign legal 
systems would collectively respond by stating that the definitive characterisation 
should be that rendered by the lex Situs. "If the law of the situs attributes the quality of 
determines whether a thing or interest is immoveable still prevails but has been challenged by a recent 
and growing group of writers with their creed that the lex foci does everything. " (Rabe!, E, `The 
Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study - Volume I' (1958), p 15) 
46 Re Hoyles [1911] 1 Ch 179,185; and Lalive (1955), ibid., p14. 
47 Cheshire made a similar observation in the 3`h edition of his work, namely, "The first task of the court 
in a conflict of laws case ... is to 
decide whether the res litigiosa is a moveable or an immoveable. 
Upon this preliminary decision depends the legal system that will be applicable to the case. " (1947, 
ibid., p547) 
48 Chatfield v. Berchtoldt [1872] L. R. 7 Ch. App. 192; Macdonald v. Macdonald 1932 S. C. (HL) 79; 
and Re Fitzgerald [ 1904] 1 Ch. 573. 
49 Dicey & Morris, ibid., Rule 111, p917, paragraph 22R-001. 
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moveability or of immoveability to the object in question, the English court which is 
seised of the matter must proceed on that basis. "50 The equivalent approach of the 
Scottish courts is well-established, 5' and there is currently little doubt that the lex Situs 
should determine whether an object itself, or a right connected with it, is to be 
considered as immoveable or moveable. 52 
Scottish and English courts will likewise acquiesce in foreign characterisations of 
foreign situated property, and will admit the right of another country to determine 
whether property situate within that country's jurisdiction falls within the class of 
moveable or immoveable, as that foreign country alone shall decide. There may, 
however, be a degree of limitation on this principle of characterisation by the lex 
situs: "It is commonly and confidently said that in an English court the preliminary 
classification of property is in fact to be made by the law of the site (unlike any other 
classification), but subject to the qualification that the categories, wherever the site, 
are the civil law categories of immoveable and moveable. "53 It should be noted, 
however, that Clarence Smith cites no authority in support of this proposition. 
The significance of the characterisation process lies in the fact that the assertion that 
an asset is moveable or immoveable is simply, "... a shorthand form of asserting that 
50 Cheshire & North, ibid., p924; and Johnstone v. Baker (1817) 4 Madd. 474. 
51 Ross v. Ross's Trustees July 4 1809 FC. 
52 Consider cases at note 45 above. Macdonald v. Macdonald 1932 S. C. (HL) 79 - character of 
Canadian assets determined by lex situs; Downie v. Downie's Trustees (1866) 4M. 1067 - nature of 
Scottish mortgage determined by Scots law; Train v. Train's Executors (1899) 2F. 146 - character of 
bonds and dispositions in security determined by the Scottish lex situs; Breadalbane's Trustees v. 
Dowager Marchioness of Breadalbane (1843) 15 Scot. Jur. 398; Monteith (1882) 9R. 982; and Moss's 
Trustees 1916 2 S. L. T. 31. Consider, however, the remarks of Anton, that, "In light of the reasoning of 
the House of Lords in the case of Macdonald, it is thought that the earlier Scottish decisions of Train v. 
Train's Executors and Moss's Trustees v. Moss must be regarded as incorrect. " (Anton (1967), ibid., 
p387) In Train, the deceased's widow received a two-fold benefit as a result of an irregular process of 
re-characterisation of a bond over heritage in Scotland. See note 58, infra. 
53 Clarence Smith, ibid., p17. 
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a number of legal propositions should be applied to the one or the other; it has no 
bearing upon the real nature of the thing. s54 According to Scots rules of international 
private law, rights over immoveable property are determined by the law of the situs 
whereas rights over moveable property are not necessarily governed by that law. 55 
Since the situs principle constitutes a "simple and effective rule" for questions relating 
to physical things and to immoveables, there is a tendency to "extend it to all 
questions and to regard it as the general determinant of rules for choice of law 
concerning choses in action. This is a false analogy. Moreover, it frequently leads to 
forcing a rule, eminently adapted to one set of circumstances, to fit circumstances for 
which it is entirely inappropriate .... one must be aware of the danger of straining 
rules to fit categories. "56 Historically, questions regarding moveable property have 
been solved by reference to a variety of connecting factors. 57 
Although selection of the applicable law is based upon the moveable/immoveable 
distinction, once the applicable law has been so selected, if its domestic rules are 
founded upon some other idiosyncratic distinction (e. g. realty and personalty, or 
54 Lalive (1955), ibid., p14. Cf. Hellendall, who, in considering whether property is tangible or 
intangible, states, "This questions is no more a 'natural' question than the question whether a thing is 
to be regarded as moveable or immoveable ... it is a question of pure law; it is the question whether the 
forum's rules of conflict of laws applying to tangible things or those applying to intangible things shall 
determine the rights to a thing which is the subject matter of the dispute. " (1941, ibid., p392) More 
recently, Carter has opined that, "generally speaking in English private international law the 
distinction between moveable and immoveable property is only important in cases of general or 
universal transfer (as distinct from particular transfer) which occur on occasions such as bankruptcy 
and death. " (Carter, P B, `Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position in English Private 
International Law' in Lalive, P, ed. `International Sales of Works of Art' (1988), p318) 
55 For - among other considerations - it then depends on what is meant by `situs'. For reasons which 
will be set out in Chapters Eight and Eleven, infra - `The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property' 
and `The Assignation of Incorporeal Moveable Property' - it is not easy to narrate the rule regarding 
moveables - particularly incorporeal moveables - in any more definitive a manner. 56 Cheshire & North, ibid., p927. 
57 Consider generally Lalive, P A, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative 
Study' (1955), and Zaphiriou, G A, `The Transfer of Chattels in Private International Law: A 
Comparative Study' (1956). Consider, however, Venturini's view that, "In reality the distinction 
between moveables and immoveables, which is generally acknowledged ... is of 
little practical 
importance today ... 
for 
... the 
lex rei sitae is applied practically everywhere both in respect of 
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heritage and moveables), that internal categorisation and the consequences thereof 
will be respected: "This is because the case has now reached a stage when it has 
passed out of the domain of the conflict of laws into the domestic domain. "58 Whilst 
within the conflicts domain, however, it is evident that the moveable/immoveable 
distinction looks set to prevail over any other possible characterisation of property. 
On this basis, therefore, it is necessary now to consider the steps which must be taken 
in the judicial process when the nature of the property has been so determined, 
namely, to consider what is the localizing element or connecting factor as regards the 
acquisition, disposal, transmission or extinction of rights in, and over, particular items 
of immoveable or moveable property. 
moveables and immoveables. " (Venturini, G C, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, 
Volume 111, Ch. 21 - Property' (1976), p8) 58 Dicey & Morris, ibid., p918, paragraph 22-007. Cf. Crawford, ibid., p308, paragraph 14.02; and 
Falconbridge (1947), ibid., at p438: "The [moveable/immoveable] distinction is material for the 
purpose of the conflict rules of the forum, but it is immaterial for the purposes of the domestic rules of 
the proper law if... that distinction is not a feature of those rules. " Consider too Wolff's view that the 
"natural, extra judicial [moveable/immoveable] distinction is everywhere the starting-point for the 
legal distinction. But only the starting-point. " (Wolff, M, `Private International Law' (1950), p502) 
Wolff later expands upon this point, stating, "The help given by the [lex Situs] is limited to one small 
component of the problem: after having made known to the English court that the thing situate in 
France is moveable as understood by French law, that law withdraws, and the English court will apply 
the English conflict rule concerning moveables. " (ibid., p504/5) Cf. Clarence Smith, who has advised 
that, "a classification for the choice of law does not preclude a different classification for the purpose 
immediately in hand. " (ibid., p20) Furthermore, "After the controlling law has been selected, that law 
may classify the right differently, but not by way of treating as annexed to any site anything which the 
law of that site does not annex to it. " (ibid., p33) 
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Chapter Four 
Defining the `Situs' 
The principal connecting factor concerning property in the conflict of laws, is the lex 
situs. 1 Although this concept is often assumed to be self-explanatory, it is important 
that the precise meaning of the factor be articulated as regards immoveable property, 
corporeal moveable property and incorporeal moveable property, respectively, for 
although these three categories of property differ quite radically in nature, the same 
connecting factor (nominally, at least), is applied to choice of law disputes concerning 
all three categories .2 Widespread use of the `lex situs' factor persists only because, as 
Carnahan has explained, "... the term `situs' is itself an expression of a conclusion 
which a court has made after consideration of the relationship of the particular kind 
of property to various states with which it may have a possible connection. "3 
The lex Situs - Immoveable property 
In 1919, Joseph Beale remarked that, "The sinus of land can offer no serious difficulty. 
Land has by its nature a permanent situs; and that situs must necessarily be within the 
state in whose boundaries it lies. It cannot change its location. Its sovereignty may 
'Sometimes also referred to as the lex loci rei sitae or the lex rei sitae. Consider, in this regard, 
Bingham's remark that, "Nothing so tends to confusion in any science as misuse or loose use of terms. " 
(Bingham, J W, `Some Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures' (1907) 7 Col. L. R. 1,2) 
2Consider Hancock's citation of Cook (whom he christens `the great fallacy-hunter'), viz.: "The 
tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with 
more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them runs through legal 
discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against. " (Hancock, 
M, `Fallacy of the Transplanted Category' (1959) 37 Can. Bar Rev. 535,575, citing Cook, W W, `The 
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws' (1942), p159) 
3 Carnahan, C W, `Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts' (1958), p440. (Emphasis added) Cf. 
Hellendall, F, `The Characterization of Proprietary Rights to Tangible Moveables in the Conflict of 
Laws' (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 374,392: "The situs is a connecting factor, a `local element which 
connects the factual situation with a particular country. ' As such it must be determined by the lexfori. " 
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indeed be changed; it may lie within the territory of one sovereign, now within that of 
another. But even in such a case its situs remains constant. 94 Venturini, however, has 
drawn attention to one complication which could possibly (albeit infrequently) arise 
in connection with land, or other immoveable property, namely, a situation where the 
asset in question straddles the border between two contiguous states (e. g. the sale of 
an estate on the Scottish/English border). In such a scenario, however, the problem, 
according to Venturini, is easily solved, "by dividing this economic unit into two 
distinct parts and thus by submitting each of them to the law of the country in which it 
is situated. "5 Whilst this may be reasonable for the purposes of jurisdiction, insofar as 
a plea of forum non conveniens may, if appropriate, be upheld so as to unify or 
streamline what would otherwise be separate proceedings concerning the `one' estate, 
it is submitted that in a case where the land in question is owned by a single proprietor 
and is, to all intents and purposes, one estate, Venturini's rule is unsatisfactory for the 
purposes of choice of law. 6 While the formal requirements of the respective leges 
(Emphasis added) In theory, different forums might ascribe a different situs, given the same problem 
on which to adjudicate. 
4 Beale, J H, `The Situs of Things' (1919) Yale L. J. 525,526. Cf. Dicey & Morris, `The Conflict of 
Laws' (13th edition), p935, at paragraph 22-052: "Land could not without absurdity be treated as 
situate in any country other than that where it is situated. Any interest in land is situate where the land 
is situated. "; "The Situs of an immoveable is ordinarily fixed and does not change, but this is not so in 
the case of moveables which may be in one place now and in another subsequently ... " (Spiro, 
E, `The 
Incidence of Time in the Conflict of Laws' (1960) 9 I. C. L. Q. 357,363); and "As regards immoveables 
... no great 
difficulties arise. " (Venturini, G C, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, 
Volume III, Chapter 21 - Property' (1976), p 10) 
5 Venturini, ibid., plO. 
6 Consider Scherrens v. Maenhout Case 158/87 [1988] E. C. R. 3791, which concerned an agricultural 
lease of a contiguous estate comprising five hectares of land in Belgium and twelve hectares of land in 
the Netherlands. According to the Commission's written observations, "By virtue of being a unit, 
treated as such by the parties in their contractual dealings, it might in certain circumstances be more 
practical for a single court to give judgement over the whole property rather than for two separate 
courts to do so in respect of its two parts. " (p3795) "... [T]here might, in appropriate cases, be an 
overriding reason for making an exception to the general rule under which, in the case of a lease for 
property over two separate parts of the land, two different courts have jurisdiction over two separate 
parts of the land. Such an exception might be made for land which technically forms a single unit, or 
when virtually the entire land is situated in one of the two contracting states, and only a small, 
insignificant part of it in the other, or when the land concerned forms a single economic unit in the 
sense that neither of the component parts can profitably be farmed as a separate entity ... 
[but] 
confined to cases where the land is in fact physically a whole. " (ibid. ) The effect of the Commission's 
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causae could be satisfied (e. g. registration or recording requirements), there could be 
difficulties in submitting certain matters of essential validity (e. g. questions of 
capacity to transfer, or to acquire, land) to more than one law, where those laws would 
draw different conclusions regarding the problem at hand. 
The lex loci rei sitae - Corporeal moveable property 
As regards the treatment of corporeal moveable property, the term lex rei sitae has 
been almost invariably employed by commentators on the conflict of laws, from Story 
and Savigny onward, to denote the law of the place where the property is situated. 
Use of this term is hermeneutically inaccurate, since its literal translation is `the law 
of the thing situated. ' The emphasis which this translation places on the actual object 
of property is inappropriate since no individual object can ever have a law depending 
upon it as such. Goudy has remarked that, "Despite its sanction by long usage and 
great names, I venture to object to it as an inexact and improper mode of expression 
the best English and American writers, though not all of them avoid it, employ 
correctly in its place either the term lex sites or the terms lex loci rei sitae. "7 If the 
term lex rei sitae is compared with other analogous idioms commonly employed in 
international private law, its inappropriateness becomes apparent (e. g. lex domicilii 
and lex foci are accurately-named connecting factors since domicile and forum 
indicate a definite locus or territory; lex delicti, lex celebrationis and lex solutionis, 
however, are more properly framed in the manner lex loci delicti, lex loci 
celebrationis and lex loci solutionis). Goudy compares the phrase Vex rei sitae' with 
the equivalent French phrase: "a French writer never speaks of la loi de la chose 
situee, which would be a literal translation, but of la loi de la situation, which is the 
suggestion would be to create in respect of the smaller (or less valuable) plot, a notional situs, at the 
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equivalent not of the lex rei sitae, but of the lex situs. "8 Accordingly, it is stated that 
although either of the terms lex loci rei sitae or lex situs is semantically correct, the 
latter, as the shorter, is to be preferred. Perhaps, though, for accuracy, or for its mind- 
directing quality, the former has its advantages. 
Equivalent to the possible exception to the general rule regarding immoveable 
property straddling two contiguous states, is the exception which might also pertain 
regarding the treatment of certain types of corporeal moveable property, namely, 
`aggregate moveables. '9 The commentary to paragraph 256 of the First Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws declares that, " The [American Law] Institute expresses no 
opinion whether the conveyance of an aggregate unit of moveables may not be 
governed by the law of the place where the various items are aggregated as a unit, or 
that a conveyance of an aggregate unit made up of a number of units, themselves 
aggregates, may not be governed by the law of the place where the entire unit is 
managed so far as such conveyance is not contrary to the public policy of a state in 
which any constituent unit is. "10 If a single owner is intent on transferring to a third 
party, title to `an aggregate unit of moveables' (particularly goods of the same 
description and quality), which happen to be situated, whether by chance or design, in 
more than one state, then the application of multiple leges causae to the matter of the 
situs of the larger (or more valuable) plot. See note 29 et seq., infra, concerning `notional Situs'. 
7 Goudy, H, `Lex rei sitae' 1913 (29) L. Q. R. 2. 
8 Goudy, ibid., p3- 
9 Beale, J H, `Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws' (1934), paragraph 256, comment (b): "An 
aggregate unit of moveables is a collection of things which may include tangible things, documents and 
intangibles, all devoted by the owner to a single use or managed as a single unit ... The 
fact that a 
particular item is temporarily separated from the other items constituting the aggregate unit does not 
prevent it from being included therein. " 
10 Beale (1934), ibid., paragraph 256, caveat. 
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essential validity of the transfer of ownership, may give rise to inconvenience or 
absurdity. " 
The matter of time is highly significant in determining the lex situs of corporeal 
moveable property, for as Beale has explained, situs refers to "a settled relation of the 
thing to a particular locality. "12 But the problem regarding the transfer of corporeal 
moveable property is a dynamic, not a static one. 13 Connecting factors may be 
constant or variable; "The fonner necessarily refer to a particular event or a constant 
situation [e. g. lex loci celebrationis, lex loci contractus, or lex loci delicti] at a given 
moment in time, and no further definition is needed. The latter [e. g. lex loci rei sitae, 
lex domicilii, or habitual residence] employ a test which may be liable to change over 
a period of time and thus it becomes essential that the choice of law rule should define 
" E. g. Consider a Belgian jeweller selling to a purchaser in Scotland, by means of a single transaction, 
a pair of diamonds, one of which is situated, at the point of sale, in Antwerp, and the other of which, in 
South Africa. It could be argued that it would be more appropriate (at least from the perspective of the 
transacting parties) for the essential validity of the transfer of ownership of the pair to be governed by 
one single law, rather than for the transfer of each diamond to be governed separatim by Belgian or 
South African law. 
12 Beale (1919), ibid., p525. In Beale's view, "... situs does not include the mere temporary location of 
a thing, but refers to a location which has such a degree of permanence that the thing may fairly be 
described as settled within the place and as forming a part of the mass of property in that place. " 
(ibid. ) Sed contra Beale, ibid., at p528: "The general principle of situs is that the situs of a chattel is 
based upon a natural fact, its actual position in space. Its actual position is prima facie its situs, just as 
a man's actual residence is prima facie his domicile. " Cf. Spiro, ibid., at p364: "... when locating the 
situs of a moveable thing one must have regard to the incidence of time. " Might one compare the 
notion of `situs' with that of `domicile' (a `settled' relation between a person and a locality), or with 
`habitual residence', in the sense of `habit'? Contra Zaphiriou, G, `Transfer of Chattels in Private 
International Law' (1956), at p194: "The situs of a chattel is the equivalent of a person's residence, not 
of a person's domicile. " 
1: As Grodecki has stated, "... legal rules may collide on the plane of time as well as that of space. " 
(Grodecki, J K, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Chapter 8- 
Intertemporal Conflict of Laws' (1976), p3) Cf. Spiro, ibid., p357. A temporal conflict of laws may 
appear in one (or a combination) of three guises, namely, (1) A change in the conflict rule of the forum 
(le conflit transitoire); (2) A change in the domestic rule of the lex causae; or (3) A change in the 
connecting factor. In the third case, the two or more laws consecutively indicated by the changing 
connecting factor fall into competition with one another. Most commonly the temporal problem which 
emerges in the context of moveable property is (3), referred to as `le conflit mobile. ' (This phrase was 
first coined by Bartin, E, `Principles de droit international prive', Volume I, 28 - per Grodecki, ibid., 
p33. ) Zaphiriou has remarked that, "... dynamic conflicts, like the static conflicts, are solved in 
accordance with the conflict rules of the forum ... the conflict rule must consist of two elements ... it 
must indicate the connecting factor in space ... it must indicate the connecting 
factor in time. " (ibid., 
p158) 
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the operative date ... it is thus imperative 
for the conflict rule to contain an indication 
of the point in time when reference to a given legal system must be made - only then 
will it provide an answer to the question what law should be applied. 9914 
The situation of a corporeal moveable at a particular point in time may be entirely 
fortuitous, but as regards the transfer etc. of ownership, the relevant situs is the 
situation of the object at the time of its alleged transfer. 15 As Venturini has explained, 
"... it is necessary to determine the sphere of operation of each of the legal systems 
which are applicable in succession when the same goods are transferred from one 
country to another. " 16 Difficulties naturally arise where the Situs of moveable 
property changes during the course of events (e. g. between the time of the first 
acquisition or transfer of the asset in question, and the point of litigation to determine 
the ultimate ownership thereof). The situs of moveable property is frequently casual 
and can easily be changed by wrongful act. If the situs of the object should change 
(i. e. from state X to state Y), it is straightforward enough to assert that the lex situs at 
the time of the alleged (latest) transfer of ownership should apply, but it is 
questionable how reasonable it is to apply that law. Nevertheless, it is the case that, 
"... the law of the country where the object is situated last in time determines the 
substance, and thus the very existence of proprietary rights ... all past transactions 
concerning the acquisition of title in the object are determined by the law of the 
14 Grodecki, ibid., p33. Cf. Morris, JHC, `The Time Factor in the Conflict of Laws' (1966) 15 I. C. L. Q. 
422,425. 
15 Or as Grodecki suggests, the law indicated by the latest crystallisation of the connecting factor (ibid., 
p35). E. g. Cammell v. Sewell (1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5H&N 728; and Inglis v. Robertson [1898] 
A. C. 616. Contra immutable matrimonial property r6gimes which adopt the law indicated by the first 
crystallisation of the connecting factor: Frankel v. The Master (1950) 1 S. A. L. R. 220 (South Africa). 
16 Venturini, ibid., p13. He has stated that, "Grave difficulties arise in respect of the question as to the 
time at which the place of the situation of the object is relevant for the purposes of private international 
law. " (ibid. ) 
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country where the object was situated when the alleged acquisition took place. " 17 The 
result is that the wrongful removal of property can be cured, with relative ease, by 
buttressing the wrongful act with a corrective transfer in a subsequent, well-disposed, 
situs. 18 Doubt as to the logic of applying the (new) lex situs must inevitably arise 
where property has been removed without the consent of the first owner or lawful 
possessor, to another country, and title has been validly transferred there in 
conformity with the local law of the supervening situs. 19 This shall be considered 
further in Chapters Eight and Twelve, infra. 
Finally on the subject of the situs of corporeal moveable property, particular mention 
should be made of goods in transit. As will be outlined in Chapter Eight, infra, 
property of this type is subject to special provision due to the fact that the situs of 
such property is casual, fortuitous or transient, making application of the general rule 
inappropriate, if not impossible. Savigny explained that, "... the position in space of 
moveables may be so indeterminate and fluctuating as entirely to preclude any 
definite knowledge of this position ... A traveller with 
his baggage can pass, in a 
coach or railway, through several territories in one day, without even thinking of the 
one in which he happens for the moment to be. The same case occurs when a 
17 Venturini, ibid. p13; Cammell v. Sewell, ibid; Todd v. Armour (1882) 9 R. 901; Luther v. Sagor 
[1921] 3 K. B. 532; and Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 K. B. 718. 
IS Grodecki admits that, "... the solution very largely sacrifices vested rights in favour of security of 
commercial dealings. " (ibid., p36) 
19 Consider Falconbridge's and Beale's respective solutions (in the context of fixtures) for dealing with 
surreptitiously removed house keys etc. (See Chapter Three, infra - `The Distinction between 
Moveable and Immoveable Property' - note 32 et seq. ) Might the notion of a fictional situs be 
extended in the present context? Consider too Zaphiriou's comment that, "In federal states like the 
USA and Canada where dynamic conflicts are frequent, there is a tendency to recognise as far as 
possible `acquired rights' and to subject both their creation and effects to the same law. " (1956), ibid., 
p160. Sed contra, Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods [1980] Ch. 496. Chapter Eight, infra - 
'The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'. 
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merchant sends goods to a great distance, as long as these goods are on their way 
+920 
The effect of classifying an object as property in transit is to displace application of 
the general lex Situs rule. 21 This displacement principle is primarily one of 
expediency, since, "In most of these cases, the court would find it difficult, ex post 
facto, to ascertain the situation of the chattel. "22 In view of the consequences, 
however, it is important to inquire who, or what law, determines whether an object is, 
in fact, in transit. In reality, this matter can be determined only by the forum applying 
the lex fori, since, by definition, there is no other court (i. e. no relevant forum rei 
sitae) to which the matter can be referred, unless it happens that the goods have 
temporarily come to rest in a third state. If this should be the case, then the (non-Situs) 
forum would presumably defer to the law of that third state in order to ascertain 
whether or not, in that state's view, the transit had been interrupted. 
In principle, goods will be classified as being in transit if they have left the country of 
dispatch (the locus expeditionis), without, in fact, having arrived at their intended 
20 Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p134/5. Cf. Hellendall, F, `The Res in 
Transitu and Similar Problems in the Conflict of Laws' (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 7, at p27: "In these 
cases there is either no situs at all, or the lex Situs cannot be ascertained, or the connection of the 
goods with their actual situation is so small ... 
"; Venturini, ibid., at p11: "... the connection with the 
country of transit is altogether temporary and without any practical relevance. "; and Zaphiriou, ibid., 
at p192/3: "... at the time of the alleged transfer or the alleged acquisition of a proprietary interest the 
chattels are without a fixed resting place ... a res in transitu may have no connection at all with the 
territory of a country. " 
21 Dicey & Morris, ibid., p968, paragraph 24E-015: "If a tangible movable is in transit, and its situs is 
casual or not known, a transfer which is valid and effective by its applicable law will semble be valid 
and effective in England. "; and Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland', p317, note 58. 
22 Zaphiriou, ibid., p193; Siehr, K, `International Art Trade and the Law' (1993) 243 Receuil des Cours 
VI 9,79: "Sometimes the locus rei sitae of a moveable cannot be ascertained easily. This is especially 
true of moveables en route by ship, aircraft or inland transportation. "; and Hellendall (1939), ibid., 
p27. 
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destination (the locus destinationis). 23 Moreover, an object will cease being in transit 
if its passage is suspended. The difficulty, however, in Beale's words, is "to decide 
what breaks the continuity of the journey. , 24 It has been suggested that transit will 
terminate only when a definite connection, physical or legal, can be established with 
the state where the object is (even temporarily) located. 25 
The lex situs - Incorporeal moveable property 
A more difficult concept to rationalise is that of the situs of an incorporeal moveable 
right. 26 Ex sua natura, an incorporeal right has no physical location. 27 Nevertheless, 
23 Hellendall (1939), ibid., p27, refers to Niboyet, (Niboyet, J P, `Des conflits des lois relatifs a 
V acquisition de la propriete et des droits sur les meubles' (1912)), stating that not only must the chattel 
be physically in transit (i. e. it must have left the country of dispatch), but it must also be legally in 
transit (i. e. it must not have established any legal contact with its present location). 
24 Beale (1919), ibid., p531. 
25 Hellendall (1939), ibid., p27, has stated that, "... a chattel ceases to be in transitu when the journey 
is interrupted and a legal contact has been established with the law of the place where the property is 
situate ... 
A journey is deemed to have been interrupted when the goods have arrived at the place of 
their destination stipulated in the contract of affreightment whether originally or subsequently inserted 
therein. The intention of the owner or the purchaser of the goods to forward them to another country is 
immaterial ... A contact with the law of the country where a journey is interrupted can 
be established 
either by a sale to a person resident in that country, or by an imperative provision of the law of that 
country ... 
" The author is more ambiguous in his statement on p31 to the effect that, " [the goods in 
transit] must not enter into any legal connection with the country of transit. Whether such legal 
connection is established depends on the circumstances of each case. " The author intends `legal' 
connection to be interpreted in the sense of connection with the law, as opposed to `lawful' connection, 
as is shown by his remark that, "It is not necessary that such legal contact is established by lawful acts; 
even a tortious or criminal act might determine a transit prematurely. " Consider, for example, People 
v. Bacon (1910) 243 111.313,90 N. E. 686 and General Oil Company v. Crain (1908) 209 U. S. 211, 
both cited by Beale (1919), ibid., p530: in the former case, grain removed from cars for inspection, 
weighing, drying, sacking, grading, mixing and reloading, were held to have acquired a fixed situs in 
the state where these activities took place, and in the latter case, crude oil stopped during transit for the 
purpose of being barrelled was deemed to have acquired a situs at the place of barrelling. Contrast 
Robinson v. Longley (1883) 18 Nev. 71 and Prairie Oil & Gas Company v. Ehrhardy (1910) 244 111. 
634,91 N. E. 680, also cited by Beale (1919), ibid., p529: in the former case, a travelling circus 
exhibiting in a certain state was held merely to be in transit, and not therefore, liable to tax in the state 
through which it passed, and in the latter case, a constant flow of crude oil passing through a pipeline 
between Kansas and Indiana was held to be in transit and not liable to tax in Illinois. Beale takes the 
view that, "If ... while the goods are within the state any use is made of them, or any process of 
manufacture or of preparation for market is applied to them, which is of such a nature as seriously to 
interrupt the transit, the goods while being so used or while undergoing such a process are usually 
regarded as having a fixed situs. " ((1919), ibid., p530) 
26 To be distinguished from a right of property (i. e. ownership) in respect of a corporeal moveable 
object: "There is no need to assign a legal situs to an interest in a tangible thing as distinguished from 
the actual situs of the thing which is the subject of the interest. On the other hand, if the thing which is 
the subject of the interest is itself intangible, neither the so called thing nor the interest in it has any 
actual situs, and if it should seem to be useful to assign a situs to either of them, that situs must be an 
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the connecting factor which generally applies to dealings with incorporeal moveable 
property relies, prima facie, upon the situation of the property. Cook has concluded 
that the "... source of confusion is a result of the hypostatization ('thingifying') of 
relations and abstractions, so that they are dealt with as if they were `things' in the 
same sense in which physical objects are `things'. "28 
To circumvent the impossibility of identifying a physical Situs, courts and 
commentators have instead utilised a legal fiction, imputing to incorporeal moveable 
rights an artificial legal situs. 29 In the case of Smelting Company of Australia Limited 
artificial one, invented, by analogy or otherwise, for the purpose of bringing intangibles within the 
scope of certain rules of law expressed in terms of situs ... even the use of the word thing as 
descriptive 
of the intangible concept involves a reification of what has no real existence. " (Falconbridge, J D, 
`Essays on the Conflict of Laws' (1947), p434/5) 
27 Cf. Lee v. Abdy (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309, per Day, J., at p312: "The subject matter of the assignment is 
a chose in action which has no locality. "; Smelting Company of Australia Limited v. I. R. C. [1897] 1 
Q. B. 175 [overruled on a different point by English, Scottish & Australian Bank Limited v. I. R. C. 
[1932] A. C. 238], per Lord Esher, MR, at p180/1: "The expression 'locally situate' cannot apply to 
something which in truth and in fact has no locality ... the property 
here in question cannot be touched, 
or seen, or placed anywhere. It is incapable of being brought within the fair and true meaning of the 
words 'locally situate' or of being said to exist in any locality. "; English, Scottish & Australian Bank 
Limited v. I. R. C. [1932] A. C. 238, per Lord Tomlin, at p249: "I share the view ... that it is not easy to 
form a conception of property having no local situation. " Consider too an unattributed Note entitled, 
`Situs of Intangible Property in Conflict of Laws' (1956) 30 St. John's Law Review 224, at p224: "It is 
an apparent anomaly to discuss the situs of intangible property. "; Falconbridge (1947), ibid., at 
p417: "As an intangible thing has no objective existence, it cannot have a real situs, that is, it is not 
situated in a given place in the literal sense in which a tangible thing is so situated. "; Fawcett, J J, & 
Torremans, P, `Intellectual Property and Private International Law' (1998), at p489: "... how is a 
situation to be ascribed to intangibles? "; Hellendall (1941), ibid., at p393: "... the situs of intangibles, 
even where there is a corporeal substratum, such as an acknowledgement of a debt or the like, is not 
the physical situation of the corporeal substratum. "; Rabel, "... debts have no situs and lack the all- 
purpose contact that tangible things have ... 
because the object is imagined rather than real ... it 
cannot be localized. " (Rabel, E, `The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study', Volume I (1958), 
p66/7); and Cook (1942), ibid., at p286: "... if 'things' have no 'physical substance' they can hardly be 
said to have a 'situs' if that means a location in space. " 
28 Cook (1942), ibid., p285. Cf. Falconbridge (1947), ibid., p417, where the author speaks of the 
`reification' of intangible moveable rights; and New York Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee 
[1924] 2 Ch. 101, per Atkin, U., at p119: "The question as to the locality, the situation of a debt or a 
chose in action is obviously difficult, because it involves consideration of what must be considered to 
be legal fictions. A debt, or a chose in action, as a matter of fact, is not a matter of which you can 
predicate position; nevertheless, for a great many purposes it has to be ascertained where a debt or a 
chose in action is situated. " 
29 To a lesser degree, the notion of artificial legal situs is also utilised in relation to certain corporeal 
moveable objects, including, constructive fixtures, goods in transit, sailing vessels, rolling stock and 
aircraft: a legal situs is sometimes imputed to vessels etc. at the place of their registration, or 
alternatively, in the state of the flag under which they voyage. See McNair, A D, 'Municipal Effects of 
Belligerent Occupation' (1941) 57 L. Q. R. 33,70; Venturini (1976), ibid., p10/11; Dicey & Morris, 
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v. I. R. C. 30 Rigby, LT., opined that, "No doubt for certain purposes incorporeal rights 
and chores in action, such as debts, are treated by a legal fiction as being where the 
debtor is; but I do not know that we are therefore compelled to say, or ought properly 
to say, that they have a local situation there . s31 The revisionist view of Smelting 
Company of Australia Limited has highlighted the distinction between physical and 
legal situs, viz: "Lord Esher and Lopes LJ. considered that incorporeal personal 
property could not be said to be situate anywhere. This is, of course, true, physically 
speaking, but not, I think, in contemplation of law. "32 Lord Lindley continued, "... 
the legal conception of property appears to me to involve the legal conception of 
existence somewhere. Incorporeal property has no existence in nature and has, 
physically speaking, no locality at all. We, however, are not dealing with anything 
which in fact fills a portion of space, but with a legal conception, or, in other words, 
with rights regarded as property. But to talk of property as existing nowhere is to use 
language which to me is unintelligible. "33 
ibid., Rule 22E-057: "A merchant ship may at some times be deemed to be situate at her port of 
registry. ", and Rule 22E-060: "A civil aircraft may at some times be deemed to be situate in its country 
of registration. " This is potentially of importance in the context of purported governmental 
confiscations of vessels etc. (e. g. The Jupiter (No. 3) [1927] P. 250) Consider Beale (1919), ibid., at 
p532: "A vessel has no situs at a mere port of call, even though the vessel is making regular trips 
between that port and another ... the purpose 
for which the vessel was in the port of call wholly 
excluded the idea of permanently abiding in the state. ", and at p533: "The rolling stock of a railroad ... 
is by nature and use constantly moving from place to place, [and] cannot ordinarily be regarded as 
having an actual situs anywhere. " 
30 [1897] 1 Q. B. 175. 
31 Ibid., p184. 
32 I. R. C. v. Muller & Co's Margarine Limited [1901] A. C. 217, per Lord Lindley, at p237/8. Further, 
per Lord Macnaghten, at p223: "... it is not easy to form a conception of property having no local 
situation. " 
33 I. R. C. v. Muller & Co's Margarine Limited [1901] A. C. 217, per Lord Lindley, at p237. Beware, 
however, Falconbridge's warning: "It is common practice ... to speak of the situs of an intangible thing 
and to express rules of law ... in terms of situs. Language of this kind is of course not to be taken too 
seriously, because a so-called situs attributed to an intangible thing is obviously a less substantial 
basis for resort to the lex rei sitae than the actual situs of a tangible thing. " ((1947), ibid., p417) 
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The notion of a fictional situs was endorsed by Lord Buckmaster in English, Scottish 
and Australian Bank v. LR. C., 34 when his Lordship opined that "... it is true that 
[incorporeal property] has not the attributes of place and substance like a chattel 
which you can handle and move from one place to another. But debts do, in one form 
or another, represent property of very considerable value in the modern world, and it 
appears to me it is desirable that they should possess a locality, even if they are 
invested with it by means of a legal fiction. "35 
Unfortunately, the ascription of a fictional situs entails the drawback that the fiction 
may not be universally recognised or endorsed. The situs of an incorporeal moveable 
right should be determined by the forum applying the conflict rules of the lex fori. 36 
There is scope, however, for international discord in the event that the forum 
concludes that the right in question is situated in state X, but state X, in fact, considers 
it to be situated in a third state, state Y (or, for that matter, in the forum). 37 One might 
34 [1932] A. C. 238, at p246. Cf. Lord Warrington, who stated, at p248, that, "... the task of discovering 
secundum fictionem legis a local situation for an intangible legal conception has long been a familiar 
one. One example is that of finding a residence for a company. " Further, per Lord Macmillan, at p254, 
"When the question of the local situation of a particular form of property is submitted for judgement ! 
do not think that it will do to say that it has in law no situation anywhere. " 
35 Consider also Benjamin, J, `The Law of Global Custody' (1996), at p80: "Attributing a location to an 
intangible such as an interest under a trust is a notional exercise. "; and the unattributed remarks that, 
"Since situs can be essential, intangibles have been artificially located. The application of these 
fictions has resulted in divergent, and often conflicting, theories of determining situs. " (Note (1956), 
ibid., p225). Cf. Rogerson, P J, 'The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws - Illogical, Unnecessary 
and Misleading' [ 1990] 49 C. L. J. 441, at p441. 
36 Wolff, M, `Private International Law' (1950), p505; and Benjamin, J, `Determining the Situs of 
Interests in Immobilised Securities' (1998) 47 I. C. L. Q. 877,926. Note the circulus inextricabilis 
inherent in this proposition: the question whether property is moveable or immoveable is to be 
answered by the lex situs. But, the forum determines what is the situs of the property. To determine the 
situs, the forum must decide whether the property is moveable or immoveable; this may arise then as 
an incidental or preliminary question - Cf. Sykes, E 1, 'Cases and Materials on Private International 
Law' (1962), p594. This complication can only be resolved by operation of the doctrine of renvoi. (note 
66, infra) 
37 Consider the dictum of McNair J. in Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company [1963] 2 
Q. B. 352, at p379/80, viz.: "... I should not be deterred from holding that the situs of the debt was not 
in Egypt on the evidence ... that 
by Egyptian law the Situs of the debt was in Egypt. " 
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surmise that this problem would be exacerbated in situations where the incorporeal 
right in question is one with which the forum is not familiar. 38 
Through experience, rules have emerged in terms of which certain classes of 
incorporeal moveable right have been accorded fictional situs. An incorporeal 
moveable right may require to be fixed with a notional situs for a variety of purposes, 
including, inter alia, the exercise of jurisdiction, the grant of confirmation or the 
payment of tax. 39 So, for example, a simple debt4° is deemed to be situated at the 
place where the debtor resides '41 because assistance may be required from the courts 
of the situs to secure enforcement of the obligations under the debt, including, if 
necessary, the use of diligence. 2 Enforcement of a debt at the residence of the debtor 
38 E. g. Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 Q. B. 19; and Shahnaz v. Rizwan [1965] 1 Q. B. 390. 
39 New York Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee [ 1924] 2 Ch. 101, per Atkin, U. at p 119. Cf 
Smelting Company of Australia Limited v. J. R. C. [1897] 1 Q. B. 175, per Rigby, LJ., at p184: "The term 
'locally situate' may have different meanings for different purposes. "; and J. R. C. v. Muller & Co's 
Margarine Limited [ 1901 ] A. C. 217, per Lord Lindley at p237: "It may perhaps be true that property 
which has no physical existence, may, if necessary, be treated for some purposes in one locality, and 
for other purposes in some other locality. But until the necessity for so treating it is apparent, I see no 
justification for introducing confusion by judicially holding the same property to be legally situate in 
two different places at one and the same time. " Contra Andrews, F, `Situs of Intangibles in Suits 
Against Non-resident Claimants' (1939) 49 Yale L. J. 241, at p259: "A debt may have a situs in a 
number of places at the same time, which, from a strictly theoretical standpoint, seems illogical. From 
a practical standpoint, however, the situation is no worse than in any other case in which two or more 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction. "; and Graveson, R H, `The Conflict of Laws - Private 
International Law' (1974), at p471: "... although it may possibly only have one situs at any one time, 
that situs may be as changeable and elusive as a professional debtor. " Consider too Westlake, J, `A 
Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), at p212: "Shares in a company registered in England 
for the purpose of acquiring a business carried on abroad, are property situate in England within the 
meaning of the revenue laws ... 
Nevertheless, the shares or stock of a foreign company are, for the 
purpose of the revenue laws, deemed to be situated in the country where the company has its place of 
residence and trading, and not in the place where the company is incorporated and registered, if that is 
different. " 
40According to Andrews, a simple debt is "merely an obligation upon the part of the debtor to pay the 
given amount to the creditor upon the due date. " ((1939), ibid., p255) 
Dicey & Morris, ibid., p925, paragraph 22-026; English, Scottish and Australian Bank Limited v. 
I. R. C. [ 1932] A. C. 238, per Lord Buckmaster, at p242: "That for purposes of probate and estate duty a 
simple contract debt is assumed to be situated where the debtor resides is established by a long series 
of authorities that stretch back into the mists of antiquity. "; and Banque des Marchands de Moscou 
[1954] 1 W. L. R. 1108 per Roxburgh, J., at p1115: "1 know of no authority for the proposition that a 
simple contract debt is situate in this country at a time when the debtor is not resident here. " 
42 Commissioner of Stamps v. Hope [1891] A. C. 476, per Lord Field, at p481: "Now a debt per se ... 
has, of course, no absolute local existence; but it... is a well-settled rule ... that a 
debt does possess an 
attribute of locality ... 
[it has] no other local existence than the personal residence of the debtor, where 
the assets to satisfy it would presumably be. " (Cf. Falconbridge (1947), ibid., p418) Rex v. Lovitt 
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is the oldest and most universal of the fictional situs rules. 43 Rogerson has explained 
the background to the rule: "Originally this place [the debtor's residence] was 
adopted because it was the Ordinary [the ecclesiastical officer with power to grant 
probate and to administer legacies441 for that area who had jurisdiction over the 
debtor and could, therefore, release him from his debt after the death of his 
creditor. "45 
The question of time is interesting in this regard. 46 Normally, in disputes concerning 
property, the connecting factor is determined as at the point, say, of transfer of 
ownership of the object in question. In the present context, therefore, one would 
expect that practice to translate into the Situs of the debt (i. e. the residence of the 
debtor) at the point, say, when entitlement to repayment of the debt was created or 
[ 1912] A. C. 212, per Lord Robson, at p218: "The property consisted of simple contract debts, and as 
such could have no local situation other than the residence of the debtor where the assets to satisfy 
them would presumably be. "; and New York Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. 
101, per Warrington, U., at pl14: "The rule of law with regard to the locality of simple contract debts 
is that it is determined by the residence of the debtor at the material moment ... the reason for that is 
that it is the residence of the debtor which determines the place where he may be sued, prima facie at 
all events, and is in general the place where the means of satisfying any judgement may be discovered, 
but whatever the reason is, there is no doubt that that is the rule. " Further, per Atkin, U., at p119: "... 
it seems plain that the reason why the residence of the debtor was adopted as that which determined 
where the debt was situate was because it was in that place where the debtor was that the creditor 
could, in fact, enforce payment of the debt ... that is a very material consideration. "; and Swiss 
Banking Corporation v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [1923] 1 K. B. 673, per Bankes, U., at p679. 
43 Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [ 1954] 1 W. L. R. 139. Although note also that, on 
occasion, the choice of situs is based not purely upon the debtor's residence: Republica de Guatemala 
v. Nunez [1927] 1 K. B. 669, per Lawrence, U., at p697: "In the present case the debt is connected in 
so many ways with England that there is no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that it has its 
situation or quasi-situation in England. The contract with the bank was made in England - the nature 
and extent of the bank's obligations under the contract fell to be determined by English law - the debt 
is payable in England where the bank is resident and domiciled and England is the place where the 
debt is properly recoverable. " (Cf. the multiple links identified in Indyka v. Indyka [1969] 1 A. C. 33) 
Cf. Smelting Company of Australia Limited v. I. R. C. [1897] 1 Q. B. 175, per Rigby, U. at p183. Also, 
reliance has been placed, not necessarily on the debtor's residence, but rather on his presence sufficient 
to found jurisdiction: Lorentzen v. Lydden [1942] 2 K. B. 202, per Atkinson, J., at p205, "The situs of a 
debt or chose in action is, generally speaking, the country in which the debtor is to be found and sued. " 
Cf. Westlake (1925), ibid., at p209: "A debt is situate in the country in which it is properly 
recoverable. "; and Benjamin (1998), ibid., at p931: "... one should be guided by the practicalities of 
recovery and enforcement, whether or not these lead one to the residence of the debtor. " 
44 Attorney-General v. Bouwens (1838) 4 M&W 171,191/2. 
45 Rogerson (1990), ibid., p442. 
46 Cf Rogerson (1990), ibid., p455. 
k-, 
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assigned. In view, however, of the rationale for adopting the connecting factor of 
residence (namely, the fact that residence is the place where enforcement of the debt 
may be exacted against the debtor, on the assumption that he/she will have sufficient 
assets in that state with which to satisfy the debt), the tempus inspiciendum at which 
to ascertain the debtor's residence would more appropriately be the time when 
enforcement proceedings are raised against the debtor, rather than the time when the 
debt was created, or the subsequent assignation effected, for it is quite possible that by 
the time of raising the enforcement proceedings, the debtor's residence may have 
changed and his assets removed from the jurisdiction of his erstwhile residence. 
Although crystallisation of the connecting factor at the later date would incur the 
disadvantage that the situs of the debt would effectively `float' until such time as 
enforcement proceedings were commenced, 47 postponed crystallisation would be the 
honest product of the argument which supports the existing rule. 
Although simple debts are among the most common type of incorporeal moveable 
right arising in the context of international disputes, various other types of right have 
also been ascribed notional situs, and should briefly be considered. 
A letter of credit, unlike an ordinary debt, is situate in the place where it is payable 
against documents, even if the debtor is not actually resident there. 48 Bills of 
exchange (being in reality corporeal moveable property for which the holder can 
usually obtain full value at any place where he or she chooses to dispose of them) and 
other securities which can be validly transferred by mere delivery (with or without 
47 Contra, The Armar [ 1981 ]1 All E. R. 498. Cf. Chapter One, supra, note 46. 
48 Power Curber International Limited v. National Bank of Kuwait [1981] 1 W. L. R. 1233. In this case, 
the letter of credit was considered to situate in the place where it was payable against documents, and 
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endorsement) are deemed to be situate in the country where the documentation 
representing the security is, from time to time, to be found. 49 The obvious significance 
of paper in such a transaction effectively results in the transaction transcending the 
incorporeal/corporeal moveable property dichotomy. 
When one considers company share holdings, one can appreciate the artificiality of 
assigning a locality to incorporeal property, for shares may have a different location 
for different purposes (e. g. for the purposes of transfer, or for taxation). so 
Accordingly, the purpose for which a location is to be ascribed assumes increasing 
relevance. A shareholding is intimately connected with the place where the issuing 
company has its domicile or seat, 51 since, as a matter of course, a share can be 
transferred only by substitution of the name of the transferee for that of the transferor 
on the register of shareholders and by the issue of an appropriate share certificate by 
the company secretary. 52 The register is normally retained at the company's principal 
place of business and it is entry upon that register (rather than mere possession of a 
share certificate 53) which determines actual ownership. 54 
not at the Bank's place of business. Rogerson observes, however, that neither Lord Denning, M. R., nor 
Griffiths LJ., cites any authority in support of this assertion. ((1990), ibid., p446) 
49 Winans v. Attorney-General (No. 2) [1910] A. C. 27. 
so Consider Dicey & Morris, ibid., p932, paragraph 22-044. 
51 Noting, of course, the difficulties which flow from the dichotomy between the incorporation theory 
(in terms of which the dominant connecting factor regarding the activities of a corporate entity is the 
law of the country in which incorporation took place), and the real seat (siege reel or real) theory (in 
terms of which the law of the state in which the corporation has its central management and control is 
the key localising agent). (Carruthers, J M, and Villiers, C L, `Company Law in Europe - Condoning 
the Continental Drift' 2000 (11) European Business Law Review 91) 
52 Collier has pointed out that, "Where the share is in bearer form, the Situs is where the warrant or 
other instrument is kept. " (Collier, [1996] All E. R. Annual Review 78,90) Also, Macmillan Inc. v. 
Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387, per Auld, LJ., at p411: "If the shares 
are negotiable the lex situs will be where the pieces of paper constituting the negotiable instruments 
are at the time of transfer. " 
53 Andrews, ibid., at p284, has explained that share certificates constitute mere evidence of a 
shareholder's interest, and do not themselves constitute the property in question. 
sa Consider, however, Graveson's remarks that, "While the transfer of title to registered shares must 
comply with the lex situs of the register, the independent transfer of the share certificate itself, when in 
some other country, will probably be governed by its own lex Situs, and may accordingly confer limited 
property rights on the assignee. " ((1974), ibid., p472) 
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In Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3)55 Staughton, U., opined 
that, "... an issue as to who has title to shares in a company should be decided by the 
law of the place where the shares are situated (lex Situs) ... In the ordinary way ... 
that is the law of the place where the company is incorporated. There may be cases 
where it is arguably the law of the place where the share register is kept, but that 
problem does not arise today. "56 
Accordingly, shares are situate in the country in which they can be effectively dealt 
with as between the shareholder and the company. 57 If, however, there is more than 
one register (e. g. if branch registers are retained for recording transactions effected in 
55 [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387, affirming [1995] 1 W. L. R. 978. 
56 Staughton, LJ., ibid., p405. Cf. Aldous, LJ., at p421, who cited, with approval, a dictum of Thorson, 
J. in the Canadian case of Braun v. The Custodian [1944] 3 D. L. R. 412, at p428, which explains the 
reasoning behind the rule: "It is ... a sound rule of 
law that the situs of shares of a company for the 
purpose of determining a dispute as to their ownership is in the territory of incorporation of the 
company, for that is where the court has jurisdiction over the company in accordance with the law of 
its domicile and power to order a rectification of its register, where such rectification may be 
necessary, and to enforce such order by personal decree against it. " Staughton, LJ., at p404, 
mentioned the "preponderance of authority" identifying the lex sites as the place of incorporation, but 
this reference is, in fact, to transatlantic, not United Kingdom, case law. Auld, LJ., on the other hand, 
remarked, at p413, that, "For my part, I do not derive much assistance from the North American 
jurisprudence. However, it confirms the distinction between shares and share certificates where the 
latter are non-negotiable. " 
57 Brassard v. Smith [1925] A. C. 371; and R. v. Williams [1942] A. C. 541. Cf. Benjamin, noting that 
whilst, in the case of shares, the situs will usually be the place of incorporation of the company to 
which the shares relate, "... where securities are intermediated through global custody arrangements, 
and in particular, [are] immobilised in a central clearing system ... situs is the location of the 
intermediary. " ((1996), ibid., p63, and further at p79) Also Benjamin (1998), ibid., at p924: "In 
relation to immobilised securities, this simple flex situs] rule presents a challenge in practice, as the 
location of interests in immobilised securities may not be immediately obvious. This article suggests 
that the legal location of such interests is the office of the clearing system where the account recording 
such interests is maintained. " Consider also Auld, LJ., in Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate, ibid., at p411: 
in his Lordship's view, the situs of shares "will normally be the country where the register is kept, 
usually but not always the country of incorporation. " With reference to Macmillan, Collier has noted 
that, "The members of the court were not altogether at one about [the situs of the shares] ... 
Aldous U. 
plumped for the place of incorporation, as did Staughton, U. Auld, LJ. thought that the situs is where 
the share register is kept (which need not be where the company is incorporated [at p411]). Both 
Staughton and Auld LIJ. agreed that if the shares are negotiable the situs is where the instrument 
happens to be. " (Collier, ibid., p90) In any event, the different approaches led to the same answer since, 
as Staughton LJ. explained, "Whether it be situs, place of incorporation or place of share register, the 
answer is the law of and prevailing in the State of New York. " (p405) Note also that although the Court 
of Appeal in Macmillan affirmed the decision of Millet, J., the basis of his reasoning was not affirmed: 
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other countries58) the situs of the shares will largely depend upon the country in 
which, according to the ordinary course of business, the transfer would be 
registered. 59 This assumes particular importance if a share certificate is transferred in 
a country other than that in which the principal register of shareholders is held: the 
shares may be transferred in a country whose legal system permits the legal and/or the 
equitable title to the shares to pass from the transferor to the transferee even prior to 
registration of the assignation. 
Based upon similar reasoning to that which underpins the rule concerning simple 
debts, rights of action in contract, delict or unjustified enrichment are deemed to be 
situate in the country in which they can, in fact, be pursued. 60 Similarly, if a 
beneficiary under a trust has a right to compel the trustees to implement a trust 
purpose, his or her interest is thought to be located at the place where that action may 
be brought (e. g. at the place of administration of the trust - generally the place of the 
trustees' residence61). If, on the other hand, a beneficiary has an absolute interest in 
trust or estate property, that interest is located at the actual place where the trust or 
estate property is situated. 
As far as the goodwill of a business is concerned, it is deemed to be situate, quite 
naturally, in the country where the asset to which the goodwill attaches is situated. 62 
the appellate court applied the law of the State of New York, not qua lex loci actus as did Millet, J., but 
rather qua lex situs of the shares. 
58 Section 362 of the Companies Act 1985. 
59 Standard Chartered Bank Limited v. J. R. C. [1978] 3 All E. R. 644; and Collier, ibid., p90. 
60 Danubian Sugar Factories Limited v. I. R. C. [1901] 1 Q. B. 245; Sutherland v. Administrator of 
German Property [1934] 1 K. B. 423 (C. A. ); Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954] 
1 W. L. R. 139; and Dicey & Morris, ibid., p933, paragraph 22-046. 
61 Archer-Shee v. Garland [1931] A. C. 212; Stirling's Trustees v. The Legal and General Assurance 
Society Limited 1957 S. L. T. 73; and Dicey & Morris, ibid., p934, paragraph 22-048. 
62 I. R. C. v. Muller & Co's Margarine Limited [1901] A. C. 217, per Lord Macnaghten, at p224: "The 
goodwill of a business must emanate from a particular centre or source. However widely extended or 
W, 
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Finally, intellectual property rights, although constituting an array of different 
categories of right, including copyright, patents and trademarks, are generally deemed 
to be situated in the country where they can effectively be transferred in accordance 
with the law which governs their creation. 63 
The general rule, therefore, based upon the mutual principles of control and 
effectiveness, would now appear to be that rights of incorporeal moveable property 
are deemed to be situate in the country where they can be enforced or where they are 
recoverable. 64 An object of incorporeal moveable property is said to be situate in the 
country where the debtor resides, for that is where it might be enforced. 65 Although 
this is the generally accepted rule, application of the `residence' test can give rise to 
some difficulties, leading to criticism of the lex situs rule and to suggestions that it is 
not, in fact, entirely appropriate as regards incorporeal moveable rights. This criticism 
will be explored in Chapter Eleven, infra. 
diffused its influence may be, goodwill is worth nothing unless it has power of attraction sufficient to 
bring customers home to the source from which it emanates. " Note, however, the dissenting judgement 
of Lord Chancellor Halsbury: "I am wholly unable to see that goodwill itself is susceptible of having 
any local situation. " (p240) Cf RJ Reuter Company Limited v. Mulhens [ 1954] Ch. 50,95-96. 
63 Dicey & Morris, ibid., p934, paragraph 22-051. Cf. the assignation of company shares. Fawcett & 
Torremans, ibid., at p490: "The provisions of the law of the forum will ... 
be used to determine where 
the intellectual property right, as a chose in action, can be recovered properly or can be enforced ... 
This means, by implication, that the rule will have to be refined for each type of chose in action. " This 
process of refinement pertaining to intellectual property rights is beyond the scope of this work. 
Although consider the dictum of Rigby, U. in Smelting Company of Australia Limited v. I. R. C. 
[1897] 1 Q. B. 175, at p184: "The incorporeal right can only be made effectual where the debtor is from 
the nature of the right; you can only sue a man where you find him, but it does not follow that the right 
really can have a local situation there or anywhere. " (Emphasis added) 
65 Sutherland v. German Property (1933) 50 T. L. R. 107; F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli 
Absentee Property [1954] 1 W. L. R. 139; In re Helbert Wagg & Co Ltd [1956] 1 Ch. 323; and Kwok 
Chi Leung Karl v. Commissioner of Estate Duty [1988] 1 W. L. R. 1035, per Lord Oliver at p1041. The 
rule is general, but not absolute: Power Curber International Limited v. National Bank of Kuwait 
[1981] 1 W. L. R. 1035,1041; [1981] 3 All E. R. 607. 
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Defining the Ilex Situs' 
A further matter which should be considered in the context of the definition and 
interpretation of connecting factors, is the meaning of `lex' in the expression `lex 
situs'. Is the reference to the internal, domestic law of the situs, as identified by the 
forum, or does the expression include, in addition, the international private law rules 
of the Situs? 66 In 1939, Walter Cook articulated the impact of this problem upon the 
conflict of law rules of property, stating that, "... the rule that the `law' of the situs is 
to be applied furnished no guide whatever to a court of the situs, unless it is first 
assumed that the word 'law' in the rule means in such a case the purely `domestic' 
rule of the Situs, and not its conflict of laws rule. "67 In short, the reference to the law 
of the situs is construed, if the rule is being applied by the forum rei sitae, as meaning 
the internal, domestic law of that state, 68 but if the rule is being applied by a non-situs 
forum, as including the international private law rules of the situs. 69 It is Morse's view 
that, " ... in referring to the lex situs, it is likely, though the matter is not conclusively 
66 Consider Sauveplanne, J G, 'International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 
6- Renvoi' (1990), at p4: "The phenomenon of rules of conflict of laws which are in conflict with each 
other is a specimen of a conflict of systems. The conflict rule of the forum's legal system differs from 
the conflict rule of the system designated by the forum's rules of conflict of laws. " One may note 
Cheshire's (optimistic? ) view that, "[The doctrine of renvoi] has caused distress to the practitioner ... 
[it] has unloosed a prodigious volume of literature, but, after a short though stormy career it has, so 
far as English law is concerned, received its quietus ... 
Happily the controversy is dead. Whether the 
doctrine of the renvoi is part of English law is no longer a relevant question. " (Cheshire, G C, `Private 
International Law' (1935) 51 L. Q. R. 76, at p76/7) 
67 Cook (1942), ibid., p264. (Cf. Cook's 1939 article, ibid., p1258) Cook is envisaging, in this context, 
the forum qua situs. In a footnote, he explained that, "Obviously to tell the court of the situs to apply its 
own 'conflict of laws' rule to a case which is for it a problem in the conflict of laws is to tell it precisely 
nothing. On the other hand, to tell it to decide a problem in the conflict of laws in the same way it 
would decide an otherwise similar but for it purely domestic case does furnish the court at the situs 
with a basis for reaching a decision. " (ibid. ) 
68 Sed contra Cheshire, who advocated an interest-analysis approach, stating, "It may be that a court at 
the situs, if required to give a decision, would apply the relevant rule of its own law applicable to a 
purely domestic situation. This, however, is not necessarily so. The relevant rule should be examined in 
the light of its reason, the purpose which it is designed to effect, and the policy upon which it is based, 
in order to ascertain whether it is properly applicable to a case containing a foreign element. It does 
not follow that a rule of the land law designed to promote the welfare of persons domiciled in one 
country or to regulate local transactions should necessarily be extended to transactions comrleted 
abroad between domiciled foreigners. " (Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' (1947) 3 edn., 
p713/4) 
9 Cook (1939), ibid., p1258/9, and (1942), ibid., p264. 
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settled by authority, that the reference will be construed as a reference to the whole 
law of the situs, including its rules of private international law: in other words renvoi 
is applicable in this field. The policy justification for this is that a judgement which 
conflicts with the view which the authorities of the Situs would take as to the 
destination of title to a moveable is likely to be ineffective .,, 
70 This argument applies, a 
fortiori, in the case of immoveables. 
Sauveplanne has explained that there are two types of argument commonly 
propounded in connection with renvoi, 71 namely, the (antagonistic) dogmatic type 
(including arguments based upon sovereignty and state interests, 72 and illogicality73), 
and the (proponent) purposive type, including, in particular, harmony of solution. 74 As 
regards the latter type, it is interesting to note that this argument has been advanced in 
support of `in rem' jurisdiction being exercised, on occasion, by a non-situs forum; 
70 Morse, CGJ, `Retention of Title in English Private International Law' 1993 J. B. L. 168, p172/3. Cf. 
Dicey & Morris, ibid., p966, paragraph 24-007; and Carter, "The lex Situs must denote the whole of the 
lex situs - not just the law of the situs as it would be applied in a purely internal or domestic context. 
The effectiveness strand in the rationale of the rule dictates this. "(In Lalive, P, ed., `International Sales 
of Works of Art' (1988), p329) This view is longstanding. In 1947, Falconbridge expressed the same 
opinion, namely, "It is ... assumed that for a court of a country other than that of the situs the lex rei 
sitae means whatever law, whether conflict rules or domestic rules, has been or would be applied by a 
court of the situs. " ((1947), ibid., p520) 
" Bear in mind Sauveplanne's remark that, "... as many arguments can be raised in favour of renvoi as 
there are against it. Often the same argument is advanced by both supporters and adversaries of 
renvoi. " (ibid., p7) 
72 Opposed to renvoi, insofar as "[renvoi] would amount to an unwarranted abandonment of 
sovereignty to give way to the decision made by another state. " But in favorem renvoi, on the basis 
that, "... when declaring a foreign law to be applicable, a state manifests its lack of interest in the 
application of its own law; it 'desists' from having it applied. Now why should a state be 'plus royaliste 
que le roi' and apply the law of another state against the latter's will. " (Sauveplanne, ibid., p7) 
Renvoi is considered by some to offend logic: "Adversaries of renvoi have argued that its acceptance 
disturbs the symmetry of the legal systems involved. From a logical point of view a reference to foreign 
law can only be a reference to substantive law. " (Sauveplanne, ibid., p7) On the contrary, logic may be 
said to demand the operation of renvoi inasmuch as interrupting the choice of law process prematurely 
would be to act in a random, arbitrary fashion. "In another scheme, renvoi is not the result of the 
application of a foreign conflicts rule, but of the application of an alternative rule forming part of the 
conflict-of-laws system of the forum which replaces the principal rule. " (Sauveplanne, ibid., p8) 
74 It is considered that renvoi is a tool to aid uniformity of result, regardless of the forum in which 
proceedings are'raised (Cheatham, E E, `Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws' (1960) 99 Receuil 
des Cours 1237,339). In view, however, of the varying attitudes which countries adopt in respect of 
L" . 
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Anderson has observed that, "The raison d'etre for the existence of double renvoi is 
precisely to ensure that the foreign court reaches the same conclusion as the forum 
regarding particular areas of decision making of which title to and rights in and over 
land are the primary example. "75 But it must be borne in mind that application of 
renvoi in any particular case depends upon the doctrine being averred and proved by 
one of the litigants; not many litigants have time, inclination or resources to accept the 
challenge of proving, not only the choice of law rule of the lex Situs, but also the lex 
situs' rule regarding renvoi. 76 
Further, on account of the differing attitudes which states take to the doctrine of 
renvoi, even a prima facie simple rule such as that of the Vex Situs' cannot, in fact, 
guarantee uniformity of decision. 77 According to Kaye "... the problems of possibly 
differing concepts of situs ... might 
be compounded through the operation of the 
doctrine of renvoi: where, for example, courts of France and Italy each refer to the 
law of contracting state X as the situs of property, in order to determine whether the 
property is moveable or immoveable for the purposes of their duty to decline 
jurisdiction under Article 19,78 but the law of contracting state X itself would consider 
the property to be situated in a fourth contracting state Y (or in France or Italy itself), 
the doctrine of renvoi, and of the various theories of renvoi (e. g. the internal law theory, the partial 
renvoi theory and the double renvoi theory), uniformity of result seems to be something of a vain hope. 
75 Anderson, W, 'Foreign Orders and Local Land' (1999) 48 I. C. L. Q. 167,173. "To ensure identity of 
results, the English court resorts to rather drastic measures including 'impersonation' of the foreign 
judge in whose jurisdiction the land is situated. " (Anderson, W, `Double Renvoi and the Circulus 
Inextricabilis' (1992) Commonwealth Caribbean Legal Studies 313 - per Anderson (1999), ibid., p173) 
See Chapter Six, infra - 'Cracks in the Monolith - `in personam' jurisdiction'. 
76 Cf. Re Duke of Wellington [ 1947] Ch. 506, per Wynn-Parry J., at p515. 
77 Cf. Reese, WLM, `Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws' (1971), regarding paragraph 
244: "Values of certainty of result and ease of application dictate that the forum should apply the local 
law of the selected state and not concern itself with the complexities that might arise if the forum were 
to apply that state's choice of law rules. There is no basis for supposing that fairness requires the 
forum to apply the choice of law rules of the selected state, " 
78 Brussels Convention. See now Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
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Italian courts applying the doctrine of no-renvoi, 79 would regard the domestic law of 
State X as lex Situs governing the nature of property as moveable or immoveable, 
whereas French courts, applying partial renvoi, 80 would decide the matter according 
to the law of State Y as lex situs. s81 
In the case of Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods, 82 Slade, J. sustained the 
possibility of renvoi operating in this field, viz.: "I must therefore accept ... that the 
relevant question of title falls to be determined in accordance with Italian law ... 
it is 
theoretically possible that the evidence as to Italian law would show that the Italian 
court would itself apply English law, on the particular facts of the present case, for 
the purpose of determining the rights of the second defendant vis-a-vis the plaintiff 
and vice versa. In the event I suppose it would be open to the plaintiff to argue that 
English law should, in the final result, be applied by the English court by virtue of the 
doctrine of renvoi. By this judgement I do not intend to deprive the plaintiff of the 
right to argue either of these two points [the other point being the possibility that the 
content of the Italian lex Causae could offend English public policy] at the trial. "83 
T) E. g. Re Ross [1930] 1 Ch. 377. 
80 E. g. Re Annesley [1926] 1 Ch. 692. Consider Crawford, "NOTE that the essential difference between 
Annesley and Ross lies simply in the fact that French law accepts the doctrine of renvoi whereas Italian 
law does not do so. " (ibid., p66, paragraph 5.08) 
81 Kaye, P, `Civil Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments' (1987), p898. Cf. Dicey & 
Morris, ibid., p74, paragraph 4-022. 
82 [1980] 1 Ch. 496. 
83 At p514, per Slade, J. This dictum is ambiguous insofar as it is unclear whether the plaintiff's right 
of argument refers to his entitlement to argue that the doctrine of renvoi applies, in general, to cases 
concerning the transfer of corporeal moveable property (meaning that it is uncertain whether or not 
renvoi currently pertains to this field), or merely to his entitlement to argue that the doctrine is 
applicable in the instant case (meaning that it is accepted, in principle, that renvoi applies in this 
context). While Slade, J. confirms the possibility of a renvoi remission, he is silent on the matter of a 
renvoi transmission (in respect of which, see Crawford, ibid., p58, paragraph 5.01, and Sauveplanne, 
ibid., p3). There would seem to be no reason, however, for accepting a reference to English law, but 
denying a reference to the law of a third country. Dicey & Morris state the view that when an English 
court is applying the lex Situs rule in this context, "... it should interpret the lex Situs broadly so as to 
include whatever the courts of the situs have decided or would decide. " (ibid., p74, paragraph 4-023) 
Cf. Nott, S M, `Title to Movables Acquired Abroad' (1981) 45 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 279, 
at p284: "... in the past the few English cases involving the transfer of moveables abroad have 
82 
This dictum, however, should be contrasted with the more recent dictum of 
Staughton, LT., in Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3), 84 when 
his Lordship remarked that, "The reference [to the lex situs of the shares, namely, the 
law of the State of New York] is to the domestic law of the place in question; at one 
time there was an argument for renvoi, but mercifully (or sadly, as the case may be) 
that has been abandoned. " Significantly, his Lordship cites no authority in support of 
this declaration. 
From the perspective at least of sovereignty and state interests, the argument that 
reference should be to the whole law of the situs is less convincing in the context of 
dealings with moveable property (a fortiori dealings with incorporeal moveable 
property), than in that of dealings with immoveable property. 85 The reason for this is 
that, by the time of litigation, the moveable property in question may no longer be 
situated within the territory of the situs deemed relevant by the forum; in such a case, 
given the loss of physical control over the property by the applicable `lex situs', there 
is no obvious reason why the forum should prefer the conflict rules of the lex Situs to 
those of its own system. 
It has been the pattern of recent Hague (and other) Conventions to exclude the 
operation of renvoi. 86 The Giuliano and Lagarde Report states that "More generally, 
apparently applied the domestic law of the lex situs, without recourse to the renvoi doctrine. Whether 
or not this represents the correct approach is perhaps open to conjecture. " 
84 [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387, at p405. 
85 Dicey & Morris, ibid., p74, paragraph 4-023. 
86 E. g. 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Article 15; 1985 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, Article 17; 1996 Convention on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Article 21; 2000 Convention on the 
International Protection of Adults, Article 19. Unusually, renvoi was not excluded from the 1980 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; the reference in Article 3 thereof is 
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the exclusion of renvoi is justified in international conventions regarding conflict of 
laws. If the convention attempts as far as possible to localize the legal situation and to 
determine the country with which it is most closely connected, the law specified by the 
conflicts rule in the Convention should not be allowed to question this determination 
of place. , 87 This approach may be related, at least in part, to the style of choice of law 
rule typically formulated within the new Conventions, and to the more common 
reliance upon flexible, `soft' connecting factors. Sauveplanne has expressed the 
opinion that, "The objective of renvoi can only be attained in those areas where 
choice-of-law rules are precise, which means that they determine the applicable law 
by a fixed connecting factor ... Traditional techniques of renvoi are 
difficult to apply 
where these new approaches [open-ended rules] prevail. "88 In contrast with this view, 
however, it is significant that the First Restatement (which adopted a series of fixed 
connecting factors), was generally hostile to renvoi, S9 whereas the Second 
Restatement (which adopts a `softer' approach to choice of law rules), narrates a 
general preference for application of the `local law' of the state addressed, subject, 
however, to significant exceptions. 9° Von Mehren and Trautman note that the interest 
to the whole of the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident before his/her removal or 
retention. 
87 Giuliano, M, and Lagarde, P, `Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations' 1980 OJ C282, p37. Cf. Leslie, R D, 'Building Blocks for Choice of Law Structures' 
(1998) 19 Statute Law Review 202, at p204: "Where a choice of law rule is the product of a unifying 
international convention, it is often provided that reference to a foreign governing system made by a 
connecting factor is a reference to the domestic or internal rules of that system only, renvoi is 
excluded. If this was not so, the convention's aims of unification could, on occasion, be frustrated. " 
Sed contra the view expressed by Cheatham at note 74, supra. 
88 Sauveplanne, ibid., p31/32. 
89 E. g. First Restatement, paragraph 7(b), although an exception did pertain as regards application of 
the lex situs to questions of title to land (paragraph 8). Consider Weintraub, R J, `The Conflict of Laws 
Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal Reasoning' (1986) 65 Texas L. R. 215, at p227: "This rejection [of 
renvoi] was ironic because the theoretical basis for the rigid territorial rules of that Restatement was 
the 'vested rights' theory. Under this theory, on the occurrence of a specific event, a right 'vested' 




90 Second Restatement, paragraph 8, subject to exceptions in paragraphs 223 (validity and effect of 
conveyance of an interest in land), 245 (effect of conveyance of an interest in a chattel) and 260 
(intestate succession to moveables): Von Mehren & Trautman conclude that the Second Restatement, 
"... represents a wholesale adoption of a renvoi theory for property. " (Von Mehren, A T, and 
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in uniformity "that all questions regarding property should be decided in the same 
way regardless of the forum - emerges triumphant over the interests in simplicity and 
predictability that seem to pervade the old Restatement. "91 
Significantly, "... implicit ... in the Second Restatement's broad adoption of renvoi is 
awareness that reason and policy may lead the situs to prefer some other rule. "92 It is 
interesting to ponder Sauveplanne's verdict that, "Courts have travelled half way 
around the world before ending up applying their own law ... A short cut might have 
spared the court much trouble. , 93 This response will be borne in mind in Chapter 
Fourteen, infra, where consideration will be given to the lex causae generally 
applicable to choice of law disputes concerning property. 
A homogeneous concept of Situs? 
To summarise, Scottish rules of international private law utilise three primary 
classifications of property, viz.: immoveable property, corporeal moveable property 
and incorporeal moveable property. As will be demonstrated in the following 
chapters, dealings with all three types of property rely heavily on the connecting 
factor of lex situs/lex loci rei sitae. This connecting factor, however, is subject to 
Trautman, D T, 'The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws' (1965), 
p193) As regards immoveables, "the reference ... is to the totality of the 
law, including the choice-of- 
law rules, of the state where the immoveable is. " (Second Restatement, paragraph 222, comment(e)) Cf. 
Von Mehren & Trautman, "... although many of the provisions of Restatement Second read almost 
exactly like those of the First Restatement, the word 'law' must be read to mean not the domestic law 
but the whole law, including the conflict-of-laws rules of the Situs. " ((1965), ibid., p19516) In reviewing 
the Second Restatement, Morris referred to its 'double-barrelled' rules, being those rules where the 
forum is directed to "apply the law that would be applied by the courts of the Situs". (Morris, JHC, 
'Law and Reason Triumphant - or - How Not To Review a Restatement' (1973) 21 Am. Jo. of Comp. 
Law 322,329) 
91 Von Mehren & Trautman, ibid., p193. 
92 Von Mehren & Trautman, ibid., p 197. 
93 Sauveplanne, ibid., p34. The author continues, "The acceptance of renvoi often compels a court to 
meander along circuitous and tortuous roads to goals that could just as well be reached by straight 
and direct paths. Despite lip-service paid to doctrinal arguments, renvoi appears primarily to be used 
as a technique for reaching a certain result. " (ibid., p35) 
I 
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subtle nuances of interpretation (spatial and temporal), depending upon the precise 
context in which it arises. In certain cases, it has been shown that the factor is 
manipulated or entirely fictitious - in particular, in its application to cases involving 
contiguous heritable/immoveable estates, aggregate units of moveable property, 
fixtures, goods in transit, and, more generally, incorporeal moveable property. The 
`lex Situs' in such (admittedly exceptional, or `fringe') instances indicates, not a 
physical connection as such, but rather a legal connection; it demonstrates, not a strict 
territorial connection, but an abstract, yet purposive, juridical connection. In truth, the 
factor, in its evolved form, is akin to the "centre of gravity" of a right of property, as 
propounded by Wolff. 94 It would appear that the term Vex situs' (which, on occasion, 
is clearly inappropriate in strict, semantic terms), ultimately, is a shorthand means of 
expressing what is, sometimes, the overriding, pivotal connection between an asset or 
right and a state in which it is not physically stationed. This more "homogeneous 
concept of situs"95 applies to all types of property and indicates the place where the 
property in question is principally, and most effectively, possessed, enjoyed or 
exercised, "the place of exercise of the fundamental use or enjoyment of the property 
rights, which [in the case of corporeal property] nearly always coincides with the 
physical locus. 9996 
94 Wolff (1950), ibid., p520. For example, as regards goods in transit, Wolff stated that, "... a mere 
place of transit is not the centre of gravity of rights in rem ... It seems impossible to set up a simple and 
comprehensive formula indicating the appropriate law. The answer must differ according to ... various 
relationships. " (ibid. ) 
95 Baxter, IFG, `Conflicts of Law and Property' (1964) 10 McGill Law Journal 1,25. 




Jurisdiction and Choice of Law - Fusion of the Rules? 
A traditional exposition or application of our rules of international private law would 
identify three types of conflict rule: rules of choice of law, of jurisdiction, and of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Although the emphasis to be 
placed, respectively, on each of these facets of the subject has varied over the years, 
with the weight of interest, scrutiny and perceived significance falling sometimes on 
rules of choice of law, and sometimes on rules of jurisdiction', it has consistently been 
accepted that the three categories serve different purposes and, accordingly, that they 
constitute separate bodies of rules (which, however, interact). In short, the factors 
which determine (i. e. confer) jurisdiction are not presumed automatically to determine 
(a fortiori to constitute) the lex causae. 2 In the UK at least, the reluctance to apply the 
lex fori qua lex causae (save in respect of matters of procedure), reinforces this 
notion. 3 
It is surprising, therefore, to read, in the context of our conflict rules of property, that 
"Scholars and justices have long recognised the close relationship between 
'E. g. Fawcett, J `The Interrelationship of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Private International Law' 
(1991) 44 C. L. P. 39. 
2Though consider, historically, the link between jurisdiction and choice of law in annulment of 
marriage before the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (e. g. Prawdziclazarska v. 
Prawdziclazarski 1954 S. C. 98). 
3E. g. As regards choice of law in delict, the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission remarked 
that, "We think that it is correct in principle that the introduction of a foreign element may make it just 
to apply a foreign law to determine a dispute, even though the substantive provisions of that foreign 
law might be different from our own. Apart from matters of procedure, and subject to overriding public 
policy, there is no reason why the lex foci should be applied in all cases involving a tort or delict 
regardless of the foreign complexion of the factual situation. " (Law Com. No. 193 and Scot. Law. 
Com. No. 129, `Private International Law Choice of Law in Tort and Delict', paragraph 2.7) Contra 
klý 
87 
jurisdiction and choice of law. To a great extent, resolution of the jurisdictional issue 
often resolves the choice of law. "4 Such surprise, however, is quite possibly 
misplaced: although analytically, the concepts of jurisdiction and choice of law are 
easily (indeed, logically) distinguished, in practice, the differentiation may lose 
something of its importance. Sedler has identified both a theoretical and a practical 
link between the two types of rule: "In the doctrinal sense, the same considerations 
that make it constitutional for a court to exercise judicial jurisdiction in a particular 
case may also make it constitutional for that court to apply its own substantive law to 
resolve the issues presented in that case. In the pragmatic sense, courts that are 
committed to a policy-centred approach to choice of law ... tend to apply their own 
law wherever they have a real interest in doing so, and sometimes even when they do 
not have such an interest. ,5 It is submitted that Sedler does not provide sufficient 
justification for his `constitutional argument' and that his suggestion suffers from the 
same homing tendencies as forum-oriented rules which have been widely eschewed 
elsewhere. Although persuasive perhaps in the United States, where notions of forum 
choice of law in divorce: Zanelli v. Zanelli (1948) 64 T. L. R. 556. (See Crawford, E B, `International 
Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p162, paragraph 10.08) 
4 Alden, R, `Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts' 1987 (65) Texas L. R. 585,620. 
Also in the U. S. A. - Hay, P, `Property Law and Legal Education; the Situs Rule in European and 
American Conflicts Law - Comparative Notes' (1988), at p109: "In fact, the jurisdictional rule 
historically swallowed the choice-of-law reference: a decision rendered by a non-situs court on a claim 
involving immoveable property was not traditionally recognized by the situs for want of subject-matter 
jurisdiction on the part of the rendering court, no matter what substantive law the latter had applied. " 
Further, Trautman, D, `The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
1101, at pp1108/9: "Choice of law in early England was essentially a choice of courts; common law 
courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction over titles to real property ... our [American] reception and 
adoption of the English rule [of scission in succession], with a boost from Justice Story, unnecessarily 
perpetuated its great inconvenience and awkwardness. " Curiously, on the matter of applying the situs 
rule to immoveable property, Westlake has remarked that, "What doubt there is turns more on the 
question of jurisdiction than of law. " ('A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), p215) 
Sedler, R A, `Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: the Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner' 
(1978) 63 Iowa L. R. 1031. While remarking that the same factors which make it reasonable for a state 
to exercise jurisdiction also make it reasonable for that state to apply its own substantive law to the 
issue in dispute, Sedler recognises that `The converse of this proposition has not been assumed to 
follow. " (pl032) So, too, at English common law in contract, while choice of jurisdiction might 




preference have traditionally been held in higher regard, 6 Sedler's argument should be 
discounted in our own jurisdiction, as displaying unwelcome parochial characteristics. 
Similarly, his policy-centred methodology cannot easily be transposed into our own 
jurisdiction-selecting regime. So, it is submitted that Sedler's arguments justifying the 
coalescence of rules of jurisdiction and of choice of law cannot here be accepted. 
Some connection between the two types of conflict rule (that is, rules of jurisdiction, 
and of choice of law) has, however, been evident. Writing in 1964, Baxter remarked 
that "There has not been much attention given either by the courts or in the literature 
to clear and logical policy reasons for the lex Situs in choice of law. The influence of 
jurisdictional considerations has been great. "7 This echoes earlier remarks made by 
Colwyn Williams who explained that, historically, the situs was significant first and 
foremost as a rule of jurisdiction, it being one of the bases of competency of the 
medieval Italian judge. According to Colwyn Williams, the lex situs became a rule of 
choice of law only in the feudal era "... when respect for the Lord required the 
judges, both of the forum and the foreign allodium, to apply the law prevailing at the 
place where land was situated ... a limitation demanded by the ideology of a feudal 
law according to which even the lex fori was inferior to the power over land. "g 
6 Cf. Weintraub's remarks, 'An Inquiry into the Utility of Situs as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis' 52 
(1966) Cornell L. Q. 1, at p15: "If the Situs court is the only court competent to hear such matters, this 
will support the argument that it is most expedient to apply situs law - the law of the forum. " In reading 
this passage (which is uncharacteristic of Weintraub's general antipathy towards an exclusive situs 
rule), it should be borne in mind that, at the time of writing, there was much wider support generally 
for application of the lexfori. 
7 Baxter, IFG, `Conflicts of Law and Property' (1964) 10 McGill L. J. 1,17. 
8 Colwyn Williams, D, `Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws - Lex Situs: Rule or Exception' (1959) 
11 Hastings L. J. 159,162/3. Also Gardner, J C, `The Decreasing Influence of the Lex Situs' (1934) 46 
J. R. 244,245. 
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Fawcett has remarked upon the amalgamation, in recent years, between the first, 
jurisdictional stage9 and the second, distinct, choice of law stage in a conflicts case, 
largely blaming the coalition on the ascendancy of the discretionary element in 
jurisdiction. 10 In this regard, it is interesting to consider the influence both of rules of 
jurisdiction upon rules of choice of law, and vice versa, of rules of choice of law upon 
rules of jurisdiction (for it can probably no longer be assumed that jurisdiction and 
choice of law will necessarily be determined in that order). " 
Fawcett has stated that "Even if the jurisdiction rule itself does not require the 
ascertainment of the applicable law, it may be that the underlying basis of the 
jurisdiction is a choice of law rule. This is the situation under Article 16(1) ..., which 
gives exclusive jurisdiction `in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem, 
or tenancies of, immoveable property, [to] the courts of the contracting state in which 
the property is situated. The European Court has justified giving exclusive 
jurisdiction to the state in which the land is situated on the basis that that state's law 
is applicable, and with complicated legislation on, for example, tenancies, the state in 
which the legislation is in force is the one that should apply that law. " 12 The present 
author's contention, however, is not that the choice of law rule concerning property 
(in this context, immoveable property) has influenced the rule now enshrined in 
9 Which, in itself, in modern (United Kingdom) legislation, sometimes can be found broken into two 
steps; a good example is provided by section 28 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 
(concerning jurisdictional requirements and conditions), the aim of which is to ensure forum humility 
or self-effacement. The English approach, by different means to the same end, is contained in Part 3 of 
the Act. 
10Fawcett, ibid., p40: "... increasingly there is a finding as to the applicable law being reached at the 
jurisdictional stage. " Further, at p45: "... now that it is accepted that a wider range of considerations 
should be taken into account when determining the place of trial it is understandable that the question 
of the applicable law should come to the surface. " 
11 Cf. the symbiotic relationship in Post-Rome Convention contract cases of jurisdictional (Brussels) 
and choice of law (Rome) rules (e. g. William Grant & Sons Ltd v. Marie-Brizard Espana S. A. 1998 
S. C. 537; and Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd v. Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH [2001] 4 All 
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Article 16(1), 13 but, conversely, that our traditional rule of jurisdiction over 
immoveable property, deriving from entrenched notions of sovereignty and 
territoriality, has exerted considerable influence upon our rules of choice of law in 
property. The particular menace of this phenomenon is the fact that rules of 
jurisdiction are conceived with protection of the defender in mind (albeit that there 
exist the stabilizing factors of forum non conveniens and lis pendens), whereas rules 
of choice of law are developed taking into account the interests and expectations of 
both parties, pursuer and defender. By extracting rules of choice of law from 
principles of jurisdiction, there is a possibility that the interests of the pursuer in any 
action may rank subordinate to those of the defender. 
Whilst Fawcett does briefly consider the influence of jurisdiction upon choice of law, 
he largely restricts his inquiry to the general question of whether it is possible to 
identify an increased tendency towards applying the lex fori. 14 When courts apply 
their own domestic law in property disputes, it might generally be assumed that they 
are applying that law qua lex Situs. While this may be a reasonable assumption in 
disputes concerning inimoveable property, it is not so in the case of disputes 
concerning moveable property, whether corporeal or incorporeal. In such a case, 
whilst it would likely be presumed that the forum were applying its domestic law qua 
E. R. 283, per Morison, J., at p285 - i. e. the place of performance of the obligation [a jurisdictional test] 
is identified by using the law found to be the applicable law under Rome. ) 
12 Fawcett, ibid., p48. 
13 Brussels Convention. See now Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (22 December 2001) on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(which, in terms of Article 76, entered into force on 1 March 2002). Article 22 of the Regulation is 
identical to Article 16(1), save as regards paragraph (b), where in terms of the Regulation only the 
tenant, but not the landlord, need be a natural person (i. e. Brussels is more restrictive). Hereinafter, 
reference to Article 16 shall be deemed to include reference to Article 22 of the Regulation. For the 
equivalent provision in the Hague Conference Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (amended version of text adopted by the Special 
Commission on 30 October 1999) (hereafter `the preliminary draft Hague Convention') [Article 12] - 
see note 39 infra. 
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lex situs, this may, in fact, disguise the truth that the forum has seized an opportunity 
to apply its own law qua lex foci, even where another law is arguably more 
appropriate (e. g. in cases where the property in dispute was abroad at the time of the 
relevant transaction, but has been returned to, and remains within, the jurisdiction of 
the forum at the time of litigation). 
The present author does, however, agree with Fawcett when he writes that "The 
considerations when determining the applicable law are not, and should not be, the 
same as those when determining the place of trial ... the court may still have a strong 
interest in upholding a foreign law. "15 In particular, this author would strongly 
support Fawcett's caution that the relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law 
should not become too close: "Whilst it is right and proper that one are should take 
into account developments in the other, there is no justification ... for a 
fully 
integrated approach either in the form of taking jurisdiction whenever we apply our 
law or applying our law whenever we take jurisdiction. " 16 
In light of this warning, it is interesting to note, at least in relation to immoveable 
property, the complete cohesion which has developed between our rules of 
jurisdiction and of choice of law. Is this a justifiable acknowledgement that only one 
state has an interest in the property and the power to control it, 
17 or is it an attempt to 
fuse the rules of jurisdiction and of choice of law, a covert coalition between what 
should be two independent processes, separately to determine, on the one hand, the 
" Fawcett, ibid., p53- 
'5 Ibid., p55. 
16 Ibid., p58- 
" Cf. Carswell; R D, `The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private International Law' (1959) 8 I. C. L. Q. 
268, at p278: "The doctrine of territorial sovereignty is developed into a specialised concept of 
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appropriate forum and, on the other, the applicable law? It is submitted that the situs 
has become more deeply entrenched as a choice of law connecting factor, and the lex 
situs as a choice of law rule, by reason of the fact that the situs is routinely also the 
forum. It may be that our rules of choice of law concerning property (in particular, the 
widespread reluctance to look beyond the territorial lex situs rule), in fact camouflage, 
conveniently, an old-fashioned preference for application of the lexfori. Considering 
the clear propensity for basing rules governing the transfer of corporeal and, a fortiori 
incorporeal, moveable property, upon the rules applicable to the transfer of 
immoveable property, this allegation carries with it significant repercussions for the 
rules governing the inter vivos transfer of all types of property. 
The situs rule stands apart from all other Vex loci' choice of law rules on the basis that 
it controls both choice of law and jurisdiction. '8 This peculiar characteristic was 
recognised, in 1948, by Briggs who explained that, "... there were really merged in 
this rule the elements of two basically different conflict rules, one recognizing an 
exclusive power in the situs, and the other referring to the situs' internal law. "19 Some 
years ago, Schott and Rembar described what they termed the `confusion' between 
the notions of jurisdiction and choice of law, outlining why this confusion was then, 
and is now, misplaced: "Essentially, it arises out of a misapprehension of jurisdiction. 
Courts, impressed by the immoveable nature of land, conceive that only the situs has 
physical power over the land itself, and are led to believe that therefore lex Situs must 
be used in all cases concerning land. But, obviously, most cases can be disposed of 
without having actually to deal with the land. Money judgments are the more usual 
jurisdiction. The State which has jurisdiction is the one which has the power to create legal rights, and 
these rights wilt be enforced in the courts of other states. " 
18 Alden, ibid., p589. 
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remedy, and, even in those cases where foreign courts order a conveyance, the courts 
of the situs will usually give effect to such a decree. 20 Clearly, then, there is little a 
court cannot accomplish through in personam jurisdiction, so that there is no 
`jurisdictional' necessity to use lex situs. "21 Developing this line of argument, Schott 
and Rembar openly criticized the (American) courts' indulgence of recognising only 
the jurisdiction of the situs court and the non-sequitur that the lex situs alone should 
be applied to determine the resolution of property disputes. 22 More recently Alden has 
pointed to "The jealous manner in which the common-law courts guarded their 
jurisdiction over real property [which] made them unwilling to apply any law but 
their own on questions involving land. "23 
Recognising this correlation between jurisdiction and choice of law, 24 Weintraub 
remarked in 1966 that "... if the situs had exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter 
such a state of things would seriously weaken any campaign to change from the 
situs rule. If nothing else, the simple convenience and economy in judicial 
administration flowing from the only competent forum's applying its own law would 
raise a presumption in favour of situs law that only the most compelling 
circumstances should rebut. "25 Notably, instead of advancing this as an argument in 
favour of an exclusive rule of jurisdiction, Weintraub pursued the contrary argument, 
asking why in personam jurisdiction over all persons whose interests in real property 
19 Briggs, E W, `The Jurisdictional - Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts Rules' (1948) 61 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1165,1177. 
20 The authors cite only American authority in support of this proposition. Cf. the unattributed Note on 
Re Duke of Wellington, (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, at p1057; and Chiwell v. Carlyon (1897) 14 S. C. 
61 (Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope). Sed contra, McKie v. McKie [ 1933] I. R. 464. 
Z' Schott & Rembar, `Choice of Law for Land Transactions' (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1049,1051. 
22 Ibid., p1053- 
23 Alden, ibid., p588. 
24 Weintraub (1966), ibid., at p 16: "Once false dogmas about jurisdiction of the subject matter are 
consigned to the bonfire, it becomes apparent that proper solution of the choice-of-law problem will 
rarely, if ever, result in the application of the law of the situs qua situs. " 
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are to be affected, should not be sufficient. 26 This converse argument has 
subsequently mustered minority support, at least in America, if not in the United 
Kingdom, principally, from Moffatt Hancock. 27 But still it seems that the "ancient 
jurisdictional dogmas" of territorial sovereignty continue to "rule us from the graves 
in which they have been logically buried. "28 For present purposes, Weintraub's 
inquiry and the cynicism of Hancock and Yntema raise two further, related issues, 
namely, the significance of exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16(1) and the 
relevance of in personam jurisdiction. 
Exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16(1) 
Article 16 of the Brussels Convention, which carves out exclusive jurisdiction as a 
matter of legislative policy, lays down the rule of exclusive jurisdiction relative to 
immoveable property: "The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, 
regardless of domicile: (1) (a) in proceedings which have as their object rights in 
rem in immoveable property or tenancies of immoveable property, the courts of the 
Contracting State in which the property is situated; (b) however, in proceedings 
which have as their object tenancies of immoveable property, concluded for 
temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, the courts of 
the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction, 
provided that the landlord and the tenant are natural persons and are domiciled in 
the same Contracting State; " 29 Exclusive jurisdiction exists by reason of a pre- 
25 Ibid., p4. 
26 Ibid., p5. 
Z' In a review of Professor Hancock's collected essays, Professor Weintraub advised that, "[Prof 
Hancock] ... attacked the 
jurisdictional nonsense that went hand in hand with choice-of-law nonsense 
- that only the courts of the situs 
had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine interests in realty. " ('The 
Conflict of Laws Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal Reasoning' (1986) 65 Texas L. R. 215,231) 
28 Yntema, H, `The Objectives of Private International Law' (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 721, at p726. 
29 Note that Article 16(1)(b) of the Lugano Convention contains a differently framed proviso, viz.: "... 
provided that the tenant is a natural person and neither party is domiciled in the Contracting State in 
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existing, paramount connection between the substance of the proceedings and the 
forum, and applies notwithstanding the parties' preference that the matter be 
determined in another forum, or the defender's submission to the jurisdiction of 
another Contracting or Member State's courts. 30 Discussing these paramount 
connections, Kaye has explained that, "The exclusive jurisdiction connections 
prescribed under Article 16 (facteurs de localisation) are based upon what was 
considered by its drafters to be the very close link between the subject matter of the 
litigation and a particular Contracting State territory such as to justify jurisdictional 
exclusivity of the latter's fora in the interests of certainty and judicial security, proper 
administration of justice, convenience of the parties and homogeneity of the 
Community legal order. , 31 But, of course, modifications in the light of experience and 
common sense, have made a misnomer of the heading, for now in the prescribed 
circumstances the defendant's domicile also has exclusive jurisdiction (i. e. additional, 
not alternative). 32 
The Jenard Report, anticipating the question of why exclusive jurisdiction over 
immoveable property was considered necessary, advises: "In the Federal Republic of 
Germany and in Italy, [there exists] exclusive jurisdiction, this being considered a 
matter of public policy. It follows that, in the absence of a rule of exclusive 
jurisdiction, judgments given in other States whose jurisdiction might have been 
which the property is situated. " Schedules 4 and 8 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 
contain wording more akin to that of the Brussels Convention. 
30 Kessedjian, C, `Report on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters' (Hague Conference, Preliminary Document No. 7, April 1997) (hereinafter `the 
Kessedjian Report') at paragraph 83: "Such forms of jurisdiction are called 'exclusive' because they 
automatically invalidate any contractual or tacit choice of court; they do not allow for any lis pendens 
since they cannot admit any 'competition' with other jurisdictions, and they prevent any joinder 
through related causes of action. " 
31 Kaye, P, `Civil Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements' (1987), p872. 
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derived from other provisions of the Convention (the court of the defendant's 
domicile, or an agreed forum) could have been neither recognised nor enforced in 
Germany or Italy ... Such a system would have been contrary to the principle of firee 
movement of judgments'. "33 It seems that we have surrendered to a rule of exclusive 
jurisdiction, not simply through belief on our own part that such a rule is compelled 
by logic and/or principle, but also out of deference to the mutual policy of two sister 
European states. Exclusive jurisdictions per se are conceived to be matters of public 
policy since they cannot be departed from by the free choice of the parties. The pre- 
1982 policy of Scots law in respect of jurisdiction over immoveable property34 has 
effectively now been buttressed by the equivalent German and Italian policies. As if 
to pre-empt this realisation, the Jenard Report proffers additional, subsidiary 
arguments in support of the exclusive rule: "[Exclusive jurisdiction] was in the 
interests of justice. This type of dispute often entails checks, enquiries, and expert 
examinations which have to be made on the spot. Moreover, the matter is often 
governed in part by customary practices which are not generally known except in the 
courts of the place, or possibly of the country, where the immoveable property is 
situated. Finally, the system adopted also takes into account the need to make entries 
in land registers located where the property is situated. , 35 Clearly, this last remark 
overlooks the independent scope of the sister rule of exclusive jurisdiction contained 
in Article 16(3)36 which, for proceedings which have as their object the validity of 
entries in public registers, in any event confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the 
32 Article 16(1)(b). Consider in this regard Article 23, which states that "Where actions come within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any court other than the court first seised shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court. " 
33 Jenard, P, `Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters' (hereinafter `the Jenard Report') OJ 1979 C59/1, p35- 
34 In respect of which, see Crawford, ibid., p388, note 12, which refers to the `exorbitant jurisdiction' 
affirmed by Baron Hume. 
35 Ibid., p35. 
36 See now Article 22(3) of Council Regulation 44/2001. 
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Contracting State in which the register is kept. Article 16(3), by itself, would have 
been capable of safeguarding the interests of the situs as regards the accuracy of its 
land, land charges and commercial registers. In addition, in the context of the 
preliminary draft Hague Convention, the Kassedjian Report notes that "All such 
[property/lease] disputes call for site reports, and these can best be made at the place 
where the property is situated. i37, but it later concedes that "... this advantage ... 
loses much of its attraction since it is probable that the States Parties to the future 
Convention will also be Parties to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 738 
Interestingly, the possibility of a non-exclusive situs jurisdiction was not anathema to 
the negotiators of the preliminary draft Hague Convention. Although Article 12 of the 
preliminary draft favours exclusive jurisdiction, 39 paragraph 86 of the Kassedjian 
Report tendered, as a possible alternative, an (optional) special jurisdiction at the 
court of the situs of immoveable property. The reporter advised that "If the experts 
were to decide that jurisdiction in real estate matters in [sic] not exclusive, it should 
appear at least as an optional special jurisdiction. In such a case, we could imagine 
to empower the judge of the defendant's habitual residence to decline jurisdiction and 
direct the parties to the court of the place where the real estate is situated. , 40 It is 
interesting to compare this late twentieth century proposal with Savigny's mid- 
nineteenth century description of the `Law of Things'. Savigny explained that, "In the 
37 Kessedjian Report, paragraph 84. 
38 ibid. 
39 Save in respect of tenancies: Article 12(1) states that `In proceedings which have as their object 
rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Contracting 
State in which the property is situated have exclusive jurisdiction, unless in proceedings which have as 
their object tenancies of immovable property, the tenant is habitually resident in a different State. ' 
Note should, of course, be taken of Article 12(6) which states that, `The previous paragraphs shall not 
apply when the matters referred to therein arise as incidental questions. ' 
Ibid., paragraph 86. 
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older Roman law ... the forum rei sitae was quite unknown [Vatic. Fragm. Para 3261; 
but it was early introduced in the rei vindicatio [L. 3, C. ubi in rem 3,19], and was 
afterwards extended to other actions in rem. It is not, however, held as the exclusive 
forum, but the plaintiff has an election between the (special) forum rei sitae, and the 
(general) forum domicilii. "4' 
Given that in modem Europe we have forsaken the early ideal of concurrent 
jurisdiction in favour of a rule of exclusive jurisdiction, care must be taken to restrict 
such jurisdiction to those cases for which it was genuinely intended. This requires 
careful and restrained interpretation of phrases such as `proceedings which have as 
their object'. 42 Criticism has already been levelled at the European Court of Justice's 
failure to exercise due restraint in this regard. 43 According to the Jenard Report, the 
matters referred to in Article 16 will normally be the subject of exclusive jurisdiction, 
"only if they constitute the principal subject matter of the proceedings of which the 
court is to be seised. "44 Article 16 must be read in conjunction with Article 19 which 
stipulates that, "Where a court of a Contracting State is seised of a claim which is 
principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Contracting 
State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16, it shall declare of its own 
motion that it has no jurisdiction. , 45 The words `principally concerned with' imply 
41 Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p130, paragraph 366. 
42 Cf. Ashurst v. Pollard [2001] 2 All E. R. 75, per Jonathan Parker, LJ., p81, at paragraph 33: "The 
concept of proceedings which have as their 'object' a particular category of right is not a concept 
which I find entirely easy to grasp. " 
43 Hay (1988), ibid., at p121: "The European Court's decisions missed this opportunity; they 
broadened the reach of the rule inappropriately to include non-title-related damage claims. " 
44 Jenard Report, p34. Cf. Ashurst v. Pollard, ibid., p83, paragraph 41, where Jonathan Parker, U. cites 
Advocate-General Darmon's remarks in Webb v. Webb [1994] 3 All E. R. 911, to the effect that 
proceedings which have as their object rights in rem are equated with proceedings where the `principal 
subject matter' of the claim relates to rights in rem. 
45 Cf. Article 25, Council Regulation 44/2001. Kaye suggests that Article 19 is security against breach 
of Article 16 by reason of "apathy, ignorance or convenience by agreement or submission to 
jurisdiction. " (ibid., p873) Cf. the Kassedjian Report, paragraph 83: "Were the new Convention to 
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that a court is not required to declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction, 
where the matter which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of another 
Contracting State is raised purely as a preliminary or incidental issue. 46 The rationale 
for this provision can be questioned. As Briggs has stated, " ... if the jurisdiction of 
the court depends upon the ability of the plaintiff (or the defendant, though in this 
respect acting contrary to his interests) to make the legal issues look complicated, this 
is curiously unsatisfactory. , 47 Likewise, it should be noted that the requirement to 
decline jurisdiction is restricted to proceedings principally within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of another Contracting State. This geographical restriction prompts one to 
query the strength of the public policy which supposedly demands exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Apparently, therefore, there is scope for evasion of Article 16(1), by formulation of a 
claim in such a way that the property issue appears to be ancillary or incidental to the 
principal claim. Kaye offers the example of a case in which a pursuer, who is seeking 
to uphold his own title to immoveable property situated in a Contracting State, as 
against the defender, who is in occupation thereof, sues the defender for damages in 
respect of trespass to the property, in the courts of the (Contracting State) domicile of 
the defender rather than in those of the situs of the property, "with the expectation that 
the defender will challenge the pursuer's ownership of the property by way of 
defence, thereby occasioning a Contracting State's court, other than that of the situs, 
include this concept of 'exclusive jurisdiction', the courts of States Parties to the Convention would 
have to comply faithfully with these rules, declaring themselves proprio motu without jurisdiction if 
seised in breach of these rules. " 
46 Jenard Report, p39. Consider also Jenard, P and Muller, G, `Report on the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments [Re Lugano]' (OJ 1990 C189/57), which states that, 
"Articlel6(1) applies only if the property is situated in the territory of a Contracting State ... 
If the 
property is situated in the territory of a third state, the other provisions of the Convention apply. " (p76) 
47 Briggs, A, `Recent Property Decisions' (1998) LXIX B. Y. I. L. 352,358. 
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to adjudicate - albeit incidentally - upon title. "48 While suggesting (theoretically) 
that the court of the defender's domicile should, if faced with such a scenario, sist its 
proceedings, pending a determination by the forum rei sitae upon the `incidental' 
property issue, Kaye admits that there is no justification, within the four corners of the 
Convention, for such a response. 
The second way in which the exclusive jurisdiction provision countenances the forum 
rei sitae's all too ready use of its predominant jurisdiction, is by ensuring that Article 
16 also gives the forum jurisdiction over matters related to, but not, in fact, falling 
within the ambit of the principal proceedings (e. g. issues arising as incidental 
questions), even where that forum could not otherwise exercise jurisdiction over the 
incidental issue. Kaye criticizes this over-inclusion, remarking that, "... it is one thing 
to decide to make provision for exclusive jurisdiction under the Convention, but it is 
another to confine its effect to the subject matter principally intended to be governed 
by it. "49 
Curiously, neither the Convention nor the Council Regulation seeks to define either of 
the terms `rights in rem' or `immoveable property', and accordingly, the interesting 
question of definition of connecting factors for the purposes of rules of jurisdiction 
draws into focus. The identification and interpretation of connecting factors is 
primarily a matter for determination by the forum; to adopt the interpretation of the 
lex situs would be to assume the very point in issue. Although referring this issue to 
the lex Situs may be to beg the question, according to the Schlosser Report, the answer 
to the second question, whether the dispute concerns `rights in rem', "can hardly be 
48 Kaye, ibid., p875. 
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derived from any law other than that of the situs. s50 Clearly, it would be 
unsatisfactory for Forum X to decline jurisdiction, under Article 19, on the basis that 
it considers the immoveable property to be situated in State Y, if, in fact, Forum Y did 
not consider State Y to be the situs of the property; or, equally, where Forum Y did 
not consider the proceedings `principally to concern '51 or to `have as their object' 
`rights in rem'52 in `immoveable property' or `tenancies of immoveable property'. The 
scope for conflicting interpretations between Contracting States is as wide here as it is 
in the search for, and application, of the apposite choice of law rule itself. As regards 
`tenancies', for example, as the European Court itself has observed, 53 these are 
regulated by complex social legislation in each Contracting State; what State X 
considers to be a tenancy, may not constitute a tenancy in the eyes of State y. 54 In 
view of this, and solely for the purpose of designating the territory of a particular 
49 Ibid., p877. Cf. Ashurst v. Pollard [2001] 2 All E. R., per Jonathan Parker, LJ., p85, paragraph 53. 
so Schlosser, P, `Report on the Convention on the Association of Denmark, Ireland and UK to the 
Brussels Convention' (OJ 1979 C59/71), p121, paragraph 168. 
s' Re Polly Peck International plc (No. 2) [1998] 3 All ER 812,828 - `principally' means `chiefly' or 
for the most part' - Rattee J. 's methodology was to list the legal issues which the court would have to 
decide and to note that the issue of title was only one among many difficult points. According to 
Briggs, "As such, it could not be said that the issue of title was the principal concern of the case. " 
(1998), p357. In Coin Controls Ltd v. Suzo International (UK) Ltd [1999] Ch. 33,50-1, Laddie J. gave 
a wide interpretation to the phrase `principally concerned': something which is a major feature of the 
litigation is not incidental. 
52 Re Hayward [1997] 1 All E. R. 32; Barratt International Resorts Ltd v. Martin 1994 S. L. T. 434; and 
Webb v. Webb [ 1994] 3 All E. R. 911. In Webb, Mr Webb senior provided the funds to purchase a flat in 
the South of France. Title to the flat was transferred into the sole name of his son. Mr Webb senior 
brought proceedings in England for a declaration that Mr Webb junior held the flat as trustee, and for 
an order that the son execute such documentation as was necessary to vest title in the father. The son 
challenged the jurisdiction of the English court on the ground that, by virtue of Article 16(1), the 
French courts had exclusive jurisdiction. Following a preliminary reference to the European Court of 
Justice, it was held that for Article 16 to apply, the action must be based on a right in rem and not on a 
right in personam. Since Mr Webb senior was only seeking to assert rights against his son (i. e. a right 
in personam), the action did not fall within Article 16(1). Cf. Gaillard v. Chekili [2001] I. L. Pr. 33, in 
which the European Court of Justice held that an action for rescission of a contract of sale of land (in 
France) was not an action in rem, but rather an action in personam. Accordingly, the Belgian court was 
not required to decline jurisdiction. 
53 Sanders v. Van der Putte [1977] E. C. R. 2383; and Rösler v. Rottwinkel [1985] E. C. R. 99. Kaye 
suggests that courts of a Contracting State will refer to the lex situs in order to determine whether the 
proceedings have a tenancy as their object, regardless of whether the relationship involved would 
constitute a tenancy under the lexfori. (ibid., pp912/3) 
54 Jarrett v. Barclays Bank [1997] 2 All E. R. 484 - Timeshare agreements in respect of Spanish and 
Portuguese properties were deemed to fall within Article 16(1)(a) since they related to the exclusive 
occupation of immoveable property for a specified duration, in return for payment of money. 
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foreign Contracting State as the situs of the property, Kaye has enquired whether each 
Contracting State's own determination of situs "... ought to be replaced by uniform 
Community-inspired criteria of moveability and immoveability ... for purposes of 
Article 16(1) at the instigation of the European court? "55 Such an approach to 
interpretation would at least avoid any incongruity or inconsistency among the 
approaches of the various Contracting States. 56 
Admittedly, some measures have been taken in England and Wales to restrict the 
over-exclusivity of Article 16(1). 57 Section 30(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 provides that, "The jurisdiction of any court in England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland to entertain proceedings for trespass to, or any other tort 
affecting, immoveable property shall extend to cases in which the property in question 
is situated outside that part of the United Kingdom unless the proceedings are 
principally concerned with a question of title to, or the right to possession of, that 
property. " Section 30 does not extend to Scotland, and, interestingly, the approach of 
the Scottish courts has been somewhat different. In the 1980s, when considering the 
Scots international private law of delict, the Scottish Law Commission explained that 
the Scottish courts "... have not excluded, in principle, the entertaining of actions, 
including actions of damages, in relation to immoveables abroad but, particularly in 
the context of actions to determine proprietary or possessory rights in immoveables, 
ss Kaye, ibid., p897. Fawcett & Torremans have also called for the concept of `immoveable property' 
in Article 16(1) to be given an independent Community meaning. (Fawcett, JJ and Torremans, P, 
`Intellectual Property and Private International Law' (1998), p34) 
56 Kaye points, for example, to tenancies of immoveable property which, in his view, would require to 
be specifically mentioned, since, in the eyes of French law, the right of the tenant is merely one in 
personam. (ibid., p912) Guidance as to what does, or does not, constitute a right in rem could be found, 
for example, in paragraphs 223-253 of the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. 
57 Calls for restraint have also, on occasion, emanated from the European Court of Justice (e. g. Hacher 
v. Euro Relais Gmbh [ 19921 3 I. L. Pr. 515, where the Court reiterated the need not to give Article 16 a 
wider interpretation than is required by its objectives). 
103 
they have liberally admitted the plea of forum non conveniens. , 58 This is a reasonable 
and more tempered approach to jurisdiction, marking a narrow in-road into the 
apparently inviolable situs jurisdiction. Collier has noted that the House of Lords 
considered the Mocambique rule59 to be a "... self-denying rule" with "... little or no 
justification (since if the English court were to take jurisdiction it would usually apply 
the lex Situs to the substantive issue). "60 Collier's remarks convey the notion that an 
English forum should be sufficiently objective to distinguish between rules of 
jurisdiction and rules of choice-of-law; the mere fact that the non-situs forum has 
assumed jurisdiction in such an action should not automatically result in its applying 
its own domestic law to the substantive point in issue. In short, it should not be 
presupposed that a non-situs forum will always lack choice-of-law objectivity. 
The authors of Cheshire & North advise that the Situs court is "uniquely well placed to 
deal with the subject-matter listed in [Article 16(1)]. s6l This may be true, but the 
present author would agree with Alden, who has suggested that assertions such as this 
"... only endorse the situs state's assertion of jurisdiction and do not imply that the 
nonsitus cannot exert its judicial power over the property. , 62 It is submitted that 
absence of the property from a court's jurisdiction should not, per se, suffice to 
preclude a non-situs court's assumption of jurisdiction, where circumstances would 
otherwise denote a close(r) connection between the non-situs state and the parties, 
their transacting and/or the consequences of their so doing. The assumption and 
58 Scottish Law Commission, CM No 62 (and Law Commission WP No 87), `Private International 
Law Choice of Law in Tort and Delict' (1984), paragraph 2.81. 
59 British South Africa Co v. Companhia de Mocambique [1893] A. C. 602 -a court has no jurisdiction 
to determine title to foreign land, or to decide claims for damages for trespass to such property. Also, 
Hesperides Hotels Ltd v. Muftizade [1979] A. C. 508; Hewit's Trs v. Lawson (1891) 18 R. 793; and 
Cathcart v. Cathcart (1904) 12 S. L. T. 12. 
60 Collier, J G, Conflict of laws' (2001), p262- 
61 Cheshire & North, `Private International Law' (13`h ed. ) (1999), p229. 
62 Alden, ibid., p622. (Emphasis added) 
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exercise of jurisdiction should not, it is submitted, be equated with the recognition and 
enforcement of decrees; to do this would be to demean the third category of conflict 
rule, namely, rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees. For many 
years, however, there has been a tendency to equate jurisdiction over property with 
the matter of enforcement. 63 In the same way that it has been argued that rules of 
choice of law should not be fused (or confused) with rules of jurisdiction, 64 so too, it 
is here argued, that rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees must not 
be usurped by, or subsumed within, rules of jurisdiction. Kaye has identified what the 
present author judges to be an infelicitous objective of Article 16, namely, "... the 
basis of Article 16 exclusive jurisdiction is not merely one of unifying and 
rationalising Contracting States' jurisdiction in such proceedings, but also to further 
the Community public policy objective of ensuring that courts of States with a 
particular interest in controlling the types of transaction and activities dealt with 
under Article 16, by reason of their close territorial connection therewith, are 
accorded exclusive jurisdiction in relation to such proceedings. "65 This sentiment is 
echoed in the Kassedjian Report which states that the court of exclusive jurisdiction 
"is the only one able to adjudicate the case effectively, this being a pledge that justice 
63 For example, in the unattributed Note in (1910-11) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 567: "Undoubtedly the basis for 
the rule is found in the complete power of the state throughout its own territory, so that any sound 
exception made to it must rest on an examination of that principle. " (p567) Consider also Westlake's 
view: "The principle of the forum situs, in its application to land itself, is incontrovertible. Since only 
the authorities that exist on the spot can employ force to give possession or take it away, it would be 
idle for any foreign jurisdiction to make a direct attempt to determine the possession of land, or even 
the property in it ... 
" (Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), p215) This view 
was mirrored in the writing of Briggs, E, `The Jurisdictional - Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts 
Rules' (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1165,1201: discussing the question of enforcement the author declared 
that, "The answer ... is 
found in the basic fact of the situs' exclusive power over the land; other states 
have little choice. " 
64 The desire to ensure the proper administration of justice may require "... various checks, enquiries, 
on the spot examinations by experts and entries in local land registers. " (Kaye, ibid., p892) These are 
all relevant choice of law issues, but should not be concerns at the stage of conferring jurisdiction, 
save, where relevant, for purposes of forum non conveniens. 
65 Kaye, ibid., p881. 
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will be properly dispensed. "66 This statement implies that `conflicts justice'67 is only 
done when the lexfori is applied qua lex causae, and again fails to acknowledge that 
such justice is also achieved through the application of conflict rules of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign decrees. 68 This is redolent of the now vilified notion of 
forum preference in choice of law, and is barely consonant with the internationalist 
approach expected, first, of the European Union, and secondly, of modern-day 
conflict rules. 
As Alden has remarked, albeit with reference to America, "If the situs retains any 
exclusive power it may be in enforcing a final judgment, although it must carefully 
follow the mandate of full faith and credit such a final judgment requires. "69 It is quite 
true that the power to enforce a decree rests with the forum rei sitae alone; 70 the 
power and control argument, however, could apply with equal force to moveable 
property, but in this regard, as Hay has highlighted, "it has not been doubted that 
personal jurisdiction over the parties has been sufficient to bind their interests. "71 It is 
entirely legitimate to argue that the Situs alone has jurisdiction to make effective (i. e. 
to enforce) the title of a particular party, but it is submitted that it is not equally 
66 Paragraph 83. 
67 Kegel, G, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law - Volume III, Chapter 3: Fundamental 
Approaches' (1986), p 15. 
6 This is particularly true in the (European or Hague) context of an economic, political or legal 
community, sharing a common identity or loose sense of association. Cf. Von Mehren, A, `Recognition 
and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgements: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in 
the EEC and the US. ' (1981) 81 Col. L. Rev. 1044, at p1046: "... common membership in a political, 
economic, and legal system that is in some meaningful sense federal presumably increases each 
member's awareness and understanding of the quality of justice provided by other members. " 
69 Alden, ibid., p624. 
70 Falconbridge, J D, `Essays in the Conflict of Laws' (1947), at p534: "It is only a court of the country 
in which the land is situated that can effectively grant any remedy enforceable in rem or give a 
judgement or make an order directly affecting the title to land or the possession of the land. " 
" Hay, ibid., p116. 
106 
persuasive to argue that only the forum rei sitae can determine title. 72 Significantly, 
Hay has observed that in both jurisdiction and choice of law, American practice 
displays a trend away from an exclusive jurisdiction rule, and concludes that "it is 
curious ... that the EEC Convention takes a step back and accords the situs exclusive 
jurisdiction. "73 
Since Article 16(1) is expressly restricted to proceedings which have as their object 
rights in rem in immoveable property, it may be assumed that any concerns regarding 
the alleged excessive reach of that rule would be confined to its effect upon 
immoveable property. As previously noted, however, in view of the general tendency 
to base choice of law rules relating to the transfer of corporeal and incorporeal 
moveable property, upon rules which govern the transfer of immoveable property, it is 
feared that an all-embracing resort to the jurisdiction and rules of the lex situs for the 
purposes of dealing with immoveable property, will, in fact, engender a similar 
jurisdictional and choice of law monopoly in the determination of moveable property 
disputes. 
In concluding this chapter, it is submitted that if conflict rules of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decrees are operating effectively, then limited exercise of non- 
situs jurisdiction over immoveable (and, a fortiori, moveable) property could be 
permitted. The Hague negotiators' discussion of an alternative (optional) special 
jurisdiction supports this conclusion. The concept of exclusive jurisdiction under 
Article 16(1) has abetted the dominion of the lex Situs choice of law rule, intensifying 
72 Consider Hay, ibid., at p118: "Jurisdiction to determine the right to title, the entitlement as 
distinguished from title itself, depends on the exercise of personal jurisdiction; it affects rights and 
obligations as between the parties. " 
73 Hay, ibid., p120. 
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the `land taboo'. Fusion of the jurisdictional and choice of law connecting factors has 
helped to buttress the situs monolith, but, nevertheless, another crack is surfacing, 
namely, abuse of `in personam' jurisdiction. 
108 
Chanter Six 
Cracks in the Monolith - 'in nersonam' iurisdiction 
The importance of the distinction between the determination of title, and the 
subsequent enforcement thereof, draws sharply into focus in the context of in 
personam jurisdiction. 1 
Undeniably, the situs state has ultimate control of, and responsibility for, immoveable 
property situated within its borders. The question whether this power justifies 
exclusive jurisdiction has already been considered and answered in the negative. The 
potential interest of a non-situs state in questions of title to foreign land has been 
admitted for some time, to the extent that the situs rule permits the exercise of in 
personam jurisdiction by a non-situs court even where that in personam jurisdiction 
affects foreign land. Joseph Beale outlined the position at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, viz.: "... though the creation of equitable interests in land is a 
matter for the law of the situs alone, it does not follow that the courts of equity of 
another country may not in a sense exercise power over the foreign land ... It is clear 
that in certain cases a court of equity will decree a conveyance of foreign land in 
specific performance of a contract to convey, or require mutual deeds to rectify the 
1 `[An action in rem] differs from an action in personam in that the decree of the court is not confined 
in its effects to the actual parties to the suit but embraces the disposition of the thing itself and purports 
to bind everybody in the world who might deny the validity of the interest sought to be established. ' 
(Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' (1947), 3'd edition, p145) `A right in personam can only 
be claimed against a particular person ... A right in rem, on the other hand, is available against the 
whole world ... its owner 
is entitled to demand that the thing in which it exists be given up by anyone 
not enjoying a prior right. ' (Schlosser, P, `Report on the Convention on the Association of Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK to the Brussels Convention' OJ 1979 C/59/71, p120/1) Note, however, the 
following remark, that, `Equitable interests [in English law] are not ... merely the equivalent of 
personal rights on the Continent. Some can be registered and they, like legal rights, have universal 
effect even against purchasers in good faith. " (ibid., p121) 
t 
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boundaries of foreign land, or decree a reconveyance for fraud ... the 
foreign court 
may decree a conveyance as a remedy for a tort or breach of contract of the 
defendant, although no right to a conveyance is recognised in the courts of the situs. 112 
In personam jurisdiction exists wherever a court has jurisdiction over the person of 
the defender; if the defender is shown to be in breach of his obligations under a non- 
situs law, (or at least in the eyes of a non-situs court), that non-situs court may, in 
certain circumstances, order a conveyance of foreign land, even although such a 
decree, if it is to be effective, must be acted upon, or implemented, by the defender. 3 
It is generally accepted that a court having jurisdiction over the defender can oblige 
him/her to execute a disposition or other deed affecting foreign land. 4 But the power 
of the non-situs forum extends only to the person of the defender, not to the land 
itself. Litigation between parties may involve, inter alia, contractual, delictual, or 
alimentary obligations. If the pursuer is successful in obtaining a decree from a non- 
situs court in respect of these obligations, and that same court orders the defender to 
convey foreign land to the pursuer in implementation thereof, the question arises as to 
how far the pursuer's rights extend should the defender refuse to implement the 
decree. 5 Armed with the decree of the non-situs forum, does the pursuer have 
sufficient munitions to enforce his or her rights within (and in respect of) the territory 
of the situs, or at least to request `rubber-stamping' by the forum rei sitae of the non- 
2 Beale, J H, `Equitable Interests in Foreign Property' (1906/7) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 382,384. 
3 Beale, ibid., p387. 
4 Briggs, E W, `The Jurisdictional - Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts Rules' (1948) 61 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1165,1182. See Barbour, `The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree' (1919) 17 Mich. 
L Rev. 527, at p532-3: "... [if] the defendant is personally before a court of equity, the court has power 
to order him to convey foreign land. Such a decree is an effective judgement and determines 
conclusively his obligation to convey and this obligation remains binding upon the person of the 
defendant wherever found. Such a decree ought to be entitled to full faith and credit at the situs of the 
land. " Also Currie, B, `Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees' (1954) 21 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 
620 at p620. See Ashurst v. Pollard [2000] 2 All E. R. 772, [200112 All E. R. 75 (note 15, infra). 
5 Or, in Goodrich's words, if the defender `... has succeeded in evading the clutches of the court which 
made the order. ' (Goodrich, H F, `Two States and Real Estate' (1941) 89 Uni. of Pen. L. R. 417,426) 
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Situs decree? 6 The enquiry can be reduced to the simple question whether, "... our 
plaintiff is helped by the foreign decree or must he begin de novo? "7 It is submitted 
that if the pursuer must begin his or her crusade entirely afresh, our system of 
community of judgments is flawed. 
The distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction is deceptively simple. In 
some cases it may even appear that the basis of the distinction has been altogether 
overlooked. Consider, for example, Re Duke of Wellington? Morris has highlighted 
the curious point that, in this case, the issue of jurisdiction appears to have been 
glossed over. Although the dispute centred around immoveable assets in England and 
Spain, Morris has explained that "it was ultimately arranged that the [English] court 
would deal with the matter on the footing that the law of England applied, the parties 
expressing their willingness to be bound by the decision. "9 Surely, however, the issue 
was not what the parties might have desired, but rather the soundness or otherwise of 
the forum's exercise of jurisdiction. Interestingly, Morris makes the point that "If the 
statements in the textbooks are to be taken at their face value, it looks as though the 
Wellington case could have been disposed of quite shortly on the ground that the 
court had no jurisdiction, since the better opinion is that the jurisdictional objection 
cannot be waive d. "lo 
Alden has highlighted some of the difficulties with in personam jurisdiction. In 
particular, it is not always easy for a court to frame or to classify its decree as one in 
personam, rather than in rem: "The interests of the parties cannot be separated wholly 
6 Consider Goodrich, ibid. 
7 Goodrich, ibid., p426. 
a [1948] Ch. 118, affirming [1947] Ch. 506. 
9 Morris, `Renvoi' (1948) 64 L. Q. R. 264,268. 
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from the land itself. Regardless of the label affixed to a decree, it affects both the 
interests of the state in the land and the personal interests of the parties. Not only 
does this ambiguous distinction create conflicting results, but more importantly, it 
demonstrates that there is no inherent reason why a non-situs court is an 
inappropriate forum. "" Although the situs court will generally tolerate a non-situs 
forum's exercise of in personam jurisdiction, it will take umbrage if the foreign court 
purports directly to affect the land: no reliance is placed either upon the non-situs 
forum's ability discerningly to apply the apposite choice of law rule (many of which, 
at least in European or Hague countries, are now harmonised), or in the safeguards 
inherent in the lex Situs' own rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees 
(i. e. its finite grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement). 
It can be perceived that the in rendin personam jurisdiction distinction is somewhat 
obscure, possibly giving rise to manipulation of the more permissive in personam 
jurisdiction. As Alden has stated, "Courts may thereby [i. e. through reliance upon in 
personam jurisdiction] accomplish what the law prohibits them from doing 
directly. " 12 In Alden's words, "In recharacterizing the nature of the relief, the foreign 
court simply professes to assert its equitable powers in personam and orders the 
conveyance of the extrastate land, while at the same time disavowing any intent to act 
directly on the property. When the proper language and form are used, this in 
personam loophole allows a nonsitus court to accomplish the needed division. "" It is 
intellectually naive to entertain the notion that a non-situs forum can order a 
`o Ibid., p268. Consider, however, Morris' rationalisation of the decision at p268. 
" Alden, R, `Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts' (1987) 65 Texas L. Rev. 585, 
595. 
12 Alden, ibid., p595. 
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conveyance of title to foreign land without directly affecting that title: "It is difficult to 
conceive of an action that more directly affects land than a determination of who 
holds what interests in that land. s14 It is instructive to consider the English case of 
Ashurst v. Pollard-15 The case concerned proceedings raised by an English trustee in 
bankruptcy. Mr Pollard and his wife owned land in Portugal. On 26 October 1993, a 
bankruptcy order was made against Mr Pollard. On 4 October 1999, District Judge 
Lay16 granted an order for sale of the Portuguese property with vacant possession. The 
question arose whether the proceedings, in fact, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Portuguese courts, as proceedings concerning rights in rem in immoveable 
property. '? The Pollards appealed the judgment of the District Court, 
18 to Jacob, J., 
sitting in the Bankruptcy Court of the Chancery Division. Jacob, J. dismissed the 
appeal, holding that although prima facie an order which purported to be effective 
against the world fell within Article 16(1), the article did not prevent the forum from 
enforcing an English trust in respect of land abroad, since such an action was one in 
personam and not in rem. Although the effect of an English order might be to compel 
the Pollards to complete the trustee in bankruptcy's title (which presumably would 
require action in Portugal), or indeed to do any other act in relation to the land, such 
an order was permissible if achieved through the medium of a decree in personam. It 
followed that the granting of an order requiring the bankrupt and his wife to do all 
things necessary to procure the sale of the jointly-owned property was correct in 
principle since it was an order in personam. The Pollards appealed against the 
13 Alden, ibid., p599/600 (e. g. District Attorney v. McAuliffe 493 N. Y. S. 2d 406,412 [US Supreme 
Court, 1985] where a forfeiture action was characterised as in personam and a restraining order 
supported). 
14 Alden, ibid., p607. 
15 [2000] 2 All E. R. Ch. D. 772, [2001] 2 All E. R. 75. 
16 At Brighton County Court. 
17 In terms of Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention. 
18 To the effect that Article 16(1) did not prevent the English forum from enforcing an English trust in 
respect of land abroad. 
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decision of Jacob, J., still contending that the court had no jurisdiction to make such 
an order in relation to the Portuguese property. The appeal was dismissed. 19 The 
appellate court held that in determining whether Article 16(1) applied to any 
particular case, it was necessary, first, to give a restrictive interpretation to Article 16, 
since its effect was to override the parties' choice of forum. Secondly, it was 
necessary to consider whether the proceedings involved a factual investigation that 
was best performed by the courts of the state in which the property was situated, 
and/or whether questions of local law and practice were raised. In the instant case, no 
issue was deemed to be raised as to the factual situation in Portugal, nor, it was held, 
did the matter involve any question of Portuguese law or practice. In the 
circumstances, the court held that the proceedings affected only the in personam right 
of the appellants, and accordingly, that it was appropriate for the English court to 
exercise jurisdiction. 
It would appear that the court's assessment of the factual situation was somewhat 
impressionistic, and the decision that no question of Portuguese law or practice was 
involved rather premature. In line with the sentiment of Alden's remarks, it is difficult 
to identify an issue that more directly affects the Portuguese land than the question of 
whether or not it is to be sold or transferred with vacant possession by one party to 
another. Rather than deny the nature of the order in question, and engage in 
classificatory gymnastics so as to characterise the decree as one in personam, would it 
not be more honest to recognise that, in these circumstances, the English forum had a 
greater interest in hearing the action, in determining which of two English parties, in 
fact, owned the foreign land in question, and in dealing with the resultant transfer of 
19 Ashurst v. Pollard [20011 2 All E. R. 75. The case called before a bench of three judges, Kennedy, 
Y 
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the property (save for questions of formal validity and accuracy of records, in which 
the situs has a greater interest) ? 20 It seems neither honest nor logical to state that, "The 
fact that the trustee's ultimate aim or purpose in prosecuting the proceedings is to 
effect a change in the ownership of the property by achieving its sale is not 
material"; 21 on the contrary, ownership of the Portuguese property was central to the 
point in issue. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal dismissed22 the argument put forward 
by Counsel for Mr Pollard, namely that, "... in deciding whether art. 16 applies to 
these proceedings the court must look at the substance of the dispute, rather than the 
form of relief sought or of the order made. "23 
If it is accepted that the non-situs court may have sufficient interest to grant an in 
personam decree, then, in appropriate circumstances, it could perhaps be 
demonstrated that such a court might have an interest in the land itself. Bearing in 
mind the distinction between determination of title and the subsequent enforcement 
thereof, it should be accepted that the situs' refusal to recognise another legitimately 
U., Potter, U., and Jonathan Parker, LJ. 
20 The appellate court distinguished the case of Re Hayward (deceased) [1997] 1 All E. R. 32. It is 
submitted, however, that Rattee J. 's conclusion in Hayward was less strained than the decision in 
Ashurst. In Hayward, Rattee, J. concluded that: "The trustee's claim ... was of the very essence of a 
claim of a right in rem, in that it was a claim to ownership itself of one half of the villa. " (ibid., per 
Rattee, J., p43) The trustee's claim was that the deceased's one half share in a Minorcan villa formed 
part of his estate and, accordingly, that it vested in the trustee, and that any purported transfer of the 
interest, to or by the deceased's widow, was void. Although Hayward differs from Ashurst to the extent 
that, in the former case, the trustee expressly craved the court to order the widow and X, a third party 
purchaser, to take steps to rectify the Minorcan register so as to demonstrate that the villa was held in 
the joint names of X and the trustee, it can be inferred that Mr Ashurst would also have required such 
steps to be taken, mutatis mutandis, so as to satisfy the conditions of clear title and vacant possession. It 
is submitted that the absence in Ashurst of an express crave in these terms is not per se sufficient 
grounds on which to distinguish the two cases. Jonathan Parker, LJ. distinguishes the two cases on the 
basis that the `principal subject matter' of the proceedings in Hayward, but not in Ashurst, was the 
ownership of the foreign property. His Lordship opined that, "The trustee in the instant case [Ashurst] 
is not seeking to establish or protect, let alone perfect, his title to Mr Pollard's interest in the 
Portuguese property. " (ibid., p87, paragraph 60) 
21 Ashurst v. Pollard [2001] 2 All E. R. 75, per Jonathan Parker, LJ., p86, paragraph 56. 
22 Ibid., p86, paragraph 56. 
23 Ibid., p80, paragraph 21, per Mr Prentis, Counsel for Mr Pollard. 
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interested24 court's determination of title, is not appropriate, save for customary25 
reasons. The exclusive jurisdiction rule may even be criticised precisely because it 
encourages parties against whom an in personam decree has been awarded in a non- 
situs forum, to disregard that order, pending further enforcement proceedings at the 
situs (or, more likely perhaps, contempt of court proceedings at the non-situs 
forum). 26 
It is inconsistent and illogical to refuse to recognise the decree of the non-situs forum 
merely on the basis that it infringes upon the sovereignty of the forum rei sitae. As 
Anderson has explained, "Whenever foreign judgements are enforced there is an 
`invasion' of sorts of local sovereign rights. Why should judgements affecting land be 
treated differently? "27 A `different' treatment has been justified, historically, by virtue 
of land being the principal source of wealth (as well as for political reasons whereby a 
sites may wish to exercise control over the identity of those persons who are 
permitted to live within its borders). It is suggested, however, that it is now misguided 
to presume (irrebuttably) that the interests of the situs will always be protected or 
furthered by automatic refusal to recognise the decree of a non-situs forum, or 
24 The difficulty, of course, is in ascertaining which legal system/court is legitimately interested, for in 
all matters where a forum's authority extends, it may persuade itself and others that it is legitimately 
interested. See Chapter Seven, infra - `Cracks in the Monolith - Particular Instances'. 25 i. e. Typical Convention grounds for refusal of recognition, such as fraud or public policy (e. g. 
section 51(3) of the Family Law Act 1986). Currie, B, `Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land 
Decrees' (1954) 21 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 620, indicates, at p642, that, '... there is no reason to fear the 
application of full faith and credit to foreign decrees will place the land policy of the state at the mercy 
of venal and hostile tribunals. Our systems of conflict-of-laws are sufficiently homogeneous to ensure 
that the law of the Situs will be given due consideration. ' The author later counsels his readers to `... 
replace the traditional attitude of suspicious and jealous provincialism. ' (p677) 
26 Cf. Alden, ibid., p601/2. See also Gammon v. Gammon. 684 P 2d. 1081 (1984). If it is within the 
authority of the non-situs forum to find the non-compliant defender to be acting in contempt of court, 
then it is academic to say that the non-situs forum cannot affect title to land abroad. Weintraub has also 
remarked upon this point, stating that a non-situs decree in rem cannot be deemed outrageously 
inappropriate since `situs states have consistently given effect to a deed actually executed by a party 
under compulsion of such a [non-situs] decree. ' (Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of Situs as 
a Concept in Conflicts Analysis' (1966) 52 Cornell L. Q. 1,14) 
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conversely, to presume that the interests of the situs will, without exception, be 
offended by recognition of a non-situs decree. 
The third category of conflict rule, those of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decrees, should be able to operate independently of the first category of rule, that is, 
rules of jurisdiction. Unlike rules of exclusive jurisdiction, which, it has been argued, 
already enjoy too wide a reach, rules of (non-)recognition or (non-)enforcement of 
foreign decrees typically are more restrained in their operation (i. e. whilst a rule of 
exclusive jurisdiction automatically results in all decrees of a non-situs forum being 
denied recognition, rules which merely specify grounds for refusing recognition are 
less sweeping in their effect and would likely result in at least some non-situs decrees 
being recognised in the forum rei sitae). 28 
So long as situs recording or registration requirements are satisfied (this being 
guaranteed, in some cases at least, by Article 16(3), or by Article 22(3) of Council 
Regulation 44/2001), and deeds are appropriately framed and executed so as to satisfy 
the lex situs on matters of formal validity (this being, in any event, a choice of law 
issue), it has been boldly suggested that "... the exercise of jurisdiction by a nonsitus 
court poses no unique dangers. , 29 There is little justification for a universal ban on 
foreign orders which purport to affect local land; the question of conformity with the 
formal or procedural requirements of the lex sites can be determined on a case by case 
27 Anderson, W, `Foreign Orders and Local Land: the Caribbean gets its own Version of Duke v. 
Andler' 1999 I. C. L. Q. 167,172. 
28 This holds particular significance in the U. S. A. where, according to Currie, under the doctrine of Full 
Faith and Credit, the substantiality of a state's policy objections to the recognition of a sister state's 
judgment is to be finally determined by the United States Supreme Court: "The inference is strong that 
the reason for withholding recognition lies not in the nature of the decree but in some conception of 
policy relating to local land. " ((1954), ibid., p623/4) 
29 Alden, ibid., p593. 
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basis. It is submitted that Anderson is correct in his view that, "The risk of non- 
conformity cannot be a principle that forecloses recognition of all foreign 
Judgements. 1930 
Even if rules of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement have always been 
linked by invisible threads, it is suggested that those threads, in the context, at least, of 
property, are now stronger than ever. Brainerd Currie, writing in 1954, stated that, "... 
the question of jurisdiction in a particular instance becomes one of the effectiveness 
of the judgement. Effectiveness means de facto power to produce the desired result - 
not merely in terms of power to compel the defendant to perform an act, but also in 
terms of the consequences which the appropriate foreign sovereign will attach to the 
act when performed. s3' Rules of recognition and enforcement, however, must not be 
emasculated. In the American arena, Hay has suggested that "To ask about the effect 
of non-situs land decrees at the situs mis-states the issue, or complicates it 
unnecessarily ... state court judgements do not 
directly affect any property outside the 
forum state. But they establish obligations which the full faith and credit clause 
requires the situs to recognise. "32 It is not suggested that non-situs decrees relating to 
land should affect title to foreign land ex proprio vigore, rather, in the words of 
Barbour, "... all that is contended is that the courts of the situs should recognise such 
a decree as a final determination of a personal obligation to convey, an obligation 
analogous to that arising from a valid contract. "33 The forum rei sitae, when called 
30 Anderson, ibid., p172/3. He also makes the interesting point that objections to non-situs jurisdiction 
do not take into account the principle of double renvoi: "The raison d'etre for the existence of double 
renvoi is precisely to ensure that the foreign court reaches the same conclusion as the forum regarding 
particular areas of decision making of which title to and rights in and over land are the primary 
example. " 
31 Currie (1954), ibid., p622. 
32 Hay, P and Hoeflich, M H, (ed. Hay, P) `Property Law and Legal Education; the Situs Rule in 
European and American Conflicts Law - Comparative Notes' (1988), p120- 
33 Barbour, ibid., p548; and Currie (1954), ibid., p628. 
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upon to recognise and to enforce the non-situs decree, should effectively engage only 
in a process of rubber-stamping; the grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement 
should be strictly curtailed. 34 In appropriate cases (e. g. where the parties and the 
circumstances of their transacting demonstrate a closer connection with the non-situs 
forum than with the forum rei sitae), the non-situs forum should be permitted to 
regulate the personal obligations and proprietary rights of the parties, leaving to the 
forum rei sitae only the actual enforcement of the prior determination. 35 As Hay has 
indicated, "Rarely, if ever, will the situs have so great an interest in denying full 
recognition to non-situs decrees that it should be permitted to disregard them. 36 Full 
recognition in the sense ... of issuing its decree to mirror that of the non-situs court 
.. 
"3? It is submitted that grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement should 
protect only such provisions of the lex Situs as concern alienability or marketability of 
immoveable property, accuracy of its title records, and restrictions on land use. 38 
Adopting an interest analysis approach, Weintraub has advised that, "The situs may, 
34 Cf sections 46(1) and 51(3)(a) of the Family Law Act 1986, and Article 10 of the 1980 European 
Convention on Recognition and enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on the 
Restoration of Custody of Children. For example, it might be suggested that recognition of the validity 
of an overseas transfer of rights in rem in immoveable property may be refused if: - 
(a) It was obtained without such steps having been taken for giving notice of the proceedings to 
parties having an interest in the property as, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all 
the circumstances, should reasonably have been taken; or 
(b) It was obtained without a party declaring an interest in the property having been given such 
opportunity to take part in the proceedings as, having regard to those matters, he should reasonably 
have been given; or 
(c) Recognition of the transfer of rights in rem in the property would be manifestly incompatible with 
the fundamental principles of the law relating to the ownership and use of immoveable property in 
the State addressed [i. e. the lex situs]. 
35 In such instances, the non-situs forum need not necessarily determine the rights of the parties inter 
se, or as regards the foreign property, in accordance with the lex Situs. Cf. Hay (1988), ibid., p119. 
36 E. g. Ashurst v. Pollard, ibid.; and Scottish Provident Institution v. Robinson (1892) 29 S. L. R. 733. 
37 Hay (1988), ibid., p120. 
38 Cf. Alden, ibid., p626. This could be achieved by the means suggested by Currie, so as to ensure 
formal validity of the transfer of immoveable property: `A procedure which would be strictly in 
conformity with the theory on which conclusive effect is claimed for the foreign decrees would be to 
bring, at the situs, an action to effectuate the foreign decree, or to carry it into effect. ' (Currie, 1954, 
ibid., p675) This should comprise no more than a declarator of the rights conferred or approved by the 
non-situs forum, or at most, an order mandating compliance with the recording or registration 
requirements of the lex situs. Weintraub, for example, suggests that `... the proper notation will have 
to be made in the land records at the Situs to protect persons who might rely on record title. ' 
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under a proper full, faith and credit standard, refuse to recognize a sister-state 
judgement affecting the interests of persons in really ... only when recognizing a 
particular interest as validly created will conflict with its own interests as situs and 
when this conflict with its interests is so gross as to outweigh the need for full faith 
and credit.,, 39 It is submitted, however, that the tenor of this statement may run 
against the reality of the situation; it may be argued that the onus should lie, not on the 
forum rei sitae to show gross conflict with the interests of the lex situs, but rather, that 
it should lie on the party seeking to rely upon the judgment of the non-situs forum to 
show that the decree does not conflict with the fundamental principles of the lex situs. 
Ex comitate, the situs may4° acquiesce in the non-situs decree. 
One case in which an English court was invited to make an order in respect of land in 
Scotland was Richard West & Partners (Inverness) Ltd v. Dick. 41 Megarry J. held 
that, equity acting in personam, the English court had jurisdiction to grant a decree of 
specific performance of a contract for the sale or purchase of foreign land, provided 
that the defendant was domiciled within the English jurisdiction. 42 
Counsel for the defendant had contended that "where ... the land was subject to an 
entirely different system, ... it 
[was] inappropriate to grant a remedy which might 
involve grave difficulties in working out the decree. Scots land law is probably no less 
(Weintraub, R J, `The Conflict of Laws Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal Reasoning' (1986) 65 Texas 
Law Review 215,232) 
39 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p11. Otherwise, the non-situs decree should `bind the conscience' of the 
forum rei sitae. Fall v. Eastin 113 N. W. 132,180. Cf. Cheshire & North, `Private International Law' 
(1999), p378. 
40 Or may not: McKie v. McKie 1933 I. R. 464. 
41 [1969] 2 Ch. 424. 
42 Harman, U. remarked that - "I say nothing about a case where the defendant is domiciled outside 
[the jurisdiction of the English forum]. " (p436) 
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obscure to the English lawyer than English land law is to the Scots. i43 This argument, 
however, was dismissed somewhat flippantly by Russell, U. (affirming Megarry J. ), 
viz.: "I trust that I shall not be thought lacking in a due sense of awe at the prospect 
of a Chancery Master being enveloped in the coils of Scottish conveyancing. I 
certainly do not say that in some cases there may not be very real difficulties. But I 
hope that practical difficulties in applying sound principles will never too easily be 
permitted to distort those principles ... I refuse to assume that the Scottish courts will 
stand aghast at the spectacle of a purchaser living within the English jurisdiction 
being ordered by an English court to carry out his agreement to purchase land in 
Scotland'44 
Their Lordships found justification 45 for their decision in an earlier dictum of the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Selbourne, in the case of Ewing v. Orr Ewing: 46 "The courts of 
equity in England are, and always have been, courts of conscience, operating in 
personam and not in rem; and in the exercise of this personal jurisdiction they have 
always been accustomed to compel the performance of contracts and trust as to 
subjects which were not either locally or ratione domicilii within their jurisdiction. 
They have done so as to land, in Scotland, in Ireland, in the Colonies, in foreign 
countries. " Interestingly, it has been doubted whether an English forum would accord 
the same degree of respect to the decree of a foreign tribunal purporting to deal with 
title to land in England. 47 It is submitted that to deny recognition to a foreign decree, 
431bid., p429. 
44 Ibid., and p430. 
45 Ibid., p430. 
46 (1883) 9 App. Cas. 34,40. 
47 Anderson, ibid., p168, has remarked that, "... English law still leaves open the question whether an 
English court would recognise the decree of a foreign court purporting to operate in personam on the 
parties affecting land in England. " He asserts, however, that there are Canadian and American cases 
directly in point. 
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where, mutatis mutandis, an English non-situs forum would expect the foreign forum 
rei sitae to recognise an English decree in personam, would be to offend principles of 
reciprocity and comity. 48 
Significantly, in Richard West, Russell, U. alluded to the fundamental distinction 
between rules of jurisdiction and rules of recognition and enforcement, viz: "Any 
inability of the court to enforce the decree in rem is no reason for refusing the 
plaintiff such rights and means of enforcement as equity can afford him. 1949 One 
senses in these words an exercise, by the English forum, of jurisdiction carefully 
labelled ex post facto as jurisdiction in personam, in order to achieve the end result 
desired by the forum, but without causing offence to the lex situs. 
As regards the Scots courts, in the case of Ruthven v. Ruthven, 50 the court was willing 
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defender, Lord Ruthven, to order him to 
execute and deliver a conveyance of land in Ireland. The court refused, however, to 
have the conveyance executed by the Clerk of Court, opining that this would intrude 
upon the jurisdiction of the Irish court. It must be admitted, nevertheless, that the 
court's decree ad factum praestandum did, to some extent at least, trespass upon the 
territorial sovereignty of the lex Situs, for it cannot be denied that the result of the 
litigation in Scotland was to affect the land in Ireland. 
48 Cf. Travers v. Holley reasoning ([1953] P. 246). 
49 Ibid., p431. 
50 1905 (43) S. L. R. 1. 
i 
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The line between acting in rem and acting in personam is a fine one, and one which is 
difficult to tread. 51 Professor Currie has laid down some basic pointers: "To provide 
that the [non-situs] decree shall operate of its own force as a conveyance is bad 
enough; to provide for actual registration at the situs is waving a red flag. If the 
decree is to be accepted as conclusive for any purpose at the situs, the foreign court 
must mind its manners; a plaintiff's lawyers drafting the decree must not put into the 
mouth of that court language which serves no purpose except to arouse the elemental 
instincts of the court at the situs in defense of its legitimate prerogatives ... the 
plaintiff must scrupulously avoid any prayer for relief predicated on the assumption 
that he has acquired legal title by virtue of the foreign decree. "52 In other words, the 
pursuer, and in turn, the non-situs forum, must not force the hand of the forum rei 
sitae, or suggest that the lex Situs is doing anything other than acting of its own 
accord, and as master in its own court. 
Various American cases have confronted the in rem/in personam dichotomy, and have 
revealed, in certain instances, the superficiality of the distinction. In 1810, the U. S. 
Supreme Court decided the case of Massie v. Watts. 53 Watts, Virginian, sued Massie, 
Kentuckian, in a Kentucky Federal Court, asking the Court to compel Massie to 
convey to Watts land in Ohio, to which Massie held legal title. Watts claimed that 
Massie had acquired legal title with notice of Watt's equitable title. In ordering 
Massie to convey the land to Watts, Marshall, CJ. explained that, "Was this cause ... 
to be considered as involving a naked question of title ... the jurisdiction of the ... 
Court of Kentucky would not be sustained. But where the question changes its 
51 Cf. Gardner, J C, `The Decreasing Influence of the Lex Situs' (1934) 46 J. R. 244, at p249: "... I 
submit that in many cases the distinction is much less clear than is generally contended. At any rate it 
is often so fine that it is bound to exercise an undermining influence on the principle of the lex Situs. " 
52 Currie (1954), ibid., p673. 
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character, where the defendant in the original action is liable to the plaintiff... as the 
holder of a legal title acquired by any species of mala fides practised on the plaintiff, 
the principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever the person may be found, 
and the circumstance, that a question of title may be involved in the inquiry, and may 
even constitute the essential point on which the case depends, does not seem sufficient 
to arrest that jurisdiction. "54 The shallowness of the in remlin personam distinction is 
manifest in Marshall, CJ. 's conclusion that, "... in a case of fraud, or trust, or of 
contract, the jurisdiction of a court ... is sustainable wherever the person be found, 
although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree. 
The inquiry, therefore, will be whether this be an unmixed question of title, or a case 
of fraud, trust or contract. "55 
In the later case of Cheever v. Wilson, 56 Swayne, J. remarked that, "The decree 
rendered in Indiana, so far as it related to real property in question [in Washington] 
could have no extraterritorial effect; but, if valid, it bound personally those who were 
parties in the case, and could have been enforced in the situs rei, by the proper 
proceedings conducted there for that purpose. , 57 In other words, the non-situs decree 
could have been enforced at the situs, or a declarator as to the parties' rights (pursuant 
to the non-situs decree) obtained in the forum rei sitae, and certainly, the non-situs 
53 10 U. S. 148 (18 10). 
54 Ibid., p 156. 
ss Ibid. 
56 76 U. S. 108 (1869). 
57 Paragraph 121. Consider also Muller v. Dows [18761 94 U. S. 444, per Strong, J., at p449: "It is here 
undoubtedly a recognised doctrine that a Court of equity, sitting in a state and having jurisdiction of 
the person, may decree a conveyance by him of land in another state, and may enforce the decree by 
process against the defendant. True it cannot send its process into that other state, nor can it deliver 
possession of land in another jurisdiction, but it can command and enforce a transfer of the title. " 
(Gardner, ibid., p250) 
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decree would have been recognised at the situs for the purpose of a plea of res 
judicata 58 
The 1810 dictum of Marshall, CJ. was refined in 1890, by Fuller, CJ. in the case of 
Carpenter v. Strange. 59 The rubric states that "The jurisdiction of a court ... may be 
sustained over a person, notwithstanding lands not within the jurisdiction may be 
affected by the decree ... 
" Fuller, CJ. expanded upon this, saying that, "The real estate 
was situated in Tennessee and governed by the law of its situs, and while by means of 
its power over the person of a party a court of equity may in a proper case compel 
him to act in relation to property not within its jurisdiction, its decree does not 
operate nor affect the title, but is made effectual through the coercion of the 
defendant, as, for instance, by directing a deed to be executed or cancelled by or on 
behalf of the party. " It was apparent, therefore, that while the non-situs forum did not 
assert that its decree had automatic extra-territorial effect, inherent in the court's 
coercion of the defendant (albeit coercion in personam), was an intention directly to 
affect the foreign land. 
Reliance was placed upon in personam jurisdiction in two further important American 
cases, Clarke v. Clarke60 and Fall v. Eastin. 61 In Clarke, Counsel for the plaintiff 
successfully contended that, "... what cannot be done directly62 can be accomplished 
by indirection63 and ... the 
fundamental principle which gives to a sovereignty an 
58 Cf. An unattributed note on Re Duke of Wellington [1948] Ch 118; (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 
1057: "There seems to be no valid reason why a decision of a foreign court on a matter affecting title 
to land should not be considered res judicata at the situs. " 
59 141 U. S. 87 (1890). 
60 178 U. S. 186 (1900). 
61215 U. S. 1 (1909). 
62 i. e. By decree in rem of the non-situs state. 
63 i. e. By decree in personam of the non-situs state. 
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exclusive jurisdiction over the land within its borders is in legal effect dependent upon 
the non-existence of a decree of a court of another sovereignty determining the status 
of such land. Manifestly, however, an authority cannot be said to be exclusive, or even 
to exist at all, where its existence may be thus64 frustrated at any time. "65 It is ironic 
that the misnomer of `exclusive' jurisdiction used in early twentieth century America 
is mirrored even now in the ostensible `exclusive' jurisdiction rule of Article 16 of the 
Brussels Convention. 
Fall v. Eastin concerned a deed in respect of land in Nebraska. The deed was granted 
by a commissioner under a Washington divorce decree. In determining the equities of 
the parties, the Washington divorce forum set apart the land in Nebraska to the wife as 
her own separate property. The wife contended that the "Washington court, having 
had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, in determination of the equities 
between the parties to the lands in controversy, decreed a conveyance to be made to 
her ... [and] was evidence of [the wife's] right to the 
legal title. "66 Her husband, on the 
other hand, argued that "... the Washington court had neither power nor jurisdiction 
to affect in the least, either legally or equitably, lands situated in Nebraska. "67 The 
Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was not necessary, in terms of the Full Faith and 
Credit clause of the Federal Constitution, that the Washington deed be recognised in 
Nebraska: "The rule is well settled that when a case ... is presented, a court of equity 
having personal jurisdiction of the parties may, in the exercise of its discretion, 
assume jurisdiction, although land in another state may be affected, if it can grant 
effective relief by a decree acting solely upon the person whose title or interest in the 
64 i. e. By the in personam judgment of a non-situs state asserting jurisdiction by its own rights. 
65 Paragraphs 191/192. 
66 Page 67. 
67 Page 68. 
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land is to be affected, as distinguished from a decree acting directly upon the land ... 
But the decree is ineffectual without a conveyance by the holder of the title pursuant 
to the requisition of the decree. "68 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska explained the strength of the in personam decree, 
viz:, "We think there can be no doubt, where a court of chancery has, by its decree, 
ordered and directed persons properly within its jurisdiction to do or refrain from 
doing a certain act, it may compel obedience to this decree by appropriate 
proceedings and that any action taken by reason of such compliance is valid and 
effectual wherever it may be assailed. " But, in spite of the in personam effect, the 
decree was not effective in rem: "The [Washington] decree is inoperative to affect the 
title to the Nebraska land, and is given no binding force or effect so far as the courts 
of this state are concerned, by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States 
with reference to full faith and credit. s69 In fact, the wife in this case did not utilise 
the remedy which lay open to her in terms of provision for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decrees. As Weintraub has indicated, "Instead of suing the 
husband's grantees directly, she should first have sued upon the Washington decree 
in Nebraska asking a Nebraska court to establish and enforce it as a decree from a 
Nebraska court. "70 Apparently, the forum rei sitae becomes somewhat piqued in the 
face of a presumptuous and ill-mannered non-situs forum. 71 
The superficiality of the in rem/in personam distinction, and the ease with which it 
can be manipulated by the non-situs forum, is evident in the following statement: "A 
68 Page 67. 
69 Page 69. 
70 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p9. 
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court of equity, having authority to act upon the person, may indirectly act upon real 
estate in another state, through the instrumentality of this authority over the person. 
Whatever it may do through the party, it may do to give effect to its decree respecting 
property, whether it goes to the entire disposition of it or only to affect it with liens or 
burdens. s72 Ultimately, if the husband in Fall v. Eastin had been compelled, by virtue 
of contempt of court proceedings raised in the Washington forum, to transfer to his 
wife title to the land in Nebraska, then the Nebraska forum rei sitae would have 
recognised his wife's title, regardless of the fact that, effectively, the transferor would 
have been acting under compulsion. As Goodrich has remarked, "... if the defendant 
makes a conveyance in pursuance of such an order [i. e. an order of the non-situs 
forum delivered at the conclusion of contempt proceedings] he may not deny, even in 
the state of the situs, that the conveyance is his own free act and deed even though he 
made it to get out of jail. "73 
This incongruity was underlined in Fall v. Eastin, where the Supreme Court, citing 
the earlier case of Carpenter v. Strange, 74 opined that "... a court of equity may, in a 
proper case, compel [a party] to act in relation to property not within its jurisdiction; 
its decree does not operate directly upon the property nor affect the title, but is made 
effectual through the coercion of the defendant; as, for instance, by directing a deed 
to be executed or cancelled by or on behalf of that party. , 75 
71 Weintraub suggests that the wife in Fall v. Eastin breached `procedural etiquette'. (ibid., p10) Cf. 
note 52, supra. 
M Ibid. 
73 Goodrich (1941), ibid., p426. 
74 141 U. S. 87,105. 
75 Fall v. Eastin, p70. 
128 
The casuistry of the in remlin personam distinction was apparent even to the Supreme 
Court itself, which admitted the "... embarrassment which sometimes results from 
[the application of the distinction]": "Whether the doctrine that a decree of a court 
rendered in consummation of equities ... will not convey title, and that the deed of a 
party coerced by the decree will have such effect, is illogical or inconsequent, we 
need not inquire, nor consider whether the other view would not more completely 
fulfil the constitution of the U. S. s76 Although only the forum rei sitae has subject- 
matter jurisdiction over land, a non-situs forum is fully able to exercise personal 
jurisdiction so as indirectly to affect the foreign land. 77 In granting an order in 
personam against the defender, the non-situs forum fully anticipates that, ultimately, 
its decree will have extra-territorial effect. 78 The converse proposition would be 
absurd, to say nothing of vexatious. In 1966, Weintraub instructed scholars to, 
"... dismiss at once the argument that by refusing to recognize the sister-state decree 
as between the original parties ... the situs 
is simply protecting the hypothetical bona 
fide purchaser who might rely on a record title which does not note the sister-state 
decree. When bona fide purchasers exist, the situs is free to protect them on the same 
basis as it would in wholly domestic transactions which are improperly recorded. It 
may not ... create imaginary 
bogies to mask what is simply hostility to a sister-state 
decree. s79 
76 Ibid., p70. 
n Cf. Cheshire & North, ibid., at p377: `A decree may be issued, which though personal in form, will 
indirectly affect land abroad. ' 
78 To argue otherwise would be tantamount to saying that "equity is willing to act in vain" (Anderson, 
ibid., p174). Consider also Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), at p215: `... 
an indirect attempt may be made by a foreign jurisdiction to determine the possession or the property 
in land by compelling one who is personally subject to its authority to employ those possessory or 
proprietary rights which he possesses in the forum Situs in such a manner as to give effect to a 
determination which in itself would be nugatory. ' 
79 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p11. 
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Despite Colwyn Williams' prediction in 1959 that "... in general the situs rule is 
weakening all through the conflict of laws ... It may well be that it is in this area [that 
is, the recognition of foreign land decrees] that the land taboo will first disappear 
" 80 the taboo still exists, at least in name. In practice, however, the in rem/in 
personam distinction permits, to some extent, circumvention of the situs rule. What a 
non-situs forum cannot achieve directly, it is able to achieve using the device of 
decree in personam. As Gardner concluded in 1934, by requiring a party to implement 
a contractual, delictual or trust obligation in respect of foreign land, "... a Court of 
personal jurisdiction can issue what practically amounts to a decree in rem. s8 1 
The apparent difficulty (both in theory and in practice) in making a demarcation 
between jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in personam, is indicative of further 
weakness in the monolith. 82 In this chapter, however, the authorities relied upon to 
demonstrate the weakness derive principally from the United States, and rely heavily 
upon American conflicts thinking, and upon notions of equitable jurisdiction. In the 
following chapter, it is intended to measure the extent of the `weakness' in the 
Scottish and English jurisdictions. 
80 Colwyn Williams, D, `Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws - Lex Situs: Rule or Exception' (1959) 
11 Hastings Law Journal 159,160. 
81 Gardner, ibid., p249/250. 
82 Gardner, ibid., refers to it as, "a factor in the decreasing influence of the lex situs. " (p251) 
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Chapter Seven 
Cracks in the Monolith - Particular Instances 
Property and Divorce 
The in remlin personam distinction has been used to outflank the exclusive 
jurisdiction rule in the context of division of property in the event of divorce. ' In 
considering financial provision in the event of divorce, including, in particular, 
transfer of property orders, one must explore two aspects of the problem: first, the 
approach of a Scottish or English consistorial forum asked to deal not only with the 
separating spouses' Scottish or English property, but also with such foreign assets as 
constitute matrimonial property (in the view, at least, of the Scottish or English 
forum), and secondly, the response of a Scottish or English forum rei sitae to the 
decree of a foreign consistorial forum which purports to deal not only with the 
separating spouses' property situated within that foreign jurisdiction, but also with 
matrimonial property in Scotland or England. 
In Hamlin v. Hamlin, 2 for example, Mrs Hamlin petitioned the court for divorce, and 
applied aditionally for various heads of ancillary relief, including an order that Mr 
Hamlin be restrained from disposing of a Spanish villa, valued at approximately 
£60,000. Title to the villa (which was the main item of matrimonial property) was in 
the name of the defendant. Mr Hamlin objected to the order sought on the basis that 
he might face bankruptcy proceedings were he to be precluded from selling the 
1 Consider Scoles, E F, `Choice of Law in Family Property Transactions' (1988) Receuil des Cours II 
13, at p56, where the author suggests that, "On divorce, the courts regularly undertake to make this 
allocation of property without regard to the location of the assets. " 
2 [198512 All E. R. 1037. 
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property. At first instance, the county court rejected Mrs Hamlin's application, on the 
ground of no jurisdiction. On appeal, however, it was held that when dealing with a 
claim for financial provision on divorce, the English court did have jurisdiction to 
make an order restraining the defendant from disposing of property (real or personal) 
situated abroad. The appellate court paid heed to the theoretical distinction between 
the first and third categories of conflict rule, 4 noting that even if the litigants are 
present within the forum's jurisdiction, the forum will not generally make an order, 
the effectiveness of which depends upon its being recognised or enforced by the 
forum rei sitae, if evidence suggests that the order will not, in fact, be recognised or 
enforced there. 5 It is critical, however, to note the rider which Kerr, I J. places on the 
court's pronouncement, namely, "... such cases go to discretion and not to 
jurisdiction. 116 In the case of Tallack v. Tallack and Broekema, 7 for example, an 
English forum refused to grant an order in respect of property situated in the 
Netherlands, on the ground that there was evidence to suggest the order would not be 
effective there. But importantly, as Kerr, U. emphasised, "... the fact that the 
property in question was abroad was not treated as ousting the court's jurisdiction in 
principle. "8 Rather, the distinction between jurisdictional competence and the actual 
exercise of jurisdiction is a matter to be determined by principles of forum non 
3 Ibid., per Kerr, U., at p1042: "... it is convenient to pause to consider to what extent, if any, the 
application of the foregoing principles and authorities requires any distinction to be drawn according 
to whether or not the property abroad is real or personal property. In my view there is no such 
distinction in regard to the existence of the jurisdiction. Admittedly, the exercise of the discretion to use 
the jurisdiction is in practice circumscribed by the fact that under the law of the foreign locus the 
court's order may not be effective. In such cases the jurisdiction will not be exercised, but it exists. " 
4 Respectively, rules of jurisdiction, and rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees. 
5 Ibid., per Kerr, U., at p1041: "... it is a fundamental principle that, in the exercise of their discretion, 
our courts will not make orders which they cannot enforce. " 
61bid., p1041. 
[1927] P. 211. 
8 Hamlin v. Hamlin, ibid., p1042. 
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conveniens or lis pendens. 9 In certain cases, as will later be demonstrated, the scales 
of appropriateness may tip in favour of the non-situs forum, 1° but as Weintraub has 
indicated, "... if a non-situs forum in a particular place proves to be an inconvenient 
place to litigate title to lands' ... the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is available to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice. "12 
In Hamlin, Kerr, I. J. made reference to section 37(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 ('the 1973 Act'), which states that, "Where proceedings are brought by one 
person against another, the court may, on the application of the first-mentioned 
person - (a) if it is satisfied that the other party to the proceedings is, with the 
intention of defeating the claim for financial relief, about to make any disposition or 
to transfer out of the jurisdiction or otherwise deal with any property, make such an 
order as it thinks fit for restraining the other party from so doing or otherwise 
protecting the claim. " It was the view of the court that this enabling provision was 
not restricted in its application to property situated within the jurisdiction of the 
English court, but that it extended also to property situated abroad. 13 Although the 
1973 Act does not apply in Scotland, it is submitted that equivalent powers are 
conferred upon the Scottish courts by virtue of section 14 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985 ('the 1985 Act'). Section 14 authorises the Scottish courts to 
9 Cf. Kerr, LJ., ibid., at p1044: "... the existence of jurisdiction ... must 
be distinguished from the 
decision whether or not it will be exercised in any given case. " Cf. also unattributed note on Re Duke of 
Wellington [1948] Ch. 118, (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, at p1057: "It would be desirable if 
jurisdiction to try title to foreign land were exercised generally (subject to the limitations of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens). " 
10 E. g. Razelos v. Razelos [1960] 3 All E. R. 929; and Sandford v. Sandford [1985] 15 Fam. Law 230. 
Contra Kerr, LJ., ibid., at p1045: "... in the present case the respective merits [of the situs and non- 
situs fori] have not yet been investigated. But that issue goes to the discretionary exercise of the court's 
jurisdiction, not to its existence. " 
11 For example, because physical inspection of the land is necessary, or crucial witnesses are competent 
or compellable only at the situs. 
12 Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of Situs as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis' (1966) 52 
Cornell L. Q. 1, at p 15. 
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grant incidental orders, including an order, inter alia, that property shall be transferred 
to any curator bonis or trustee or other person for the benefit of the applicant spouse, 14 
and any ancillary order which is expedient to give effect to the section 9 principles. '5 
Kerr, U. explained in Hamlin that, "The jurisdiction of the courts in this field is 
exercised in personam against persons who are amenable, as a last resort, to the 
courts' coercive powers to enforce orders made against them. The orders do not 
operate directly on the property, let alone in rem. "16 But the coercive effect upon 
foreign property of a decree in personam ultimately may be the same as that of a 
decree in rem pronounced by the forum rei sitae. 17 In the case of Razelos v. Razelos, 18 
for example, a consistorial case concerning the division of immoveable property in 
Greece, Baker, J., in observing the choice of law/recognition of foreign decree 
distinction, concluded that, "I ... [shall] make an order in respect of the [Greek 
immoveable property] for what it may be worth in respect of the property now. If the 
Greek courts will enforce such an order, so much the better. If not, there is still the 
probability that [the husband] will return to England and the chance of enforcement 
in personam. "19 
13 Ibid., p1040. 
14 Section 14(2)(g) of the 1985 Act. 
15 Section 14(2)(k), ibid.. Consider Thomson, J M, 'Family Law in Scotland', at p126: "Armed with this 
plethora of powers, the court can make orders for financial provision which can be tailormade for the 
particular couple concerned. " 
16 Hamlin, ibid., p1041. 
17 Consider Hay, P, `Property Law and Legal Education; the Situs Rule in European and American 
Conflicts Law - Comparative Notes' (1988), at p120: "... while the [non-situs] court may not affect 
title to real property situated outside the state, it may make an equitable distribution thereof, and order 
one of the parties to convey such property. " 
18 [1969] 3 All E. R. 929. 
19 Page 1044. The merits of Mrs Razelos' claim were particularly strong since, in the words of Baker, 
J., "The wife dare not go to Greece to establish her case there ... 
In the absence of such an order the 
wife would be left without any means of recovering property which I find was obtained from her 
fraudulently, being dishonestly bought in [Mr Razelos'] name with her money. " (p1044) Cf. Lightning 
v. Lightning Electrical Contractors [1998] N. P. C. (Q. B. D. ) (71 1998 C. L. Y. 768), in which the 
receivers of LEC appealed against the dismissal of their application for a declaration that the English 
court had no jurisdiction over property in Scotland. The appeal, however, was dismissed. Peter Gibson, 
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In cases of distribution of matrimonial property in the event of divorce, it is especially 
true that the interests of the situs will not necessarily outweigh those of a non-situs 
forum which is responsible for determining the outcome of the consistorial 
proceedings. In many cases, the non-situs forum (which typically will be the 
domicile20 or habitual residence of at least one of the parties and often will be the 
shared matrimonial domicile21) will represent the state which is most interested in (i. e. 
affected by) the parties, their marital relationship (including legal termination 
thereof), and their financial affairs (including, in particular, the post-divorce financial 
status of the spouses). The forum rei sitae, in contrast, will usually have legitimate 
interest only in matters of alienability of the asset in question, the accuracy of its own 
records, and any restrictions on land use. 22 
In relation to orders for financial provision on divorce, the question of title to property 
and any transfer thereof is secondary to the central issue, which is making a fair 
LJ., opined that as both the company and its managing director were `resident' in England, an equitable 
remedy in personam which was not recognised by a foreign (i. e. Scottish) court was still available in 
respect of the foreign (i. e. Scottish) land. 
20 Or in cases where the spouses are non-UK domiciliaries, the nationality. 
21 Consider sections 7 and 8 of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. For actions raised 
after 1 March 2001, see Article 2 of Council Regulation No. 1347/2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental 
Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses ('Brussels II' - 2000 OJ 1160/19). 
22 Cf. Scoles (1988), at p23: "This is not to say that in the U. S. or the British Commonwealth reference 
to the law of the situs is not significant on occasion, such as to issues of use or title registration... " 
Consider too Alden, R, `Modernizing the Siuts Rule for Real Property Conflicts' (1987) 65 Texas L. R. 
585, at p625: "The situs rule places an inordinate importance on the land itself; ignoring the more 
important interests of persons in the property ... many actions concern the land and its title only 
collaterally. " Even as to questions of alienability, however, the non-situs court may sometimes have a 
stronger interest than that of the situs (e. g. in the case of sale of matrimonial property, outwith the state 
of the matrimonial domicile, and without the consent of a jointly-entitled spouse/joint owner, where the 
law of the matrimonial domicile, but not the law of the state where the sale took place, considered the 
property to be unmarketable unless the consent of both spouses has been obtained. This may be the 
case where assets are removed from a state, the law of which incorporates a community of property 
regime, and taken to one which maintains a system of separation of property. In Scales' opinion, "... 
the marital property regime is not destroyed by reason of assets being moved physically. " (ibid., p36) 
Hence, if an interest analysis approach were applied to the issue of alienability, a different result may 
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distribution of matrimonial property between the spouses. 23 Family property 
transactions are essentially a matter of personal law, and cases involving the transfer 
of property in the event of divorce essentially concern the incidental property aspects 
of what is not generally, or principally, a proprietary relationship. 24 Weintraub has 
remarked that, "... when the forum is granting a divorce and dividing the property of 
the warring spouses, it is highly desirable that such division be made with a view of 
the full picture and include property of the couple wherever situated. "25 On account of 
the clear benefit of the forum having in view the complete financial picture of the 
spouses, it is appropriate not only for the non-situs forum to exercise jurisdiction over 
the spouses' property in such a situation (or at least upon them personally in relation 
to that property26), but also for that forum to apply whatever law it considers to be 
most appropriate to the transfer of the foreign property (not necessarily the lex 
situs). 27 This approach can be seen also in the venerable matrimonial property conflict 
cases of De Nicols (No. 2)28 and Chiwell v. Carlyon. 29 
In a divorce action raised in Scotland, the Scottish forum has authority to make an 
order obliging one spouse to transfer property which he/she owns to the other 
apply than would apply under the general rule of Duc de Frias v. Pichon [1886] 13 Journal du Droit 
international 593. 
23 Fair sharing of the property being the dominant principle in Scotland at least, in terms of section 
9(1)(a) of the 1985 Act. An overseas divorce forum would apply whatever principles of division it 
deemed appropriate in terms of the relevant lex causae. For disposal of an application for financial 
provision in a Scottish forum following an overseas divorce etc., section 29(1), Matrimonial and 
Family Proceedings Act 1984 states that Scots law will apply as it would were the application being 
made in an action for divorce in Scotland. 
24 Consider Scoles' view that: "... a single law should be applicable and ... the nature of the asset as 
moveable or immoveable is generally insignificant. " (ibid., p22) See also Venturini, G C, 
`International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 21 - Property' (1976), p9. Cf. 
Scottish Executive Consultation Paper on Hague Convention on Children 1996, paragraph 79: 
"... matters of personal welfare and property are often inter-related. " (14 December 2000) 
25 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p15. 
26 Cf. Razelos v. Razelos [ 1969] 3 All E. R. 929. 
27 Cf. Hay (1988), ibid., p119. 
28 [190012 Ch. 410. 
29 (1897) 14 S. C. 61 (S. A. ). 
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spouse. 30 Such an order, however, must be justified by the principles set out in section 
9 of the 1985 Act. In terms of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention, 31 the Convention 
(and hence the exclusive jurisdiction provisions set out in Article 16 thereof) shall not 
apply to `rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship. ' The 
interpretation provisions32 of the 1985 Act make no special mention of property 
situated furth of Scotland (nor, incidentally, does section 22 of the Matrimonial 
Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981, whose definition of `matrimonial 
home', being without geographical limitation, may be presumed to be inclusive of 
property situated abroad). 33 The inference may be that it is competent for a Scottish 
court to make a transfer of property order in respect of property situated abroad. It is 
submitted that sections 11(3)(h), (4)(e) and (5)(e) of the 1985 Act (which enable a 
Scottish court charged with applying the section 9 principles to have regard to `all the 
other circumstances of the case'), would empower a Scottish court to weigh the 
interests of the lex Situs and to consider the appropriateness of applying that law to 
any transfer of the foreign property in question. 34 This, in turn, may justify the 
Scottish forum sisting the action on the basis of forum non conveniens, and bowing to 
the jurisdiction of the forum rei sitae as regards the distribution or transfer of the 
foreign property. 35 
30 Sections 8(1)(aa) and 12 of the 1985 Act. 
31 Schedule 1, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. Cf. Article 1(2)(a), Council Regulation 
No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. 
32 Sections 10(4), 25(3) and 27. 
33 Section 22 defines `matrimonial home' as "any house ... which has been provided or has been made 
available by one or both spouses as, or has become, a family residence. " (Emphasis added) Professor 
Meston's Annotations to the 1981 Act do not counter the suggested presumption. 
34 It should be noted, however, that this power only applies to orders made under section 9(1)(c), (d) or 
(e), and not to the more commonly relied on principles contained in section 9(1)(a) or (b). 
35 i . e. A (common 
law) sisting within the substantive conduct of the case, to be distinguished from a 
(statutory) sisting of jurisdiction to settle, at the outset, a question of conflicting jurisdictions (Domicile 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, Schedule 3). 
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As regards the `active' functions of the Scottish or English consistorial fori, therefore, 
one might infer that these courts are able, in terms of the relevant statutory provisions, 
to exercise jurisdiction over `foreign' matrimonial property. The issue of whether or 
not that jurisdiction will, in fact, be exercised, is best resolved by application of 
general rules of forum non conveniens, and in the light of likelihood of effectiveness. 
If, as an integral part of the weighing process involved in that doctrine, attention were 
paid to principles of interest analysis, then, in many cases, it would be apparent that 
the interest of the consistorial forum in the transfer of the foreign property is stronger 
than that of the foreign situs. 
One might also consider in this context the divorce forum's approach to private 
marriage contract provisions made by the parties, and intended to apply (principally, 
one supposes) to property matters upon divorce. The divorce forum may give its 
approval to these, or not; in this it may - or may not - be influenced by the parties' 
own `current' attitudes thereto. 36 But in any event, it is quite possible that the drafting 
and implementation of the marriage contract may (have) take(n) little heed of the 
traditional `situs' concerns of conflict of laws theory. 
Turning now to the converse `passive' scenario: what is the attitude of a Scottish or 
English forum rei sitae to a foreign consistorial decree which incorporates a transfer 
of property order, or other ancillary measure, which purports to affect property in 
Scotland or England? Some insight can be gleaned from cases decided prior to the 
passing of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (`the 1984 Act'). 
36 Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p332, paragraph 15.09. 
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Galbraith v. Galbraith, 37 for example, concerned a domiciled Scotsman who married, 
in Scotland, a woman of Finnish nationality. Following the marriage, the parties lived 
together in a house in Prestwick, Scotland, which, according to Lord Wheatley, was 
the only matrimonial home. 38 In 1966, three years after the marriage, Mrs Galbraith 
returned to Finland, and, in 1968, obtained a divorce decree from the court in 
Helsinki. The action was served on Mr Galbraith, but he did not enter appearance, and 
subsequently he raised an action for divorce in Scotland, on the basis of his wife's 
desertion, or alternatively, for declarator that the marriage had been validly dissolved 
by decree of the Finnish court. The Scottish action was undefended. 39 Free to depart 
from the ratio of Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, 40 but declaring the decision in Indyka v. 
Indyka4' to be highly persuasive, the Scottish court held that the jurisdiction of the 
Finnish court to entertain Mrs Galbraith's action should be recognised, and decree of 
declarator was granted in the terms craved. Significantly, Lord Wheatley stated that, 
"The [Finnish] decree granting divorce and custody and aliment to the defender is 
now final and not open to appeal. 9942 This extended even to dealings with the Scottish 
matrimonial home: "It seems to me therefore that while the wife must be regarded as 
a domiciled Scotswoman, and the matrimonial home which she left was in Scotland, 
she appears to have satisfied the various tests which their Lordships severally 
envisaged as taking the law beyond the confines of the Travers v. Holley rule. , 43 
37 1971 S. L. T. 139 
38 Ibid., p139. 
39 Mr Galbraith had served as defender not only his wife, but also, in the public interest, the Lord 
Advocate and the Registrar General for Scotland. 
40 1895 A. C. 517. When the rule in Le Mesurier was extant, it is not clear whether the lex domicilii also 
governed questions regarding property belonging to the divorcing spouses and situated abroad. 
1969 1 A. C. 33. Lord Wheatley explained that although, technically, he was not bound by Indyka, he 
found it to be "... of the highest standing and persuasion. " (Galbraith v. Galbraith, ibid., p140) 
42 Galbraith v. Galbraith, ibid., p139. (Emphasis added) 
41 Ibid., p141. 
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A similar situation arose in the case of Bain v. Bain, 44 save for the fact that in the 
latter case there was no matrimonial property situated in Scotland. 45 Even so, a dictum 
of Lord Robertson is significant: "It was argued on behalf of the pursuer that, once it 
is accepted that the foreign court is a court of competent jurisdiction and allegedly 
applied Scots law, it did not matter that Scots law had been applied wrongly. The 
decree was a judgment in rem and could not be so scrutinised [citing in support of 
this argument Castrique v. Imrie46] ... In my opinion this argument is sound. "47 
Historically, even where the litigants were domiciled in Scotland (as was the case 
both in Galbraith and in Bain48), a Scottish forum was bound to recognise the 
consequences of the foreign divorce decree. In theory, this obligation extended not 
only to the personal consequences of such a decree (i. e. to status), but also to the 
proprietary consequences thereof, the sole safeguard open to the forum rei sitae being 
the standard one of public policy. This position was highlighted by the case of Torok 
v. Torok. 49 Even if the proprietary consequences of the foreign decree offended the 
forum rei sitae, at most those consequences could be ignored; it was not possible for a 
Scottish or English forum to supplement the provision of the foreign court, or to 
substitute the foreign relief with the forum's preferred financial provision. 50 Ormrod, 
44 1971 S. L. T. 141. 
°S Lord Robertson explained that, "At the time of the marriage the defender apparently made it clear to 
the pursuer that she had no intention of living with him anywhere but in Japan, and in particular had 
no intention of setting up house in Scotland ... 
It was understood that the defender would cohabit with 
the pursuer when his ship went to Japan during voyages. After 20`" May 1962, however, the pursuer's 
ship ceased to call at Japanese ports. " (ibid., p142) 
46 1870 L. R. 4 (H. L. ) 414. Cf. (in reverse) Merker v. Merker [1963] P. 283, concerning error by a 
foreign court as to its own law. 
47 Bain v. Bain, ibid., p145. 
48 Both cases being litigated prior to 1 January 1974, at a time when the unity of domicile rule 
prevailed, clothing married women with the domicile of their husbands, ex lege. See now Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. 
49 [1973] 1 W. L. R. 1066. 
50 The reason, at least in England, was partly (or largely) technical: since by virtue of the foreign 
divorce the parties were no longer married in the eyes of English law, the English courts had no locus 
to grant financial relief. (Cheshire & North (1999), ibid., p844) 
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J. verbalised the widespread frustration at this result, "... there is no doubt that under 
the [Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations] Act of 1971 this court is bound, 
or would be bound to recognise any decree of the Hungarian court made in this case 
on these facts, which would have the effect, if that decree were made before a decree 
in this court, of shutting out this court's jurisdiction to deal with the property 
belonging to the spouses in this country - which of course is to produce a ridiculous 
situation, where two people have been living in England since 1956, married in 
England, with children who have been brought up in England and who have English 
Christian names, whose matrimonial home - and whose only matrimonial home - was 
in this country, and whose future is obviously here, or in Canada, or some other 
place, but certainly not Hungary. "51 
The 1984 Act was passed, inter alia, to make provision for financial relief to be 
available in Scotland or England, where a marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or 
the parties to a marriage have been legally separated, in an overseas country. 52 The 
annotations to the statute indicate that prior to the passing of the 1984 Act "Financial 
provision may be sought in the jurisdiction where the [divorce etc. ] decree was 
granted, but this may be difficult, unsatisfactory or even impossible. Moreover, there 
may be no court able to adjust property rights in a matrimonial home in England or 
Wales [or Scotland]. Any statutory rights of occupation conferred by the Matrimonial 
Homes Act [or the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981] will 
51 Ibid., p1069/70. 
52 Part III concerns financial relief in England and Wales following an overseas divorce etc, and Part IV 
financial relief in Scotland in equivalent circumstances (following the Scottish Law Commission 
Report on Financial Provision after Foreign Divorce, SLC. No. 72 (1982)). The approaches of Part III 
and Part IV are different, the SLC preferring "a more restricted approach to the problem than the Law 
Commission 
... 
The Scottish Law Commission preferred legislation which identifies certain cases as 
inappropriate in advance. " (Miller, J G, Annotations to the Scottish Current Law Statutes 1984, 
Volume 3, c. 42, p42/27-28) 
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have been terminated as a result of the decree. 1953 Admitting that, prior to 1984, the 
Scottish court could not supplement the financial provision made in the foreign 
decree, the question whether the Scottish court would nevertheless recognise the 
proprietary consequences of the foreign order (insofar as it professed to affect 
property in Scotland) was left largely unanswered (indeed unasked). 54 
The 1984 Act introduced the option of supplementing the financial provision 
embodied in the foreign consistorial decree. Now, a Scottish court may entertain an 
application by one of the ex-spouses for an order for financial provision, subject to 
satisfaction of the section 28(2) jurisdictional requirements and purification of the 
section 28(3) conditions. In disposing of such an application, however, section 
29(3)(b) obliges the Scottish forum to have regard, inter alia, to "any order made by a 
foreign court in or in connection with the divorce proceedings for ... the transfer of 
property, by one of the parties to the other. " If, therefore, a foreign consistorial forum 
should purport to order the transfer of property in Scotland from one spouse to 
another, the obligation upon the Scottish court to recognise and enforce the order is 
not mandatory, rather section 29(3)(b) is permissive in its terms, expressly enabling 
the Scottish forum rei sitae to acquiesce in the order of the non-situs forum. Section 
29(5) also provides that where the Scottish court has jurisdiction to grant financial 
provision after the overseas divorce etc. only because the defender owned (or was the 
tenant of, or had a beneficial interest in) property in Scotland which had at some time 
53 Miller, ibid., p42111. 
sa Consider Chebaro v. Chebaro [1987] 1 All E. R. 999, per Balcombe, L7., at p1000: "Until Pt III of 
the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 was brought into force, our courts had no power to 
grant ancillary financial relief after divorce unless the decree had been granted in this country, 
notwithstanding that both the property and the parties were within the jurisdiction. " Chebaro 
concerned the recognition of a Lebanese divorce, and subsequent proceedings in England under the 
1984 Act, regarding property in Greater Manchester. 
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been the matrimonial home of the parties, 55 the court may make an order relating to 
the former matrimonial home or its furniture and plenishings (i. e. it cannot make any 
wider order for financial provision). It may be inferred, however, from the 
discretionary (rather than mandatory) power conferred by section 29(5) that merely 
because Scotland is the forum rei sitae of the former matrimonial home does not mean 
that an order of the foreign consistorial forum concerning the matrimonial home or 
other matrimonial property in Scotland, will not be recognised or enforced in 
Scotland. 
The question whether an English court would recognise the long-arm jurisdiction of a 
foreign consistorial forum arose specifically in the post-1984 case of Holmes v. 
Holmes. 56 The parties in this case had married, in England, in 1968. In 1978, they 
moved, with their son Rowland, to New York, and, in 1979, resolved to stay there 
indefinitely. At that point, they purchased an apartment in New York, title being taken 
in the sole name of Mr Holmes, and Vine Cottage in England, title being taken in the 
spouses' joint names. In 1986, the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a 
divorce, ordering that the flat and the cottage be sold, and that the proceeds be divided 
equally between Mr and Mrs Holmes. In December 1986, Mrs Holmes returned to 
England, to reside in Vine Cottage, where she wished perpetually to remain. In March 
1988, however, when Mrs Holmes failed to raise a mortgage which would allow her 
to purchase her husband's share of the cottage, the New York court confirmed its 
1986 order for the sale of Vine Cottage. Two months later, Mrs Holmes applied in 
England for financial relief under the 1984 Act. At first instance, Heilbron, J., held 
that the proper forum for determining the issue of financial provision was the New 
55 Section 28(2)(b)(iii), 1984 Act. 
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York court, but, dissatisfied with this result, Mrs Holmes applied to the Court of 
Appeal for leave to appeal. Leave was refused on the ground that the New York court 
had been properly seised of the matter and was the natural forum for resolving the 
dispute between the parties. 
It appears that Purchas, LJ. accepted that the New York forum had authority to deal 
with the property in England, remarking that, "The New York apartment and Vine 
Cottage were to be sold, the proceeds of sale in each case to be divided between the 
parties. The [New York] order contained detailed provisions as to how the sales were 
to be carried out, and so forth. It is not necessary to say more than that the directions 
were extremely detailed and provided for the proper distribution of the assets. "57 The 
English court also appeared to concede that the New York court's power to enforce its 
decree in personam was sufficient to affect the English land, for in Purchas, LJ. 's 
opinion, "... the [English] court must always be slow to interfere with a competent 
court seised of the matter, as was the Supreme Court of the State of New York, which 
has made orders which are clearly enforceable, which is capable of enforcing them, 
and has dealt with the matter on a reasonably careful assessment of all the 
features. 1158 It is arguable that by the time of the English proceedings Mrs Holmes had 
acquired a domicile of choice in England, 59 but even as regards the immoveable 
property in England, of an English domiciliary, the stronger interest of the non-situs 
court was acknowledged by the forum rei sitae, and the decree of the foreign court 
recognised in England. 
56 [1989] 3 All E. R. 786. 
57 Ibid., p788. 
SB Purchas, LJ., p794. 
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In considering the issue of forum non conveniens, Purchas, U. relied upon a dictum 
of Lord Templeman in The Spiliada, 60 viz.: "The factors which the court is entitled to 
take into account in considering whether one forum is more appropriate are legion. 
The authorities do not, perhaps cannot, give any clear guidance as to how these 
factors are to be weighed in any particular case ... the solution of 
disputes about the 
relative merits of trial in England and trial abroad is pre-eminently a matter for the 
trial judge. " Although the facts and nature of The Spiliada were quite different from 
those in Holmes, Purchas, U. concluded that, "The problem here is whether or not, on 
the application of one of the parties, the courts in this country should interfere with 
the resolution of matrimonial difficulties and disputes, particularly in the field of 
financial relief, where there is in place a competent forum in a foreign jurisdiction 
seised of the matter, where the parties at the material time were domiciled or 
otherwise within the jurisdiction of that court, have submitted to the jurisdiction of 
that court, and apart from one aspect, have been content to abide by the judgement of 
that court. "61 It is neither the purpose nor objective of the 1984 Act to open up to the 
financially disadvantaged spouse a further avenue of appeal, nor is it to confer upon 
the Scottish or English forum authority to consider de novo the financial position of 
the parties: "... I do not believe that the intention of Parliament in passing the 1984 
Act was in any way to vest in the English courts any powers of review or even 
correction of orders made in a foreign forum by a competent court in which the whole 
matter has been examined in a way exactly equivalent to the examination which 
would have taken place if the application had been made in the first instance in the 
59 Purchas, U., remarked that, "... for all practical purposes [Vine Cottage] is the home of both the 
wife and Rowland. " (ibid., p788) 
60 Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex [ 1987] A. C. 460,465. 
61Holmes v. Holmes, ibid., p792. 
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courts here. That is not the object of this legislation at all. "62 As the court in Holmes 
observed, the New York forum had examined carefully the parties' circumstances 
and, although arriving at a different solution from that at which an English forum 
might have arrived in equivalent circumstances, neither the solution nor the process 
through which it was reached breached `natural justice', nor offended the English 
forum's notion of public policy. 63 
The decision in Holmes can be contrasted with that of Mitchell v. Mitchell. 64 Whilst in 
Holmes the spouses had initially agreed that New York was the proper forum in which 
to hear the action (despite matrimonial property being situated in England), in 
Mitchell, from the outset, the husband challenged the appropriateness of the Scottish 
forum's exercise of jurisdiction. Mitchell, in fact, concerns the application of 
Schedule 3.9(1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, concerning 
discretionary sists, and not financial provision following an overseas divorce. 
Interestingly, although the terms of Part IV of the 1984 Act mean that the question of 
forum non conveniens is, in Scotland, quite separate from the appropriateness or 
62Purchas, U., ibid., p794. Cf. the view of Dillon, U., who remarked that, "The essential ground for 
seeking to apply in this country now is that the wife thinks that she may get relief in England of a kind 
which she will not get in New York, for instance, a property transfer order in respect of the husband's 
beneficial half-share in Vine Cottage or an order deferring the sale of Vine Cottage and entitling the 
wife to live there, at any rate until Rowland is no longer in full-time education ... I cannot think that it 
was intended that the English courts should be swift to assume jurisdiction wherever English 
legislation in respect of the making of financial provision for wives is in English eyes better than 
foreign legislation, or wherever better relief is available for wives here than abroad. " (ibid., p794/5) 
Cf. Hewitson v. Hewitson [1995] 1 All E. R. 472 where Butler-Sloss, U. opined that the purpose of the 
1984 Act was to mitigate disadvantage and not to confer extra advantages on a particular group of 
applicants which would be unavailable under domestic matrimonial legislation, adding that, "It would 
... 
be wrong in principle and contrary to public policy to extend the narrow compass of an Act 
designed to meet limited objectives to cover a wide and unintended situation. " (p476) 
63 Dillon, U. remarked, "... there is no basis for saying that justice would not be done if she is 
compelled to pursue her remedies for financial provision in the courts of New York according to the 
law of New York. The New York court is the natural forum for the resolution of disputes arising from 
the breakdown of the marriage. " (ibid., p795) 
64 1993 S. L. T. 123. Noting that if the facts of Mitchell were to arise today, the question of competing 
jurisdictions (Scottish/French) would be determined according to Article 11 ('Lis pendens') of Council 
Regulation No. 1347/2000 (2000 OJ 1160/19) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
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otherwise of a Scots court appending an award of financial provision to an overseas 
divorce, Part III, applying only to England, approximates the two concepts insofar as 
it entrusts to the courts, guided by a list of factors, the responsibility for "[sifting] out 
cases where an award would be inappropriate. , 65 Section 16(1) of the 1984 Act 
compels the English court, before making an order for financial relief, to "consider 
whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order 
to be made by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it 
would be appropriate, ... [to] dismiss the application. 
" The Scottish forum, on the 
other hand, is subject to Part IV "... which identifies certain cases as inappropriate in 
advance. , 66 
In Mitchell, the husband's motion for a sist of the Scottish proceedings was refused on 
the basis that his marriage was most strongly connected with Scotland and not France. 
Highly influential on the court's decision was the fact that the couple's ownership of 
property in Edinburgh was central to their dispute. The court took the view that a 
dispute concerning heritable property in Edinburgh would be more conveniently 
resolved by the Scottish, rather than the French, court. Whilst the English court in 
Holmes was not opposed to the New York forum dealing with the issue of ownership 
of Vine Cottage in England, the Scottish forum in Mitchell was troubled by the 
prospect of a French court overseeing the question of title to a property in Edinburgh. 
What is the reason, or justification, for the more provincial approach taken by the 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of Both 
Souses. 
65 Miller, ibid., p42-42. Note also section 11(b) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, 
which preserves the court's power to silt an action under general rules of forum non conveniens. Cf. 
Butler v. Butler [19971 2 All E. R. 822, in which the wife's application for stay of the English 
proceedings was granted in circumstances where all of her property, including the couple's only 
matrimonial residence, was in Florida, and her husband had acquired property in England only after 
their separation. (per Sir Stephen Brown, P) 
66 Miller, ibid., p42-27/28. 
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Scottish court? It is evident from the opinion of the court in Mitchell that there were 
particular difficulties concerning ownership of `The Whitehouse', the property in 
question. Initially, Mrs Mitchell had agreed that `The Whitehouse' was not 
matrimonial property. Later, however, she adjusted her pleadings, asking the court to 
set aside a disposition granted by her husband on 8 February 1991, by which he had 
purported to sell The Whitehouse to Pageant Investments Limited for £750,000.67 In 
contrast with Holmes, ownership of the relevant asset was central to the dispute and 
involved at least one third party. In these circumstances, the balance of fairness 
(including convenience) dictated that the Scottish proceedings should continue. 
Returning to the essential feature of family property transactions such as these, it is 
significant to note that the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws has observed, in 
this context, the collateral nature of the proprietary issues. 68 Paragraph 223 of the 
Second Restatement provides that, "(1) Whether a conveyance transfers an interest in 
land and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would 
be applied by the courts of the situs. " Thereafter, however, the scenario is outlined 
where W, domiciled in state X, raises divorce proceedings against H, also domiciled 
in state X, in forum X. As part of the financial provision on divorce, W asks the forum 
to make a transfer of property order in respect of land in state Y. A true conflict 
arises where W is entitled to that order in terms of X law, but not in terms of the Y lex 
rei sitae. In examining the question in terms of interest analysis, Professor Reese asks 
whether state X or state Y has the dominant interest in the resolution of this particular 
issue, and whether forum X can provide W with effective relief. The commentary to 
Paragraph 223 concludes that X is, in fact, the state having dominant interest and that 
67 Mitchell v. Mitchell, ibid., p 127. 
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the purpose of the X rule of financial provision would be furthered by its application 
to H and W, both domiciled in state X. 69 In contrast, the reporter suggests that "... it is 
doubtful that any interest of [Y] would be served by application of the [Y] rule, which 
is presumably directed, at least primarily, to spouses domiciled in [Y]. "7° 
As well as engaging in interest analysis, U. S. courts and commentators have 
occasionally utilised a party expectations test. They have concluded, however, that in 
cases of divorce, parties either will be completely lacking in expectations as to which 
law will apply to determine their dispute, or alternatively, they will expect the law 
which governs their matrimonial relations to resolve any proprietary issues which 
flow incidentally from the termination of their marital relationship. 71 
Taking the same facts as above, if state X were to grant a transfer of property order 
against H, that order would not be effective in state Y as regards third parties, until 
such time as the transfer of property between H and W had satisfied the formal 
requirements (including registration or recording requirements) of state Y. But 
Professor Reese is of the view that "The [Y] recording system would not be affected if 
the [X] court were to apply [X] local law and order H to transfer to W his interests in 
68 Reese, WLM, `Restatement of Law Second, Conflict of Laws' (1971) ('Second Restatement'). 
69 Consider Alden, ibid., at p594: "More important considerations and interests exist in divorce ... 
cases than the geographical location of the land. " 
70 Paragraph 223(l)(i). Cf. the probable result of using an interest analysis approach to deal with the 
question of capacity to transfer immoveable property, highlighted by the limited interest of Transvaal 
law in the case of Bank of Africa v. Cohen [1909] 2 Ch. 129. Cf. also section 28(2)(a) of the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, which requires that the applicant for financial 
provision in Scotland be domiciled or habitually resident in Scotland on the date when the application 
was made. This is indicative of the fact that the rule is intended only to protect the interests of Scottish 
domiciliaries/residents. Contrast this with a scenario where both (ex-)spouses are non-Scottish 
domiciliaries/residents (i. e. outside the scope of the 1984 Act); the interest of the Scottish lex situs is 
limited in such cases, it is submitted, to questions of alienability, accuracy of land records, and 
restrictions on land use. 
7! Consider Alden, ibid., p596. 
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[Y] land. , 72 In the view of the reporter, the sole justification 73 for state Y refusing to 
recognise the decree of the X forum would only be where the marriage between H and 
W itself offends the public policy of state Y (a matter which would be resolved as an 
incidental question). 74 Observing the need for greater co-ordination between rules 
concerning financial provision on divorce, and those concerning the transfer of 
property, Venturini has asked, "how the respective spheres of operation are to be 
delimited. "75 One might suggest that unless the public policy of the situs is grossly 
offended, 76 its interests in the matter (other than in respect of accuracy of records and 
restrictions on land use) should yield to those of the non-situs state, whose polices, 
according to Alden, are "directly implicated. "77 
As in the previous chapter, a question arises as to the enforceability of an in personam 
order should the defender refuse to implement the decree of the non-situs forum. In 
72 Second Restatement, paragraph 223(1)(i). 
73 Sed quaere, there may be said to be two types of objection which might reasonably be held by the 
situs, viz. (1) `legal' (such as quoted by the reporter as the sole example, and requiring to be treated as 
an incidental question), as, for example, whether the parties were validly married -a larger issue than 
policy, involving perhaps validity of antecedent divorce or annulment - and are about to be validly 
divorced (giving rise to questions, perhaps, as to the jurisdiction of the divorce forum); and (2) `policy' 
in the specific sphere of matrimonial property adjustment. But even the traditionalist might concede the 
force of the `interest' argument here (and the absence of legitimate Situs interest). 
74 Cf. Weesner v. Weesner 168 Neb. 346,95 N. W. 2d 682 [1959], a case in which a non-situs divorce 
decree purported to alter the spouses' interests in land in Nebraska. The Nebraska Supreme Court 
stated that "Where all necessary parties are before a competent court in the non-situs state, such an 
order will be given force and effect ... 
if the related public policy of the situs state is in substantial 
accord with that of the other state. " Weintraub has suggested that the public policy hurdle may 
necessitate ensuring, for example, that the lex situs would itself, in a similar domestic case, have power 
to make a transfer of property order in the event of divorce. (Weintraub (1966), ibid., p13) It is 
submitted that if the parties are not domiciled in the situs, then the policy concerns of the situs 
regarding financial provision on divorce (which must be presumed to be intended to protect only the 
interests of its own domiciliaries) are not relevant to non-domiciliaries. 
75 Venturini, ibid., p9- 
16 Cf. Cheni v. Cheni [ 1965] P 85. 
77 Alden, ibid., p592. "Decisions regarding divorce ... involve more important considerations than the 
requirements of an indirectly affected recording act. " (p593) See also Hay, ibid., at pl17, where it is 
said that, "Marital property rights of a surviving spouse as well as division of property upon divorce 
similarly do not implicate situs interests qua Situs but are more properly referred to the state of the 
matrimonial domicile. " 
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the American case of Mallette v. Carpenter78 a wife sought to divorce her husband in 
Illinois, where both parties were domiciled. The court granted the divorce and entered 
decree directing the payment of $4,000 alimony, `to be satisfied by the conveyance' of 
land in Wisconsin. In breach of the Illinois order, the husband conveyed the 
Wisconsin land to a third party. Upon learning of this, the wife raised an action in 
Wisconsin to have the husband's conveyance set aside and to have the land conveyed 
to her. The wife's application was successful, the court recognising that a decree to 
convey land in a foreign jurisdiction when based on prior equity in the land 
constitutes a binding adjudication of the facts, to which full faith and credit are due. 79 
The husband's conveyance to a third party was, in effect, a fraud on his creditors, and 
liable to be set aside. 80 
Alden has made reference to Californian courts which have, on occasion, awarded 
capital sum payments equivalent to the market value of the foreign land in issue, as a 
means of preventing the defender from evading liability through his/her own non- 
compliance with the non-situs decree. 81 Measures such as this, however, are not 
infallible and are defeated where the defender himself is neither present within the 
jurisdiction of the forum, nor has assets there. Alden has concluded therefore, and it is 
submitted correctly, that, "Simply giving effect to a nonsitus decree [at the situs] 
eliminates the waste and cumbersome procedural dance that a court must undertake 
78 160 N. W. 182 (Wis. ) (per (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. ) 
79 Cf. Burchell v. Burchell. (192612 D. L. R. 595, concerning an Ohio court's decree in respect of land 
in Ontario. As matters transpired, the husband was happy to accept cash, instead of his ex-wife's 
interest in the Ontarian land. For discussion of the case, see 40 Harv. L. Rev. 500. 
80 (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 522. 
81 E. g. In re Marriage of Fink 25 Cal. 3d 877 [1979] (per Alden, ibid., p603). 
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to enforce its order ... The manner in which [the non-situs court] renders a decree 
should be irrelevant for jurisdictional concerns. s82 
It appears, therefore, that in cases where financial provision on divorce is sought (and 
particularly in cases where the non-situs, consistorial forum wishes to grant a transfer 
of property order), courts sometimes do (and it is submitted, correctly) exercise 
jurisdiction over foreign moveable and immoveable property. Certainly, the English 
forum has exercised jurisdiction over foreign property in Hamlin, Tallack and 
Razelos, and has deferred to (or perhaps, more accurately, has acquiesced in) the 
authority of a foreign consistorial court over property in England, at least in the case 
of Holmes. 83 In the U. S. A., this has been justified by principles of interest analysis 
which are largely unknown to, or at least have not been overtly adopted by, the 
Scottish or English courts. But even so, as cases such as Hamlin, Tallack, Razelos and 
Sandford84 illustrate, courts in England have been content to optimise the in remlin 
personam distinction (possibly with unarticulated reliance upon rudimentary notions 
of interest analysis), so as to exercise jurisdiction over immoveable assets which do 
not, in fact, lie within their territorial boundaries. This represents another fissure in the 
situs monolith in the area of exclusive jurisdiction, and one which, it may be argued, 
the United Kingdom courts appear on occasion to have accepted by acquiescence. 
Property and Children 
Elsewhere in the context of family law, one can identify fractures in the situs 
monolith, namely in the matter of jurisdiction over property belonging to children and 
82 Alden, ibid., p603. 
83 Cf. De Nicols (No. 2) [1900] 2 Ch. 410 and Chiwell v. Carlyon (1897) 14 S. C. 61 (S. A. ), 
distinguishing Callwood v. Callwood [1960] A. C. 659. 
84 (1985) 15 Fam. Law 230. 
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incapable adults. In terms of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children ('the 1996 Convention'), 
the courts of a child's habitual residence have jurisdiction to deal, not only with the 
person of the child, but also to take measures directed to the protection of the child's 
property. 85 As Dr Clive has stated, "Property interests and personal interests are 
often intertwined and it will generally be convenient for them to be handled by the 
same country's authorities. "86 Measures in respect of a child's property are deemed to 
include the administration, conservation or disposal of such property. 87 The Justice 
Department of the Scottish Executive has stated in a recent consultation document 98 
that "This would not be a difference so far as Scotland is concerned89 and may not be 
a great difference so far as England and Wales and Northern Ireland are concerned 
at least if the question of protection of the child's property arose in the context of the 
85 The Explanatory Report to the 1996 Convention (Lagarde, P) ('Lagarde Report I') explains that the 
Special Commission (which drew up the preliminary draft Convention) took the decision to deal also 
with the child's property after hearing expert (French) evidence concerning, "... the utility of having 
precise rules concerning the designation and the powers of the child's legal representative to 
administer the child's property located in a foreign state, in particular where it is necessary to carry 
out the settlement of an estate which has passed to the child. " (paragraph 10) The Eighteenth Session 
of the Hague Conference (meeting between 30 September and 19 October 1996) endorsed the 
Commission's decision, but also took into account the interests of the lex situs, by virtue of Article 55, 
infra. 
86 Clive, E, `The New Hague Convention on Children' 1998 J. R. 169,186. Cf. text at note 24, supra. 
87 Articles 1(1)(a) and (2), 3(d) and (g), and 5(1) of the 1996 Convention. The wide formulation of 
`administration, conservation or disposal of the child's property' is deemed to include "all the 
operations concerned with the minor's property, including acquisitions, considered as investments or 
assignments disposing of the property transferred in consideration of the acquisition. " (Lagarde Report 
I, paragraph 25) 
88 Consultation Paper on Hague Convention on Children 1996,14 December 2000 (hereinafter `S. E. 
Consultation Paper'). 
89 Section 14(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 provides that "(1) The Court of Session shall have 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order relating to the administration of a child's property 
if the child is habitually resident in, or the property is situated in, Scotland. " Subsection (2) confers 
equivalent jurisdiction on the sheriff court in cases where the child is habitually resident in, or the 
property is situated in, the sheriffdom. The provision relates to heritable and moveable property 
(Crawford, ibid., p228, at paragraph 11.41, note 46). Questions of interpretation may arise over the 
location of the property. Does the Scottish court have jurisdiction over the property of a child 
habitually resident in Scotland, wherever that property may be. (i. e. Is the condition that the property 
be situated in Scotland only applicable to a child who is not habitually resident in Scotland? ) 
153 
inherent jurisdiction or the 'pure' guardianship jurisdiction. "90 The Justice 
Department has also suggested that since children do not generally own property of 
substantial amount or significant value, and because trusts are excluded from the 
scope of the Convention, 91 "... rules on children's property may not be important in 
practice. , 92 Regardless of this, however, in cases where the welfare of the child 
requires that property matters be taken into consideration, the Department states that, 
"... it is not obviously inappropriate that the courts of the child's habitual residence 
are able to take a global view. "93 
In terms of section 11(1)(d) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, the court of the 
child's habitual residence is able to make an order in relation to the administration of 
a child's property, and, one can infer from section 14(1) and (2) of the same Act that 
this applies, even where the child's property is situated abroad. The Justice 
Department is swift to advise that, "It goes without saying that any order relating to 
property in a foreign country would have to be implemented in accordance with the 
law of that country", 94 but then adds rather ambiguously, "A United Kingdom court 
would, however, be able to take account of the law of the property's situation in 
making its order. "95 Article 15 of the 1996 Convention states that, "(1) In exercising 
their jurisdiction ... the authorities of the 
Contracting States shall apply their own 
law. (2) However, in so far as the protection of ... the property of the child requires, 
90 S. E. Consultation Paper, paragraph 78. 
91 Article 4(f). In the Lagarde Report I, it is said that "The exclusion of trusts is understandable in view 
of the concern that the Convention not encroach on systems of property law and, more generally, on 
the categories of property rights. " (paragraph 32) But, consider the apparent need for, and late 
introduction of, Article 55 (note 102, infra). Moreover, it was considered that, "the creation of a trust 
involving a child's property is not necessarily a measure of protection of that child and that the 
questions of private international law concerning trusts have already been dealt with in a specific 
Convention. " (paragraph 32) 




they may exceptionally apply or take into consideration the law of another State with 
which the situation has a substantial connection. " Even if the forum chooses to apply 
the lex situs of the child's property under paragraph (1), there is scope for applying 
another closely connected96 law under paragraph (2). So, the Department concludes 
that "... there can probably be little objection to the courts in any part of the United 
Kingdom having jurisdiction to deal with all oa child's property where the child is 
habitually resident in that part of the United Kingdom. i97 This, it is submitted, 
constitutes an exception to the Brussels rule of (soi-disant) exclusive jurisdiction. 98 
That this is the intended interpretation of the Convention is corroborated by paragraph 
80 of the S. E. Consultation Paper, which outlines the need for United Kingdom courts 
to have the power to exercise an emergency jurisdiction, or an ability to take 
provisional measures of protection, in respect of property situated in the United 
Kingdom, but belonging to a child habitually resident in another Contracting State 
(i. e. in such cases, primary jurisdiction would be conferred upon the state of habitual 
residence, not the forum rei sitae). 99 Articles 11 and 12 of the 1996 Convention, 100 
respectively, provide an emergency jurisdiction and jurisdiction to take provisional 
measures, and Articles 8 and 9 allow for jurisdiction to be transferred from the court 
of the state of the child's habitual residence to that of the state in which property of 
9s Ibid. 
96 Not necessarily `more closely connected. ' 
97 S. E. Consultation Paper, paragraph 79 (Emphasis added). 
98 But noting the point made by Dr Clive that "It is implicit in the convention that it does not apply to 
ordinary legal remedies under, for example, the general law on obligations and property which just 
happen to have the incidental effect of protecting the interests of a child... The convention is impliedly 
limited to matters which would be thought of as child protection or child law matters, rather than 
matters relating simply to ordinary laws of general application which have their own private 
international law rules. " (ibid., p172) 
"Ibid., paragraph 80. 
10° Cf. paragraph (14) of the Preamble to EC Council Regulation No 1347/2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental 
Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses. Paragraph 14 states, "The Regulation does not prevent the 
courts of a Member State from taking provisional, including protective, measures, in urgent cases, with 
regard to persons or property situated in that State. " 
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the child is located, if the first state should consider that the second state would be 
better placed, in the particular case, to assess the best interests of the child'01 
Despite Articles 8,9,11 and 12, Article 55102 of the 1996 Convention permits 
Contracting States expressly to reserve the jurisdiction of its authorities to take 
measures directed to protect property which is situated on its territory. 103 It is 
significant, however, to note that the Justice Department has indicated that, "The fact 
that [Article 55] is there does not mean that it has to be used and it is arguable that 
the more responsible solution would be not to use it. "104 The view of the Justice 
101 Article 8(1) and (2)(b) of the 1996 Convention. Under Article 8 the transfer of jurisdiction is 
initiated by the court of the state of the child's habitual residence, whereas under Article 9, the 
proactive party is the forum rei sitae, that court having been empowered to request that the state of 
habitual residence authorise the forum rei sitae to exercise jurisdiction to take such measures of 
protection as it considers necessary. The S. E. Consultation Paper suggests that, "The transfer 
jurisdiction under articles 8 and 9 could also be used to transfer jurisdiction to deal with the property 
on a long-term basis from the courts of the habitual residence to the courts of the property's situation", 
before expressing the seemingly inconsistent sentiment that, "To give the courts of the country where 
the property is situated any wider jurisdiction to deal with long-term questions would run the risk of 
conflicts with the courts of the child's habitual residence who will also have jurisdiction. " (paragraph 
80) The Lagarde Report I suggests that Article 8(2) only permits transfer of jurisdiction to the forum ref 
sitae where that state is a Contracting State (paragraph 53). The example given under Article 8(2) was 
the granting of an authorisation to sell immoveable property located in a state other than that of the 
child's habitual residence. (ibid., paragraph 55) It is significant to note, however, that "... the language 
of the text does not limit the subsidiary jurisdiction of the court where the property is located to 
measures concerning the property. " (ibid., paragraph 55) This is echoed in the emergency jurisdiction 
provision of Article 11, with reference to which Paul Lagarde has said that, "The authorities of the 
State on the territory of which property of the child is present have, in cases of urgency, jurisdiction 
which is not limited to the protection of this property. " (ibid., paragraph 69) 
102 Proposed by the United Kingdom delegation and accepted by the other delegations, "... although 
the debates indicated clearly that few considered it necessary or desirable. " (S. E. Consultation Paper, 
paragraph 81). Paragraph 181 of the Lagarde Report I indicates that the United Kingdom proposal was 
supported, in particular, by Australia and Canada. According to Professor Lagarde, "The fear was 
expressed by these delegations of not being able to convince their respective States to ratify the 
Convention, if the jurisdiction of their authorities was not preserved in order to take the measures of 
protection for property, or for certain property, in particular immovables, of the child situated on their 
territory, as well as the possibility of not recognising a parental responsibility or a measure which 
might be incompatible with a measure taken by their authorities in respect to this property. " (ibid., 
paragraph 181) The reservation had not been included in the Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on 
the Protection of Children. 
103 It further permits Contracting States expressly to reserve the right not to recognise any parental 
responsibility or measure in so far as it is incompatible with any measure taken by its authorities in 
relation to that property. Article 55(2) permits the reservations to be restricted to certain categories of 
property. 
104 S. E. Consultation Paper, paragraph 81. In spite of the sentiments of the United Kingdom delegation, 
the Justice Department is of the view that, "Making the reservation disrupts the scheme of the 
Convention and increases the likelihood of conflicts of jurisdiction. " Cf. Dr Clive who expresses the 
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Department is noteworthy, particularly in light of Professor Lagarde's remark that, 
"Here, one is at the interface between property law and the law of protection of 
minors, and the needs of the law of the situs are particularly strong. "los Certainly, the 
reservation would be ill-advised as regards moveable property, 106 but, at present, the 
results are not available of the Executive's consultation as to whether or not the 
reservation should be made in respect of immoveable property. The view of the 
Justice Department, however, seems to be that the reservation should not be made, 
undermining in this context the traditional dominance of the lex situs. 
Property and Adults in Need of Protection 
The position regarding children's property has largely been mirrored in the case of 
adults who, "... by reason of an impairment or insufficiency of their personal 
faculties, are not in a position to protect their interests. s107 The Explanatory Report to 
the 2000 Convention expressly states that "The [Adult] Convention follows the 
general structure of the Convention of 19 October 1996 and adopts on many points 
the same solutions. "108 The objects of the 2000 Convention are to determine the State 
whose authorities have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the 
person or property of relevant adults, and to determine which law should be applied 
hope "... that most Contracting States will feel able to apply the convention to property as well as 
personal matters. " (ibid., p187) 
105 Lagarde Report I, paragraph 181. Cf. Dr Clive, who dismisses the matter somewhat cursorily, 
stating, "Of course the mechanics and legal technicalities of dealing with property will depend to a 
large extent on the law of the situation of the property but that is not a problem. It just means that a 
local lawyer will often have to be employed just as would be the case with an adult dealing with his or 
her own property in another jurisdiction. " (ibid., p187) 
106 The Department has indicated that "In relation to [moveable] property there is a strong argument 
for allowing one court, the court of the child's habitual residence, to have jurisdiction to make long- 
term decisions in the light of the child's whole situation. " (S. E. Consultation Paper, paragraph 81) Cf. 
text at note 24, supra. 
107 Preamble and Article 1 of the Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults dated 13 
January 2000 ('the 2000 Convention'). The 2000 Convention has been signed by the Netherlands, but it 
has not yet entered into force. 
108 Lagarde, P, Explanatory Report ('the Lagarde Report II'), p24, paragraph 4. 
157 
by the appointed fori. 109 As with the 1996 Convention, the measures referred to 
include "the administration, conservation or disposal of the adult's property", ' 10 and 
"the authorisation of a specific intervention for the protection of the property of the 
adult. ""' 
Primary jurisdiction is conferred upon the state of habitual residence of the adult in 
question. ' 12 A transfer jurisdiction also exists under Article 8, akin to Article 8 of the 
1996 Convention. 113 The provisions of Article 9 differ from those of the 1996 
Convention, giving the lex situs a slightly stronger footing in the case of adults: "The 
authorities of a Contracting State where property of an adult is situated have 
jurisdiction to take measures of protection concerning that property, to the extent that 
such measures are compatible with those taken by the authorities having jurisdiction 
under Articles 5 to 8. "114 Professor Lagarde is of the view that "The need to include a 
jurisdiction in the authorities of the State in which property of the adult is situated to 
take measures of protection relating to that property is explained by the fact that 
adults in need of protection are generally, in contrast to children, owners of 
property. "' 15 The limitation regarding compatibility with jurisdiction under Articles 5 
to 8 is "self-explanatory and aims to avoid any inconsistency between measures for 
the protection of property which may be taken by the local authorities and those taken 
109 Article 1(2). The Lagarde Report II explains that extension of the Convention to the property, as 
well as the person, of the adult is even more essential for an adult than for a child, "since the adult's 
frail condition generally continues to an age at which he or she has at his or her disposal property 
which cannot be left unmanaged. " (p28, paragraph 12) 
lio Article 3(f). The Lagarde Report II expresses the view that "This sub-paragraph assumes great 
practical importance for adults ... 
This very broad formulation encompasses all operations concerning 
property, in particular sale of immovables, management of securities, investments, regulation and the 
handling of successions devolving to the adult. " (p31, paragraph 25) Cf. 1996 Convention, note 87, 
supra. 
Article 3(g), 2000 Convention. 
112 Article 5(1). Lagarde Report II, p25, paragraph 5 and p38, paragraph 48. 
113 Consider Lagarde Report II, p43, paragraph 65. 
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by the authorities which have a general jurisdiction to arrange protection. "116 
Significantly, and illustrative of the primacy of the habitual residence basis of 
jurisdiction, Professor Lagarde continues to explain that, "It should be noted that the 
measures taken by the authorities with general jurisdiction may have been taken 
before or after those taken by the authorities of the State of the situs. If they have been 
taken afterwards, they will terminate the measures taken by the authorities of the situs 
to the extent of the incompatibility. "117 In short, if there is conflict between the 
measures taken by the authorities of the habitual residence of the de cuius, and the 
forum rei sitae, then the former will prevail over the latter. 
Briefly, as far as applicable law is concerned, echoing the 1996 Convention, the 
primarily applicable law in the case of adults with incapacity is that of the habitual 
residence of the adult in question, and only exceptionally, insofar as the protection of 
the person or the property of the adult requires, may the forum apply or take into 
consideration the law of another State with which the situation has a substantial 
connection. 118 Professor Lagarde has explained that Article 13(2) "... constitutes an 
exception clause based not on the principle of proximity (the closest connection) but 
on the best interests of the adult. "119 This approximates to an interest analysis 
approach, the aim being to consider which law better protects the proprietary interests 
of the de cuius. 
"' Article 9. The Lagarde Report II suggests that Article 9 confers a "concurrent subsidiary 
jurisdiction to the authorities of the State in which property of the adult is situated. " (p25, paragraph 5) 
115 Lagarde Report II, p46, paragraph 75. 
116 Ibid. 
"' Ibid., p46, paragraph 76. 
118 Article 13, and bearing in mind also Article 21 which stipulates that the application of the law 
designated can be refused only if this application would be manifestly contrary to public policy. Page 
25, paragraph 5 of the Lagarde Report II indicates that Chapter III of the Convention "takes up the 
principle of the' 1996 Convention according to which each authority taking a measure of protection 
applies its own internal law. " Later, Professor Lagarde remarks that, "The Commission adopted 
without discussion the principle laid down by the 1996 Convention. " (p52, paragraph 91) 
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Together, the 1996 and the 2000 Conventions demonstrate that, in certain 
circumstances, focus on the character of the property in issue and on the mechanics of 
acquiring, conserving or disposing of such property, should be secondary to certain 
wider issues deemed more important. Where this is shown to be the case, then the 
approach of these two recent international measures is that it is correct for the lex situs 
rules of jurisdiction and choice of law to yield to another more appropriate forum and 
applicable law. No longer is the lex situs considered to be impenetrable or completely 
impervious to challenge. Now, the more important issue seems to be one of 
appropriateness, not merely one of control. 
Property and Succession 
Finally, the test of appropriateness seems also to be advancing into the area of 
succession. In recent years abandonment of the lex situs rule has been mooted in the 
law of intestate succession. ' 20 Traditionally, even where the lex domicilii has been 
applied to general assignments of moveable property, whether in the event of death or 
bankruptcy, 121 the lex situs at the date of death has governed intestate succession to 
immoveable property. 122 It is interesting to note the commentary offered by Dicey and 
Morris to rule 98 of the tenth edition of their work, 123 viz: "... the rule has always 
1 19 Lagarde Report II, p53, paragraph 92. 
120 E. g. The 1989 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased 
Persons ('the 1989 Convention'). 
121 Sill V. Worswick (1791) 1 H. B. 1 665; Provincial Treasurer for Alberta v. Kerr [1933] A. C. 701, 
721; and Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q. B. 248,257 per Devlin J,: "The 
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam is the exception rather than the rule and is probably confined to 
certain special classes of general assignments such as marriage settlements and devolution on death 
and bankruptcy. " 
`ZZ Crawford, ibid., p356, paragraph 17.10. See also Dicey & Morris, `Conflict of Laws', Rule 133; 
Fenton v. Livingstone (1859) 21 D. (HL) 10; Downie v. Downie's Trustees (1866) 4 M. 1067; and 
Train v. Train's Executrix (1899) 2 F. 146. 
123 Rule 98 states that, "The succession to the immoveables of an intestate is governed by the law of the 
country where the immoveables are situated (lex situs). " This rule has appeared in identical terms in 
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been taken for granted rather than expressly laid down by judges ... It makes no sense 
today when England and all other countries in the world (except Bermuda) have 
adopted one system of intestate succession for all kinds of property. It has, therefore, 
been suggested that the lex Situs rule has outlived its usefulness and should be 
abandoned in favour of the law of the intestate's domicile. " , 124 The esteemed authors 
even warn that, "There is a serious risk that the retention of the lex situs rule will 
frustrate the intentions of Parliament. " 125 Not until the twelfth edition of their work, 
however, did the authors suggest that reform could best be achieved by treating the 
whole estate (moveable and immoveable) as a single unit, to be governed by the lex 
ultimi domicilii. 126 
The situs rule in succession has been the subject of strong criticism on an international 
level: the Actes et Documents of the Sixteenth Session of the Hague Conference 
report that, "Many people ... regard the connecting 
factor of situs in the case of 
immoveables to be practically inevitable, but it has been widely recognised in the 
scissionist jurisdictions that the rule of the situs is open to serious criticism. "127 On 
the domestic plane, meanwhile, the remarks made by Dicey and Morris in their tenth 
edition have received judicial consideration, and in the case of In re Collens, 
deceased, it was pronounced, per curiam, that there, "... is much force in the 
trenchant criticism in Dicey and Morris ... as to the illogicality of requiring English 
immoveable assets to be regulated for the purpose of succession by the lex Situs rather 
later editions: 11th edition (1987), rule 138; 12`h edition (1993), rule 135; and 13th edition (2000), Rule 
133 (p1027, paragraph 27R-015). 
124 Dicey and Morris, `Conflict of Laws' (10`h edition) (1980), p613. 
125 Ibid., p614. 
'26 Dicey and Morris, `Conflict of Laws' (12`s edition), p 1028. 
127 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Actes et documents de la seizieme session, Tome II 
- Succession to Estates - Applicable Law, (1990), p535. 
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than by the law of the domicile. "128 It was with a note of resignation that Sir Nicholas 
Browne-Wilkinson, VC concluded that, "However, that is the law as it stands. If the 
Law Commission choose to look at the matter, they may find factors which suggest 
that a rule which accords with the view in Dicey and Morris would be fairer and 
better. But my job is to administer the law as it now is. 17129 
In fact, in 1986, the Scottish Law Commission ('the SLC') did turn its attention to 
matters of succession! 30 Paragraph 6.1 of the report notes that "Although the 
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 assimilated heritage and moveables for some 
purposes (such as succession to the free estate situated in Scotland) it did not change 
the private international law rules. , 131 
The argument was advanced that if Scots law had ceased to make a distinction 
between heritage and moveables for the purposes of the domestic law of intestate 
succession, then it would be anomalous to preserve the differentiation for the 
purposes of choice of law. 132 
128 In re Collens, deceased [1986] Ch. 505. 
129 Ibid., pp512-3. The reference to Dicey and Morris is to the 10`s edition (1980), pp613-4. 
130 SLC Consultative Memorandum No. 71, `Some Miscellaneous Topics in the Law of Succession' 
(1986) ('Memo 71'). 
131 The rules are articulated in paragraph 6.2 of Memo 71 which explains that, "Intestate succession to 
immoveables is governed by the law of the place where they are situated ... The prior right of a 
surviving spouse to the deceased's interest in a dwellinghouse, being a right to immoveables, may be 
claimed out of residential property situated in Scotland, irrespective of the deceased's domicile, 
provided the other conditions are satisfied ... 
Prior right ... to a cash sum ... is rateably 
borne by 
moveable and heritable property. Where the deceased died domiciled Furth of Scotland, the whole right 
is claimable out of immoveables in Scotland, without reference to the value of any foreign estate. " 
Though this is admirably clearly expressed, the Scottish rules in this area admit of some difficult points 
of interpretation, with conflict of laws potential (e. g. does the surviving spouse's right to furniture and 
plenishings extend only to such items as are contained in the qualifying dwelling-house? ) (See further, 
Leslie, R D, `Prior Rights in Succession: The International Dimension' 1988 S. L. T. (News) 105) 
132 Memo 71, paragraph 6.4. 
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For present purposes, it is highly significant to note the following remarks: "... the 
argument that the application of foreign law to land in Scotland somehow threatens 
the dignity or independence of the country seems lacking in force today, even if it was 
a relevant consideration in the days when land was held by a comparatively small 
number of persons, when possession of land conferred status, and when feudal 
obligations running with the land required the presence of a person in Scotland to 
fulfil them. In fields other than succession, land in Scotland may be affected by the 
laws of other countries. "133 
Drawing the conclusion that the interest of the lex Situs is not the paramount interest 
in this area, the SLC proposed that, "The law of a deceased person's last domicile 
should regulate the devolution of his or her whole intestate estate (immoveables and 
moveables) wherever situated. " 134 The SLC proposed a rule of mutual comity, 
recommending that when faced with a question of succession to immoveable property 
in Scotland, albeit belonging to a non-Scottish domiciliary, the same rule should be 
133 Memo 71, paragraph 6.5. The Report proffers the example of a contract to sell a factory in Scotland, 
which contract may be made in Germany and subject to German law. It should be observed, however, 
that, "Foreign law would ... regulate only the 
beneficial interests; questions of title and conveyancing 
in relation to Scottish land would continue to be governed by Scots law. " The inference is that only 
mattes of formal validity should be governed exclusively by Scots law. Cf. also paragraph 6.21. 
134 Memo 71, paragraph 6.7. Cf. paragraph 6.6, which states that, "... the use of the law of the 
deceased's last domicile to regulate the devolution of the whole intestate estate is more likely to reflect 
the wishes of the deceased than the present rule that succession to immoveables devolves in 
accordance with the law of the country in which they are situated. " This is endorsed by Scoles who has 
stated that, "An owner views his or her estate as a unit. " (ibid., p64) Cf. SLC Report on Succession 
(No. 124, Part X, Private International Law) ('1990 Report'), paragraph 10.5, which states that "... it 
does not seem reasonable to presume that a person investing in foreign shares is aware of the law of 
the relevant country on survivorship rights in joint holdings or that, even if he were aware of it, that he 
would wish it to apply ... as a matter of policy 
it would seem preferable to regard the question whether 
property passes to someone else on the death of an owner or part owner as a question of succession to 
be governed by the law of the deceased's domicile. " 
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applied, that is, devolution of the Scottish property should be determined, not by Scots 
law, but by the lex ultimi domicilii of the deceased. 135 
Ironically, the law reform intentions of the Scottish Law Commission have been 
hindered by the impasse reached on the international front. In 1990, the SLC 
intimated that it would make, "No recommendation on those areas covered by the 
draft Hague Convention, pending the government's UK response. " 136 Usefully, 
however, the SLC was prepared to "... place on the record that our consultation 
revealed strong support for having one law governing the whole of the succession to a 
person's estate, without distinction between moveable and immoveable property. " 137 
The SLC's reference was to the preliminary draft Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons. 138 In a commentary 
upon a succession questionnaire completed by the various Hague countries, Georges 
Droz concluded that a rule of unity of inheritance (in terms of which succession to the 
entire estate of a deceased person would be governed by one single law, regardless of 
where the assets are situated139) was generally provided for, even if the connecting 
factor chosen by the relevant states was not always uniform. '40 In 1986, Hans van 
Loon suggested that there was a growing tendency towards support for the unity 
135 Memo 71, paragraph 6.20, "Our tentative preference would be to eliminate the distinction between 
immoveables and moveables so that the law of the testator's domicile should be presumed to apply to 
the construction of deeds relating to any kind of property. " 
136 1990 Report, paragraph 10.1. 
137 Ibid.. See also Crawford, ibid., p357, paragraph 17.12. 
138 The 1989 Convention was concluded on 1 August 1989, but has not yet entered into force. 
139 Droz, G, `Commentary on the Questionnaire on Succession in PIL' (1969), p19 (Actes et 
documents, ibid. ) 
140 Droz (1969), ibid. The countries adopting a rule of unity included, inter alia, Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. In contrast, a scissionist approach was taken by Belgium, 
Canada, France, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the Unites States of America. 
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principle. 141 This tendency was emerging in the context of an international society in 
which, "The removal of legal barriers between many countries ... has provided an 
accelerating rhythm of settlement of nationals of one country in another country for a 
shorter or longer period of their choice. "142 This migration highlights the paradoxical 
situation which has arisen: the growing internationalisation of succession issues, 
stemming from an increasingly peripatetic society, is to be contrasted with the 
"tradition-bound character of the law of inheritance". 143 Although the situs rule was 
developed at a time when wealth could largely be equated with land ownership 
(which, in turn, could be equated with rights of suffrage14), the economy has since 
evolved and, as Scoles as advised, "... the situs rule has continued over the years to 
be applied in an economy which is no longer agrarian and in which land no longer 
holds the unique place that it once held both in society and the economy. " 145 
Intended to expunge this paradox, the prime feature of the 1989 Convention is the 
adoption of a unity principle, "... whereby a single law will govern the succession to 
both moveable and immoveable property in the deceased's estate. , 146 In terms of 
141 Van Loon, H, `Update on the Commentary' (1986) (Actes et documents, ibid. ) 
142 Van Loon, ibid., pl51. The author identified, in particular, "The attraction of foreign workers, 
special relations with former colonies, the influx of refugees, the expansion of international companies 
and the mushrooming of international organizations ... " as additional causes of increased movement of 
foreign nationals. 
143 Van Loon, ibid., p155. In this context, in particular, it is significant to note the statistics of the 
Commission of European Affairs regarding the acquisition of primary or secondary residences in 
countries with a favourable climate: as of 22 May 1986, Van Loon advises that, "75% of the 
apartments in the Canary Islands are owned by foreigners ... on the Costa del Sol there are many 
English and Arabian property owners, and in the Balearics English and German property owners. " 
(ibid., p159) 
144 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p19. 
145 Scoles, ibid., p63. It is evident that the land taboo permeates also the field of succession, the author 
remarking that, "Notwithstanding these changes, the sentimental attachment that the ... 
Anglo- 
American legal mind has to land seems to blind lawyers and judges in their analysis of conflict of laws 
issues related to land, including its succession. " 
146 Waters, DWM, `Report of the Special Commission' (Acres et documents, ibid. ), p241. The 
Convention also endeavours to provide "... a formula for the determination of the applicable law to 
govern the succession (the objective connecting factor), a formula which represents a compromise 
between the connecting factors of habitual residence and nationality. " (ibid. ) It is reported that 
adoption of a unity principle was acceptable to all delegations no later than the end of the November 
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Article 1(2), the Convention does not apply to (a) the form of dispositions of property 
upon death; (b) capacity to dispose of property upon death; (c) issues pertaining to 
matrimonial property; or (d) property rights, interests or assets created or transferred 
otherwise than by succession. 147 Although Article 3 of the 1989 Convention gives 
primacy to the law of the State in which the deceased was habitually resident at the 
time of his death, and to the lex patriae, there is nevertheless provision for application 
of the law of the State with which the deceased was `manifestly more closely 
connected' . 
148 
Although a rule of unity is imposed, Article 15 tackles the residual concerns of the lex 
situs by providing that, "The law applicable under the Convention does not affect the 
application of any rules of the law of the State where certain immoveables, 
enterprises or other special categories of assets are situated, which rules institute a 
particular inheritance regime in respect of such assets because of economic, family or 
social considerations. " This is not intended to amount to a general reservation in 
favour of the lex situs, rather it applies only in narrowly-defined circumstances, where 
the lex situs has imposed a particular form of distribution for specific assets. '49 
1986 session. (ibid., p243) The commentary to the final Convention reports that, "... it is interesting 
that the proposed move to the unitarist position by the Convention was welcomed in the early sessions 
of the Special Commission, and never questioned again. " (Actes et documents, ibid., Final Convention, 
p535) 
47 Paragraph (d) was not contained in the preliminary draft Convention, and was added only at the 
stage of the final draft. (Actes et documents, ibid., Conclusions, Preliminary Draft Convention (1986), 
p515) 
48 Articles 3(1) and (2). Article 3(3) also incorporates a displacement rule, but in that instance the test 
is not `manifestly more closely connected', but simply `more closely connected'. The difference 
between these benchmark standards is not immediately obvious. In a commentary upon Article 3(2) 
`closer connection', Waters has remarked that, "The difficulty with this term ... is that it appears almost 
as a non-rule ... it 
has no touchstone. However, this would be to misunderstand it, because this 
connecting factor is the focussing of elements (or factors). The elements are observable personal data, 
and when focussed, as one would focus binoculars, they reveal the central place of the de cujus' life. " 
(Acres et documents, ibid., p253) 
149 E. g. There may be specific provision in the lex situs whereby family-owned farms, at or under a 
given size, are to devolve as one unit through the male line of the proprietor. (Waters, ibid., p273) Cf. 
Weintraub's remark that, "... [the situs] might have a rule designed to prevent land from being broken 
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What is generally being advocated in the international arena, however, is a movement 
away from the absolute control of the lex situs in respect of intestate succession to 
immoveable property. The aptness of the lex Situs rule, while for many years 
uncontested, has recently been challenged, nationally and internationally, and has 
been found to be lacking in legitimate interest. '50 In contrast, "Persons domiciled in a 
nonsitus state seeking a divorce or declaration of interests in a decedent's estate give 
that state very significant contacts and create state interests. Certainly the nonsitus 
state will most likely experience the social consequences of the failure to apply its 
law.  151 
If a forum rei sitae were to prohibit a certain form of distribution which, nevertheless, 
would be permitted or tolerated by a non-situs forum which happens also to be the 
domicile or habitual residence of the testator and/or the beneficiaries, then it could be 
argued, adopting a functional analysis of the problem, that the non-situs forum has a 
greater interest in the resolution of the matter, and in the consequences, than does the 
forum rei sitae, and that the matter would more appropriately be determined by the lex 
domicilii (or other personal law equivalent), for as Hancock has submitted, "... local 
statutes ... [are] designed to embody the supposed 
desires of persons domiciled at the 
up into parcels too small to be utilized economically. " ((1966), ibid., p18); and Dr Crawford's 
comment that, "Sometimes it is found that a foreign lex situs may not permit immoveable property 
owned by 'an incomer', defined by that law, to devolve according to his/her heirs but may require it to 
be sold; and of course the lex situs has the last word. " (ibid., p358, paragraph 17.12) One can 
anticipate difficulties in interpreting (according to which law? ) this key issue of whether or not a 
particular inheritance regime is imposed because of economic, family or social considerations (e. g. 
rules concerning entails, perpetuities and accumulations). 
'S° Consider Alden, "The situs rule is especially nefarious when the Situs chooses to apply its own law 
to problems of intestacy. Unless the resolution affects the use of land or the economy, the Situs qua 
Situs has no interest... " (ibid., p617) 
151 Alden, ibid., p630/1. 
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forum 
... Real property of a 
foreign decedent should be distributed according to a 
scheme embodying the customs and mores of his home community. "152 
One might consider the scenario where H and W and their two children are domiciled 
in Utopia, and H dies intestate, owning land in Arcadia. In terms of Utopian law, the 
surviving spouse may be entitled to one half of H's estate, and the two children to one 
quarter each. Arcadian law, on the other hand, may provide that W is entitled to one 
third of the estate, and likewise, that each child is entitled to one third thereof. The 
question arises whether Utopian or Arcadian law should apply to determine 
succession to the land in Arcadia. Taking an interest analysis approach, it is submitted 
that Utopian law, as the settled residence of the deceased and the three claimants has 
the greater interest in determining the proportions due to each beneficiary. Weintraub 
would argue that, "... if the distribution does not comport with [Utopia's] idea of 
fairness, and the [Utopian] claimants quarrel, it is [Utopia's] peace that is 
disturbed. 19153 In contrast, the interest of Arcadia is, in most cases, marginal. 
Weintraub has even gone so far as to state that, "The conflict is a false one only 
[Utopian] law being rationally applicable. "lsa Weintraub does, however, concede, 
that the interest of the situs could, theoretically, be stronger than that of the non-situs 
court where the rules of intestate succession applied at the lex situs are intended 
specifically to protect "the economy and vital interests of the situs. " This is subject to 
the same interpretational difficulties identified at note 149 supra, in the context of 
`particular inheritance regime due to economic, family or social considerations'. 
152 Hancock, M, `Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws: The 
Disadvantages of Disingenousness' (1967) 20 Stanford L. Rev. 1,11. 
153 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p17. 
154 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p17: "... [A]pplying the situs law is likely to be ... inimical to the interest of 
the home state of the claimants in treating them according to its own notions of fairness. " (p18) Cf. In 
re Berchtold, Berchtold v Capron [1923] 1 Ch. 193. 
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In the same manner that an interest analysis approach may advocate the application of 
non-situs law in the event of distribution of matrimonial property upon divorce etc, 
Alden has even argued that "... protection of nonsitus interests may mandate the use 
of nonsitus law e. g. well-being of its citizens affected by distribution of property under 
a will. i155 While this is a more radical proposition than applying the non-situs law in 
instances of intestate succession to land, Alden makes the valid point that, "When 
land use or free circulation are ... threatened, scenarios that never arise in the 
average divorce or estate distribution case, an interest analysis would yield the same 
results as the Situs rule. "156 But the interest analysis approach is preferred because 
the lex situs, if applied, is arrived at, "... through a disciplined, jurisprudentially 
sound approach of interest analysis and not through the rote recitation of an 
inflexible 'rule'. 1157 
Finally, an interesting doctrine which should be mentioned in this context is that of 
equitable conversion, for it has been suggested that "... the mysterious doctrine of 
equitable conversion also has been used to erode the situs formula in cases of 
intestate succession. "158 The operation of this doctrine results in property which is 
normally regarded as heritable being treated as if it were moveable, and vice versa. 159 
155 Alden, ibid., p596. This comparison has also been drawn by Scoles, whose opinion is that "Clearly, 
the law should not offer less protection to the spouse who persists until dissolution of the marriage by 
death. " (ibid., p59) 
156 Alden, ibid. 
157 Alden, ibid. 
158 Hancock (1967), ibid., p18. The author has accused courts of using the doctrine, "to avoid an 
unpalatable decision without appearing to disturb or disregard an ancient and oft-repeated formula of 
law. " (ibid., p19) 
159 Anton, A E, `Private International Law' (1990), p597. Consider In re Cutliffe's Will Trusts, Brewer 
v. Cutliffe [19401 1 Ch. 565 (realty treated as personalty); sed contra In re Berchtold, Berchtold v. 
Capron [192311 Ch. 193 (money treated as realty). Examples can also be found in Scots domestic law 
of chameleon-type property (that is, property which is moveable for one purpose, and heritable for 
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The doctrine is a fiction to the extent that "real estate is treated as personal estate and 
personal estate is treated as real estate; not that immoveables are turned into 
moveables or moveables into immoveables. " 160 It is said, in Scotland at least, that the 
"... conversion from moveable to heritable is effective only for the purposes of the law 
of succession ... 
s161 and that it operates under the maxim 'quodfiere debet infectum 
valet' ('what ought to be done avails although not done'). 162 Clearly, a fiction such as 
this, by which immoveable property is to be treated as moveable property, could be 
perceived to be a form of subterfuge, another way by which to evade the operation of 
the lex Situs rule in intestate succession, favouring instead operation of the lex ultimi 
domicilii. 163 Simply by ordering that immoveable property situated abroad be sold and 
the proceeds distributed to beneficiaries, the non-situs forum can effectively convert 
the foreign immoveable property into moveable property and thereafter apply its own 
(arguably more relevant) rules of succession. Whilst theoretically possible (since the 
question whether or not property has been converted is determined, in Scots law, by 
the lex ultimi domicilii, and not by the lex Situs' ), this "re-labelling devicei165 is not 
another) - sometimes with conflict implications as, for example, in Train v. Train's Exr. (1899) 2 F. 
146. 
160 Actes et documents, ibid., p21. 
16' Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 18, paragraph 15. 
`62 Walker, D M, `Principles of Scottish Private Law', Volume III, p16; and Trautman, D T, `The 
Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1101,1107. Lowenfeld has 
explained that "The mysterious doctrine of equitable conversion, for those who have forgotten or never 
knew, permits a court of equity to treat 'as done what ought to be done', so that land subject to a 
direction to sell may in certain circumstances pass to the next of kin as personalty, rather than to the 
heirs as realty. By analogy, in intestate cases an interest in land subject to sale (or lease) may be 
treated like personalty, so that the law of the testator's domicile, rather than the law of the situs, is 
applied. " (Lowenfeld, A F, `Book Review: Revolt Against Intellectual Tyranny' (1985-86) 38 Stanford 
L. Rev. 1411,1418) 
163 Weintraub has even referred to the doctrine as an "... advocate's trick ... to 
be remembered and 
stored away for possible use in undermining the situs monolith when all else fails. " ((1966), ibid., p20) 
Consider also Hancock who, in an attack upon several arcane favourites, expressed consternation at 
how "... learned lawyers of the past, supposedly clear-thinking, practical men, could allow their 
thought processes to become entangled in such bewildering conceptions as the building which is part 
of the land, the weird alchemy of equity which converts real property into personal property or the 
ceaseless oscillation of the renvoi. " (Hancock, M, 'Fallacy of the Transplanted Category' (1959) 37 
Can. Bar Rev. 535, at p535/6) 
164 Crawford, ibid., p375, at paragraph 17.39, citing Hall's Trs v. Hall (1854) 16 D. 1057. Hall's Trs. 
concerned the proceeds of a heritable bond belonging to an English domiciled woman, and deposited 
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an attractive solution. 166 Until such time, however, as the scissionist rule is 
abandoned, the doctrine constitutes a useful device to be employed in appropriate 
cases where it is apparent to the (non-situs) forum that the interest of the lex situs in 
the case in hand is, in fact, secondary to that of the deceased's or beneficiaries' 
personal law. 167 
One must bear in mind, however, that the artifice of equitable conversion does not 
extend to all cases. Where the forum lacks discretion to order sale of the foreign 
immoveable property, the device cannot be employed. Similarly, it may be that the 
competition to determine the `most interested law' is played out, not just between the 
lex Situs and the forum (e. g. the lex ultimi domicilii of the deceased), but also with a 
with a Scottish bank. The English husband claimed the sum under the ius mariti, but the wife's trustees 
claimed that the money was a surrogatum for the bond and therefore determined by the Scottish situs. 
The court held that the question of right to the property had to be regulated by English law, England 
being the parties' domicile at the date of dissolution of the marriage. Lord Justice Clerk Hope opined, 
"That the money is in Scotland is wholly immaterial. " (p1060) This may be less a matter of conversion, 
however, than one of matrimonial property, for Lord Cowan articulated the, "... general principle ... 
that the rights of the spouses inter se fall to be determined by the law of the domicile at the dissolution 
of the marriage. " (p1060) Sed quaere, Murray v. Champernowne [1901] 2 Ir. R. 232, in which it was 
argued that Irish lands were equitably converted into money, and therefore, to be determined by the 
Scots personal law. Andrews, J., however, held that succession should be governed by the lex situs: 
"The lands of Rathsheagh notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable conversion are still lands in fact 
... 
" (paragraph 236) Contra the rule in America (paragraph 209, First Restatement (1934) and 
paragraph 225, Second Restatement (1971)), in terms of which whether interests in land are converted 
into personal property by dealings with the land depends upon the law of the state where the land is. " 
Cf. Von Mehren, A T, & Trautman, D T, `The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on 
Conflict of Laws' (1965), p194. Consider Clarke v. Clarke 178 U. S. 186 (1900): "A decision by a 
testatrix's domicilaitary court that her will worked a conversion into personally of all her real 
property, wherever situated is not conclusive upon the courts of a sister state in respect to the effect of 
the will upon the title to real property in that state. " (per White, J. paragraph 191) 
165 Weintraub, R J, `The Conflict of Laws Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal Reasoning' (1986) 65 Texas 
L. R. 215,230/1. 
166 Consider Hancock, who suggested that "Instead of employing this clumsy fiction ... [replace] the 
law-of-the-situs with a policy analysis ... to escape the rigors of the 
law of the situs. " (Trautman, D T, 
`The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1101, at p1107) Hancock 
explained that although treating interests in realty as interests in personal property "... occasionally 
leads to a correct result ... 
[equitable conversion is a] ... 
flawed and poor substitute for proper interest 
analysis. " (per Weintraub (1986), ibid., p231) This view has also been advanced by Professor Reese. 
(Reese, WLM, `Studies in Modern Choice-of-Law: Torts, Insurance, Land Titles' (1984) 9 Dalhousie 
Law Journal 181, p 184) 
167 Consider Weintraub (1966), ibid., at p20: "It is true that on average, more just and rational 
decisions will be reached by accepting this argument of equitable conversion than by rejecting it. This 
is because the domicile of the decedent at death will usually have the predominant interest, often the 
sole interest, in regulating the intestate distribution of his property. " 
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third state which appears to be interested (e. g. the common domicile of the 
beneficiaries, where that law differs from the deceased's lex ultimi domicilii). The 
doctrine of equitable conversion can only be employed to supplant the lex Situs with 
the lex ultimi domiciiii; what is required is a choice of law rule which aims to identify, 
without restriction, the most appropriate law. As Weintraub has asserted, "... the 
substitution of one rigid, territorially-oriented choice-of-law rule, 'domicile at death', 
for another, is not why we storm the Bastille. "168 
Analysing the role of interest analysis 
Reference has been made in this, and preceding, Chapters to the strength or weakness 
of a particular state's interest in the application of its law to the matter in dispute. As 
was indicated in Chapter One, supra, in the USA especially, selection of the lex 
causae has sometimes been determined by means of an analysis of the interests of 
individual states in the facts in hand. 169 In contrast, in the United Kingdom, reference 
is seldom made to these, prima facie, nebulous concepts. In particular, Morris has 
openly criticised the use of interest analysis in matters of property law: "... it seems to 
me that in property law you must make some concessions to conceptualism, whether 
you like it or not, and that free-wheeling talk about `interests' and 'policies' is out of 
168 In a later work Weintraub indicated that, in any event, "Acceptance of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion is not the answer ... 'Domicile' itself is a 
flawed concept for choice-of-law purpose. " 
((1986), ibid., p432) 
169 Consider Jaffey's assertion that in America, "... choice of law mainly consists of an investigation 
into the presence or absence of such interests. " (Jaffey, AJE, `The Foundations of Rules for the 
Choice of Law' (1982) 2 Ox. J. L. S. 368,368) Consider also, for example, the case of Williams v. 
Williams 390 A 2d. 4 (1978) (cited by Weintraub, R J, 'Commentary on the Conflict of Laws' (1986), 
p458), in which the court explained that it had arrived at its decision (concerning matrimonial property 
rights upon divorce), using "a conflicts analysis that requires us to evaluate the governmental policies 
underlying the applicable conflicting laws and to determine which jurisdiction's policy would be most 
advanced by having its law applied to the facts of the case under review. " (p5/6) Consider also Von 
Mehren and Trautman's claim that "... an understanding of the policies underlying the substantive rule 
of law can assist in rationally relating a transaction to a particular jurisdiction" (Von Mehren, AT 
and Trautman, D T, 'The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws' 
(1965), p108) 
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place. " 170 Despite this criticism, interest analysis was utilised in Kunstsammlungen zu 
Weimar v. Elicofon, '7' an American case concerning the Federal Republic of 
Germany's attempt to recover two Albrecht Duerer portraits stolen, in 1945, from a 
castle located in what is now East Germany, and fortuitously discovered, in 1966, in 
the Brooklyn home of Edward I Elicofon, an American citizen, where they had been 
openly displayed by him since his good faith purchase of them more than twenty 
years earlier (and without the knowledge that the portraits were Duerers). The U. S. 
Court of Appeals concluded that New York's interest in regulating the transfers of 
property located within its borders overrode any interest which the German 
Democratic Republic might have had in applying to extraterritorial transactions its 
policy of Ersitzung (which awards title to the holder of property upon ten years' 
uninterrupted good faith possession thereof). In holding the plaintiff entitled to 
possession of the painting, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the U. S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 172 The appellate court endorsed 
the view that, "[The contacts with New York] are indeed relevant to effecting its 
interests in regulating the transfer of title in personal property in a manner which 
best promotes its policy. i173 Commenting upon the `perfunctory' interest analysis 
conducted by the District Court, Garro concluded that, in the circumstances, "New 
York does have an interest in applying its law because its policy of protecting owners 
170 Morris, JHC, `Law and Reason Triumphant - or - How Not to Review a Restatement' (1973) 21 
Am. Jo. of Comp. Law 322,325. Consider too Morris' more general remarks regarding the Second 
Restatement: "Although I applaud the `most significant relationship' formula in torts, contracts and 
agency and partnership, I was surprised and perturbed to see it recurring as the general principle for 
`property in general' (paragraph 222). " (Morris, ibid., p327) Cf. Weintraub: "Although slower in 
coming than in other areas and with little assistance from the Second Restatement, functional 
resolutions of conflicts problems concerning realty have begun. Courts are inquiring into the policies 
underlying apparently conflicting situs and non-situs law and shaping their opinions to effect a 
maximum accommodation of those policies. " ((1986), ibid., p457) 
171 678 F. 2d. 1150 (1982). 
172 536 F. Supp. 813,829, per Jacob Mishler, J. The Court held that there was a false conflict (note 182, 
in ra) which permitted it to apply the substantive lexfori. 
17 Ibid., p846. 
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is not confined to resident owners, but extends to owners generally as a means to 
preserve the integrity of transactions and prevent the state from becoming a 
marketplace for stolen goods. " 174 
Interestingly, a rare British reference to interest analysis (in admittedly embryonic 
form) features in the third edition of Cheshire's Private International Law. The author 
depicts a scenario involving a car transferred, in England, from A to B, under a hire 
purchase agreement. Thereafter, B removes the car to Holland, where he sells it to C. 
Cheshire surmises that, according to Dutch law, hire purchase agreements must be 
recorded in a public register, and that the validity of a sale by a hirer depends upon 
whether the initial hire purchase agreement between A and B was recorded. Cheshire 
takes the view that the Dutch lex situs would require to examine its own municipal 
law to ascertain whether the recording requirement extended to agreements made 
abroad between two foreigners. This, he says, would necessitate an investigation into 
the policy of the Dutch law: was its object to protect all persons in Holland who paid 
money on the faith of an ostensibly good title? If the answer to this question is yes, 
registration would be deemed necessary in the case of all moveable property found 
within the jurisdiction. But Cheshire also suggests, in the alternative, that "... the 
policy of the Dutch law might be different. Its design might be to strike only at 
agreements concluded in Holland. " 175 The critical factor is the purpose or policy of 
the Dutch rule. 176 
174 Garro, A M, `The Recovery of Stolen Art Objects From Bona Fide Purchasers' (Lalive, P, ed., 
`International Sales of Works of Art') (1985), 503, at p507/8. Garro's personal verdict on Elicofon is 
more in line with the view expressed by Morris (note 170, supra), namely, that, "... the merit of 
certainty of the situs rule is likely to be lost in the choice of law process of weighing competing 
governmental interests. The uncertainties of adopting a policy-oriented conflicts methodology are well 
illustrated by the rationale followed in Elicofon. " (ibid., p512) 
175 Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' 3rd edition (1947), p587. 
176 Cf. Goetschuis v. Brightman 245 N. Y. 186,156 N. E. 660, per Lehman, J.: "Unless a regulation of 
this state [New York] is plainly intended to apply to property brought here without the consent of the 
174 
Despite Cheshire's early reference to this policy-centred approach, generally in the 
United Kingdom, analysis of cross-border property disputes is conducted according to 
the classical formulae of characterisation of the cause of action, identification of the 
lex causae (designated by fixed and often longstanding localising factors), proof and 
application thereof and, where appropriate, limitation of that law. '77 Notwithstanding, 
it has been suggested that while the American movement has not achieved in the 
United Kingdom the revolutionary status which it secured at its source, its 
transatlantic influence is growing: "... even codifications of private international law 
as well as international conventions show traces of modern American scholarship 
(e. g. the Rome Convention). , 178 
In this Chapter, it has been argued that, "... the preference for situs law should yield 
when there are no situs interests involved and the parties and the transaction are most 
owner, it is clear that the courts should not extend the local rules so as to deprive the owner of those 
rights to his property which he possessed before the property was wrongfully removed. " (paragraph 
193); "Clearly the [New York] statute may not be interpreted so as to include attempted regulation of 
the validity of contracts made without the state in regard to property situated elsewhere ... If the 
conditional vendee resides outside of the state and the property is not in the state, the contract cannot 
be filed. The statute has no application to a contract made under conditions which render compliance 
with the statute impossible. " (paragraph 663) Cf. Dublin Finance Corp. v. Rowe [1943] N. I. 1 and 
Dulaney v. Merry [19011 1 K. B. 536: registration requirements frequently are found to be intended to 
be of limited, local scope (by whatever reasoning). 
177 Page 31, supra. Consider Jefferson who, with reference to Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods 
[1980] 1 Ch. 496, remarked that, "The nagging doubt ... is that the submissions were within the 
traditional terminology of problem, connecting factor and legal system: the judge was not invited to 
evaluate the respective merits of the domestic laws of the possible systems. " (Jefferson, M, `An Attempt 
to Evade the Lex Situs Rule for Stolen Goods' (1980) 96 L. Q. R. 508,511) The inference is that had 
Slade, J. been invited (or permitted) to consider the respective interests of England and Italy in 
resolution of the dispute in question, his decision would have favoured Mr Winkworth rather than Dr 
D'Annone. 
178 Kegel, G, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Ch. 3, Fundamental 
Approaches' (1986), p29. Consider too Yntema, who has judged that, "The conception that legal 
problems ... should 
be studied in terms of social policies, and not as mere exercises in deductive or 
intuitive manipulation of abstract principles of justice represents a basic modern insight into the nature 
of law. " (Yntema, H, 'The Objectives of Private International Law' (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 721, at 
p731) In 1987, Kay remarked that "Whether local law policies should play a dominant or only a 
peripheral part in the solution of the choice of law problem is at the heart of the current academic 
debate over choice of law theory. " (Kay, H K, 'Testing the Modern Critics Against Moffatt Hancock's 
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closely connected with another state ... "179 The premise, in effect, has been that, 
"[An] ... analysis of policies and interests involved in real property conflicts shows 
that too often the situs rule leads to inequitable and irrational decisions ... the situs 
rule can force the application of inappropriate laws, and ignore more important and 
more directly affected policies and interests. s180 The assumption in this premise is 
that it is a relatively straightforward task to discern precisely what are the directly 
affected policies, or the specific interests which a particular rule of law was designed 
to protect. Brainerd Currie, the father of governmental interest analysis, clearly 
mapped out criteria to determine which state's rule of law should apply (in effect, 
which state's interest should prevail), once it has been determined which law(s), in 
fact, express(es) an interest in the matter in hand. 181 Currie, however, did not 
formulate any method by which the specific interest(s) or policy(ies) which a 
substantive rule of law purportedly protects, were to be ascertained. 182 At most, Currie 
Choice of Law Theories' (1985) 73 Cal. L. Rev. 525,526) Primarily, the debate raged in the context of 
conflict rules of contract and delict. 
179 Hay, P, `Property Law and Legal Education; the Situs Rule in European and American Conflicts 
Law - Comparative Notes' (1988), p119. 
180 Alden, R, `Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts' (1987) 65 Texas L. Rev., 585, 
610. Cf. Kay (1987), ibid., who remarks that the situs rule "tends to encourage a mechanistic mode of 
thinking that diverts judicial attention away from what [Hancock] views as the central importance of 
the 'policies or purposes of the domestic rules. "' (p259) 
181 Currie, B, "Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Law" (1959) Duke L. J. 177, 
reprinted in "Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws" (1963). 
18 The four interest analysis combinations presented by Currie in his Selected Essays are summarised 
by Kegel (1986, ibid., p29): - (1) If only one state shows an interest in having its rules applied, apply 
that law (a false conflict); (2) If both the forum and a foreign state demonstrate an interest, there is an 
apparent conflict. If it emerges, on a `more restrained interpretation of the policies', that only one state 
insists upon the application of its substantive law, there is a false conflict. [Questions of the intensity of 
a state's interest then arise - this is even more difficult to assess than whether the interest exists in the 
first place, and again, no suggestions are proffered by Currie regarding how this process should be 
conducted]. If, however, both states wish to apply their law (a true conflict), then the forum's rules of 
substantive law ought to prevail; (3) If several states have a strong governmental interest in the 
application of the policy of their own substantive law (a true conflict), the forum's rules of substantive 
law ought to prevail; and (4) If none of the several foreign states claims an interest (the `unprovided 
for' case), the forum's rules of substantive law should again prevail. Consider also Von Mehren and 
Trautman who, like Currie, skip to the question of competing interests without dealing with the 
logically prior question of how one, in fact, determines interests in the first place: "... once the aims of 
particular states can be determined, it will often become clear that one or more of the states involved in 
a transaction are not concerned jurisdictions with respect to a given issue and hence have no claim to 
regulate the question. " (Von Mehren and Trautman, ibid., p108) Consider also Weintraub, who states 
with misleading simplicity that, "The policies underlying each state's rules are identified. Then the 
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advocates that, "An `interest' ... is the product of (a) a governmental policy and (b) 
the concurrent existence of an appropriate relationship between the state having the 
policy and the transaction, the parties, or the litigation. "183 
Clearly, the assumption that intrinsic interests or policies can be easily and swiftly 
ascertained is mistaken, for as Lando has explained, "... the purpose of a statute or 
other rule of law is sometimes obscure. Sometimes it is also complex. Even when the 
purpose of the statute is known and straightforward, its application in space is 
doubtful ... 
s184 Similarly, Professor Reese has detected that, "The legislative history of 
a state rule is frequently unavailable and, even if it were, it would be the rare case 
where this history would cast any light on what extraterritorial application, if any, the 
legislature would have wished that its rule be given. Probably the legislature never 
thought about this problem at all and, in any event, the burden involved in trying to 
ascertain a usually non-existent intent would rarely be worth the effort. " 85 In 
determining the underlying policy of a particular rule of law, account must be taken 
not merely of its internal, domestic purpose, but also of whether that purpose is 
echoed externally, through intended extraterritorial application of the rule. 186 It may, 
of course, be the case that the legislatures in question have no formulated intentions 
regarding the territorial reach of their statutory provisions. 
question is asked; `which states are likely to experience the social consequences of implementing or 
frustrating those policies? "' (Weintraub, (1986), ibid., p46) 
183 Currie, B, "Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws" (1963), p621. Hay subsequently suggested that 
relevant governmental policies would include matters regarding the health, safety or welfare of a state's 
citizens, or its financial stability. (Hay, P, "Flexibility versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of 
Law' (1991) I Receuil des Cours 285,353) 
184 Lando, 0, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Ch. 24 - Contracts' 
(1976), p80. 
185 Reese, WLM, `Book Review - Studies in Modern Choice-of-law: Torts, Insurance, Land Titles' 
(1984) 9 Dalhousie Law Journal 181,183. If it is difficult to determine the purpose or policy of a 
legislative enactment, it is submitted that this difficulty is only exacerbated as regards common law 
rules. 
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Furthermore, it seems widely to be assumed that there is only ever one purpose 
underlying any rule of law; it is never supposed by interest analysis protagonists that a 
rule of law may have two or more purposes which, in Professor Reese's words may, 
"point in different directions so far as concerns choice of the applicable law. " 187 
Professor Hancock's functional analysis/statutory construction approach and 
Professor Currie's interest analysis approach both confer upon the judiciary 
apparently unbridled discretion to determine, first, what is or is not the underlying 
policy of a rule of law (either of his/her own state, or indeed of a third state) and its 
extent, and secondly, whether the interests of a particular state, as enshrined within its 
rules of law, will be furthered by its application to the case in hand. 188 
Obviously, it is preferable to apply a law the purpose of which would be furthered by 
its application to the facts in hand, than to apply one whose purpose is not to deal with 
186 Cf. Trautman, D T, 'The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
1001,1110: "... it is important to reiterate that a proper functional analysis cannot be limited to an 
analysis of the policies of domestic law. " 
187 Reese (1984), ibid., p187. E. g. The purpose of a rule preventing married women from acting as 
guarantors for their husbands' debts could be (a) to protect married women domiciled in the state 
where those debts are situated (or indeed domiciled anywhere) and (b) to protect creditors domiciled in 
that state. One might consider the comments of Castel, J G, regarding Bank of Africa Limited v. Cohen 
[1909] 2 Ch. 129, viz.: "... the court failed to consider what was perhaps the real question, namely, 
whether, even if it is admitted that the capacity to convey or mortgage land is governed by the lex loci 
rei sitae, a rule of that law relating to the capacity of married women is intended to be limited to 
women domiciled in the country of the situs, or extends (as the court assumed) to women domiciled 
elsewhere. " (Castel, J G, `Cases, Notes and Materials on the Conflict of Laws' (1960), p574) Cf. also 
Morris who, despite reservations later expressed [note 170 supra] argued that the court in Bank of 
Africa should have inquired as to the policy of the Transvaal domestic law; the policy may have been 
to protect Transvaal married women, rather than Transvaal land: "The lex situs was applied. The 
reasoning is, however, most unsatisfactory. " (Morris, JHC, `Cases on Private International Law', 0 
edition (1968), p350) 
188 Rather scathingly, Professor Reese suggests that "... Professor Hancock applies what is really his 
own hunch in determining the underlying purpose of the rule involved and whether this purpose would 
be served by the rule's application to the issue at hand. " ((1984), ibid., p183) Reese adds, however, 
that, "... although legislative history will usually be lacking, a fair conclusion can frequently be 
reached on what was the probable purpose, or purposes, intended. " (ibid. ) This seems hardly 
scientific. 
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circumstances such as those in issue. 189 The American approach is to be applauded 
insofar as it calls for a more "enlightened inquiry into legislative purpose ... looking 
not just at the words adopted by the legislature, but at whether the assets, or the 
donor's family, or the activity in question were intended objects of the forumisitus 
state's regulatory scheme. "190 However, it is submitted that whilst the proposed 
guessing game as to what is, or is not, the underlying purpose of a rule of law, may be 
a satisfactory means by which to disentangle abstract conflict problems, it is not a 
proper basis for the resolution of concrete disputes. 
Regarding the question, what are the legitimate interests of the lex situs, Von Mehren 
and Trautman, in taking what they term a functional analysis approach, advise that, 
"The basic issue is whether a given jurisdiction has, with respect to the particular 
aspect of the matter that has given rise to the controversy and in view of those 
elements in the total situation that are related to the jurisdiction in question, a real 
concern or interest. s191 This, they argue, should be determined by ascertaining 
whether there is a relevant relation between the jurisdiction and the transaction and/or 
the parties, in terms of what they call "relating elements". 192 In the context of 
financial provision upon divorce and intestate succession to immoveables, it would 
appear that two legal systems, at least, have (in their own eyes) legitimate interest in 
the settlement of the dispute: in divorce, the consistorial forum settling the financial 
affairs of the separating spouses, and any foreign forum rei sitae, are both interested 
in the case, creating what Currie refers to as a true conflict; and in succession, the lex 
189 Cf. Reese (1984), ibid., p183. 
190 Lowenfeld, A F, `Revolt Against Intellectual Tyranny' (1985-86) 38 Stanford L. Rev. 1411,1417. 
19' Von Mehren and Trautman (1965), ibid., p102. Cf. Weintraub who states that, "... a fiunctional 
analysis' of choice-of-law problems describes a process that first focuses on the apparently conflicting 
domestic rules of two or more jurisdictions having contacts with the parties and with the transaction. " 
(1986, ibid., p46) 
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ultimi domicilii of the deceased and/or the common lex domicilii of the beneficiaries, 
and similarly the foreign forum rei sitae both express legitimate interest. In both of 
these scenarios, it is plausible that if the forum rei sitae were to adopt a `more 
restrained interpretation' of its policies (as proposed by Currie), it would become 
evident that what had arisen was, in fact, only an apparent conflict. In that case, only 
one state (the consistorial lex causae, or the lex ultimi domicilii, as appropriate) would 
insist upon the application of its substantive law. 193 As Weintraub has observed, 
"Although two states have domestic rules pointing to different results if applied to 
interests in realty, analysis of the purposes underlying those domestic rules may 
reveal that the conflict is apparent rather than real. The purposes underlying one 
domestic rule may not be advanced by applying that rule to the transaction in issue; 
the policies of the other domestic rule, on the other hand, may be fully applicable. " 194 
The question must be asked, what are the legitimate interests of a particular legal 
system, and who or what is to determine what is or is not legitimate? It is suggested 
that legitimate interests, in this context, could be construed as being those interests 
which persist even after a state has engaged in a `more restrained interpretation' of its 
192 Ibid, p104. Cf Currie, at note 183, supra, paragraph (b). 
193 It is interesting to note, under Curie's analysis, that in the event of a true conflict, the lex fort's 
rules of substantive law ought to prevail. This is significant in view of the potential manipulation of in 
personam jurisdiction so as to evade operation of the rule which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the 
forum rei sitae. Clearly, if in personam jurisdiction is exercised, that non-situs forum will not be 
bound, under Currie's analysis, to apply the lex situs. 
194 Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of Situs as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis' (1966) 52 
Cornell L. Q. 1,16. The author concludes that, "A rational solution will turn primarily on interests and 
policies which the two jurisdictions have in common and on clearly discernible trends and 
developments in the substantive area involved. " (ibid., p16) While sounding theoretically appealing, it 
is submitted that this is completely lacking in pragmatism and would amount, in practice, to little more 
than judicial whim. Cf. Kay's conclusion that, "... Hancock expects a judge confronting a choice of 
law problem to analyze the competing laws and policies of both states by conducting detailed research 
into the domestic cases interpreting the conflicting laws and the legislative history of any relevant 
domestic statutes. He rejects the notion that judges should rely on a purely abstract estimation of what 
the underlying policies might reasonably be. " (ibid., p530) Interest analysis seems to operate most 
effectively in retrospect, and primarily as an academic tool for evaluating the appropriateness or 
otherwise of the solution arrived at using the established orthodox rule. It is interesting to note 
Lowenfeld's observation that, "Characteristically, [Hancock] answers the question by using particular 
cases - going backwards to explore antecedents and sources, sideways to find actual cases that 
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policies. One might reasonably inquire, however, how, and by whom, restraint is to be 
interpreted, and more fundamentally, why a state should even participate in the 
limitation exercise which Currie proposes. 195 One answer might lie in Hay's notion 
that the ultimate aim of interest analysis in the context of land transactions should be 
"... the accommodation of the concerns of the situs state, the non-situs state, and of 
the parties in the conflict of laws regarding immoveables. " 196 The forum rei sitae 
may, in a particular case, be prepared to defer to (or at least to tolerate) the application 
of e. g. the consistorial lex causae, so long, at least, as its own rules regarding 
alienability, title recording and land use are not compromised (for in these matters the 
interest of the situs must be paramount), and its public policy is not otherwise 
offended. Ultimately, the objective of interest analysis is articulated in Schott and 
Rembar's declaration that, "... the state most deeply interested in the issue presented 
is the one which should determine the resolution of that issue ... 
"197 Whilst it is 
difficult to dispute the virtue of this sentiment, the tautology of the remark does not 
assist in the practical context of endeavouring to identify the `most deeply interested' 
state. 
Regarding the question of who should determine whether a state is legitimately 
interested in applying its rules to the case in hand, the answer can only be that each 
state must determine this matter for itself, in the context of its own law, and through 
its own processes. When a state is performing this task, however, interest analysis 
protagonists argue that it should adopt an `extrovert' approach, taking special note of 
illustrate his hypothetical variations, and forwards to see where solutions that satisfy in one case lead 
in another. " (ibid., p 1424) 
195 Arguably, in these modern days of harmonisation of laws, legal systems are more conscious of 
policies, and ethnicity of law, in deciding what is `non-negotiable'. 
196 Hay (1988), ibid., p110. 
197 Schott & Rembar, `Choice of Law for Land Transactions' (1938) 38 Columbia L. Rev. 1049,1059. 
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the peculiar foreign elements in the factual scenario, and not adhering too closely to 
its assessment of its interests in an equivalent domestic scenario. Cook has suggested 
that the question for the forum rei sitae should be, "Does or should the policy laid 
down in our law for purely domestic situations apply to this factual situation with its 
foreign elements ? 1,198 
Currie has argued that in the relatively few cases where a specific local policy can be 
discerned, it turns out to be, "(1) an understandable reaction against a particularly 
irksome error of law on the part of the foreign court, or (2) mere pride of local law 
manifested in unwillingness to bring about a result which could not regularly have 
been achieved by an action in the local courts in the first instance or (3) a not very 
clearly articulated apprehension that recognition would inject uncertainties or 
anomalies into the local system of recording land transactions. "199 Only (3) is 
specific to land transactions and the strength of this as an argument in support of the 
lex Situs rule will be considered in Chapter Twelve, infra. 
At the most basic level, Weintraub has suggested that "... a functional analysis 
reveals that the situs qua situs ... has an interest in applying its own law to affect the 
interests of persons in properly only when choice of law will affect the use of the 
land. , 200 This moves away from issues of formal validity to one of essential validity, 
and is in accord with what has hitherto been stated regarding the Situs' obvious and 
incontrovertible interest in the uses made of its own land. But, even in such a case, 
198 Cook, W W, `The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws' (1942), p289. Cook goes on to 
remark that, "... each conflicts situation must be examined by a court of the sites of the land, to see 
whether or not the case before it is to be decided in the same way in which a purely domestic situation 
would be. " (ibid. ) 
199 Currie, B, `Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees' (1954) 21 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 620,634. 
20° Weintraub (1966), ibid., p16. 
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Weintraub would propose that the situs rule should yield "... to the conflicting rule of 
another state which has a genuine interest in validating a transaction that the situs 
would invalidate"201 or, alternatively, that the situs should succumb to the rule of that 
state which will have to bear the `social consequences' of the decision. It has been 
suggested by situs rule antagonists that while the lex situs must naturally protect third 
party interests by means of recording provisions, and regulation of land use through 
burdens and title conditions, 202 most cases concerning property in fact "... raise 
questions about the policies underlying the transaction that brings the parties 
together. These policies concern succession, family law, contract, or even ... tort, and 
they far outweigh any interests of the place where the land is located. "203 The lex situs 
rule, it is claimed, does not address these policies, or weigh in the balance competing 
interests, in the manner that an interest or functional analysis approach would 
endeavour to do. 
Proponents of an interest or functional analysis approach perceive that a choice of law 
rule of property which only and always applies the lex Situs to property disputes will 
result, in certain instances, in the application of a law which is largely disinterested in 
the social problem in respect of which the dispute has arisen, and which the litigation 
201 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p42. Consider the negative attitude of Scots common law, compared with 
any more facilitative an approach by the lex situs, to the creation of a floating charge over a company's 
immoveable property, wherever situated. (Carse v. Coppen 1951 S. C. 233) Sensitivity to the need for 
possession in the matter of security rights manifested itself again where Scots law was the lex Situs in 
Romalpa cases. 
202 It is evident that in cases concerning the actual use of land, no state other than the situs can claim a 
legitimate interest: "When one considers the nature of various property rights (obligations between 
neighbours, riparian rights ... servitudes and the 
like), it becomes rather clear that much property law 
is deeply rooted in locally developed legal traditions which for hundreds of years have addressed these 
issues in the manner most adapted to the locality. " (Gambaro, A, `Perspectives on the Codification of 
the Law of Property: An Overview' (1997) 5 European Review of Private Law 497, at p497) 
203 Trautman (1986), ibid., p1110. 
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is intended to resolve. 204 It is their view that, "A seemingly simple, settled rule results 
in a growing number of adjudications that are dysfunctional responses to a social 
problem"205, and they perceive that, " ... a full functional re-analysis of the field 
emerges through re-focusing on the underlying social problem that the rule was 
supposed to solve. "206 
Whilst this seems relatively persuasive, interest and functional analyses are not 
without their critics, even (or especially) in the U. S. A. wherein the approaches 
originated. Stumberg, for instance, has argued that, "Abstract theories of state power 
and exaggerated views of local policy are insecure foundations on which to build 
satisfactory doctrines of conflict of laws. s207 The foundations are insecure because the 
theories are inherently ambiguous; already it has been argued that a judge seeking to 
apply either of Currie or Hancock's theories would be engaging in a process marred 
by guesswork and caprice. 208 
While Currie's original analysis, so called governmental interest analysis, advocated a 
consideration merely of the interests of states, the concept of `interests', if it is to be 
fully effective in distinguishing between the genuine and the spurious application of a 
204 Contrast the view articulated by Von Mehren and Trautman, to the effect that, "A community in 
which a person lives is often concerned with particular substantive issues ... 
because of its substantive 
concern for the situation out of which the issue arose. " (1965, ibid., p162) 
205 Weintraub (1986), ibid., p51. 
2'36 Weintraub (1986), ibid., p51. When re-analysis is achieved, the author says, "The unarticulated 
becomes articulated and jargon becomes comprehensible. " (ibid. ) Weintraub comments that in the 
U. S. A., "In recent years, judicial treatment of choice-of-law problems concerning personal property 
has demonstrated a welcome trend towards functional analysis of the problem based on inquiry into 
policies underlying putatively conflicting domestic rules ... [evidencing] movement toward more 
thoughtful solutions to personal conflicts problems. " (ibid., p460) 
207 Stumberg (1942), ibid., p550. 
208 Cf. Shapira, A, `The Interest Approach to Choice of Law' (1970), at p185: "The evaluative function 
which judges will have to undertake for this purpose is indeed of an ad hoc nature. " There is inevitably 
scope for what Shapira refers to as `Khadi justice, or coin flipping'. (ibid., p176) Reese highlights the 
dangers in this exercise: "There is also the danger of ascribing non-existent purposes to a rule, and of 
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state's law209 should be wider-ranging, and not limited to the interests of states. 210 
One should recall Savigny's mid-nineteenth century admonition that, "We must never 
forget that rules of law are made for the parties, whose real interests it is their 
purpose impartially to further ... 
s21 Although Hancock's theory of functional 
analysis, effected through statutory construction, focuses upon wider policies and is 
less restricted in terms of the factors which it takes into account than is Currie's 
interest analysis model, 212 even so, it only takes into account the interests of the 
parties via the indirect means of retrospective policy analysis. It seems, therefore, that 
the call to interest or functional analysis is half-hearted, failing as it does fully to 
embrace all of the interests which are, in fact, at stake in the dispute. 
Professor Reese, witness to American interest analysis in practice, has concluded that 
courts faced with conflict of laws disputes have `fared worst when they have 
disregarded ... [the] purposes 
[sought to be achieved by potentially applicable rules 
of the states involved] and unthinkingly applied some broad choice-of-law rule, such 
as one calling for application of the law of the Situs. "213 This is an interesting, though 
perhaps not surprising, observation by the reporter to the Second Restatement, which 
generally adopts a more flexible approach to choice of law issues than does the First 
Restatement under the superintendence of Professor Beale. Nevertheless, it is 
disregarding actual ones, in order to arrive at what is thought to be the best solution of the case on the 
merits. " (1984, ibid., p183) 
209 Lowenfeld suggests that the aim of interest analysis is, "... to separate the genuine and the spurious 
- especially in regard to the so-called interest of states. " (1986, ibid., p 1430) 210 Consider Kegel's view that, "Regard must be had to the interests of individuals, with special 
reference to the need to accord equal treatment to foreigners, to the interests of the national society in 
which the facts materialise, and to the interests of the international society ... It may be asked who this 
international society is. Does it include emigrants, refugees, guest workers, tourists, nationals working 
for aliens, persons dispatched abroad, diplomats, artists and playboys? " (1986, ibid., p14) 
211 Von Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p93. 
212 Kay, for example, states that Hancock's method "... is not a search for a specific legislative intent 
about the geographical scope of domestic law; it is instead a more comprehensive interpretation of 
local policy to see whether it rationally encompasses the extrastate facts. " (1985, ibid., p538) 
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significant that Professor Reese has questioned the value and accuracy of seeking to 
ascertain the specific policies upon which rules of law are allegedly anchored. 214 Such 
attempts, he concludes, "... are likely to be time-consuming and would often prove 
unproductive. 9)215 
Ultimately, Professors Currie and Hancock entirely forsake the use of established 
territorial contacts, favouring instead a `soft' approach to choice of law. It is 
submitted that the point which these esteemed Professors were endeavouring to 
impress upon their conflicts audience was, and is, a wholly valid one, namely that the 
use of mechanical connecting factors does not always result in application of the most 
interested or most appropriate law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the interest and 
functional analysis protagonists overstate their position. Whilst the interest or policy 
or purpose underlying a particular rule of the lex Situs or other system may be 
important, there is little to commend an approach according to which these elusive 
and amorphous concepts completely outweigh other significant factors, including, for 
example, indisputable territorial connections or the justified expectations of the 
parties 
Finally, it is essential to note that whilst, fundamentally, Currie was advocating "total 
abstinence" from conflict rules, 216 he had in mind interstate as opposed to 
213 Reese (1984), ibid., p184. 
214 "Worse still, there is the constant danger that a judge, consciously or unconsciously, would let his 
desire to reach a particular result influence his assessment of a policy's strength or weakness. " (Reese, 
(1984), ibid., p186/7) Reese concludes that, "When all is said and done, Professor Hancock is too 
much of a simplicist. " (ibid. ) 
215 Reese (1984), ibid., p 187. 
216 Kegel (1986), ibid., p29/30. Kegel explains that "Currie formulated these rules as a substitute for 
the total complex of conflicts rules of the Restatement Second, which he rejected. " (ibid. ) 
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international conflicts. 217 One must ask what, if any, difference this makes. 218 
Traditionally, American conflicts scholars did not make any distinction between 
conflicts rules operating interstate and those operating internationally, 219 but, in 1962, 
Ehrenzweig advised that, "... it has become advisable to treat many interstate and 
international conflicts separately. 17220 Principally, Ehrenzweig viewed the uniform 
treatment of these different types of conflict problem as impeding the proper 
development of bespoke interstate conflict rules. 221 International conflict of law 
problems were, he perceived, far more complex than their interstate equivalents: "In a 
New York court, the law of an adjoining Canadian province will receive different 
treatment than the law of Saudi Arabia. The treatment of international conflicts may 
not only differ from that of interstate conflicts, but may differ as to each foreign 
country; yet, insistence on general formulas covering both international and 
interstate conflicts may have prevented recognition of this fact. 11222 
217 Cf. Hancock, whose theorising, according to Lowenfeld, "... exemplifies an elegantly rational 
approach to interstate (and interprovincial) controversies. " (1986, ibid., p1417) Consider, however, 
Shapira, who remarks that, "The possible bearing of the differing characteristics of interstate and 
transnational conflicts situations on the shaping of an appropriate choice-of-law system has been given 
very limited consideration by American writers. " (ibid., p41) 
218 Cf. Shapira, who poses the question whether, "the proper resolution of transnational conflicts 
requires an approach different from that adopted in the interstate sphere. " (ibid., p34) Consider the 
remarks of Nadelmann who is of the view that, "The simultaneous study of conflicts prevention 
problems on both the international and the interstate level has great advantages. Experience on one 
level can be of value to the other. Contrary to a widespread belief, the internal American problem is 
not incomparable to others. " (Nadelmann, K H, `Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American 
Conflicts Law' (1963) 28 Law and Contemporary Problems 860,868) 
219 Consider Ehrenzweig, A A, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1962), p16, at paragraph 6: 
"Traditionally ... 
American texts ... 
have treated interchangeably cases and principles relating to 
international and to interstate problems. " 
220 Ehrenzweig, ibid. 
221 "Full Faith and Credit between the state of the Union would and should grow if finally divorced 
from the precarious concept of 'comity' between foreign nations. " (Ehrenzweig, ibid., p17, paragraph 
6.1) 
222 Ehrenzweig, ibid., p18/19, paragraph 6.2. For example, the rules on proof of 'foreign' law differ 
according to whether the `foreign' law is that of a disconnected foreign state, or merely that of a sister 
federal state: "American courts ... will usually require the 
law of a foreign country (but no longer that 
of a sister state) to be pleaded and proved. " (ibid., p 19, paragraph 6.2) 
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Gradually, in the USA, there has been a distancing between the conflict rules 
governing interstate problems and those governing international ones. 223 It is 
appropriate then to inquire whether rules designed primarily for use in an interstate 
context can, or should, be extended to the international sphere. 
Essentially, interest analysis is at variance with the jurisdiction-selecting tradition of 
Scottish and English conflicts methodology. Jurisdiction-selection disregards the 
substance of the lex causae (and a fortiori, the purpose or policies underlying, or 
inherent in, that law), pending selection and application of the applicable law. In 
contrast, scrutiny of the substantive content of the potentially applicable laws (and 
implicit in that notion, the purpose or policies behind those laws) is the fulcrum upon 
which rule-selection depends. 224 
Shapira has identified six factors regarding which interstate and international conflict 
problems differ, and has argued that these constitute legitimate reasons why rules and 
techniques developed to help resolve interstate conflicts issues should not be deployed 
in the resolution of international disputes. 225 The first factor is the impact of 
223 To a large extent this is due to the development of rules specifically dealing with the different types 
of conflict issues which arise, respectively, interstate and internationally. Typically, interstate problems 
concern wrongful death statutes, the operation of statutes of limitations or workmen's compensation. 
On the other hand, "... problems relating to currency fluctuations, expropriations or litigation 
concerning aliens are virtually limited to international transactions. So are those arising in 
bankruptcy, antitrust or admiralty, where interstate conflicts are eliminated by a national law. " 
(Ehrenzweig, ibid., p18, paragraph 6.1) Cf. Shapira, ibid., p40. Consider also Kahn Freund, 0, "Book 
Review, XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law" (1962) 76 Harv. L. Rev. 223, at p228: 
"... [T]he Atlantic is still very much wider than the English Channel. The reason is only to a small 
extent the prevalence of interstate over international conflicts situations in the United States ... 
" 
224 The difference between the two approaches is ultimately a matter of timing; while rule-selection 
appraises the content of the potentially applicable laws at the point of choosing the lex causae, the 
European jurisdiction-selecting orthodoxy prefers conflict rules which "contain a priori value 
judgments. " (Hay, P, `Flexibility versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law' (1991) I 
Receuil des Cours 285,346) 
225 Shapira, ibid., Chapter II, pp34-44. Shapira sets out to prove that, "While multistate and 
multinational conflicts instances have much in common, they are at the same time distinguishable in 
several important aspects. " (ibid., p43) See also Du Bois, "The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the 
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constitutional mandates. The sister states of the U. S. A. are bound by the constitutional 
requirements of due process and the Full Faith and Credit clause, whereas outwith the 
federation there is a lack of overarching, supranational legal control. 226 Secondly, 
Shapira cites mutuality, reciprocity and sense of unity. This is related, in part, to the 
first factor. In Shapira's view, "There is an undeniable gap between the intensity of 
socio-political affiliation within a federal union and the corresponding sense of 
mutuality in the international arena. "227 The political, economic and cultural ties 
which bind the states of a federal union are inevitably stronger than those which may 
exist between or among unrelated nations, and it is to be expected that sister-states 
within a federation will be more accommodating (whether ex lege or ex comitate) of 
the laws of its confreres. 228 The limited sense of mutuality which exists between 
nation states does not compel the full and fair-minded consideration of the interests 
and policies which underlie another nation's rules of law, in the same way that the 
constitutionally-imposed standards of collaboration and co-operation bind the states 
of the U. S. A. 229 
The third factor identified by Shapira is the extent of substantive diversity among 
different legal systems and their respective laws. Professor Currie's predilection for 
the application of the lex foci in the event of a true conflict may already be seen as 
Distinction between Interstate and International Transactions. " (1933) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 361; Kahn 
Freund, 0, "Book Review, XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law" (1962) 76 Harv. L. Rev. 
223. 
226 Although consider now the position in Europe, and the obligations imposed upon European sister 
states by virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam (entry into force I May 1999). Article 65 of Title IV of the 
EC Treaty now forms the basis for new Community-wide international private law initiatives. See 
Beaumont, P, (1998) 48 I. C. L. Q. 225-9. 
227 Shapira, ibid., p35. 
228 Predicting the advances in a united Europe, however, Shapira admitted that, "This profound 
difference between interstate and international sense of community may lose ground with the progress 
of currently popular aspirations for some measure of international integration, whether economically- 
oriented (as in Western Europe) or politically-ideologically based (as in Eastern Europe) or 
otherwise. " (ibid., p36) 
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indicative of an unwarranted `homing tendency'. 230 This tendency will doubtless be 
exacerbated in the event that the two or more laws being juxtaposed are 
fundamentally different in substance. The inference is that the laws of two sister- 
states are less likely to differ in substance than those of two entirely separate legal 
systems, and that if a Scottish or English court engaging in interest analysis were 
faced with a choice between determining and furthering the purposes of its own law, 
or those of an unrelated third state, it would, more than likely, prefer its own rule. 
`Policies' within the constituent parts of one political unit may be easier to discern. 231 
Shapira's fourth and fifth factors are in some way related to the third, concerning as 
they do the practical possibility of forum-shopping (which he perceives to be more 
prevalent in the interstate than the international context232), and the feasibility of 
substantive law unification. These factors, however, are less pertinent to the question 
of whether an interest analysis approach should be applied to international disputes. 
Finally, Shapira makes mention of the frequency and subject-matter of conflict-of- 
laws litigation, being of the view that, "As a practical matter, the choice-of-law 
problem is far more recurrent in the interstate than in the international sphere. , 233 
This is related to the American theorists' general notion that from a `soft' flexible 
229 Shapira suggests that, "... the adjudication of interstate cases can be more readily entrusted to a 
comparatively flexible outline of guiding principles administered by the judiciary. " (ibid., p36) 
230 Cf. Kegel, who claims that "[Currie] nationalizes private international law by favouring the 
substantive rules of private law of the forum. " (1986, ibid., p32) 
231 E. g. Where the same, or different, legislative action or common law course has followed an active, 
nationwide debate (e. g. after `technical' discussion, Parts III and IV of the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 - note 65, et seq, supra). 
232 Cf. Ehrenzweig, who remarks that, "Interstate conflicts rules, whether or not adopted under 
constitutional compulsion, are largely dictated by the need of curtailing any forum shopping for the 
more advantageous law ... But this consideration 
has little meaning in international conflicts cases... " 
(ibid., p20, paragraph 2) Forum-shopping in the international arena, however, is a popular pastime, but 
perhaps more from a (size of) remedy or enforcement perspective, than from conscious choice of law 
forecasting. 
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approach to choice of law there will, in time, emerge a body of more detailed conflicts 
rules and principles, with the result that implementation of the interest analysis 
process would gradually become less arduous. 234 The relative scarcity of international 
choice of law litigation (certainly in Scotland, and likewise in England), would mean, 
however, that this evolutionary process, if at all evident, would be extremely slow. 
In summary, it is submitted that although interest and functional analysis approaches 
may be of some use in an interstate context, it is extremely unlikely that their 
reception into international conflicts usage would be successful or constructive. 
The approaches may be utilised to reveal some inadequacies of the situs rule235 - 
particularly regarding the transfer of property upon divorce, and intestate succession 
to immoveable property), but it is submitted that they would not form suitable 
foundations upon which to construct, in Scotland or in England, a re-modelled rule of 
choice of law in property. 
233 Shapira, ibid., p40. 
234 Cf. Reese's view of the Second Restatement approach to choice of law, viz.: "I believe that one 
ultimate goal, be it ever so distant, should be the development of hard-and-fast rules of choice of law 
... 
I believe that in the development of these rules consideration should be given to the basic objectives 
of choice of law, to the relevant local law rules of the potentially interested states ... 
" (Reese, WLM, 
(1976) 11 Receuil des Cours 44,65) Consider too Kegel's belief that, "With growing experience ... 
Currie's doctrine of governmental interests could lead to the development of rules. " (1986, ibid., p32) 
235 It is interesting to note Kay's remark concerning Professors Hancock and Currie's antipathy towards 
mechanical connecting factors generally, viz., "Both men were heirs to the critical attack on the 
traditional approach by Professor Cook and others: an attack that had exposed the arbitrary and 
irrational nature of the traditional theory. " (1985, ibid., p531) 
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Chapter Eight 
The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property 
In this chapter, attention will be focused not on the general transfer of moveable 
property which might occur upon the event of death, bankruptcy or marriage, ' but 
rather upon particular transfers of such property by means of gift, sale, mortgage or 
otherwise. 2 In particular, attention will be paid to corporeal moveable property, 
comprising "all things having a physical corpus capable of actual possession. ,3 In the 
normal run of events, title to corporeal moveable objects is evidenced not by formal 
written title (although motor vehicles, aircraft, ships and other such vessels will 
generally be accompanied by registration documents akin to documents of title), but 
merely by right. Hence, the law which determines the acquisition or transfer of rights 
in such property is not always immediately apparent. 
The authors of Cheshire & North have stated that, "This is one of the most intractable 
topics in English private international law, because most of the few relevant 
authorities are antiquated and they do not reveal with any certainty what principles 
govern the subject as a whole. A common but fallacious assumption is that all 
problems must be referred to one single law. In the course of time, varied views on 
what this is have been advanced. The law of the situs of the property, the law of the 
1 Events which Carter describes as "occasions of legal trauma. " (Carter, P B, `Decisions of British 
Courts During 1981' (1981) 52 B. Y. B. I. L. 329,330) 
2 Consider Hellendall, F, `The Characterization of Proprietary Rights to Tangible Moveables in the 
Conflict of Laws' (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 374, at p376: "The question whether a claim relating to a 
tangible moveable is based on an individual transaction or upon a general assignment has arisen 
before the English and American courts ... only in relation to the validity of donationes mortis causa. " 
E. g. in re Korvine's Trust, Levashoff v. Block [1921] 1 Ch. 343; and In re Craven's Estate, Lloyds 
Bank v. Cockburn (No. 1) [ 1937] 1 Ch. 423. 
3 Walker, D M, `Principles of Scottish Private Law' (3`d edition), Volume 3, p367. 
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place of the parties' domicil or of the transferor, the law of the place of acting, the 
`proper law of the transfer' - each of these has had its advocates. The assumption, 
however, is untenable. It represents an oversimplification of the position, because it is 
based on the fallacy that the possible questions arising out of a transfer of moveables 
all fall into the same category and are all of the same juridical nature. "4 
While selection of the appropriate conflict rule should be based upon considerations 
of justice, and the reasonable expectations and interests of those parties involved in a 
transfer of property, in this area of law, considerations of practical convenience are 
particularly significant: "When called upon to solve a conflict case, a court will not 
follow a purely logical, but a practical process of reasoning. ,5 
A more fundamental question (which draws into focus especially when third parties 
are introduced into the ownership equation) concerns the validity of the transfer itself: 
by which law should the transfer of moveable property be governed? As soon as a 
dispute has been characterised as one of property, the forum must proceed to the next 
stage of inquiry, namely to choice of law, and selection of the apposite connecting 
factor. Over the course of time, various connecting factors have been periodically 
favoured. 
The lex domicilii theory 
The connecting factor traditionally applied is based upon the brocard "mobilia 
sequuntur personam"6 Lord Kames argued that "although the local situation is 
4 Cheshire & North, `Private International Law' (1999), p938. 
SLalive, P A, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' (1955), p32. 
6 `Moveables follow the person'. Otherwise, "mobilia ossibus inhaerent. " Consider Schmidt v. Perkins 
(1907) 74 N. J. L. 785 (per Stumberg, G W, `Conflicts - American Casebook Series' (1956), p377), per 
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essential to a moveable no less than to land ... by their intimate connection with the 
proprietor, the law of his country ought to prevail. "7 Professor Anton has suggested 
that Erskine, likewise, favoured this principle, although Anton has advised that the 
passage in which Erskine refers to this issues is "open to various constructions. "9 
The lex domicilii rule was first propounded by the Italian statutists. Some (e. g. Paul 
Voet and Dumoulin) thought that laws concerning moveables were real (statuta 
realia), but that by fiction of law, all moveables were supposed to be situated at the 
place of the domicile of the owner. 10 Others, however, (e. g. D'Argentre) believed that 
laws dealing with moveables were statuta personalia because moveables, in the 
contemplation of law, have no situs. 't 
Since it was postulated that moveables are accessories of the person, it was supposed 
that they could not properly be associated with the country of their actual physical 
Swayze, J.: "The maxim `mobilia personam sequuntur' [sic] states a mere fiction of law which it is 
sometimes necessary to apply in order to do justice, but it ought not to be extended beyond that 
necessity. " 
7 Karnes, Equity III. 8.3. 
8 Erskine, Institute 111.2.40.: "... though obligations to convey, if they be perfected secundum legem 
domicilii, are binding here; yet conveyances themselves of subjects within Scotland, are not always 
effectual, if they are not executed according to the solemnities of our law ... But in the case of a 
moveable subject lying in Scotland, the deed of transmission, if perfected according to the lex domicilii, 
is effectual to carry the property; for moveables have no permanent situation, but may, at the pleasure 
of the proprietor, be brought from any other place to his own domicil, and therefore are considered as 
lying in that territory where the deed is signed, according to the rule, Mobilia sequuntur personam. " 
9 Anton, A E, `Private International Law' 15f edition (1967), p400. 
10 Venturini, G C, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Chapter 21 - 
Property' (1976), at p3: "The doctrine of the statutists distinguished between immoveables ... and 
moveables which ... were governed 
by the personal law of the owner, for since the latter were of little 
importance they could be exempted from the operation of territorial sovereignty. " Cf. Graveson, R H, 
`Private International Law' (1974), ibid., p456. 
" Zaphiriou, G A, `The Transfer of Chattels in Private International Law: A Comparative Study' 
(1956), p17. Consider, however, Story: "The probability is, that the doctrine itself had not its origin in 
any distinction between real laws or personal laws, or in any fictitious annexation of them to the 
person of the owner, or in their incapacity to have a fixed situs; but in the enlarged policy, growing out 
of their transitory nature and the general convenience of nations. " (Story, J, `Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Laws', p552) 
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location. 12 Whilst it might reasonably be argued that the mobilia principle is a sensible 
rule as regards general transfers of corporeal moveables on death, bankruptcy or 
marriage (so as to ensure a uniform devolution of the de cuius' estate), it does not 
necessarily follow that the same principle should be applied to particular transfers of 
isolated or disconnected corporeal moveables: "It may have been true in early times 
that articles of personal estate were few and were usually located at the owner's 
domicil. It is entirely untrue in modern commerce. "13 In spite of this, traces of the 
principle, as promulgated by medieval Italian statutists and widely accepted on the 
Continent, in England and America, can be identified in a long series of cases, as 
appropriate to determine the validity of a transfer of corporeal moveables. 
Thus, in the eighteenth century case of Sill v. Worswick14 Lord Loughborough opined 
that "It is a clear proposition ... in every country 
in the world where law has the 
semblance of science ... that personal property 
has no locality; the meaning of that is, 
not that personal property has no visible locality, but it is subject to that law which 
governs the person of the owner. With respect to the transmission of it, either by 
succession or by the act of a third party, it follows the law of the person. " This view 
was reiterated in later cases such as Sommerville v. Sommerville, 
15 Re Ewing, 16 
Dulaney v. Merry 17 and Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez. 
18 Likewise, Lord Watson, 
12 Consider Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), at p189: "The law as to 
individual moveables, as well as that on entire moveable fortunes, has been widely considered to 
depend on the person of their owner, on account of a special connection supposed to exist between 
them and him. " 
13 Morris, JHC, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' (1945) XXII B. Y. I. L. 232, at p232. 
14 (1791) 1 H. B. L. 690. 
IS (1801) 5 Ves. Jun. 750. 
16(1830)1G&J 151. 
"[1901] 1 Q. B. 536. In the later case of Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [1927] 1 K. B. 669, at p688, 
Scrutton, LJ. observed that Channel, J. in Dulaney v. Merry, "had not found any clear case of a 
transfer [of personal property], good according to the law of the domicile of the owner, and made 
there, but held bad for not conforming to the law of the country where the goods are situate. " Consider 
also Provincial Treasurer of Alberta v. Kerr [ 1933] A. C. 710, per Lord Thankerton. 
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in North Western Bank Limited v. Poynter, Son and Macdonalds, 19 opined (rather 
incautiously) that, in a conflict between English and Scots law, English law should 
apply, since both the pledgor and the pledgee were English domiciliaries. 20 In fact, the 
decision in this case ultimately rested upon different reasoning, and the weight of the 
case as authority in support of the lex domicilii rule must be doubted since the two 
laws which could have been applied to determine the pledgee's title (English and 
Scots law), were not, in fact, divergent. Lord Watson revisited the point in Inglis v. 
Robertson & Baxter, 21 and adjudged that if a transfer is valid according to the lex loci 
actus and according to the lex domicilii, but void according to the lex situs of the 
chattel at the time of the alleged transfer, then the lex Situs is applicable. 22 
In the United States, Story found justification for the rule in its simplicity, its 
convenience and its enlarged policy. "23 Since the rule was endorsed by scholars such 
as Story, it was common judicial practice to refrain from questioning its application. 
Many courts merely stated that the rule was "self-evident" or "in the nature of things", 
without attempting to justify it on practical or theoretical grounds. 24 
18 [1927] 1K. B. 669. 
19 (1894) 22 R. (H. L. ) 1. 
20 "When a moveable fund, situated in Scotland, admittedly belongs to one or other of two domiciled 
Englishmen, the question to which of them it belongs is prima facie one of English law, and ought to be 
so treated by the Court in Scotland. " (ibid., p12, per Lord Watson) 
21(1898) 25 R. (H. L. ) 70. 
22 Inglis V. Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R. (H. L. ) 70, at p74, per Lord Watson. 
I Story, ibid., Chapter IX, paragraph 370. Story explained that, "... the general doctrine held by nearly 
all foreign jurists being, that the right and disposition of moveables is to be governed by the law of the 
domicile of the owner, and not by the law of their local situation ... 
by a fiction of law all moveables 
are supposed to be in the place of the domicile of the owner ... moveables 
have in contemplation of law 
no situs and are attached to the person of the owner wherever he is. " (p549) The rule rested upon the 
concept of a fictional situs: "... as moveables have no fixed and perpetual situs as lands have, it is 
necessary that their situs should depend upon the pleasure of the owner, and that they have the very 
situs which he wishes, when they have that of his own domicile. " (pS50) Situs at the owner's pleasure, 
while attractive in some respects, would give rise to difficulties concerning stolen property. The 
concept of a notional situs, being where the `owner' wishes the goods to be, was considered a step too 
far in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [1986] 1 Ch. 496. 
24 Freke v. Carbery (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 461,466 (Lalive, ibid., p42). Graveson makes the comment that 
this theory was 'fortified' by Story. (ibid., p456) Story himself remarked that, "[The doctrine] ... 
has 
so general a sanction among all civilized nations, that it may now be treated as part of the jus 
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It has been pointed out, 25 however, that Story adopted the view that where the lex 
domicilii did not require delivery in order effectively to pass property, but the lex Situs 
did, in fact, require delivery, then the lex Situs rule prevailed: 26 "the laws of the 
owner's domicile should in all cases determine the validity of every transfer, 
alienation or disposition made by the owner, whether it be inter vivos or be post 
mortem, and this is regularly true unless there is some positive or customary law of 
the country where they are situate, providing for special cases (as is sometimes done) 
or from the nature of the particular property it has a necessary implied locality. " 
Thus, it has been remarked that "the lex domicilii theory was seriously qualified by 
Story. "27 Such an exception amounts to an almost unequivocal submission to the hex 
situs theory. In addition, for Story, the lex domicilii rule does not appear to have 
denied the owner of property the opportunity to elect to transfer it in accordance with 
some other system of law28 (i. e. Story appears to have conceded a degree of party 
autonomy). 
Other arguments in favour of applying the lex domicilii are the public law argument, 
(that the sovereignty of a state over its nationals abroad extends also to their moveable 
property, which is considered to be an adjunct of the person), and also the reasonable 
expectations argument (that a transferor cannot be expected to reckon with laws other 
gentium. " (ibid., p553) "The same doctrine has been constantly maintained both in England and 
America, with unbroken confidence and general unanimity ... Foreign jurists are not less expressive in 
its favour. " (ibid.., p555) Venturini has also advised that the theory was adopted in some continental 
codifications of the law. (ibid., p3) 
25 Zaphiriou, ibid., p21. 
16 Story, 15` edition, p315, and 8`h edition, p543. 
27 Zaphiriou, ibid., p21. 
28 (1834), ibid., paragraphs 380,383, and 384. 
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than his own29 and he should, accordingly, be entitled to transfer property abroad with 
some degree of knowledge and certainty, thereby promoting - perhaps - international 
trade). 30 The former argument fails wholly to convince, for the reason that doubt will 
linger as to which (and whose) personal law should, in fact, apply. 31 Although it was 
generally assumed that the mobilia rule referred to domicile, and not to nationality, or 
to the more recently favoured factor of habitual residence, it was nowhere clearly 
stated that the domicile in question was that of the transferor, and not that of the 
transferee, or, in cases of transfer by a thief, that of the original owner. 
In any event, it is illogical to argue that the lex domicilii of the owner should apply 
when the very point in dispute is "Who is the owner? ". Were the rule to be adopted 
today, further refinements would be necessary, perhaps to the effect that the apposite 
lex domicilii would be that of the putative owner, giving rise to the usual `time' 
problem. 32 However, the disadvantages of this are clear. Were a title dispute to arise 
29 C f. Dinwoodie's Executrix v. Carruthers' Executor (1895) 23 R. 234, per Lord Traynor, at p239: "... 
in any question between the depositors themselves, or their representatives, Scotch law must govern, 
seeing that the depositors are both Scotch, that they were dealing with moveable estate situated in 
Scotland and that they cannot be presumed to have transacted with each other on any footing than that 
their respective rights should be determined by the only law with which they were supposed to be 
acquainted, that is, the law of their own country. " 
30 Consider too Westlake, ibid., at p191/2: "[The rule] is ... a protection, not against the justice of the 
country to which the proprietor sends his ... merchandise, 
but against the possible failure of that 
justice ... 
No doubt the interests of commerce require that great freedom of disposition should be 
allowed to proprietors, and this consideration speaks in favour of an alienation made in the manner 
prescribed by the law of the alienor's domicile. " Contrast the view of Wolff, M, `Private International 
Law' (1950), at p510: "The owner's domicile ... may not only change any 
day, but it is frequently 
unknown to purchasers or creditors who are not in a position to ascertain it ... they cannot be expected 
to delve into the intricacies of foreign law. Thus the domicile principles appears calculated to hamper 
commercial intercourse. " Also Graveson: "... the chief defect of the domicile principle in this 
connection is its complete unpredictability in a world where men of commerce call, not always with 
success, for certainty. For not only is it difficult for A to be sure of B's domicile, and then to ascertain 
the legal effect under B's domiciliary law of the proposed transaction: it may be impossible for A 
himself by the light of nature to know his own domicile. " (ibid., p458) Cf. Zaphiriou, ibid., p24. 
3' Consider Graveson: "The advocates of the doctrine ... supported it on grounds of its simplicity and 
convenience ... it is a single ascertainable 
law to govern transactions taking place in countries ... in 
respect of moveables whose situation may not always be ascertainable ... But, 
however desirable it is 
to have a single system of law to govern any situation, it is essential that such a system should be easily 
ascertainable, which can rarely be said of domicile ... 
" (ibid., p456/7) 
32 Who was `first' owner? Is the `first' owner the putative owner? 
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between persons of different domiciles, the lex domicilii theory clearly fails to furnish 
a definitive guide to the applicable law. Even if the parties shared a common 
domicile, it is reasonable to doubt the value of applying the law of that country to 
determine ownership if the property is situated in a different country, particularly if it 
is in one, the law of which applies opposing principles of substantive property law. 33 
Beale, somewhat scathingly, has concluded that the mobilia principle "... proved to 
be a refuge of a judge in a hurry, confronted with a difficult situation. "34 
To permit either party to invoke the law of his domicile in respect of a dispute 
concerning the transfer of moveable property is commercially impracticable and 
inconclusive. 35 In a legal community where, not infrequently, domestic and 
international jurists alike are unable to reach agreement as to the definition, or 
determination, of an individual's domicile (both as regards the circumstances to be 
weighed in the balance, and the ultimate factual conclusion), it would be preposterous 
to expect the layman, with little or no knowledge of the legal vernacular, to transact in 
reliance upon such a concept. There is little, if any, rationale for introducing into the 
world of commerce the intricacies and convolutions inherent in determining domicile. 
However, the fact that an object of property had been (permanently) housed at a 
particular party's residence or domicile in country A, prior to theft and removal of the 
object to country B, may be relevant in ascertaining the law with which the question 
of ownership is most closely connected. 36 
33 As Graveson has stated, the lex causae should be "one which has a real and substantial connection 
with the subject matter of the assignment. " (ibid., p457) 
34 Beale, J H, `The Conflict of Laws' Volume II, p978. 
35 Graveson, ibid., at p458: "While the difficulties inherent in the doctrine of domicile have to be 
accepted in the more important spheres of personal status and universal assignments, the application 
of domicile in the less vital matters of individual or particular assignments represents an unnecessary 
complication of law. " 
36 See Chapter Fourteen, infra - 'The Lex Proprietatis'. 
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As regards the reasonable expectations argument, it must be doubted that transacting 
parties would have in mind the lex domicilii of either party at the time of transacting, 
particularly when the transaction is concluded outwith the jurisdiction of either 
party's domicile. Any expectations as to personal law are more likely, it is submitted, 
to pertain to lex patriae, rather than to lex domicilii. In any event, the `reasonable 
expectations' of parties will differ according to status, qua thief, fence, mala fides 
purchaser, bona fides purchaser, or original owner; it is questionable whether 
nefarious expectations should ever be confirmed. 
Although the significance of the lex domicilii should not be underestimated in the 
field of family law, its aptness to commercial matters should not be exaggerated. If a 
rule is implemented beyond the limits of its logical application, then it becomes 
necessary, in order to escape the ludicrous consequences of its implementation, "to 
resort to logical subterfuges, to introduce `exceptions' in circumstances where the 
alleged connection between the goods and the owner is said to be severed, or simply 
to make an extensive use of the notion of public policy. "37 Overactive use of the public 
policy escape route would be detrimental and would detract from the cosmopolitan 
quality which should percolate through sophisticated systems of international private 
law 
For a time, the lex domicilii rule was applied beyond what was judicious. Now, 
however, its application is restricted to the boundaries set by Lord Devlin: "[the] 
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam is the exception rather than the rule, and is 
37Lalive, ibid., p37. 
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probably confined to certain special classes of general assignments, such as marriage 
settlements and devolutions on death and bankruptcy. , 38 In the past, the rule was 
applied too vigorously and a reaction against its exclusive character was reasonably to 
be expected. 39 It is appropriate, therefore, to consider those connecting factors which 
emerged during the recoil from the mobilia principle. 
The lex loci actus theory 
A second connecting factor which previously held sway was the lex loci actus, the 
law of the country where the transaction took place: "The claim of the lex actus [in the 
sense of lex loci actus] to be the governing law of any international transaction has 
not only the rational appeal of simplicity, but a respectable tradition in both the 
common law and civil law systems. "ao 
In Alcock v. Smith, " a bill of exchange, payable to the order of merchants in Norway, 
was indorsed in Norway and delivered by the payees to X. X delivered it to S, an 
agent of the plaintiff. While with S, it was seised by J, one of the plaintiff's creditors, 
in satisfaction of a debt. Later, in Norway, it was sold by public auction to M, before 
being transferred, in Sweden, to K and sent to Smith for collection. It was held that 
Swedish law, as the law of the place of the transaction governed the transfer, with the 
effect that the title validly acquired in Sweden was duly recognised in England. Kay 
38 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1QB 248, per Lord Devlin, at p257. Cf. 
Provincial Treasurer of Alberta v. Kerr [1933] A. C. 710, at p721, where the Privy Council stated that 
mobilia sequuntur personam means, not that moveables are deemed to be situated where their owner is 
domiciled, but simply that "their devolution on his death is governed by his personal law. " 
39 Cf Carnahan, who said of the rule that, "... its basis upon medieval conditions has long been 
outgrown by circumstances of travel and circumstances of ownership of property in more than one 
state. " (Carnahan, W, `Tangible Property and The Conflict of Laws' (1935) 2 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 345, 
346); and Graveson, ibid., at p456: "The doctrine has long been abandoned in America ... and no 
longer represents English law of general application. " 
40 Graveson, ibid., p460. 
41 [1892] 1 Ch. (C. A. ) 238. 
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U. stated that, "As to personal chattels, it is settled that the validity of a transfer 
depends, not upon the law of the domicil of the owner, but upon the law of the country 
in which the transfer takes place. 142 A similar situation arose in Embiricos v. Anglo- 
Austrian Bank. 43 In North Western Bank Ltd v. Poynter, Son and Macdonalds, 44 where 
the merchandise in question was afloat at the time of the transfer, and accordingly had 
no situs, Lord Chancellor Herschell noted that if there had been a difference between 
the provisions of the two potentially applicable laws, the law of England would have 
been applied because the contracting parties were both domiciled there and the 
transaction had taken place there: "A transaction between a merchant in England and 
a bank in England and the rights which arise out of that transaction, cannot ... fall to 
be determined by anything but the law of England. 9A' A primary objection to the lex 
loci theory, however, is that in most of the cases in which reference to it has been 
made, that law has coincided with the lex situs. 
46 This must surely detract from the 
authority of the lex loci actus, per se. Consider, however, the dictum of Scrutton, Li., 
in Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez: 47 "On the question of the law applicable to an 
assignment of personal property invalid by the law of the country where the 
42 Ibid., p267. 
43 [1905] 1K. B. 677. Vaughan Williams, LJ. remarked, at p683, that, "... [the] effect of the decision in 
Alcock v. Smith that the rule that the validity of the transfer of chattels must be governed by the law of 
the country in which the transfer takes place, applies to a bill or a cheque ... is right. " Further, Romer, 
LI., at p685: "The plaintiffs contend that ... 
bills of exchange and cheques are wholly outside the 
general principle of private international law which gives effect to a title acquired by transfer abroad 
by the law of the country in which the transfer took place. I think that contention is erroneous. " 
Vaughan Williams, LJ., opined, at p684, that, "... the indorsement of a bill in a foreign country, valid 
under the foreign law, but invalid under English law, would be effectual to give the indorsee a good 
title to the bill as against the drawer or acceptor. " 
44 (1894) 22 R. (H. L. ) 1; [1895) A. C. 56 (H. L. ) 66. 
45 (1894) 22 R. (H. L. ) 1,6. Note also the dissenting voice of Lord Young in Robertson & Baxter v. 
Inglis (1897) 24 R. 758, at p805: "By what law, then, is the dispute regarding Inglis' right arising out 
of the transaction in question to be determined? I think clearly by the law of England, the country 
where it was made between two English merchants and who presumably -I should say certainly - had 
regard only to that law in expressing their intentions and doing what they knew or were advised was 
necessary to their accomplishment. " 
46 Macmillian Inc v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387, per Staughton, U., 
at p399: "... the law of the place of the transaction (lex loci actus), in the case of the sale of a chattel, 
will almost invariably be the same as the law of the place where the chattel is (lex Situs). " 
47 [1927] 1 K. B. 669. 
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transaction takes place, ... but valid by the law of the country where the property is, 
or is deemed to be, situate, the English authorities are scanty and unsatisfactory ... 
Conversely, I have not been able to find, nor could counsel refer me to, any clear 
statement of the principles governing the question whether a transaction in personal 
property, as distinct from land, invalid by the law of the country where the transaction 
takes place, may be valid by the place where the property is situate. Mr Foote48 points 
out that in most of the judgements where general statements are made the transaction 
took place in the country where the property was, and a conflict between the lex loci 
actus and the lex loci rei sitae was not dealt with. "49 
Although the lex loci actus may have some valid claim to determine matters of formal 
validity, 50 its wider application could produce incongruous results. The fact that a 
transaction is effected in a particular country is no reason for submitting the 
proprietary consequences of that transaction to that local law rule. In Carse v. 
Coppen, Lord President Cooper commented that "in this matter, the lex [loci] actus 
does not impress me as of significance. "51 In those pre-1961 days, 52 he opined that "It 
would never do to allow Scottish companies to create unrestricted floating charges 
over English assets by the simple expedient of sending two directors and the secretary 
across the border to sign the relative documents. "53 
48 'Private International Law', 5`s edition, p293. 
49 [1927] 1 K. B. 669, at p68819. Scrutton, LJ. 's remarks must be considered to be obiter since this case 
concerned the assignment of a chose in action, not a chose in possession. 
50 Consider Erskine 111.11.40: "All personal obligations or contracts entered into according to the law of 
the place where they are signed, or, as it is expressed in the Roman law, secundum legem domicilii, vet 
loci contractus, are deemed effectual, when they come to receive execution in Scotland, as if they had 
been perfected in the Scottish form. " 
5' 1951 S. C. 233,242. 
52 See now the Companies (Floating Charges) (Scotland) Act 1961, as amended by the Companies 
(Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972, in terms of which a Scottish company can grant 
a floating charge over its assets. 
53 Ibid.., p242. Note, however, the dissenting opinion of Lord Keith: "The English courts, if the matter 
became litigious before them, would presumably satisfy themselves that the deed was properly executed 
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Furthermore, the locus actus may be entirely adventitious, 54 or worse still, 
indeterminate, especially in cases where the constituent elements of the transaction 
(e. g. the offer to purchase, the corresponding acceptance, inspection and delivery of 
the goods) occur in different countries. 55 Where there is conflict between or among 
those potential leges actus, regarding an essential element of the negotiation or 
transacting, it is a legitimate objection to the lex loci actus theory that it lacks a clear 
rule as to which locus actus should take precedence. 56 
As regards acquisition of rights in rem by virtue of prescription or other implied 
operation of law, the lex loci theory is entirely futile since in such cases "there is no 
lex [loci] actus which could possibly be consulted. 57 In spite of this, however, 
Graveson has declared that "It is not unreasonable to suppose that the validity of an 
act should be governed by the law of the place where it is performed, for reasonable 
men expect to comply with the law of any country in which they carry out their 
transactions. "58 The veracity of Graveson's statement depends upon what the author 
intended by `performance'. Performance could refer either to execution of the act 
according to the law of Scotland (the lex loci actus) and give the creditor a good title, but the effect of 
the deed would be judged by the law of England (the lex loci rei sitae). Once objection to the formal 
validity of the deed constituting the security, or to the title or capacity of the granter to the deed are 
overcome ... the effect of the security over 
foreign assets falls, in my opinion, to be determined by the 
lex loci rei sitae. " (1951 S. L. T 145, at p151) 
54 Zaphiriou, ibid., pp29/30. 
ss Cf Benaim v. Debono [1924] A. C. 514; Entores Limited v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 
Q. B. 327; Brinkibon Limited v. Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelgesellschaft GmbH [1982] 1 All 
E. R. 293. 
16 Graveson explains that "The chief objection to lex [loci] actus as a theory would appear to lie in the 
likelihood of conflict between various leges [loci] actus in respect of several transactions carried out 
by different parties in relation to the same movables. " (ibid., p461) See note 60 infra, regarding inexact 
use of the expressions 'lex actus' and Vex loci actus'. 
sl Wolff, ibid., p518. Wolff drew attention, "to the obvious fact that the lex loci actus doctrine cannot 
present a solution to questions not connected with human acts. " Also Graveson, ibid., p460; and 
Schmitthoff, C, `English Conflict of Laws' (3`d edition), p193. Cf. the significance of the `locus regit 
actum' principle and operation of a particular form of prescription in the context of choice of law rules 
of marriage: Dysart Peerage Case (1881) 6 App. Cas. 489. 
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which is characteristic of the transaction (i. e. the essential element of performance, 
rather than any reciprocal pecuniary obligation), 59 or merely to the place where the 
technicalities of agreement were struck. If the latter interpretation were intended, then 
it is submitted that Graveson's assertion should properly be limited to the formal 
validity of an act. If, however, the former interpretation were intended, then the 
statement is, in fact, more supportive of the lex actus theory. 
The lex actus theory 
Imprecise use of terminology has occasionally given rise to confusion between the lex 
loci actus and the lex actus theories. Wolff, for example, suggests that, "G C Cheshire 
in declaring60 the lex loci actus to be decisive uses this term in a sense differing from 
the usual meaning of the word. While ordinarily lex loci actus designates the law of 
the country where an agreement has been made, Cheshire has in mind the law `which 
is equivalent to the proper law of a contract' or `with which a transaction has the 
most real connexion'. s61 Ironically, what is intended by the `lex actus' idiom is the 
antithesis of the `lex loci actus': the lex actus indicates a `proper law', objectively 
ascertained. 62 
58 Ibid., p460. 
59 Cf. Article 4, Schedule 1, Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
60 Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' 3`d edition (1947), p564. 
61 Wolff, ibid., p517. In fact, Cheshire is not guilty of the sin of which he is accused: on p546 of his 
third edition, Cheshire writes, "The third law that may be chosen to govern questions arising out of a 
transfer of moveables is the lex actus. This expression is often taken to mean the law of the country 
where the transfer is effected, but its correct meaning is that legal system with which the transfer has 
the most real connexion. The lex actus, in other words, is equivalent to the proper law of a contract. " 
Cf. Graveson's view that, "much can be said in favour of the theory of the lex actus if one accepts the 
normal judicial -meaning of the term as 
being synonymous with lex loci actus. " (ibid., p460) 
62 C f. the plaintiff's averments in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Limited [198011 Ch. 496; 
Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland', p315, paragraph 14.15; and Zaphiriou, ibid., 
p31. 
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Morris described the lex actus as "the law of the State with which the transaction has 
the closest and most real connection, that is the proper law of the transfer, not 
necessarily the law of the State in which the transfer takes place. "63 Morris did not, 
however, indicate whether he conceived the lex actus to be a factor objectively, or 
subjectively, ascertained (i. e. whether the lex actus was the law with which the 
transaction could be said, objectively, to have the closest or most significant 
connection, or whether it was the law which best accorded with the expressed or 
implied intentions of the transacting parties). 
It was Zaphiriou's belief that "... the lex actus theory stands or falls with the attitude 
that one takes towards the proper law of the contract. , 64 As will be illustrated at note 
129, infra, the proper law of the transfer presently governs the transfer of goods which 
are in transit. One might additionally suggest that the lex actus rule would be equally 
appropriate to deal with transfers of aggregate moveables (where a common or 
universal Situs does not pertain), or cases where moveable property situated in one 
state is to be transferred by parties acting in a different state (e. g. where the lex loci 
actus and the lex domicilii of the parties coincide with each other, but not with the lex 
situs). In such cases it cannot truthfully be argued that, "... the centre of gravity of the 
transfer of ownership and of the creation of a proprietary interest is the place where 
the moveable is situated at that time. 110 
Morris speculated whether it was the "inability of the situs rule to furnish an 
appropriate test in certain circumstances which has led Professor Cheshire (almost 
63 Morris, ibid., p233. Significantly, Morris' rider `rebuts' any `presumption' in favour of the lex loci 
actus, and not, as one might have anticipated, the lex situs. 
" Zaphiriou, ibid., p38. 
65 Zaphiriou, ibid., p41/2. Cf. Wolff, ibid., p20. 
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alone amongst modern writers) to abandon it. "66 The clear interest of the lex Situs in 
the majority of cases should not be denied, but it is submitted that the rule should be 
modified so as to introduce greater flexibility in appropriate cases. Morris was of the 
opinion that the necessary flexibility would be secured if "the validity of a transfer in 
one State of chattels situated in another is governed by the proper law of the transfer, 
that is, by the system of law with which the transfer has the closest and most real 
connection, ... the proper 
law is presumed to be (but is not necessarily) the lex situs of 
the goods. q167 The value of a rebuttable presumption in favour of the lex situs will be 
considered in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, infra. 
The most persuasive advocate of the lex actus theory has been Professor Cheshire, 
who proposed that "all questions arising between parties themselves to a transfer, 
whether relating to the transfer or the preliminary contract, should be governed by 
the proper law of the transfer, the proper law for this purpose being objectively 
ascertained. "68 Graveson noted, however, that Cheshire upheld the dominance of the 
lex situs, when that law differed from the proper law, in questions of priority between 
the transacting parties and third parties. 69 
One might conclude that the lex actus theory never developed fully, being over- 
shadowed by support for a simple and straightforward theory. As will be 
demonstrated at note 235 et seq., infra, however, recent attempts have been made to 
resurrect the lex actus theory. 
66 Morris, ibid., p238. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' 7th edition, p410 (per Graveson, ibid., p463). 
69 Graveson, ibid., p463. 
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The lex Situs theory 
One of the reasons why the lex domicilii theory mustered considerable support, and 
evolution towards application of a different connecting factor was protracted, was 
simply because there was infrequent opportunity, in practice, to test it. In some cases, 
Counsel refrained from pleading the relevant foreign law, 70 whilst in others, the 
competing laws embodied virtually identical provisions, giving rise to false 
conflicts. 71 Eventually, however, "The application of the lex Situs was advocated both 
on territorial grounds, such as the sovereignty of the state of the situs over property 
within its territory or the implied submission of the owner of property to the law of the 
place where he chooses to leave it, and upon the more practical ground that, since the 
security of international transactions requires a simple rule pointing directly to a 
single system, this can be the only system which can effectively control the 
property. "2 Thus, the rule emerged that the essential validity of a particular, inter 
vivos, transfer of corporeal moveables is governed by the law of the country where the 
moveables are situated at the time of that transfer. 
In Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., 73 Slade J. advised that, "At least 
before the decision in Cammell v. Sewell74 ... there had been some conflict of judicial 
opinion as to whether the validity of a disposition of moveables generally depended 
on the law of the owner's domicile ('lex domicilii') or on the law of the country where 
the relevant transaction was concluded ('lex loci actus'), or on the law of the country 
where the goods were situated at the time of the disposition ('lex situs') ... Pollock 
70 Cochrane v. Moore [ 1890] 25 Q. B. D. 57 (C. A. ). 
71 Mehta v. Sutton (1913) 108 L. T. 214,216. 
72 Anton (1990), ibid., p612. 
" [198611 Ch. 496. 
74 (1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5 H&N 728. 
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C. B. clearly affirmed the lex Situs theory ... the principle of Cammell v. Sewell has 
been reaffirmed in many subsequent decisions. , 75 
The ratio of Cammell v. Sewell provides that, "If personal chattels are sold in a 
manner binding according to the law of the country in which they are disposed of, 
that disposition is binding in this country. "76 In the Exchequer Chamber, Crompton, J. 
noted that, "Many cases were mentioned in the course of the argument, and more 
might be collected, in which it might seem hard that the goods of foreigners should be 
dealt with according to the laws of our own or other countries. "77 Significantly, 
however, his Lordship advised that, "Very little authority on the direct question before 
us has been brought to our notice. s78 
The court in Cammell v. Sewell was not unanimous in its decision: Byles, J. delivered 
a dissenting judgment, in which he enquired, "Can such a foreign law as the law of 
Norway is alleged to be, avail in England to take the property in the cargo out of the 
English owners? "79 His Lordship concluded that, "I should feel great difficulty in 
acceding to the universal proposition however true it may be in general, that in the 
absence of a judgment in rem, a disposition of moveable property, effectual by the law 
75 Ibid., p501/2. Further, at p504, "... Cammell v. Sewell is thus, in my judgment, clear authority for the 
following proposition: the mere circumstances that the goods in the present case have been brought 
back to England, following the sale to the second defendant and that their proceeds are now in 
England do not entitle the English court to decline to apply Italian law for the purpose of determining 
the relevant issue if but for those circumstances, that would be the law applicable. " 
76 (1860) 5 H&N 728, at p744. 
77 Ibid., p744. 
7 Ibid., p745. 
79 Ibid., p748. His Lordship continued, "... the law of Norway amounts to this, that if the ship has 
satisfied the single but indefinite condition of `wreck', the cargo, however large, valuable, uninjured 
and capable of transhipment, may be sold by the master. It is obvious that if a law of this nature were 
recognised by other countries as giving validity to the title of a purchaser, property at sea would be 
exposed to a species of confiscation. " Further, at p750, "This alleged law of Norway therefore, placing 
the cargo at the caprice of the master, seems to me to be a law not only of an alarming nature, but so 
far as I can perceive without precedent, without necessity and at variance with the general maritime 
law of the world, at least as understood in this country. " 
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of the country where that property may at the time be locally situate, is necessarily 
operative, without any exception, into what country soever that personal property 
may afterwards happen to come. s80 Coinciding with the view expressed in the 
dissenting opinion, the court in Castrique v. Imrie subsequently declared that, "This 
[the ratio of Cammell v. Sewell], we think, as a general rule, is correct, though no 
doubt it may be open to exceptions and qualifications. "81 
In the Scottish case of Todd v. Armour, 82 Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff affirmed that, 
"The title of the bona fide purchaser in open market for full value will ... stand all the 
world over. "83 The Scottish court adhered to the Cammell v. Sewell principle, even 
although the property in question (a horse) had been stolen from its original owner, 84 
was situated in Scotland at the time of the action, and the content of the Irish lex situs 
was viewed unfavourably by the court. 
The situs principle has since been applied in numerous cases, including Luther v. 
Sagor, 85 Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, 86 Frankfurther v. WL Exner, 87 Anglo-Iranian 
80 Ibid., p751. 
81 (1870) L. R. 4 H. L. 414,429. Given the enduring influence of the decisions in Cammell v. Sewell and 
Castrique v. Imrie, it is unfortunate that Blackburn, J. concluded that, "... we think it unnecessary in 
this case ... to enquire what qualifications, 
if any, ought to be attached to it as a general rule. " (ibid., 
p429) 
2 (1882) 9 R. 901. Lord Young, while supporting the lex situs principle, alluded, at p907, to one 
curious concession: "... in the case of goods stolen in a foreign country by whose law the vitium reale 
is ... removed 
by a sale in market overt, [ought] we to hold that the market overt must be in the foreign 
country, the vitium remaining unaffected by a sale in market overt in Scotland [? ]" However, his 
Lordship concluded that, "It certainly strikes one as unreasonable ... to require a Scotch court to 
protect the possession of a purchaser in open market at Armagh and refuse protection to a purchaser 
in open market at Falkirk - there being no other difference that the locus of the market. " Cf. Rabel, E, 
`The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study - Volume 1) (1958), p50: "As a rule, the requirements of 
the lex Situs may be complied with at any place by an act which, on the other hand, may mean nothing 
under the law of such place. " (Emphasis added) 
83 Ibid., p906. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [ 1986] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J., at p507, 
"Todd v. Armour is thus a good example of a court faithfully applying the principle of Cammell v. 
Sewell... " 
84 Cf. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [1905] 1 K. B. 677, affirming [1904] 2 K. B. 870. 
85 [1921] 3 K. B. 532. 
86 [1929] 1 K. B. 718. 
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Oil Co Ltd. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), 88 and Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV 
v. Slatford. 89 
It should be noted that the situs rule extends not only to the transfer of title to 
corporeal moveable property, but also to the creation or acquisition of title to such 
property. In this context, `lex Situs' means "the law of the country in which the goods 
are brought into existence. "90 Furthermore, the situs rule extends to gratuitous, as well 
as to non-gratuitous, inter vivos transfers of moveable property. 91 The stringency of 
this rule may not always be appropriate. Consider, for example, the gift of an 
engagement ring by a man to his fiancee, following a marriage proposal, say, in Italy. 
According to the situs rule, the validity of the donation would be determined by 
Italian law, even although the connection with Italy was, most probably, tenuous (e. g. 
where the parties were Scots domiciliaries and the intended matrimonial home was 
located in Scotland). If, for any reason, the engagement were broken, and question 
arose as to whether the gift of the ring were outright, or subject to a suspensive 
condition that the marriage would take place, the question of whether or not the 
87 [ 1947] Ch. 629. 
88 [1953] 1 W. L. R. 246. 
89[1953] 1 Q. B. 248. 
90 Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. [2001] 1 Ll. Rep. 184, per Moore- 
Bick, J., at p296. Cf. Dicey & Morris, ibid., p967, paragraph 24-010: "The application of the lex situs at 
the time of the act in question will also determine ownership upon the making of a new thing 
(specificatio), or after the incorporation of the thing into another (accessio). " 
91 Cochrane v. Moore (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 57, per Lopes, U. Further, In re Korvine's Trust, Levashoff v. 
Block [1921] 1 Ch. 343, per Eve, J., at p348: "... it is not disputed that an assignment (inter vivos] 
giving a good title to moveables according to the law of the country where the moveables are situate at 
the time of the assignment is valid. "; and In re Craven's Estate, Lloyds Bank v. Cockburn (No. 1) [1937] 
1 Ch. 423, per Farwell, J., at p429: "It is said and said truly that the subject matter of this donatio 
consists of moveables situate at all material times in Monaco, that is to say, in a foreign country, and 
that the question of the ownership of moveables must be determined in accordance with the law of the 
place in which those moveables were. " 
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fiancee was entitled to retain the ring would be governed by Italian law, the lex situs 
at the time when ownership was alleged to have passed. 92 This seems rather absurd. 
It is interesting to note that the American conflict rule regarding the transfer of 
corporeal moveable property is quite different from the rule which pertains in Scots or 
English law. According to paragraph 244(1) of the Second Restatement, "The validity 
and effect of a conveyance of an interest in a chattel as between the parties to the 
conveyance are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the 
particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the parties, the chattel and 
the conveyance under the principles stated in paragraph 6. "93 Moreover, it would 
appear that paragraph 244(2) sanctions party autonomy, stating that, "In the absence 
of an effective choice of law by the parties, greater weight will usually be given to the 
location of the chattel, or group of chattels, at the time of the conveyance than to any 
other contact in determining the state of the applicable law. "94 
Inherent in the deceptively simple situs rule are complex questions of definition and 
interpretation: what is the situs, and in turn, what is meant by the lex loci rei sitae? By 
whom, and according to what law, is this connecting factor to be defined? The 
answers to these fundamental issues have been considered in detail in Chapter Four, 
supra. Additionally, the arguments in support of, and against, the lex situs connecting 
factor will be appraised in Chapter Twelve, infra. 
92 If, for example, the proposal and donation had taken place in England, the fiancee would be 
protected by section 3(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, according to which 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the gift of an engagement ring is made unconditionally. Cf. Gold 
v. Hume (1950) 66 Sh. Ct. Rep. 85. Contra Savage v. McAllister (1952) 68 Sh. Ct. Rep. 11. 
93 Regarding the paragraph 6 principles, see Chapter One, supra - `Choice of Law Methodology'. 
94 In comment (b) relative to paragraph 244, Professor Reese states that the paragraph is applicable to 
"issues arising between the immediate parties and their privies from voluntary transfers inter vivos of 
interests in chattels ... e. g. capacity of transferor and transferee; 
formal validity and essential validity; 
nature of interests transferred. " 
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Meantime, it is important to acknowledge the full extent of the sinus rule. In 1958, 
Rabel stated that, " ... the creation, modification, and termination of rights in 
individual tangible physical things are determined by the law of the place where the 
thing is physically situated. , 95 So the lex situs may be said to determine: alienability; 
the range of proprietary and security interests which are permitted; 96 the formal and 
essential requirements of the conveyance of property (including the proprietary effects 
of misrepresentation, fraud and illegality, which may vitiate intention to effect, or 
consent to, the transfer); 97 capacity to transfer and to receive property; competitions 
between transferors and transferees; the rights of creditors and priority of claims; 
proprietary rights and remedies, including arrestment, lien and stoppage in transit. As 
Zaphiriou noted, "English judges seem to reject `specialisation' in connection with 
the transfer of ownership in moveables. There is a clear tendency to treat the transfer 
of tangible moveables, including the capacity of the parties as a whole and to subject 
it to a single law. "98 
95 Rabel, ibid., p30. Cf. Falconbridge (1947), ibid., at p377: "... the transfer of property in moveables 
or of any less extensive real rights in them , or more 
broadly, the creation, dismemberment, or 
extinction of the property in moveables, is governed by the lex rei sitae. " 
96 Cf Venturini, ibid., p19; and Wolff, ibid., p522. 
97 E. g. The need for delivery, which is likely to vary from system to system. Cf Weir, T, `Taking for 
Granted - The Ramifications of Nemo Dat' (1996) 49 Current 
Legal Problems 325, at p327: "... in 
order for an owner to effect a transfer of property to a willing transferee, was it enough that there be 
an intention that ownership should pass, or was there a further requirement that there actually be a 
good reason for the transfer, an objective causa traditionis? " Consider too Rabel, ibid., at p79: in an 
instance of "sale and dispatch of goods from a country, where delivery is required to pass the title ... 




Savigny opined that, "The capacity of a thing to become subject to private property, 
and therefore not to belong to the res quarum commercium non est, is to be judged by 
the law of the place at which the thing is situated. "99 
As regards alienability, Siehr has observed that, "There are a few jurisdictions in 
which certain goods are res extra commercium i. e. goods which cannot be transferred 
by transaction of private law. "100 Included in the category of `res extra commercium', 
for example, may be, "certain art objects exhibited or preserved in public museums 
and libraries ... exempted 
from the ordinary rules for moveables. "'()' Difficulties 
emerge when inalienable goods are removed, either lawfully (e. g. for the purposes of 
loan or exhibition) or unlawfully (i. e. by theft or illegal export), from the state which 
has imposed the embargo, and taken to a state in which no such prohibition is applied 
or recognised. 102 
In matters of alienability the present situs of property may not always demonstrate the 
strongest connection with, or interest in, the property in question (e. g. Duc de Frias v. 
Pichon103) Consider, for example, the theft of Leonardo da Vinci's `La Gioconda', by 
an Italian waiter, Vicenzo Perrugia, from the Louvre in 1911. The painting was 
recovered, in 1913, allegedly from underneath the thief's bed. What might have 
98 Zaphiriou, ibid., p66- 
99 Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p 138. Further, "The same rule applies as 
to the extent of the class of things sine domino, and therefore as to the admissibility or restriction of the 
acquisition by occupation of property in things of many kinds. " (ibid. ) 
100 Siehr, K, `International Art Trade and The Law' (1993) VI Receuil des Cours 9,82. 
101 Siehr (1993), ibid., p64. 
102 Cf. Von Plehwe, T, `E. U. and the Free Movement of Cultural Goods' (1995) 20 European Law Rev. 
431, at p441: "Foreign sale prohibitions applying to certain types of cultural or church property will 
not be considered if the chattel is subject to a transfer at the new situs and the law of the place does not 
classify the object as res extra commercium. " 
103 [1886] 13 Journal du Droit International 593. 
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happened had the felon returned home to Italy with his haul, and there sold the 
painting to a good faith (albeit somewhat naive) purchaser? According to the lex situs 
rule, the sale would have been valid, and the transfer of title effective, even although, 
according to French law, the painting (an `objet mobilier classe') would have been 
unmarketable and recoverable, without limitation of time, by the French state. '°4 
Whilst in Duc de Frias v. Pichon, the French state might have benefited from the 
contrived application of French law, in the case of the Mona Lisa, the situs rule might 
well have worked to its detriment, had Signor Perrugia ventured to carry his treasure 
across the French-Italian border. '°5 
Consider also the case cited by Biondi, namely, French Minister of Cultural Heritage 
v. Italian Minister of Cultural Heritage and De Contessini Corte di Casszione, 106 in 
which two seventeenth century tapestries, declared, in 1901, to be French national 
treasures, were stolen, in 1975, from the Palais de Justice in Riom, France, and sent 
to Italy, where they were bought two years later by an antique dealer. The French 
government raised an action in the Italian courts for return of the two tapestries, 
alleging that since they belonged to the French State they were unmerchantable 
according to French law. The action, heard at all levels of the Italian legal system, 
ultimately failed. The main argument was that since the sale had taken place in Italy 
and the tapestries were actually held in Italian territory, the case was subject to Italian, 
not French law. The antique dealer was considered to be a bona fide purchaser, so 
restitution was denied. The tapestries are now in Italy. 
104 The current French rule is contained in Article 18 of the Law of 31 December 1913 on Historical 
Monuments. (Redmond-Cooper, R, `Passing of Title and Limitation Periods' (1998), p4) 
10 Consider Lagarde's remark that, "The case of the ciborium of Burgos (Seine, 17/4/1855) shows that 
symmetrical rules apply. " (Lagarde, P, `Le commerce de fart en droit international prive frangais', at 
p408 - In Lalive, P A, `International 
Sales of Works of Art' (1988)) 
215 
Capacity to transact 
The commentary to paragraph 244 of the Second Restatement narrates that the "grant 
of capacity is a determination that a person is not in need of the protection which a 
rule of incapacity would bring ... [there is] usually little reason why the local law of 
some state [other than the situs] should be applied to give him this protection. " 107 
Likewise, Rabel has stated that capacity to acquire and dispose of real rights in 
moveable property is determined by the lex situs. 108 
It is apparent, however, that the connecting factor in respect of capacity to deal in 
moveable property has altered in line with the generally applicable connecting factor. 
Savigny, for example, considered that, "The capacity of a person to acquire property, 
and likewise the capacity of a person to dispose of the property belonging to him, is to 
be judged by the local law of the domicile of the one or the other person and not 
therefore by the law of the place where the thing is situated, because each of these 
incapacities is only a particular branch of the general capacity to have rights and to 
act, and therefore pertains to personal status. "109 
106 Case 24/11/95, No 12166. (Biondi, A, `The Merchant, The Thief and The Citizen' 1997 C. M. L. R. 
1173,1174) 
107 Reese, WLM, `Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws' (1971), paragraph 244, comment 
(h). Cf. Beale, J H, `Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws' (1934), paragraph 219, and comment 
(c): "If the conveyor has capacity to make a transfer according to the law of the state where the chattel 
is at the time of the conveyance, it is immaterial that he has not such capacity according to the law of 
the state of his domicile or of the state in which the conveyance is made. If the conveyor has not 
capacity to make a transfer according to the law of the state where the chattel is at the time of the 
conveyance, it is immaterial that he has capacity according to the law of the state of his domicile or of 
the state in which the conveyance is made. " Contra Venturini, ibid., at p24: "It is necessary to 
differentiate rules of a restrictive character according to their function, namely whether they regulate 
the condition of persons or of certain goods. Only in the latter case the lex rei sitae applies. " Evidently, 
Venturini adopts a more refined, quasi-interest-analysis approach to the matter of capacity. 
108 Rabel, ibid., p40. 
109 Savigny, ibid., p 136/7. Savigny noted objection to this theory, stating that, "Many say that these 
capacities belong, not to the abstract qualities of the person, but to the legal effects of these qualities; 
and that as to these it is not the law of the domicile that is applicable, but the law of the judge who 
determines in each case. " (ibid., p137) 
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There do not appear to be any Scottish or English cases which deal expressly with the 
question of capacity to deal in corporeal moveable property, but it is surmised that the 
lex loci fei sitae would govern this matter. It is submitted, however, that an `in 
favorem' approach' 10 would be preferable, so that capacity according to any one of 
the lex rei loci sitae, the lex loci actus, or the lex domicilii of the de cujus would 
suffice. A provision equivalent to Article 11 of the Rome Convention would further 
buttress the in favorem principle, e. g. "In a transfer concluded between persons who 
are in the same country, a party who would have capacity under the law of that 
country may invoke his incapacity resulting from another law [e. g. his or her lex 
domicilii, or the lex loci rei sitae of the goods (at the time of the transfer)] only if the 
other party to the transfer was aware of this incapacity at the time of the transfer, or 
was not aware thereof as a result of negligence. " 
Formal validity 
Savigny expressed the opinion that the formal validity of a transfer of moveable 
property must be determined according to the lex loci rei sitae. Thus, "If a Parisian 
sells his furniture situated in Berlin to a Parisian in Paris, the property is transferred 
only by tradition; but if, conversely, a Berliner sells his goods situated in Paris, to a 
Berliner in Berlin, the mere contract transfers the property. ""' Disregarding the 
appropriateness, or otherwise, of this rule, there may be occasional difficulties in its 
"o Cf. Capacity of a beneficiary to take a bequest of moveables. In English conflict rules, the lex 
domicilii of the beneficiary, or of the testator, whichever confers capacity at the earlier age, will apply: 
Re Hellman's Will 1866 L. R. 2 Eq. 363 (albeit the lex Situs must be satisfied as regards bequests of 
immoveables). Dr Crawford advises that "There seems no reason why a similar rule should not also 
apply in Scotland. " (Ogilvy v. Ogilvy's Trustees 1927 S. L. T. 13) (Crawford, ibid., p356, paragraph 
17.09) 
111 Savigny, ibid., p139, paragraph 367. Cf. Beale (1934), ibid., paragraph 256, and comment (a): "The 
rule stated in this Section is applicable with respect to such requirements as those of writing, of 
delivery, of a seal, or acknowledgement. " Contra Second Restatement, paragraph 244. 
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application. 1 12 Although Savigny noted the potentially accidental or transient nature of 
the situs, he dismissed it as irrelevant: "It will suffice to bring this rule into operation 
if the continuance of the things at a place should be only transient and very short; for 
in every case the transference of the property depends on a momentary act, and 
therefore fills no long space of time. "113 
Is a transfer between parties in state X, relating to moveable property situated in state 
Y, to have no effect, even between the contracting parties, merely because it fails to 
satisfy certain requirements of formal validity of Y law, and even where the res 
litigiosa is thereafter to be removed to state X, according to the law of which all 
requirements of formal validity have been satisfied (albeit whilst the res was situated 
within the jurisdiction of state Y)? 
Of course, if the rule governing questions of formal validity were to differ from that 
which governs questions of essential validity, preliminary difficulties of 
characterisation would arise. Which law, for example, should determine whether a 
requirement, say, of writing, or notarial execution, or delivery should be characterised 
as a formal or essential condition? ' 4 
112 E. g. Regarding aggregate moveables. Consider Beale (1934), ibid., paragraph 256, caveat, viz.: "The 
[American Law] Institute expresses no opinion whether the conveyance of an aggregate unit of 
moveables may not be governed by the law of the place where the various items are aggregated as a 
unit, or that a conveyance of an aggregate unit made up of a number of units, themselves aggregates, 
may not be governed by the law of the place where the entire unit is managed so far as such 
conveyance is not contrary to the public policy of a state in which any constituent unit is. " 
113Savigny, ibid., p139, paragraph 367. 
114 Cf the difficulties encountered in characterising parental consent to marriage as a matter of formal 
or essential validity: Simonin v. Mallac (1860) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67 and Ogden v. Ogden [1908] P. 46. 
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Competing claimants 
Reference has already been made to Lord Watson's dictum in North Western Bank 
Ltd. v. Poynter, Son & Macdonalds, 15 to the effect that "When a moveable fund, 
situated in Scotland, admittedly belongs to one or other of two domiciled Englishmen, 
the question to which of them it belongs is prima facie one of English law, and ought 
to be so treated by the Court in Scotland. "' 16 The effect of this remark was that, in a 
conflict between English and Scots law, English law should apply, since both the 
pledgor and the pledgee were English domiciliaries. 117 Lord Watson, revisiting the 
point in the ensuing case of Inglis v. Robertson & Baxter, 118 determined that the lex 
situs of the chattel at the time of the alleged transfer is applicable: "... [the] relative 
rights of the pledgor and the pledgee depended upon the law of England, the country 
in which the pledge of the bill of lading was made and in which the facts which were 
said to have destroyed the right of the pledgees occurred. "' 
19 Lord Watson explained, 
however, that, "It would ... be contrary to the elementary principles of international 
115 (1894) 22 R. (H. L. ) 1. 
116 Note 20, supra. 
17 Cf. Forbes v. Official Receiver in Bankruptcy 1924 S. L. T. 522, per Lord Morison, at p524: "There is 
here a dispute about a moveable fund - situated in Scotland - between domiciled Englishmen, and ! 
think the question as to their respective rights to it inter se must be determined by the law of England. " 
Note, however, the remarks of Anton, 1S` edition, at p404: "This remark [by Lord Watson] was clearly 
a slip of the tongue in a case where the question was inadequately argued; up to the House of Lords 
the case had proceeded upon the assumption that every aspect of it fell to be governed by Scots law and 
even in the House their Lordships, being of the view that English law and Scots law were identical 
upon the substantive question raised by the transactions, did not need to choose between the two 
systems. " 
118 (1898) 25 R. (H. L. ) 70. In the Court of Session, a whole court of 11 judges was convened to hear 
this case. Roberston & Baxter, the respondent, successfully argued that, "Where, as here, a question 
arose as to the competing rights of the security holders or creditors doing diligence with reference to 
corporeal moveables situated in Scotland, the competition ought to be determined by the law of 
Scotland as the lex situs of the goods and the lex fori of the competition. The question depended upon 
whether or not a real right had been completed in the person of the creditor and that question could 
not be determined except by the law of the place where the res was situated, and where the preference 
was claimed. " ((1897) 24 R. 758, at p772) Lord Young was alone in delivering a dissenting judgment. 
X19 Inglis v. Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R. (H. L. )70, per Lord Watson at p74. In Glencore 
International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc., ibid., Moore-Bick, J. explained, at p292, that 
Lord Watson's later dictum undermined his North Western Bank dictum: "[Lord Watson] explained the 
decision in North Western Bank v. Poynter as turning on the relative rights of the pledgor and pledgee, 
and in that case, of course, both the original pledge and the redelivery of the bills of lading, which was 
the transaction by which those rights were said to have been altered, had taken place in England. " 
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law ... to 
hold that the right of a Scottish creditor when so perfected can be defeated 
by a transaction between his debtor and the citizen of a foreign country which would 
be, according to the law of that country, but is not according to the law of Scotland, 
sufficient to create a real right in the goods. "120 Professor Anton has reconciled the 
dicta of Lord Watson in North Western Bank Limited v. Poynter, Son & Macdonalds 
and Inglis v. Robertson & Baxter, by concluding that the two decisions may be looked 
upon as, "establishing that, while the contractual aspects of a contract to assign 
corporeal moveables are governed by its proper law, the final question of proprietary 
right must be determined by the lex Situs. "121 This accords with Robertson & Baxter's 
averment that, "It might be true that where a contract was made in England with 
reference to moveables in Scotland, the rights of the parties to the contract would fall 
to be determined by the law of England as the lex loci contractus, but where the party 
having right under the contract sought to vindicate his right in and to the thing itself 
against third parties, then the question depended not upon his contract, which 
affected only the contracting parties, but upon whether or not he had obtained a real 
right in the thing itself which he could vindicate against all the world. This question 
could be determined only by the lex situs. "122 
120Ibid., p73. 
121 Anton (1967), ibid., p405. Cf. Zaphiriou, ibid., p17; and Webb, PRH& Brown, DJL, 'Casebook 
on the Conflict of Laws' (1960), p375. 
122 (1897) 24 R. 758, at p772. Cf. Connal & Co v. Loder (1868) 6 M. 1095, per Lord Neaves, at p1101, 
and Lord Justice Clerk Patton, at p1110: "It seems to me that in a question of competition, either with 
respect to a right to moveables intra territorium, or with reference to obligations of Scotch creditors 
with respect to the delivery of such moveables, we must, where there is a conflict and competition, go 
according to the law of Scotland. " 
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Goods in transit 
It has been said that "Only where the situation of the moveables in one country or 
another is at the time of their transfer unascertainable or merely transitory does the 
lex situs theory break down. "123 
Accordingly, a specific exception to the lex Situs rule pertains where goods are in 
transit and their situs is casual124 or not known: ex sua natura, the lex Situs of such 
goods is inconstant and indeterminable. '25 This exception exists largely because it 
would be impossible, ex post facto, to determine the situs as at the relevant time, 126 
and additionally, because to do so would not accord with party expectations. 127 The 
acquisition or transfer of title128 to such goods will be governed by the proper law of 
the transfer, and "a transfer which is valid and effective by its proper law will 
(semble) be valid and effective in England [and in Scotland] .,, 
129 The natural question, 
123 Graveson, ibid., p462. 
124 Consider Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1966] 1 
W. L. R. 287, per Sellers, LJ., at p301: "When goods secured in the hold of a ship are being moved 
inexorably across an ocean, their locality changing with every thrust of the propeller ... there seems to 
be no good reason to apply the lex situs to goods so situated. " 
125 Consider Prott's observation that, "In the contemporary art market many ... transactions are 
possible involving the transit over long distances of cultural objects (tribal art, for example, from the 
Pacific area which is much in demand in Europe and the US. " (Prott, L V, `Problems of Private 
International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage' (1989) V Receuil des Cours 215,264) 
126 Unless, of course, the transit had been interrupted, in which case, the general rule would revive: 
Cammell v. Sewell (1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5 H&N 728. See Chapter Four, supra - `Defining the 
`Situs", note 22. 
127 Cf. Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), at p150: "It would be pedantic to 
apply the general doctrine so as to bring in the law of a casual or temporary situs not contemplated by 
either party in the dealing under consideration. " (Emphasis added) 
125 The proper law of the transfer determines not only the transfer of ownership, but also the acquisition 
of an inferior right, such as a right in security (e. g. pledge or lien). Hellendall advises that, "The same 
would apply to the power of the government of the country of transit to confiscate or attach the goods 
and the effect of such confiscation or attachment. " (Hellendall (1939), ibid., p31) It is submitted, 
however, that territorial control (i. e. the lex situs) would, in fact, determine this matter: in Cammell v. 
Sewell (1958 3 H&N 617,1860 5 H&N 728) the cargo was effectively in transit from Russia to Hull. It 
is submitted that if, when the vessel grounded in Norway, the cargo had been confiscated, rather than 
sold, the Norwegian lex Situs would have governed the confiscation, not the `proper law' of the 
transfer. The casual Norwegian situs would have assumed greater significance than the connection of 
the goods with either Russia or England. 
129 Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [ 1986] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J., at p501. See Chapter 
Four, supra - `Defining the `Situs", note 21 et seq. See also Dicey & Morris, `Conflict of Laws', 13i° 
edition, p968, paragraph 24E-015: "If a tangible movable is in transit, and its situs is casual or not 
221 
therefore, is, what is meant by the `proper law' of the transfer of such property? 130 
Carter has suggested that this simply comprises "the law with which the transfer is 
most closely connected. "131 
In determining the proper law, there are several potentially applicable localising 
agents, including, the lex loci destinationis (the law of the place of destination) and 
the lex loci expeditionis (the law of the place of dispatch). 132 Venturini favoured 
application of the lex loci expeditionis, since a definite connection exists with that 
state, and it "constitutes the last effective territorial contact with the goods, while the 
place of destination can always be modified and is not always reached. " 133 The 
objective, however, is not merely to ascertain territorial contacts, but, is, as Wolff has 
suggested, to determine the "centre of gravity of rights in rem. v034 Although goods 
necessarily have a locus expeditionis, once they have departed from that state, any 
connection with it may be remote, or might even have been permanently severed, 135 
so there may be little sense in having that law govern the validity of a subsequent 
transfer of the itinerant goods. 136 In contrast, the ultimate destination may exercise 
known, a transfer which is valid and effective by its applicable law will semble be valid and effective in 
England. "; Crawford, ibid., p317, note 58; and Morse, CGJ, `Retention of Title in English Private 
International Law' (1993), p 172. 
130 Cf. Hellendall, ibid., p8. 
13' Carter, P B, `Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position in English Private International 
Law', p319 (In Lalive, ibid. ). 
132 Zaphiriou advised that the starting point and the ultimate destination are the "natural connecting 
factors of a res in transitu" (Zaphiriou, ibid., p194), but Cheshire considered that, "A case ... may 
perhaps be made for the lex domicilii when the moveables are in transitu. " (Cheshire, G C, `Private 
International Law', 3`X edition (1947), p593) 
133 Venturini, ibid., p12. 
134 Wolff, ibid., p520. 
135 Cf. disagreement among domicile-favouring countries upon the merit of continuance of the domicile 
of choice when the propositus is in itinere: In the Goods of Bianchi (1862) 3 Sw. & Tr. 16. Contra Re 
Jones' Estate (1921) 182 N. W. 227 (Sup. Ct. of Iowa). 
136 Sed contra, the tenacious quality of the domicile of origin: such a domicile cannot be displaced until 
acquisition of a domicile of choice animo et facto. See Crawford, ibid., p76, paragraph 6.06, and 
further, at p78, paragraph 6.08: "... departure in a final manner from the domicile of origin effects no 
change unlessluntil domicile of choice is established clearly elsewhere. " E. g. Bell v. Kennedy (1868) 6 
M. (HL) 69. 
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eventual, and possibly enduring, control over the goods. Additionally, one might 
suppose that application of the lex loci destinationis would accord with the reasonable 
expectations, first, of the transacting parties, and secondly, of third parties who wish 
to exercise a right of stoppage in transit, or of lien. Against application of the lex loci 
destinationis, however, is the fact that parties' intentions may change, the goods may 
be lost during transit, or the terms of the charter party may be such that the ultimate 
destination of the goods is speculative: in short, the intended destination may never be 
reached. 
Zaphiriou also referred to the possibility of applying the lex situs praeteritus, 
according to which, "the property effect of the transaction will remain in suspense 
until the goods arrive at their ultimate destination. Whether this destination is the 
original one is immaterial. "' 37 This theory seems inherently flawed: the objective of 
the proper law doctrine is to permit property transactions to proceed, notwithstanding 
the fact that the goods themselves are temporarily in transit. The objective is not to 
adjourn further dealings with the goods pending their safe arrival on identifiable 
territory. In any event, ultimate reference to the lex loci destinationis is a veiled 
capitulation in favour of that theory. 
The applicable law may be particularly important as regards a seller's right of 
stoppage in transit. Although such a right may sometimes be characterised as 
contractual, this will not always be appropriate138 and, in such cases, it would be 
premature to determine the seller's rights in accordance with the lex loci 
137Zaphiriou, ibid., p196. 
138 Falconbridge (1947), ibid., p394. 
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destinationis. 139 Faced with a contest between applying Russian law (according to 
which rights of stoppage still existed) and English law (according to which the right 
of stoppage could no longer be exercised), the court in Inglis v. Usherwood'40 
preferred to apply the Russian lex loci rei sitae. 141 Although the casual Situs gave rise 
to a close connection with Russia, it appears that Grose J., in adopting a quasi-rule- 
selecting approach, was strongly influenced by the content of the Russian law: "... the 
Russian law is a most equitable provision, and ought to have a liberal construction; 
for it enables that justice ... be done between the parties, which I have often lamented 
could not be obtained here. s142 
No more refined test has been formulated than simply to state that the proper law of 
the transfer will apply. Unless party autonomy is permitted, however, this law can 
only be identified ex post facto, in light of all the relevant circumstances. This clearly 
hinders advance or anticipatory regulation of property transactions. While Zaphiriou 
has admitted that, in theory, this solves all difficulties, he has criticised it as being "a 
vague and uncertain test ... a 
form of legal escapism. " 143 Nevertheless, in practice, the 
test does not appear to have produced many difficulties, so this disadvantage of the 
lex actus theory should not be unduly exaggerated. 
It should be noted that, when one is concerned with objects of property conveyed by 
means of a document of title, the lex loci actus may be relevant; otherwise, the 
validity of title acquired under, say, a bill of lading would be significantly impaired. 
Graveson has stated that "the importance of this [goods in transit] exception is 
139 Inglis v. Usherwood (1801) 1 East 515; 102 E. R. 198. 
140 (1801) 1 East 515; 102 E. R. 198. 
141 By this time the goods had acquired a `temporary' situs, as had the cargo in Cammell v. Sewell. 
142 Inglis v. Usherwood, ibid., per Grose, J. (per Webb & Brown, ibid., p371) 
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considerably diminished by the mercantile practice of treating the normal documents 
of title to such goods ... as representative of the goods themselves, so that in effect the 
relevant situs is generally that of the documents of title. " (i. e. the lex loci cartae)144 To 
ascertain, by reference to the lex actus, whether or not such documents do, in fact, 
represent the goods in question, would be to create a circulus inextricabilis, so it is 
submitted that the lex cartae should instead determine, first, whether or not the 
document is a valid and conclusive representation of the goods, 145 and secondly, 
whether there has been a valid transfer of ownership by means of the document of 
title. 146 If the goods are in transit, the lex loci cartae will invariably coincide with the 
lex loci actus. 
Recognised exceptions to the situs rule 
It is recognised that, in certain limited circumstances, exclusive reference to the lex 
situs could cause hardship to a deprived owner were his or her moveable property to 
be dealt with in a foreign country. For this reason, the court in Winkworth v. Christie, 
Manson & Woods Ltd. 147 articulated a number of specific exceptions to the lex Situs 
rule. In a recent case before the Commercial Court of the Queen's Bench Division, 
namely, Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc., 148 attempt 
was made to introduce a further exception. In light of the close analysis in these cases 
of the particular exceptions to the general rule, it is instructive to consider them in 
some detail. 
143Zaphiriou, ibid., p198. 
144 Graveson, ibid., p462. Sed contra Venturini, who considers that, "... the fact, very frequent in 
international trade, that the goods in transit are being negotiated by means of commercial documents 
... appears to 
be irrelevant. " (Venturini, ibid., p12) 
145 Note, however, that the lex fori will determine whether such a rule is evidential or substantive: 
Owners of The Immanuel v. Denholm & Co. (1887) 15 R. 152. 
X46 Cf Zaphiriou, ibid., p202. 
147 [198011 Ch. 496. 
149 1200111 Ll. Rep. 284. 
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Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods: vice over virtue? 
The plaintiff, Mr Winkworth, sought declaration against the defendants (the English 
auctioneers, Christie Manson & Woods Limited, and an Italian art collector, the 
Marchese Paolo Da Pozzo, otherwise designated Dr D'Annone), that certain works of 
art (reputedly a collection of Japanese netsuke) had, at all material times, remained the 
plaintiff's property. In addition, he sought an injunction restraining Christie's from 
paying to Dr D'Annone any part of the proceeds of sale of the netsuke, or from 
disposing of any part of the collection then in their possession. As a complimentary 
measure, Mr Winkworth sought an injunction preventing Dr D' Annone from 
receiving any part of the sale proceeds, or from disposing of any part of the collection 
then in his possession. Furthermore, the plaintiff sought an order for return of the 
collection, or its value, and an order for damages for detinue or, alternatively, for 
conversion. 
The goods in question had been stolen, whilst in England, from the lawful possession 
of Mr Winkworth, an English domiciliary who was, at the time of the theft, the lawful 
owner of the goods. '49 Thereafter, the goods had been removed to Italy where they 
were sold and delivered by an unknown, unidentified third party to Dr D'Annone, the 
bona fide third party purchaser. 150 The sale was made under a contract concluded in 
Italy, and the contractual rights of the parties were governed by Italian law. At the 
time of sale and delivery respectively, the goods were physically situate in Italy. 
ia9 Slade, J. advised, at p499, that, "On the agreed facts the second defendant has on no footing violated 
any actual possession of the goods by the plaintiff, who, by reason of the theft, had already lost such 
possession before the time when the contract of sale was concluded in Italy. " 
150 Harding and Rowell have described this tripartite scenario as "one of the most basic and most 
common frauds of commercial law. " (Harding, CSP, and Rowell, M S, `Protection of Property Versus 
Protection of Commercial Transactions in French and English Law' (1977), p355) 
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Significantly, Mr Winkworth neither knew of, nor consented to, the removal of the 
goods to Italy, nor to any subsequent dealings with, or movement of, them. 
Some time later, the collection was delivered by Dr D'Annone to Christie's, in 
England, for sale there on his behalf. 151 A certain proportion of the goods were sold, 
in England, by Christie's, but before the sale proceeds could be transferred to Dr 
D'Annone, Mr Winkworth asked for, and received, undertakings from Christie's that 
they would not part with the sale proceeds, or the netsuke which remained in their 
possession, at least pending judicial determination of the issues between the plaintiff 
and Dr D'Annone. 
In his counterclaim, Dr D'Annone averred that he had acquired good title according to 
Italian law, the lex Situs of the goods at the material time. Accordingly, the 
preliminary point of law which required to be decided was whether English domestic 
law or Italian domestic law should be applied in order to determine ownership of the 
works of art as between the plaintiff and the second defendant. 
As against Dr D'Annone, Mr Winkworth required to establish an immediate right to 
possession of the goods. There was no suggestion that any other individual, not a 
party to the proceedings, had ever acquired title to the goods such as could have 
destroyed the plaintiff's right to immediate possession. At least until the point of sale 
in Italy, nothing had occurred which extinguished Mr Winkworth's entitlement. 152 
The crucial issue was this: was the effect of the sale in Italy to confer upon Dr 
151 The factual scenario occurring in Winkworth was predicted almost fifty years earlier, by Carnahan 
(1935), ibid., at p534. Carnahan identified two possible means of solving the problem: by application 
of (a) the lex fori (qua present situs of the chattel), or (b) the lex situs (being the law of the state to 
which the chattels had been surreptitiously removed). 
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D'Annone a title to the goods which was valid even against Mr Winkworth? More 
importantly, should this issue be determined in accordance with English domestic law 
or Italian domestic law? This question was one of some import to the parties: if 
English law applied, Dr D'Annone could not have acquired title to the stolen goods, 
but if Italian law applied, title could potentially have been transferred to Dr 
D'Annone. '53 
Counsel for Dr D' Annone argued that Italian law applied for the simple reason that, 
"There is ... a general rule of private 
international law that the validity of a transfer 
of moveable property and its effects on the proprietary rights of any persons claiming 
to be interested therein are governed by the law of the country where the property is 
situated at the time of the transfer (`lex situs'). "154 
Counsel for the second defendant recognised five specific exceptions to this general 
rule, namely: "The first 'if goods are in transit and their situs is casual or not known, 
a transfer which is valid and effective by its proper law will (semble) be valid and 
effective in England' ... The second exception ... arises where a purchaser claiming 
title has not acted bona fide. The third exception is the case where the English court 
declines to recognise the particular law of the relevant situs because it considers it 
contrary to English public policy. The fourth exception arises where a statute in force 
in the country which is the forum in which the case is heard obliges the court to apply 
152 Slade, J., p499/500. 
153 The second defendant's pleadings (founding upon Articles 1153 and 1154 of the Italian Civil Code), 
averred that, "Under Italian law a purchaser of movables acquires a good title notwithstanding any 
defect in the seller's title or in that of prior transferors provided that (1) the purchaser is in good faith 
at the time of delivery, (2) the transaction is carried out in a manner which is appropriate, as regards 
the documentation effecting or evidencing the sale, to a transaction of the type in question rather than 
in some manner which is irregular as regards documentation and (3) the purchaser is not aware of any 
unlawful origin of the goods at the time when he acquires them. " (Slade, J., p500) 
154 Slade, J., p501. 
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the law of its own country ... 
Fifthly ... special rules might apply to determine the 
relevant law governing the effect of general assignments of movables on bankruptcy 
or succession. "155 It was conceded that none of these exceptions bore any relevance 
to the immediate case. Accordingly, the second defendant submitted that the court 
was bound to apply Italian law to determine whether Dr D'Annone had acquired good 
title, not only vis-a-vis the vendor, but also vis-a-vis Mr Winkworth. 
Counsel for Mr Winkworth, faced with an undeniably strong line of authority in 
support of the lex situs theory, 156 accepted that as a general rule, the validity of a 
transfer of moveable property is governed by the lex Situs and, as a result, Italian law 
would be the relevant law for determining the rights of Dr D'Annone and the Italian 
vendor from whom he had purchased the goods, as between themselves and their 
respective successors. 157 Counsel argued, however, that this case was concerned not 
with such a scenario, but with the respective proprietary rights of the deprived owner, 
Mr Winkworth, and Dr D' Annone. He contended that an accumulation of factors 
gave the case an unusually strong association with England: "At the time of the theft, 
the goods were situated in England, in the ownership and lawful possession of a 
person who was domiciled in England. The plaintiff neither knew of nor consented to 
the removal of the goods from England or anything which made such removal more 
probable. The goods have now been voluntarily re-delivered to England where they 
iss At p501. The merits of these exceptions will be discussed in detail in Chapter Twelve, infra - `The 
`Situs' Rule - For and Against'. 
156 Including, inter alia, Cammell v. Sewell (1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5 H&N 728; Todd v. Armour 
(1882) 9R. 901; Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [1905] 1 K. B. 677; Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K. B. 
532; and In re Anziani [ 1930] 1 Ch. 407. 
157 Slade, J., p502. 
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or their proceeds of sale still remain. Finally, it is an English court which is now 
hearing the matter. "158 
It was suggested, therefore, that these five connecting factors were significant, 
individually and collectively, and clearly connected the case with England. Counsel 
for Mr Winkworth sought to devise an avenue of escape from the seemingly 
ineluctable lex situs rule. Accordingly, he made two separate submissions. First, he 
argued that, in this instance, the lex Situs should be treated as being English, rather 
than Italian, since the goods were in England at the date of the theft and at the date of 
the court action and, furthermore, they had not left England with the owner's consent. 
Alternatively, he argued that if the lex Situs rule resulted in the relevant issue being 
determined according to Italian law, "then the exceptional facts of the case bring it 
outside this principle. i159 These were enterprising attempts to circumvent the 
dominant lex situs principle. 
Despite the strong line of authority in support of the general situs rule, Slade, J. 
acknowledged that, "No authority has been cited the facts of which can be said to be 
precisely on all fours with the present case, in the sense that all the English 
connecting factors relied on by Mr Mummery are present. " 160 To that extent, 
158 Slade, J., p502/3. Consider in this regard Jefferson's remarks at p510: "What interests the conflicts 
lawyer is the unsuccessful attempt by the plaintiff to evade the application of a long-standing and 
arbitrary rule by using a more precise technique ..., namely the grouping of significant contacts. 
" 
(Jefferson, M, 'An Attempt to Evade the Lex Situs Rule for Stolen Goods' (1980) 96 L. Q. R. 508) One 
should perhaps enquire whether the facts of Winkworth were, in fact, `exceptional'; consider notes 150 
and 151, supra. 
X59 Slade, J., p503. 
160 Ibid., p503. 
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therefore, there was sufficient (if not abundant) scope for a display of judicial 
ingenuity. 161 
As regards the fictional situs argument, for the purpose of determining the respective 
proprietary rights of the plaintiff and the second defendant, the plaintiff contended 
that the court was entitled and obliged to hold that the situs of the goods remained 
English throughout: "They were in England at the date of the theft; they are still here; 
they never left England with the plaintiff's consent; there was never any voluntary act 
on his part which connected or was even likely to connect the goods with any foreign 
system of law. "162 
Slade, J., however, would not countenance the fictional situs argument, declaring that, 
"... the lex Situs of the relevant disposition cannot be treated as being English rather 
than Italian. Intolerable uncertainty in the law would result if the court were to permit 
the introduction of a wholly fictional situs when applying the principle to any 
particular case, merely because the court happened to have a number of other 
English connecting factors. " 163 Curiously, uncertainty as to situs has not hindered 
reliance upon a fictional situs in other rules of choice of law in property (e. g. as 
regards incorporeal moveable property, or constructive fixtures). 
Slade, J. held fast to the traditional lex Situs rule, accepting that the principle is 
"capable of applying so as to bind and destroy the proprietary rights of a third 
161 Slade J. remarked, at p506, that, "[Cammell v. Sewell] is binding on me except insofar as it can 
properly be distinguished on its material facts. " 
162 At p508. Further, Slade, J., at p509: "Mr Mummery submitted the alleged connection of the situs 
with Italy, for the purpose of determining the plaintiffs rights, is a spurious connection which should 
be disregarded by the court. " 
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person, even though he was not a party to the relevant disposition and did not consent 
to it, but asserts his claim by virtue of a title prior in time to that of any such 
party. "' 64 A chink of light, however, is evident in his Lordship's judgment insofar as 
he considers Cammell v. Sewell to be authority for the proposition that, "if a person 
acquires a title to goods situated in England at the date of the purchase, by virtue of a 
purchase in market overt, and that title is a good one under English law, the English 
court will generally still recognise his title to them in priority to that of the previous 
owner, even though such previous owner may be a foreigner from whom the goods 
had been stolen and the laws of the previous owner's country would not regard his 
title as having been divested by the purchase. "165 Regrettably, his Lordship did not 
elaborate upon the exceptional instances where the general rule may be displaced. 
His Lordship upheld a strict, jurisdiction-selecting approach, 166 remarking that, "... 
the English court will not, I conceive, decline to apply a well-established principle of 
private international law merely because a British subject will suffer thereby or 
merely because adherence to the principle must result in the application of rules of 
foreign law which it may regard as inferior to its own equivalent rules. " 167 
Accordingly, if Mr Winkworth were to have succeeded, it could only have been on 
the basis of Counsel's second submission. Counsel sought to formulate an additional 
163 Ibid., p509. Cf. Carter, P B, 'Decisions of British Courts During 1981' (1981) 52 B. Y. B. I. L. 329, 
331: "This resort to mysticism was decisively, and with respect rightly, rejected by the learned judge. " 
164 Slade, J., p 505. 
165 Ibid., p505. (Emphasis added) 
166 Interestingly, Mr Winkworth's Counsel did not try to persuade the court to adopt a rule-selecting 
approach: "Mr Mummery ... pointed out that 
for the purpose of the present application, he did not rely 
on the content of the relevant Italian law as a reason why this court should refuse to recognise any 
rights of ownership thereby conferred on the second defendant vis-a-vis the plaintiff`. " (ibid., p5 10) 
16 Ibid., p506. Cf. Beale, J H, `Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel' (1927) 40 Harv. L. 
Rev. 805, at p806, regarding Edgerly v. Bush 81 N. Y. 199: "The fact that Canadian law with respect to 
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exception to the general rule, viz.: "where moveables have been stolen from country A 
or otherwise unlawfully taken from the owner in country A and are then from country 
A removed without the owner's knowledge or consent and are then dealt with in 
country B without his knowledge or consent and are then returned voluntarily to 
country A, the law of country A should be applied to determine whether the original 
owner is or is not still the true owner of the moveables. "168 Whilst Mr Mummery was 
unable to cite any authority in support of this proposition, nor could the defending 
Counsel cite any cases which showed it to be improper. 
Mr Mummery argued that three factors justified the application of the law of country 
A (i. e. English law). 169 First, since the goods were situated in England at the time of 
the litigation, there could be no objection on grounds of ineffectiveness to the 
application of English domestic law. Secondly, there had been no voluntary act on the 
part of the original owner leading to any connection between the goods and Italy. 
Finally, "... the legal concept of security of titles is an important one and country A is 
justified in making an exception to the general principle ... for the purpose of 
securing a prior title recognised by its own system of law. " 
170 
the passing of title differs from New York law is not in itself enough to justify New York in giving no 
recognition to the Canadian title. " 
168 Ibid., p510. Cf. Falconbridge (1947), ibid., at p380: "One important question is whether any 
modification of the general rule should be admitted if the chattel is removed from one country to 
another without the express or implied consent of the owner. " In Cammell v. Sewell, ibid., the timber 
was en route (on a particular route), with the consent of the owner, but arguably, no-one anticipated its 
coming to rest in Norway, or impliedly consented to the consequences thereof. The distinction between 
Winkworth and Cammell, however, rests upon the unlawful element; in Winkworth, but not in Cammell, 
dispossession of the original owner was involuntary and unlawful. 
'69 Ibid., p5101511. 
170 Ibid., p511. 
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As to the first factor (ineffectiveness), Slade, J., took the view that although this did 
not negative Counsel's contention, nor did it actually lend any positive support to the 
proposition. 
Regarding the second factor, '7' Counsel relied on certain American authorities which 
suggest that the knowledge of an owner that his or her goods have been removed to 
the jurisdiction of another state, or his or her consent thereto, or acquiescence therein, 
is relevant to the question of determining whether or not his or her title has been 
divested. 172 In America, this factor has generally been considered to be pertinent to 
the issue of jurisdiction, not to choice of law. 
Joseph Beale wrote that, " ... the law of a state into which chattels have been 
surreptitiously removed without the knowledge of any owner and against his will does 
not apply its law to divest the title of the absent owner ... a state has no jurisdiction 
over the title of an absent owner in a chattel which has been brought into that state 
without any act of his sufficient to submit his interest in the chattel to the jurisdiction 
of the state. "173 
171 Consider Savigny, ibid., p129. See Chapter Twelve, infra - `The `Situs' Rule - For and Against', 
note 39, et seq. 
172 E. g. Beale, J, H `Treatise of the Conflict of Laws' (1935), Volume 1, p298 et seq. Slade, J., ibid., at 
p511: "[Mr Mummery] suggested ... that the 
broad considerations of policy, which have influenced 
many American states in protecting the title of an owner who has not consented to his goods being 
removed to another state, are relevant ... in 
determining whether [this court] should formulate an 
exception to the rule in Cammell v. Sewell ... 
" 
13 Beale (1935), ibid., p511, and Beale (1927), ibid., p810. Cf. Davis, JLR, `Conditional Sales and 
Chattel Mortgages in the Conflict of Laws' (1964) 13 I. C. L. Q. 53,74; and Note (unattributed), 
`Jurisdiction over Moveable Property Brought into State Without Owner's Consent' (1910/11) 24 
Harv. L. Rev. 567, at p567: "Although it is often asserted that all property within a certain territory is 
absolutely subject to the control of its sovereign, it does not necessarily follow that the sovereign has 
absolute control over the rights of the former owner of such property. Whenever property is in the 
territory of a state with the consent of the owner, the state has power, not only over its physical 
disposition, but also over the owner's title, which he has impliedly subjected to the control of the state 
by placing his property under its protection ... it is not a necessary conception that rights in property 
are entirely dependent on its physical control ... the contrary assertion would imply that national 
power was based rather on brutum fulmen than on justice or law. " [i. e. a state into which property has 
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Beale's statement of principle may be compared with paragraph 52 of the proposed 
Final Draft of the Conflict of Laws Restatement of the American Law Institute, No. 2, 
which stated that, "If a chattel belonging to a person who is not a citizen of, or 
domiciled in, the State, is brought into the State without his consent, the State has no 
jurisdiction over his title to the chattel until he has had a reasonable opportunity to 
remove it, or until the period of prescription in the State has run. " The comments 
following paragraph 52 direct that: - 
(a) A state in which a chattel is has jurisdiction to deal with it in any way that does 
not divest the owner's title. 
(b) A state in which a chattel is may not divest the owner's title unless: - 
(1) The owner is a citizen of or domiciled in the state; 
(2) It was in the state when the owner acquired title or he allows it to remain there 
after having a reasonable opportunity to take it out of the state; 174 
(3) The owner allows it to be taken into the state; 175 
been taken without the consent of the owner may regulate possession, but not ownership thereof. ] Cf. 
Castel, J G, `Notes and Materials on the Conflict of Laws' (1960), p581; Falconbridge, ibid., p381; and 
Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum No. 27, `Corporeal Moveables: Protection of 
the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer or Another's Property' (1976) (hereinafter `S. L. C. (Moveables)'), at 
p4: "Possibly the least complex of the compromises adopted in Western legal systems is to protect the 
bona fide acquirer in possession on an onerous title habile to transfer ownership in cases where the 
ri inal owner had voluntarily parted with possession of his property in the first place - but not in 
cases of dispossession by forcible or clandestine means. " (Emphasis added) 
174 No indication is given as to what is considered to be `reasonable opportunity': would the original 
owner, for example, be required to exercise due diligence in seeking to locate the property? 
175 Consider Carnahan, ibid., at p371: "... what constitutes consent? Obviously expressed consent or 
permission. So also if it is intended or contemplated by the parties that the goods shall be removed to 
another jurisdiction ... consent is 
inferred. " (e. g. where a conditional seller or chattel mortgagee should 
have contemplated removal of the chattel into another jurisdiction) Note, however, Stumberg, G W, 
`Chattel Security Transaction and the Conflict of Laws' (1942) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 528,537 et seq., 
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(4) The owner places it in the hands of a bailee without express stipulation against 
taking it into the state and the bailee takes it there; 176 
(5) It remains in the state after the period of prescription has run in the state. 
Paragraph 52 effectively draws a distinction between cases of voluntary and 
involuntary dispossession of the original owner. '77 Beale commented that, 
"[Paragraph 521 has met with as much opposition as support; and it has not been 
definitively accepted by the [American Law] Institute itself, or by its Council as a 
sound statement of law; nor has it been rejected. "178 In England, Cheshire made the 
point that, "The lex situs is chosen because in the last resort it is the only effective 
law. Of what use would it be, for instance, for English private international law to 
ordain that the lex situs applies only if the res litigiosa has been moved to the situs 
with the consent of the owner? What indeed is the relevance of consent ? "179 The 
relevance, it is submitted, is that the requirement of securing the owner's consent to 
particularly at p541: "... consent to removal is by no means the equivalent of consent to a transfer of 
[the creditor's/the owner's] interest. " 
176 Account should clearly be taken of the extent to which the original owner has `facilitated disposal' 
of the object by permitting a dishonest intermediary to acquire possession thereof. Cf. S. L. C. 
(Moveables), p42; Stumberg, ibid., p550; and Harding and Rowell, ibid., at p357, where the authors 
consider the "quasi-moral issue of fault - who is to blame, as between owner and third party acquirer, 
for the wrongful transfer of the property to the latter. " 
the view of Professor Hahlo, viz.: "Theft, and to some extent, loss, have the unpredictability of 177 Cf 
lightning, and there is relatively little the owner can do to protect himself against them. It is of his own 
free will, on the other hand, that the owner parts with the possession of goods of his own to another by 
way of loan, lease, deposit, pledge etc. and he has every opportunity of investigating the integrity of 
that person before doing so. It is only fair and equitable, therefore, that the risk should fall on him 
rather than on the innocent purchaser. The fact that he has in the first instance voluntarily parted with 
possession swings the delicate balance of equity in his favour. " (Hahlo, H R, `Quebecois Study on Sale 
o'Another Person's Property' [per S. L. C. Moveables, Appendix, p14]) 
18 Beale (1927), ibid., p810. Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., at p380/1, regarding the First Restatement, 
paragraph 49: no opinion was "expressed on the question whether a state from which a chattel has been 
removed without the consent of the owner may not also exercise legislative jurisdiction over the title to 
the chattel. " Falconbridge explains, however, that a comment following paragraph 49 states that: "Even 
though a state may have jurisdiction over a chattel brought into the state without the consent of the 
owner, it does not, at common law, exercise such jurisdiction over the title to the chattel. " (ibid., p381) 
Stumberg warned that, "... the matter of state power over property wrongfully removed deserves more 
than passing notice ... 
lack of power is sometimes attributed to a hypothesis that the secured creditor 
cannot be deprived of his interest unless he consents. " (ibid., p541) 
179 Cheshire, G C, 'Private International Law' Yd edition (1947), p588. 
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removal of the res would prevent an artificial nexus being created between the res and 
the second situs, particularly in cases where a thief intended to exploit the lex situs 
rule, by laundering the stolen or illegally removed object in a more favourable situs. 
Furthermore, in scenarios such as that which arose in Winkworth, it is wrong to argue 
that the lex situs `is the only effective law', since, by the time of the litigation, the only 
effective law may, in fact, be the lex foci. It is extremely unlikely that Cheshire was 
implying that the lex Situs at the time of litigation should apply, since nowhere else 
did he proffer that suggestion. Although one may argue that the effect of bad faith on 
the part of the purchaser of stolen goods, or of the owner's lack of consent to the 
removal of the res from the first Situs, should be matters for consideration by the lex 
situs at the tempus inspiciendum (i. e. the subsequent lex situs), 180 Winkworth 
demonstrates that this may provide inadequate protection of the deprived owner 
against deliberate exploitation by a thief of a `pro-purchaser' situs. It is submitted, 
therefore, that there is some virtue in the `consensual' approach, and that the 
involuntariness of an original owner's dispossession should justify moderation of the 
situs rule. 
Arguably, the sentiment expressed in paragraph 52 is implicit in Savigny's 
affirmation of the lex Situs rule18' (i. e. if an owner did not voluntarily submit himself 
and his property to a particular jurisdiction, such as in instances of theft and sale by a 
non-owner, the situs rule should not apply). It is not clear, however, from the face of 
Savigny's writings, what would be the substitute rule in such a case. 182 
180 E. g. Morris, JHC, 'The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' (1945) XXII B. Y. I. L. 232, 
240. 
181 Chapter Twelve, infra -'The 'Situs' Rule - For and Against', note 39 et seq. 
182 Although, following the tenor of Savigny's writing, one could seek to determine the matter by 
reference to the `real seat' of the res litigiosa (which, in Winkworth, for example, would most likely 
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Beale supposed that the second situs (the place to which the property had been 
surreptitiously removed) would be prohibited from exercising jurisdiction, on the 
ground that, if ownership (being a legalised relation between a person and a thing) 
exists not only in the thing, but also in the person of the owner, then unless the owner 
has personally submitted to the law of the new Situs, or has acquiesced in the 
prorogation of that jurisdiction, "there is no jurisdiction in that state to affect the 
rights of the `absent person'. i183 
In effect, Beale's proposition builds upon the distinction between a factual situs, and a 
legal situs, as employed in the context of the law of fixtures. 184 As Lalive has noted, 
however, "No authorities can be found to support the view that the situs should be not 
merely factual' but 'lawful' ... States 
have generally affirmed their power to apply 
their laws whatever the reason for the presence of the chattel in their territory. 485 
Typically, in this context, the prima facie right of control has been viewed as being 
more significant than the concept of a `legal' situs. 
One might be inclined to draw a parallel between Beale's proposition, and the 
handling of cases involving the wrongful removal of a child into a foreign state, by an 
abducting parent. The courts of states which have ratified or acceded to the 1980 
have been England, given that the goods were stolen from England and were situated there at the time 
of the proceedings). 
183 Beale (1927), ibid., p812. He continued, "If the state where the thing is has no jurisdiction over the 
absent owner's title, any provision of its law by which his interest as owner is affected will be given no 
force abroad. " (Cf. Chapter Twelve, infra - `The `Situs' Rule - For and Against', note 39 et seq. ) 
184 Chapter Three, supra - `The Distinction between Moveable and Immoveable Property'. Cf. 
Falconbridge, ibid., p381. 
185Lalive (1955), ibid., p176. Cf. Davis, ibid., p74. 
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Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction186 may be 
entitled to exercise an urgent, protective jurisdiction over children within their 
territory, in order to safeguard the immediate welfare of those children, 187 but those 
courts likewise acknowledge the closer connection which exists between the child and 
the state in which he or she is habitually resident. Following the wrongful removal or 
retention of a child from the state of his or her habitual residence, the courts in the 
destination state will generally188 order the return of the child to the state of its 
habitual residence, in order that the courts of that state may determine substantive 
questions concerning the child's residence and welfare. By analogy, it could be 
argued that the courts of a state into which property has been surreptitiously removed 
should likewise generally189 order return of the property to the locus originis (the 
place from which it had been clandestinely removed, or, if different, the place in 
which the original owner is habitually resident'90), in order that the forum originis 
may determine ownership of the property in accordance with the internal lex loci 
originis. It is intended to return to this suggestion in Chapter Fourteen, infra. 
Counsel for Mr Winkworth sought to rely, in particular, on the American case of 
Edgerly v. Bush. 191 Interestingly, the American case tackled the problem of sale by a 
non-owner from the angle of jurisdiction, whereas Counsel for Mr Winkworth, in fact, 
196 The United Kingdom became party to this Convention (as well as to the European Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children) by virtue of the Child 
Abduction and Custody Act 1985. 
187 E. g. Section 12 of the Family Law Act 1986. Cf. Article 12 (Provisional, including protective, 
measures) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 ('Brussels H'). 
188 An order for return of the child may be denied if circumstances are proved such as are described in 
Articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention. 
189 Return of the property could feasibly be refused on grounds akin to those in Articles 12 and 13 of 
the Hague Convention (e. g. by operation of a rule of limitation of action, return could be refused where 
a certain period of time had elapsed since the date of the theft or the date on which the original owner, 
exercising due diligence, could have located the property or identified the possessor). 
190 This, of course, has overtones of mobilia sequuntur personam. 
239 
sought to tackle the same problem from the perspective of choice of law. The facts of 
Edgerly v. Bush were as follows: an individual by the name of Baker granted to the 
plaintiff a chattel mortgage over a span of horses. Both parties were then resident in 
New York and the horses were situated there also. Baker subsequently took the horses 
to Canada where they were sold on his behalf by a trader dealing in horses. The 
purchaser bought in good faith and without knowledge of Edgerly's claim. Thereafter, 
Bush, a resident of New York, purchased the horses in Canada. 192 Upon Bush's 
refusal to deliver the horses to Edgerly, the plaintiff raised an action for conversion. 
Essentially, the question before the court was equivalent to that which arose in 
Winkworth, namely, "... which law is to prevail in determining this contest - that of 
Lower Canada, or that of this State ?,, 193 Chief Justice Folger detailed the various 
factors which connected the case with New York law: "... the plaintiff, and Baker 
from whom the plaintiff got title, were residents of this State when the transfer was 
made between them; ... 
it was a transfer of property which was then here, whence it 
was taken without the consent of the plaintiff, ... the transfer was made by mutual 
consent, and was executed and valid here; ... the consideration for the transfer 
existed and passed here; ... the plaintiff and 
defendant were and are residents of this 
State; ... the 
forum in which they stand is here. Thus the law of the domicile, and the 
191 (1880) 81 N. Y. 199. See further Note (1910-11), ibid., p567, which cites, in addition, the case of 
Houghton v. May 17 Ont. W. Rep. 750 (1910), in which an attachment, levied in a state where property 
was brought without the owner's consent, was dissolved. Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., p382. 
192 Edgerly v. Bush, ibid. (Westlaw Report), per Folger, CJ., at p3, explains that the relevant Canadian 
law incorporated a rule of market overt, akin to the rule then pertaining in the City of London. In 
contrast, the law of New York favoured the original owner: "Our policy has been, and is, to protect the 
right of ownership, and to leave the buyer to take care that he gets a good title. It would be to the 
contravention of that policy, and to the inconvenience of our citizens, if we should give effect to these 
statutes of lower Canada ... 
Notions of property are slight, when a bona fide purchase of stolen goods 
gives a good title against the original owner ... We are not required to show comity to that extent. " 
(ibid. ) This suggests that the content of the lex Situs, if prejudicial to a deprived owner, is not beyond 
policy reproach. 
193 /bid., per Folger, CJ., at p3. 
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law of the then situs of the property, and the law of the forum in which the remedy is 
sought, all concur to sustain the right of the plaintiff . "l94 
The New York Court of Appeals, distinguishing Cammell v. Sewell, 195 held that 
Edgerly was entitled to recover the horses, since, "As between citizens of this State, 
the title to personal property cannot be divested without the assent or intervention 
and against the will of the owner, by the removal of the property from the State by 
another, having no authority from the owner, and its sale in another country under 
different laws. " 196 The accumulation of factors which connected the case with the 
state of New York was deemed sufficient to displace the operation of the relevant 
Canadian law. Accordingly, the American case supports a further exception to the 
general situs rule, to the effect that the law of the state into which property has been 
surreptitiously removed, without the knowledge of the owner (according, that is, to 
the original lex situs), and against that party's volition, will not be effective so as to 
denude the (original) owner of his or her pre-existing title. 
194 Ibid. The conflict rule applied by the American court seems to be an unusual hybrid between the lex 
domicilii and the lex situs theories, although ultimately, the court seems to prefer the lex situs theory: 
"Though a transfer of personal property, valid by the law of the domicile, is valid everywhere as a 
general principle, there is to be excepted that territory in which it is situated and where a different law 
has been set up, when it is necessary for the purpose of justice that the actual situs of the thing be 
examined. " (Folger, CJ., at p3, citing Green v. Van Buskirk 7 Wall. 139) 
195 Folger, CJ. explained that, "... [In Cammell v. Sewell] the property had not been in England until 
after the sale in Norway, and had never been in the possession of the English owners. We doubt 
whether, in a case like this, where, after a title to property has been acquired by the law of the domicile 
of the vendor, and of the Situs of the thing, and of the forum in which the parties stand, in a contest 
between citizens of the State of that forum, it has ever been adjudged that such title has been divested 
by the surreptitious removal of the thing into another State, and a sale of it there under different laws. " 
(ibid. ) Note Beale's criticism of this dictum: "This extract seems to allege several reasons without 
alleging that any one alone is enough to satisfy the decision. " (1927, ibid., p806) Ironically, it is 
precisely this accumulation of factors (as in Winkworth) which gives volume to the cry for application 
of a more closely connected, non-situs law. 
196 Ibid., pl. "... [C]onsidering that the contest was between citizens of New York, and all the other 
circumstances of the case, the New York law should apply; and the mortgage, according to that law, 
giving the plaintiff a title which could not be devested [sic] against his will, the defendant was liable for 
a conversion. " (ibid., p2) The whole Court of Appeals concurred, save for Rapallo, J. whom the report 
describes as "not voting". Nevertheless, Beale subsequently remarked that, "That the knowledge of an 
owner of the removal of his chattel into another state makes a difference as to his claim to the chattel, 
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In Winkworth, Slade, J. was little aided by the decision in Edgerly v. Bush: "I find it of 
no assistance for present purposes, since, with due respect, the judgement of the court 
is expressed in such confusing language that it is impossible to extract from it any 
coherent reasons for the ultimate decision. s197 The current author finds it rather 
surprising that the English court encountered such difficulty in deciphering the ratio 
of the New York case, since the opinion of Chief Justice Folger would appear to be 
framed in quite easily discernible terms. 198 The English judge did not pass comment 
on the grounds on which the New York court distinguished Cammell v. Sewell, but 
merely concluded that, "1 find it impossible to derive from the English cases any 
principle that the absence of such voluntary act should preclude or even deter the 
court of country A from applying the law of country B in accordance with the 
principle of Cammell v. Sewell. " 199 
Finally, Slade, J. was most strongly persuaded by Mr Mummery's third factor in 
support of the application of the law of country A, namely, security of title: "This, I 
think is by far his strongest point. In principle, any court must surely regard, with 
in spite of the fact that by the law of the state into which the chattel is taken his title is divested, is plain 
from the cases. " (Beale, J H, `The Conflict of Laws' (1935), Volume II, p806) 
197 Slade, J., ibid., p511/2. Cf. Beale, (1927), ibid., at p805: "The opinion of C. J. Folger is not a 
satisfactory one. It is full of curious and obsolete notions, and avoids a specification of reasons. The 
nearest to any form of decision is in the form of a doubt. " 
198 Given Beale's overriding preference for hard, inflexible choice of law rules [bear in mind that 
Beale's preferred means of dealing with the problem of theft and sale-on was to introduce an 
exceptional rule of jurisdiction, not of choice of law], the cynic might suggest that it was this general 
antipathy towards a more flexible choice of law provision which underpinned Beale's criticism of 
Folger, CJ. 's judgment, rather than any obvious error or confusion in the court's reasoning. 
199 Slade, J., ibid., p512. Contra, albeit in a different context, the view of the Scottish Law Commission: 
"We are not at all convinced that abolition of the doctrine of vitium reale attaching to property of 
which an owner had been forcibly or clandestinely dispossessed is desirable. We think that the owner 
who had not voluntarily handed over possession of his property has a preferable right to a bona fide 
purchaser. " (S. L. C. (Moveables), ibid., p54) Although the matter was not specifically addressed, it 
would not seem altogether logical for a different conclusion to be reached merely where the bona fide 
purchaser makes his purchase in a different situs than that in which the original owner acquired or 
exercised his right of ownership. 
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some initial sympathy, the position of a blameless person ... who, if attention is paid 
solely to the law of the country of that court, has at all material times had and 
retained good title to the goods which are the subject of his claim. "200 In reality, this 
sympathy was short-lived, being wholly diluted by the counter-balancing 
consideration of security of transaction. 201 Whilst security of title demands an 
immutable connecting factor (the lex situs at the time when title vested), security of 
transaction (perceived by Slade, J. to be the higher goal), depends upon a mutable 
factor, that is, the lex Situs, from time to time. 
Slade, J. explained that, "Were the position otherwise, [i. e. were not the lex situs 
applied] ... [a purchaser of valuable moveables] would 
have to try to effect further 
investigations as to the past title, with a view to ensuring, so far as possible, that there 
was no person who might successfully claim a title to the moveables by reference to 
some other system of law; and in many cases even such further investigations could 
result in no certainty that his title was secure. , 202 It is submitted, however, that 
further investigations would not, in every instance, be unreasonable (e. g. when 
acquiring a painting, it would be reasonable to request, and be given sight of, a 
detailed provenance, and to consult a stolen art database such as the Art Loss 
200 Ibid., p512. Nott, S M, `Title to Moveables Acquired Abroad' (1981) 45 Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 279,280: "Undoubtedly sympathy was felt by the court for the entirely blameless individual ... 
This expression of sympathy went no further. " Cf. Beale's view of Edgerly v. Bush, "... the case must 
be supported, if at all, on the ground of the 'surreptitious' removal of the thing into another state. " 
((1927), ibid., p807) 
201 Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., at p382, where enquiry was made as to whether it was "socially desirable" 
that the general situs rule be modified. Contra Franklin, M, `Security of Acquisition and of 
Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase' (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 589,601, 
where the author urged that, in some contexts, security of title should be protected at the expense of 
security of contract; and Harding and Rowell, ibid., at p357/8, where it was suggested that "For 
instance, during periods of political instability, considerations of public order may necessitate an 
added protection of property rights [as opposed to commercial expediency]. " 
202 Ibid., p512. 
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Register203). If the purchaser did not exercise the requisite due diligence, then it could 
be argued that he or she did not act in good faith, or exercise the necessary degree of 
care. 
204 
Slade, J. concluded by stating that, "I cannot accept the plaintiff's submission that the 
court should regard such facts as giving rise to a further exception, based on the 
grounds that the goods were stolen from the plaintiff in England, then removed to 
Italy and sold there without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent and have now been 
returned to England. 9,205 Accordingly, the question of title as between Mr Winkworth 
and Dr D' Annone fell to be determined in accordance with Italian domestic law, not 
English domestic law. 
The case report does not reveal what happened thereafter, but one can assume that if 
Dr D'Annone were able to prove that he acted in good faith at the time of conclusion 
203 Cf. Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] A. C. 1; Autocephalous Greek Orthodox 
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (1989), 917 F. 2d. 278 
(1990), per Bauer, CJ. (U. S. Court of Appeals - Westlaw report): "in such cases, dealers can (and 
probably should) take steps such as a formal IFAR [International Foundation for Art Research] search; 
a documented authenticity check by disinterested experts; a full background search of the seller and his 
claim of title; insurance protection and a contingency sales contract; and the like. If Goldberg would 
have pursued such methods, perhaps she would have discovered in time what she has now discovered 
too late. " Cf Garro, A M, `The Recovery of Stolen Art Objects from Bona Fide Purchasers' (In Lalive, 
P, ed., `International Sales of Works of Art' (1988)), at p517, where the author speaks of the "duty of 
inquiry" which is incumbent upon the purchaser [i. e. `caveat emptor']; International Foundation for Art 
Research Journal (1998), Volume 1, Number 3, at p19: "In this current age of repatriation, a collector 
would be wise to tread lightly in this area ... 
Those interested in collecting [artworks] ... would be wise 
to monitor the developing legal landscape in this area on a consistent basis to ensure that 
opportunities to deal in such items are lawful as well as enticing. "; and Hayworth, A E, `Stolen 
Artwork: Deciding Ownership is No Pretty Picture' (1993) 43 Duke Law Journal 337, at p341, quoting 
an American lawyer: "Collectors used to ask [art connoisseurs] ... if something was good. Now they 
have a phalanx of lawyers telling them whether it's legal. " Further, (in a different context) Stumberg, 
ibid., at p546: "Sympathy for a purchaser diminishes materially when it is realised that he as a 
reasonable person should have taken into consideration the possibility of the existence of a prior lien. " 
Cf. Article 11, Schedule 1, Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990: in a contract concluded between 
persons who are in the same country, a natural person may invoke his incapacity under another law 
only in a case where the other contracting party was aware of the incapacity at the time of conclusion 
of the contract, or was not aware thereof as a result of negligence. " (i. e. if circumstances were such as 
to create a possibility - or likelihood? - that there was incapacity under another law, but the transacting 
party in question did not take appropriate steps to verify the other's capacity. ) 
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of the Italian contract, that he was not aware of any defect in the title of the vendor in 
Italy, that suitable documentation evidenced the sale, and that he had grounds for 
believing that the vendor was entitled to dispose of the goods to him, and assuming 
that no question of renvoi arose, then Dr D'Annone's ownership of the goods would 
be duly admitted and recognised in England. The likely result is that Mr Winkworth 
would be deemed to have no better title to the netsuke than would a complete stranger 
to the case. 
The problem which arose in Winkworth occurs also in the context of hire purchase 
and conditional sale agreements, and chattel mortgages, for "[these transactions] raise 
in a particularly acute form the old problem of where the line is to be drawn between 
security of titles and security of transactions. , 206 Davis has remarked, in line with 
Ziege1,207 that, "Since 1945 there has been a noticeable trend, especially in Canada 
and to a lesser extent in the U. S. A., towards supporting the innocent purchaser 
against the mortgagee or conditional vendor. , 208 The general problem can be stated 
thus: A sells a chattel in State X to B under either a conditional sale agreement, or a 
chattel mortgage, in terms of which B pays the price by instalments, whilst taking 
immediate possession of the chattel. Ownership of the chattel is to remain with A, 
until such time as B has paid the price in full. Prior to making payment in full, B 
removes the chattel from State X to State Y, where (a) he sells the chattel to C, a bona 
fide purchaser for value, or (b) the chattel is seised by B's creditors (also designed C) 
and diligence is thereafter effected upon it. In each of these scenarios, according to the 
internal law of State X, A remains the owner of the chattel, whereas according to the 
205 Slade, J., ibid., p514. 
206 Dicey & Morris, ibid, p971, paragraph 24-025. 
207 Ziegel, J S, `Conditional Sales and The Conflict of Laws' (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 284, at p297. 
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internal law of State Y, since B was the purported owner of the chattel, C's title is 
prima facie valid and marketable. The most common manifestation of this problem 
concerns motor vehicles. The proliferation of motor vehicles means that, in federal 
states or in countries whose boundaries are contiguous with those of another country, 
"a dishonest person need only pay the hire-purchase deposit on a motor car before 
driving it to another state, selling it to an innocent purchaser and disappearing with 
the proceeds, while the purchaser is left to argue out his title with the original owner, 
usually a large finance company. "209 
While Slade J. 's judgment in Winkworth constitutes clear affirmation of the lex situs 
rule, it is important to emphasize his Lordship's declaration that, "The rule, however, 
is not one of universal application; in particular it is not likely to be applied in any of 
the five exceptional cases already mentioned. , 210 His Lordship's use of the words `in 
particular' implies that the categories of exception to the general rule are not yet 
closed. The five exceptions specifically enumerated in Winkworth are particular 
instances of displacement of the general rule, but it would appear that further 
`exceptions' may still be admissible. A recent attempt, however, to expand the 
categories of exception met with failure. 
208 Davis, JLR, `Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages in the Conflict of Laws' (1964) 13 I. C. L. Q. 
53, at p53. 
Z°9 Ibid., p55. More worryingly, Ziegel has remarked that, "If the reported cases are any guide, the 
overwhelming number of chattels (usually vehicles) which are surreptitiously removed from one 
province into another are wrongfully disposed of in the second situs before the end of four months. " 
(Ziegel, ibid., p301) Consider also the criminal law implications: R v. Atakpu [1993] 4 All E. R. (Ch. 
D. ) 215, concerning interpretation by an English forum of section 3(1) of the Theft Act 1968. Ward, J. 
concluded, at p218, that, "The theft was complete abroad and the thieves could not steal again in 
England. " In quashing the convictions of the appellants ("a pair of thoroughly dishonest rascals"), his 
Lordship outlined the nature of their "simple but audacious scheme to hire expensive motor cars 
abroad, have them driven into the United Kingdom but then, after ringing the changes to the vehicles, 
to sell them to unsuspecting purchasers. " (ibid., p217) 
210 Ibid., p514. (Emphasis added) 
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Glencore International v. Metro Tradinc-: more oil on troubled waters? 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that a property dispute may occur either 
between the actual parties to the transfer of the object in question ('an original-party 
dispute' ), 211 or between one of those original parties, and a third party claiming 
otherwise to have acquired or derived title to the property in question ('a remote-party 
dispute'). 212 In 1947, Cheshire proposed that, for the purposes of choice of law, a 
distinction should be made between these two types of dispute. 213 Rather than apply 
an identical connecting factor to the two types of dispute, Cheshire argued that 
different rules should determine the respective leges causae. 214 
As regards original-party disputes, 215 Cheshire submitted that, "... questions of this 
type are on principle governed by the lex actus ... there is no English authority which 
replaces this law by the lex Situs. "216 The lex actus, he argued, was "... equivalent to 
the proper law of the contract and is ascertainable in the same way. It is the law with 
211 E. g. Where the transferor and the transferee disagree as to the validity of "... an assignment made in 
London of goods situated in Paris ... valid 
by English law but void by French internal law. " (Morris, J 
H C, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' [ 1945] XXII B. Y. I. L. 232,234) 
2'2 E. g. "... where, though there has been a previous dealing with the goods between A and B, the claim 
is made by a third person C who relies upon some later independent transaction quite unconnected 
with the earlier one between A and B. " (Morris, ibid., p234) (e. g. where a motor car, transferred under 
hire purchase agreement from A to B, in Scotland, is taken by B (or by a thief), to France, where it is 
sold to C. ) 
213 Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' 3`4 edition (1947), p576; Cf. Cheshire (1935), ibid., p 84, 
and `Private International Law' 4`h edition (1952), p435. Cheshire had earlier remarked that, "... the 
ideal is that there should be one system of law which will be applicable to every case. " ('Private 
International Law' 2°d edition, p416), but as Professor Anton has subsequently advised, "... no one 
system of law has a claim to govern every question relating to the transfer of moveable property. " 
(1990, ibid., p613) Consider also Trautman, D, `The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' 
(1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1101, at p1110: "In some situations, the law of the Situs must protect certain 
third-party interests ... 
But most cases ... instead raise questions about the policies underlying the 
transaction that brings the parties together ... 
Good judges ... understand that these family and 
transactional concerns must be respected. " 
214 Cheshire adopted a more fact-sensitive, refined analysis, prompting Morris to remark that, "... the 
treatment of the subject by Professor Cheshire marks a notable advance from the jejune and 
contradictory rules of Dicey. " (Morris, ibid, p234) Cf. Foster, who considered that Cheshire "... 
provided us with a brilliant rationalisation of existing decisions. " (Foster, J G, `Some Defects in the 
English Rules of Conflict of Laws' (1935) XVI B. Y. I. L. 84,94) 
215 Including inter vivos donations of corporeal moveable property. (Cheshire, 1947, ibid., p578) 
216 Cheshire (1947), ibid., p576. 
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which, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, the transfer is most closely 
connected - the law to which the reasonable man would turn should any dispute arise 
with regard to the transfer. "217 Cheshire was careful to emphasize that the lex situs 
should not automatically be considered to constitute the lex actus. 218 So, for example, 
in a case concerning the transfer by A, domiciled and resident in England, of goods 
situated in Spain, to B, domiciled and resident in Holland, while Cheshire considered 
that the lex actus would probably be Spanish law, he advised that the forum would 
require to know, inter alia, "Where was the transfer effected? Was the transaction, if 
reduced to writing, drafted in terms peculiar to English, Dutch or Spanish law? Were 
the goods only temporarily in Spain ? "219 
The effect of this would be that, if, say, delivery of the property in question were 
required under the lex Situs, but not under the lex actus, then, notwithstanding lack of 
delivery, the transaction would nevertheless, be effective, as between the original 
parties, so as to transfer title to the goods to the transferee, on satisfaction of the 
requirements imposed by the lex actus. This is farther reaching than the distinction 
proffered by Morris, whereby, "as between the parties, an assignment may be 
ineffectual as an executed transfer, but effectual as an executory contract to 
transfer. , 220 
217 Cheshire (1947), ibid., p576. The author advised that, "... the lex actus is not necessarily the same 
as either the lex loci actus or the lex Situs ... it may be either of these laws, or it may be both where 
they coincide, or it may be some different law altogether, as, for instance, the law of the place where 
the moveables are to be delivered to the transferee. " (ibid. ) Further, in the 4°' edition, at p436, 
Cheshire stated that, "... questions of a proprietary nature affecting the validity or effect of a transfer 
and arising between the parties themselves are governed by the lex actus where this law differs from 
the lex situs. " 
218 (1947), ibid., p577: "The danger ... is to avoid the assumption that the lex situs always constitutes 
the lex actus. " 
219 (1947), ibid., p577. 
220 Morris (1945), ibid., p236. The inadequacy of the contractual analysis is apparent if, as Morris 
urged, "... we assume that the original assignment was by way of gift, for then the assignor would be 
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Cheshire concluded that, "As compared with the and dogma of the lex situs, it is 
reasonably clear that the doctrine of the lex actus provides a test which is more 
elastic and better calculated to fulfil the expectations of the parties. "221 This, it is 
submitted, is accurate insofar as it is restricted to original-party disputes. Furthermore, 
it should give rise to no greater evidential burden than does ascertainment of the 
contractual lex causae. 222 
As regards remote-party disputes, where the third person was not privy to an earlier 
transfer of the res litigiosa, but instead relied upon a subsequent, independent 
transaction, Cheshire recognized that, "... in this type of case ... on realistic grounds 
it becomes futile to cling obstinately to the principle of the lex actus ... the lex actus 
must ex necessitate give way. , 223 He did not, however, concede that the lex situs, in 
this context, was more appropriate on grounds of logic or principle, but purely on the 
basis of practical expediency. 224 
The original-party/remote-party distinction is observed, to some extent, in dealings 
with incorporeal moveable property: disputes between the creditor and debtor under 
an incorporeal right (e. g. an insured party and his or her insurer) are largely governed 
under no contractual obligation at all to the assignee, and a pure question of title would arise. " (ibid. ) 
(Cf. Cochrane v. Moore (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 57) 
221 (1947), ibid., p577. 
222 Under Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
or under the common law rules if the contractual obligation in question is of a type listed in Article 1(2) 
of the Convention. 
223 (1947), ibid., p583. Further, "... experience ... 
has shown the futility of any attempt to enforce the 
lex actus in the teeth of a contradictory lex situs. " (p587) Cheshire made reference to the "inescapable 
fact" that "physical power over the moveables rests with the authorities in the situs. " (ibid., p583) It is 
not clear whether he would have persisted in applying the lex actus in cases where a conflit mobile 
meant that the situs at the tempus inspiciendum no longer exercised control over the asset. 
Z24 Cheshire (1952), ibid., p438. 
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by the proper law of the right, 225 whereas disputes between the assignor and assignee 
of that right are largely determined according to the proper law of the assignation. 226 
The significance of the original-party/remote-party dichotomy came to the fore in 
Glencore International A. G. and Others v. Metro Trading International Inc. 227 This 
conflict of laws dispute was the first phase of what has become known as `the Metro 
Litigation', 228 which arose out of the collapse, in February 1998, of an oil storage 
facility operated in Fujairah229 by the defendant ('MTI'). The five plaintiffs had all 
entered into agreements with the defendants, in terms of which they delivered oil 
products to the defendants, for storage. MTI were engaged in the business of storing 
the oil and thereafter re-selling it, after carrying out blending and other processes. 
When MTI became insolvent, the claimant oil companies asserted proprietary rights 
to the oil then held by MTI. In addition, four banks claimed that they were entitled to 
a first charge over various sums of money due to MTI from purchasers of fuel oil, and 
over products remaining in storage, as security for amounts outstanding under loans to 
MTI. Furthermore, the purchasers of various cargo parcels of fuel oil ('the 
purchasers') alleged that they had good title to the oil. Hence, the case concerned the 
competing claims to property, from both within, and among, different classes of 
litigants. 230 In order to tackle the preliminary issues, a number of assumptions were 
225 Consider Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention. 
226 Consider Article 12(1) of the Rome Convention. See Chapter Eleven, infra. - `The Assignation of 
Incorporeal Moveable Property'. 
227 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 284. 
228 The litigation, in its entirety, comprises 35 separate actions, and involves more than 50 litigants. Rix, 
J. directed that the litigation should be disposed of in a series of separate phases, each dealing with a 
limited group of issues. This particular phase was argued in the Commercial Court before Moore-Bick, 
J. 
229 Fujairah is one of the seven emirates which form the federation of the United Arab Emirates. 
"' Although the interests of the five plaintiffs coincided in relation to the conflict of laws issues arising, 
their interests conflicted to the extent that it would have been impossible to satisfy all of their claims 
out of the oil remaining in MTI's possession. 
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made. 231 Moore-Bick, J., explained that, "These assumptions are fundamental to the 
determination of the issues arising under phase 1, but it is right to emphasize that 
they are no more than assumptions. "232 
The primary issue of conflict of laws was: what system of law governs the transfer of 
title to oil delivered by the plaintiffs to MTI, and by MTI to the purchasers, and any 
non-contractual liabilities which MTI and the purchasers may have incurred to the 
plaintiffs? 
MTI and the purchasers alleged that the transfer of title to the oil in Fujairah was 
governed by the law of Fujairah (according to which, the property had passed from 
the claimants to MTI, and thence to the purchasers). The plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
sought to rely on the law which governed the contract between themselves and MTI. 
The issue, therefore, was whether, "... as between the immediate parties to a contract 
under which goods are delivered by one party to the other, the passing of property is 
governed by the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract (the proper law) 
or by the law of the place where the property is situated (the lex situs) where these do 
not coincide in their effect. "233 
Z3' These are detailed in an Appendix to the judgment, at p333. 
232 Ibid., p290. It was assumed, inter alia, that: (1) The relevant contractual relationships between the 
oil company claimants (other than Texaco) and MTI were governed by English law; (2) Title to the oil 
was vested in the oil company claimants immediately before the carrying vessel arrived at Fujairah; (3) 
The storage vessels were at all times within the territorial waters of Fujairah, and all acts of 
commingling, blending, sale and delivery took place within Fujairah; and (4) Everything done by the 
purchasers in relation to the purchase, delivery, consumption and disposal of the oil was done in 
Fujairah. 
233 Moore-Bick, J., at p290. 
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Mr Schaff, Q. C., Counsel for Glencore, acknowledged that the general rule in English 
law is that the passing of property in moveables is governed by the lex situs, 234 and 
observed that some limits to this principle have already been recognized. Counsel 
further submitted that an additional exception ought to be recognized, namely, where 
goods have been transferred by one person to another under a contract. Noting that in 
matters of contract, English law gives effect to the proper law of the contract and 
thereby, to the parties' intentions as expressed in the contract, Counsel submitted that 
when issues relating to the passing of property arise as between the immediate parties 
to the contract, English law ought to resolve any conflict between the terms of the 
contract and the lex situs, by recognising and giving effect to the contract in 
accordance with its proper law, rather than the lex situs. Mr Schaff argued that none 
of the decided cases, in fact, precluded such an approach, 235 which, he contended, 
would better accord with the commercial expectations of the transacting parties. 
Counsel conceded that this approach would require to be modified were a third party 
to become involved. 236 As Chesterman has indicated, "... the claim should not be 
234 Ibid., p291. Reference was made to Dicey & Morris, `The Conflict of Laws' 13th edition, p963, and 
to Cheshire & North, `Private International Law', 13th edition, p942, as well as to Cammell v. Sewell 
(1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5 H&N 728; Castrique v. Imrie (1870) L. R. 4 H. L. 414; Re Anziani [ 1930] 
1 Ch. 407; and Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N. V. v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q. B. 248. 
235 This point was accepted by Moore-Bick, J., at p292. 
236 Cf. Von Mehren and Trautman who considered that, "... when persons other than parties to a 
transaction become involved, the situs of the chattel is an obvious focal point. " (Von Mehren, A T, and 
Trautman, D T, `The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws' (1965), 
p 196) Cf. Chesterman, M R, `Choice of Law Aspects of Lien and Similar Claims in International Sale 
of Goods' (1973) 22 I. C. L. Q. 213, at p234: "The law which most satisfactorily reflects the interests of 
the third party is the lex situs as at the time when the conflict between the claimant and the third party 
arises. " (It is suggested that the author's qualification as to time refers to `lex', rather than to `situs'. Cf 
Lynch v. Provisional Government of Paraguay (1871) L. R. 2 P&D 268) Mr Schaff did, nevertheless, 
contend that whilst, "... ordinarily questions of title arising between the true owner and a third party 
purchaser would be governed by the lex Situs ... in this case the contracts under which the purchasers 
bought bunkers from MTI were not subject to Fujairah law but contained an express choice of English 
law and jurisdiction. To that extent they could be said to have been aware of the fact that the passing of 
property was intended to be governed by English law rather than by the law of Fujairah. " (ibid., p298) 
Moore-Bick, J., dismissed this argument (rightly, it is submitted) rather brusquely: "... although the 
transactions in question can in one sense be viewed as part of a single chain, the interposition of MT1 
means that the choice of English law to govern the transaction between MTI and the purchasers was 
entirely fortuitous as far as the oil claimants were concerned. There is in reality no link between them 
and the purchasers of a kind which would justify treating them as if they were parties to an agreement 
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resolved entirely by a law which the claimant may well have been wholly or partly 
responsible for selecting and the identity of which may not be known to the third party 
until after litigation begins. , 237 
Although none of the decided cases precluded such an approach, reference was made 
to the dictum of Lord Justice Diplock in Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural 
Poultry Producers Association. 238 Diplock, LJ. advised that, "The transfer of the 
[contractual] documents is a symbolic act which has as a consequence in English law 
the transfer of the property in the goods wherever they may be. But it does not follow 
from this that the place where the property in the goods passes is the place where the 
symbolic act is done and not the place where it has its effect, that is to say the place 
where the goods are. The proper law governing the transfer of corporeal moveable 
property is the lex Situs. "239 
Moore-Bick, J. made reference to the views of Professor Cheshire who noted that, 
"[In 1965] there was then no ... English authority preferring the lex Situs over the 
proper law of the transfer when the dispute was limited to the two parties to the 
governed by English law ... as 
between the oil claimants and the purchasers questions of title are 
governed by the law of Fujairah as the lex situs. " (ibid., p298) 
7 Chesterman (1973), ibid., p234. 
238 [1966] 1 W. L. R. 287. 
239 Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1966] 1 W. L. R. 287, 
at p330. His Lordship continued, "A contract made in England and governed by English law for the 
sale of specific goods situated in Germany, although it would be effective to pass the property in the 
goods at the moment the contract was made if the goods were situate in England, would not have that 
effect if under German law (as I believe to be the case) delivery of the goods was required in order to 
transfer the property in them. This can only be because the property passes at the place where the 
goods themselves are. " His Lordship's remarks, however, must be considered to be obiter dicta, and 
not, therefore, binding upon Moore-Bick, J. 
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transfer. [Professor Cheshire] suggested that in such a case the proper law of the 
transfer was to be preferred on the grounds of principle and convenience. "240 
Mr Schaff referred the court to relevant Scottish cases dealing with competing 
transfers, including North Western Bank v. Poynter, Son and Macdonalds241 and Inglis 
v. Robertson & Baxter, 242 but Moore-Bick, J. concluded that, "Such support as Mr 
Schaff obtains from [North Western Bank] ... is undermined by Inglis v. 
Robertson. , 243 Reference was also made to Zahnrad Fabrik Passau G. m. b. H. v. 
Terex, 244 in particular, to obiter remarks by Lord Davidson to the effect that whether 
or not title had passed was a matter to be determined by reference to the contract: 245 
Lord Davidson stated that, "If, as s. 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides, the 
parties to a contract are entitled to agree when property is to pass, then I think it is 
wrong to regard the lex situs as being an inflexible corpus of law. , 
246 Moore-Bick, J., 
however, conceived that this meant no more than that, "the lex situs itself may 
recognize the effect of the transaction and hence its proper law. "247 
240 Moore-Bick, J., at p292, referring to the 7t' edition of Cheshire's `Private International Law'. The 
court noted that Professor Cheshire's view was not repeated in the 8`h or subsequent editions (includin 
the current edition). This may possibly have been due to a change in authorship: the Preface to the 9 
edition, written by Dr PM North, states that, as regards the 8t' edition, "I was primarily responsible for 
much of the work, [although] it was all subjected to Dr Cheshire's careful scrutiny. " 
241 [1895] A. C. 56. 
242 [1898] A. C. 616. 
243 Moore-Bick, J., at p292. 
20 1986 S. L. T. 84. 
245 Cf Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1950] A. C. 24; and Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v. 
Frankman [1950] A. C. 57, in which questions concerning possession were governed by the proper law 
of the contract. Consider Counsel's reference to the remarks of Lord Reid in Zivnostenska, at p 83: "... 
there is no apparent reason why the parties should find it attractive that rights under the contract with 
regard to deposited property should vary according to the place where that property might be at the 
time; and should, so long as that property was deposited abroad, be settled by a law with which the 
parties were perhaps unfamiliar. " 
246 ibid., p88. 
247 Moore-Bick, J., ibid., p293. This interpretation amounts, in effect, to a renvoi by the lex Situs. 
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Seeking to counter the customary arguments in support of the lex Situs rule, Mr Schaff 
argued that, "... where property is disposed of by contract, as between the parties to 
the transaction the natural expectation of reasonable men is that property will pass in 
accordance with the contract, and that where no third party interests are involved 
practical control over the goods is of relatively little importance because contractual 
remedies will usually be sufficient to ensure that the goods are delivered or title is 
perfected. "248 Moore-Bick, J., however, stated rather starkly that, "These arguments 
have their attractions, but ultimately I do not find them persuasive. "249 His Lordship 
showed greater support for "consistency of principle ... whether or not third party 
interests are involved. "250 He further opined that, "... it would be highly anomalous if 
questions of title to the goods were to be governed by English law as the proper law 
of the contract if the seller had not purported to re-sell the goods to a third party, but 
by German law as the lex Situs if he had. "251 With respect, what is relevant is not 
whether or not the seller may have purported to re-sell the goods (an interpretation 
which would confer upon the seller some degree of control regarding determination of 
the lex causae), but rather, whether or not the circumstances are such that a third party 
could, at his or her own instance, establish a putative interest in, or claim to, the goods 
in question. 
His Lordship noted that, "Questions of title are most likely to be of importance when 
one party to the transaction is insolvent. The interests of third parties in the form of a 
general body of creditors may clearly be affected in such a case, but it would be 
equally anomalous if the law governing the passing of property depended on 
248 Ibid., p294. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid., p295. 
251 Ibid., p295. 
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considerations of this kind. "252 It is respectfully submitted that this would not be 
anomalous, but merely, fact-sensitive. 253 It is not suggested that the original-parties 
exception would be widely employed, 254 but it is urged that the exception should 
pertain where circumstances indicate that the lex situs is not the most appropriate law 
to apply. 255 It is accepted, however, that if the law applicable to the contract between 
the original parties has not been chosen by the parties (whether expressly, or 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case256), but rather falls to be ascertained by the court in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Rome Convention, it is arguable that the lex situs 
may be the more appropriate law to determine the proprietary issues between the 
contracting parties, for in such a case, the parties' expectations may best be satisfied 
by applying, not the contractual lex causae, but rather the lex loci rei sitae. 257 
Moore-Bick, J. concluded that questions as to who, as between MTI and the plaintiffs, 
acquired, retained, or lost title to the oil, upon and after its arrival within Fujairahan 
territorial waters, are governed by the law of Fujairah, qua lex Situs of the oil. 258 
252 Ibid., p295. 
253 Cf. Section 12 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
254 Moore-Bick, J. stated that, "I am not persuaded that such a rule [the lex situs] is likely to prove 
unsatisfactory in many cases. " (ibid., p295) The general correctness of the lex Situs rule is not disputed. 
255 Moore-Bick, J. himself recognised, at p294, "... [the] apparent oddity of applying a lex situs rule to 
the transfer of property in goods temporarily situated abroad under a contract made between two 
Englishmen in London. " 
256 Article 3 of the Rome Convention. 
257In such a scenario, it is relatively likely that the contract (unless it is a business-to-business contract 
- in which case Article 3 is, in any event, more likely to apply) would, at any rate, be deemed to be 
most closely connected with the lex loci rei sitae. 
258 Moore-Bick, J., ibid., p296. It was not disputed that contractual claims by the plaintiffs against the 
defendants were governed by the proper law of the contract. Furthermore, his Lordship advised that, 
"... subject to the application of the law of Fujairah in relation to the passing of property, the law 
applicable to determine claims by the oil claimants against MT1 is that system of law which is 
identified as the proper law of the relevant contract in each case. " It appears, from a somewhat opaque 
passage, that this extends even to claims against MTI in tort, the case falling under section 12 of the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. (ibid., p296) Note, however, that 
claims in tort by the plaintiffs against the purchasers (based upon wrongful interference with goods) 
were not considered to fall within the section 12 rule of displacement. Mr Schaff submitted that, "... a 
comparison between the factors connecting the case with Fujairah and those connecting it with 
256 
Conclusion 
It may be virtually impossible to state dogmatically that one theory above all others 
should govern the transfer of corporeal moveable property. If, from the outset, one 
were to adopt the broader perspective that more than one law may be relevant (or, at 
least, that not merely the lex Situs is relevant), it would be possible to identify the 
particular system(s) of law which is (are), in fact, most closely connected to the 
transfer in question, or more particularly, to the incident in question. 
In Carse v. Coppen259 Lord President Cooper was led "... to abandon the search for 
an overhead solution ..., and 
indeed to doubt the wider validity claimed for many of 
the earlier decisions pronounced at a stage when private international law was less 
developed that it has since become . 
"2w The Lord President concluded that, "I prefer to 
particularize the problem more narrowly. 19261 More recently, in Bankhaus H 
Aufhauser & Ors. v. Scotboard Ltd, 262 Lord Hunter cautioned that, "The opinion of the 
Lord President in Carse v. Coppen, contains ... a salutary warning against attempts 
to state general principles in this particular area of Scots private international 
law. "263 The challenge now is not to articulate the general principle, but rather, it is to 
moderate (not, it is emphasised, wholly to subvert) the grip of the general situs rule, 
and to formulate a rule which allows greater sensitivity to the circumstances of a 
England indicated that it was substantially more appropriate for the applicable law in the present case 
to be English law. " (ibid., p298) Moore-Bick, J., however, held that, "I am quite unable to accept that 
the mere fact that MTI agreed to sell bunkers on English law terms is sufficient to displace the general 
rule in s. 11. The fact that all the events in question occurred in Fujairah where the goods themselves 
were situated seems to me to provide the strongest possible connection with that country. " (ibid. ) 
2591951 S. L. T. 145. 
260Ibid, p148. 
261 Ibid. 
262 1973 S. L. T. (Notes) 87. 
263 Ibid., p89. Lord Hunter humbly concluded that, "I shall not attempt a task which has been regarded 
as impracticable by judges more eminent than myself. " 
257 
property dispute, and to the particular issues which have arisen. In 1935, Foster 
expressed the view that it was not too late for a "set of logical and comparatively 
simple propositions on assignments to be laid down by the courts. "264 One hopes, 
almost seventy years later, that this proposition still holds true. 
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